JUDGMENT - DHABE H.W., J.:-This is a second appeal preferred by the defendant-tenant against the concurrent judgment of the courts below. The only point raised in this case before the courts below was whether the defendant-tenant proved that at the time when the lease was created, Laxmanrao Mairal had orally assured not to demand the vacant possession of the demised property by terminating the tenancy for a period of 10 years therefrom, as alleged. Both the courts have answered the aforesaid point against the defendant-tenant. The finding rendered by the courts below in this regard is a finding of fact based upon the evidence on regard. It is not, therefore, open to me to disturb the same in the limited scope of the second appeal as it does not involve any question of law. 2. The other question raised on behalf of the defendant, that all the legal representatives of the deceased landlord Laxmanrao did not join to file the instant suit, also involves determination of the questions of fact, and the finding of the courts below on that question therefore is final. The same cannot be interfered with in this second appeal. The question as regards, the legality or validity of the notice is also a question of fact upon which the finding of the courts below is final and cannot be interfered with in this appeal. 3. The learned Counsel for the defendant has for the first time, during the hearing of this appeal, raised new ground in this case. He contends that the provisions of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (for short the Rent Control Order) are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, because they are not applicable in the case of the vacant lands but are applicable to the “houses” only, whereas the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (for short the Bombay Act), is applicable to the open lands as well as the houses. The submission is that in applying the Rent Control Legislation to the open lands in a part of the State only there is discrimination practised as the tenants of the open lands in the Vidarbha region of the State of Maharashtra are deprived of the benefit of the protection of the Rent Control legislation since the Rent Control Order is not applicable to the open lands. Normally I would not have been inclined to allow the appellant to raise this ground during the hearing of this appeal for the first time after about 13 years in this Court but since the said question relates to the validity of the Rent Control Order and is sought to be raised as a pure question of law and jurisdiction. I have allowed the appellant to raise this question for the first time during the hearing of this appeal. 4. It may be stated that if the Rent Control Order is applicable, then the previous permission of the Rent Controller is necessary before giving quit notice to the tenant under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Further the tenancy can be permitted to be terminated only upon the grounds enumerated in Clause 13(3) of the Rent Control Order. The submission, therefore, is that the tenants in respect of the open lands are deprived of the aforesaid protection under the Rent Control Order in respect of termination of their tenancies which is granted only to the tenants of the “houses” covered by the said Rent Control Order. 5. The learned Counsel for the appellant has relied upon two decisions of Supreme Court in support of his contention that the State should have enforced uniform Rent Control Legislation throughout the State in respect of the open lands and not to the part of the State alone where the Bombay Act is applicable. The submission therefore is that the Rent control Order which is applicable in the Vidarbha region of the State of Maharashtra and which is not applicable to the open lands is arbitrary, discriminatory and is liable to be struck down under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The decisions of the Supreme Court relied upon are: (Motor General Traders and another v. State of Andhra Pradesh)1, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 121 and (Shri Swamniji of Shri Admar Mutt v. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department)2, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1. 6. In the case of Motor General Traders arising out of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, the question was whether section 32(b) of the said Act was arbitrary and discriminatory and therefore, violative of Article 14. 6. In the case of Motor General Traders arising out of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, the question was whether section 32(b) of the said Act was arbitrary and discriminatory and therefore, violative of Article 14. The Supreme Court held in the said case that a provision which was once non-discriminatory piece of legislation may in course of time become discriminatory and be exposed to a successful challenge on the ground of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. In taking the above view the Supreme Court has referred to its various decisions in which the classification based upon geographical consideration founded on historical reasons due to Reorganisation of States was challenged as violative of Article 14 but was upheld although the Supreme Court observed in the said cases that the continued application of one enactment in a part of the State may after a time become discriminatory. 7. In the second case relied upon on behalf of the petitioner i.e. Shri Swamiji of Shri Admar Mutt, cited supra, the challenge was to the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (for short “Madras Act”) which was applicable to the South Kanara District which was previously a part of the State of Madras but which became a part of the new State of Mysore (Now Karnataka) after the Reorganisation of States in 1956. A fee of 5% of its income as prescribed was levied under the Madras Act upon the income derived by the religious institutions which fee was not levied in the State of Mysore as a result of which the said fee was applicable only to the South Kanara district which became a part of the State of Mysore after Reorganisation of States. The question, therefore, raised in the said case was that the levy of such a fee only in the South Kanara District of the State of Mysore was arbitrary and discriminatory and, therefore, liable to be struck down under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 8. The Supreme Court held in the aforesaid case that dissimilar treatment would not necessarily offend against the guarantee of equality contained in Article 14 of the Constitution and that the rider was that there had to be a valid basis for classification which must bear nexus with the object of the impugned provision. 8. The Supreme Court held in the aforesaid case that dissimilar treatment would not necessarily offend against the guarantee of equality contained in Article 14 of the Constitution and that the rider was that there had to be a valid basis for classification which must bear nexus with the object of the impugned provision. The Supreme Court further held that in matters arising out of reorganisation of States, continued application of laws of a State to the territories, which were within the State but which had become a part of another State, was not discriminatory since the classification rested on geographical consideration founded on historical reasons. The classification was thus upheld by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision. 9. The Supreme Court further observed in the aforesaid case that although initial application of the Madras Act to the South Kanara District was not violative of Article 14, its continued application might offend against the guarantee of equality. According to the Supreme Court section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act was intended to serve a temporary purpose viz. to enable the new units to consider the special circumstances of the diverse units before launching upon a process of adaptation of laws so as to make them reasonably uniform having regard to the special needs of the various regions and the requirements of administrative efficiency. It was, therefore, held that an indefinite extension and application of unequal laws for all time to come would militate against their true character as temporary measures taken in order to serve a temporary purpose. However, since only five or six years had passed since the reorganisation of States, continued application of the Madras Act to South Kanara District was not held violative of Article 14. It was also held hat there was no adequate data placed in the said case to show that its continued application was violative of Article 14. The Supreme Court then expressed that the Karnataka Legislature should take steps to promptly remove the inequality arising out of the application of the Madras Act in South Kanara District only within a year or so. 10. In my view the ratios of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the above cases are entirely different and are not attracted in the facts and circumstance upon which the challenge under Article 14 is based in this case. 10. In my view the ratios of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the above cases are entirely different and are not attracted in the facts and circumstance upon which the challenge under Article 14 is based in this case. The questions answered in the above cases are different from the question which has to be answered in the instant case. In the case of Motor Traders, cited supra, the discrimination arose because of the continued application of section 32(b) of the Andhra Act under which the buildings constructed after 26-8-1957 were exempted from the application of the said Act for which the rationale which existed at the time of its enactment lost its significance after its continued application for many years thereafter because the buildings constructed a few years prior to 26-8-1957 to which the said Act was applicable and the buildings which were constructed after a few years thereafter and continued to remain exempted from the application of the said Act were more or less on par for which there was no rationale for the application or the non-application of the Act. In other words the classification by the date 26-8-1957 after some time had become irrational. In the second case of the application of the Madras Act to the South Kanara District of Karnataka the said provision was per se discriminatory but was sustained only because of the classification arising out of Reorganisation of States. The challenge to the provisions of the Rent Control Order in the instant case is not on par with the challenges in the aforesaid decisions. 11. It may be seen that independent, complete and self-contained rent control enactments exist and are applicable to the various regions of the State of Maharashtra although it is true that they were enacted when they were parts of their former States prior to reorganisation of States and were continued thereafter under section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act when they were merged in the new State of Bombay. A brief examination of the Schemes of the Rent Control Order and the Bombay Act, therefore, would be useful. A brief examination of the Schemes of the Rent Control Order and the Bombay Act, therefore, would be useful. The Rent Control Order is issued under the provisions of the Central Provinces and Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946, which was enacted by the then State of Madhya Pradesh of which Vidarbha region of the State of Maharashtra was a part prior to Reorganisation of States in 1956. The preamble of the said Act shows that it was an Act to provide for regulating the letting and sub-letting of accommodation in the Central Provinces and Berar. Section 2 of the said Act dealt with controlling the rents for accommodation, preventing the eviction of tenants or sub-tenants from such accommodation in specified circumstances, requiring such accommodation to be let either generally or to specified persons or classes of persons, or in specified circumstances and for collecting any information or statistics with a view to regulating any of the aforesaid matters. It is for the first three purposes covered by Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 2 of the aforesaid Act that the Rent Control Order was issued by the then State of Madhya Pradesh. The use of the word “accommodation” in section 2, which is the principal section in the said Act as well as the preamble of the said Act would show that the intention was no regulate letting and sub-letting of the house accommodation and not of the vacant lands. 12. The Rent Control Order issued under the aforesaid M.P. Act defines 'house' in Clause 2(3) and governs only the house accommodation and not the vacant land. The definition of the expression ”landlord” given in Clause 2(4) and the definition of the word “tenant” given in Clause 2(5) show that the leases covered by the Rent Control Order are the leases in respect of the house accommodation. It is clear from Clause 13 of the Rent Control Order that previous permission of the Rent Controller is necessary before giving notice of termination of tenancy and that the said permission can be granted only upon the grounds given in Clause 13(3) of the Rent Control Order. It is clear from Clause 13 of the Rent Control Order that previous permission of the Rent Controller is necessary before giving notice of termination of tenancy and that the said permission can be granted only upon the grounds given in Clause 13(3) of the Rent Control Order. It is, thus, clear from the aforesaid scheme of the Act that the Legislature did not intend to cover thereunder the open lands presumably because the scarcity of accommodation was not so much felt so as to cover the leases of open lands also. 13. As regards the Bombay Act, it was enacted in the year 1948 in the then State of Bombay. The preamble of the said Act shows that it is intended to be a comprehensive legislation to amend and consolidate the law relating to the control of rents and repairs of certain premises, of rates of hotels and lodging houses and of eviction and also to control the charges for licence of premises etc. The scheme of the Act shows that it is made applicable to the open lands as well as to the house accommodation as is clear from the definition of the word “premises” given in section 5(8) of the said Act. It may be seen that the Bombay Act itself creates a forum under section 29 of the said Act for resolving dispute between the landlord and the tenant relating to recovery of rent and possession of the tenanted premises arising under the said Act. Thus, the scheme of the Bombay Act is materially different from the Rent Control Order because after the permission is granted by the Rent Controller under the Rent Control Order to give quit notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act it is necessary for the landlord to take recourse to the civil suit under the ordinary law applicable to him for evicting the tenant as there is no provision under the Rent Control Order for a decree of eviction against the tenant. The preamble and the various provisions of the Bombay Act show that looking to the exigencies of the situation and the magnitude of the problem in the old State of Bombay at that time, it was felt that not only the house accommodation but the leases of the open lands also should be regulated by the State. 14. The preamble and the various provisions of the Bombay Act show that looking to the exigencies of the situation and the magnitude of the problem in the old State of Bombay at that time, it was felt that not only the house accommodation but the leases of the open lands also should be regulated by the State. 14. It is thus clear that the schemes of the Bombay Act and the Rent Control Order are entirely different and that they were enacted to remedy different mischiefs which were necessary to be remedied looking to the problems and the needs of the people in those parts to which they were made applicable. Since these enactments thus belong to different classes being independent self-contained statutes prevailing in different parts of the State and Rent Control Order cannot be challenged on the ground that the Bombay Act is applicable to the open lands. It is well-settled that when the schemes of the competing statues are entirely different the validity of one statute cannot be tested under Article 14 with reference to another statute. Moreover, even otherwise, no data is placed on record to show that the magnitude of the problem of regulating or controlling the rents and accommodation is at present such in the Vidarbha region of the State that it is necessary for the State to control also the leases in relation to the open lands. In this regard I may state that there is a presumption in favour of the legislature that it understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds. See sub-para (e) of para 11 in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Ramkrishna Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar)3, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 538. In view of the above presumption in favour of the legislature adequate data or material must be placed by the person who attacks the legislation to displace the said presumption. 15. The submission on behalf of the appellant can be viewed from another angle also. Very often the courts have held that the under-inclusive classification is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. See: (Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Girish Kumar Navalakha and others)4, 1975 S.C.C. 754. 15. The submission on behalf of the appellant can be viewed from another angle also. Very often the courts have held that the under-inclusive classification is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. See: (Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Girish Kumar Navalakha and others)4, 1975 S.C.C. 754. In the above judgment the Supreme Court has observed as follows: “In strict theory, this involves an abandonment of the principle that classification must include all who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose. This under-inclusion is often explained by saying that the Legislature is free to remedy parts of a mischief or to recognise degrees of evil and strike at the harm where it thinks it is most acute.” It has further pointed out in the aid decision: “There are two main considerations to justify an under-inclusive classification. First, administrative necessity. Second, the Legislature might not be fully convinced that the particular policy which it adopts will be fully successful or wise.” Applying the said principle in the instant case, it is clear that the Rent Control Order was enacted and made applicable to the house accommodation because it appears that the Legislature at the time of its enactment thought that the mischief or evil was most acute in relation to the house accommodation, the subject in relation to which protection is granted by it. It would not therefore mean that the Rent Control Order is discriminatory because it does not apply in respect of the open lands. 16. Lastly, it may be seen that no useful purpose would be served in granting the relief to the appellant-tenant because if the Rent Control Order is struck down, he would be left without any protection of the Rent Control statute since the Bombay Act would not be thereby automatically apply in the Vidarbha region of the State of Maharashtra. In that event the civil suit filed by the respondents/plaintiffs without the permission of the Rent Controller would be still maintainable. 17. In that event the civil suit filed by the respondents/plaintiffs without the permission of the Rent Controller would be still maintainable. 17. It may also be seen that it is primarily for the State to consider whether the Bombay Act or the Rent Control Order should be applicable in the whole State of Maharashtra or to bring uniform legislation for the whole of the State which question depends upon the consideration of the extent of the problem of the accommodation in various regions of the State, prevalent rates of rent in various regions and what the effect of the existing rent control legislation in each regions. It is possible that after considering all the pros and cons of the problems the State may enforce the Rent Control Order itself in the whole of the State of Maharashtra or may not think it advisable to legislate in respect of the open lands. The Rent Control Order, therefore, cannot be struck down only because the Bombay Act is applicable to the open lands. In Writ Petition No. 147 of 1984 (Mukesh v. Vinod)5, decided on 26-7-1985, in which the validity of Clause 13(3)(ii) of the Rent Control Order was challenged on the ground that there was no such provision in the Bombay Act, I have taken a similar view while upholding its validity. It is clear from the said decision that the matter is regard to the question of introducing the uniform Rent Legislation throughout the State is under active consideration of the State and therefore even assuming that the Rent Control Order is arbitrary and discriminatory it would not be advisable to strike it down under Article 14. The same approach was adopted by the Supreme Court in the case of Shri Swamiji of Shri Admar Mutt v. The Commissioner, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1, cited supra, in not striking down the impugned Madras Act in the said case. For all these reasons, the contention as regards the validity of the Rent Control Order raised on behalf of the appellant is rejected. 18. In the result, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. -----