JUDGMENT NATARAJAN, J.: Challenging an order of detention made against his Son by name Thalapathi under the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the petitioner has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for the issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus. 2. The impugned order of detention was passed by the second respondent herein on 11th October, 1984. The detenu was on remand in connection with a case registered against him in Cr.No.657 of 1984, under sections 341 , 323 , 307 and 506(ii) of the Indian Penal Code of B.1 North Beach Police Station. The order of detention was therefore served on the detenu in prison and he was furnished with the grounds of detention and the copies of documents which had been taken into consideration by the second respondent before passing the order of detention. 3. The order of detention was confirmed by the Government, the first respondent herein. The detenu sent a representation against his detention, and after considering the same, the Government rejected it. The Advisory Board constituted under the Act, reviewed detenu's case and it was satisfied that the detention order has been passed on the basis of adequate grounds. It is thereafter this writ petition has come to be filed. 4. In the grounds of detention, it is stated that the detenu came to the adverse notice of the second respondent in two cases. The first case related to M.1 Harbour Police Station Cr.No.314 of 1984, under section 380, Indian Penal Code. It related to the theft of a roller ball bearing valued at Rs.500/- on 2nd August, 1984. The second case related to N.3 Muthialpet Police Station in Cr.No.621 of 1984 under sections 336 , 427 and 506(ii), Indian Penal Code. The said case related to the detenu getting enraged with a tea stall owner for demanding money for the tea consumed byhim and intimidating the tea stall owner and subsequently breaking and damaging the articles kept in the tea shop. The incident with reference to which the detention order has been passed is said to have taken place on 27th September, 1984. The incident with reference to which the detention order has been passed is said to have taken place on 27th September, 1984. On that date, the detenu and his accomplice one Kempu alias Kempraj are said to have attacked one Arumugham with a view to murder him. Besides the overt acts of Kempu, the detenu is said to have strangled the neck of Arumugham and when the passers-by came to the rescue of Arumugham, the detenu is said to have threatened them not to interfere on pain of similar attack on them also. 5. Mr. B.Kumar, learned Counsel for the detenu, puts forth the following five grounds to assail the order of detention: “(1) The order of detention has been passed on the basis of three instances. But the first instance relates to an offence of theft and it has nothing to do with the maintenance of public order. Such being the case, it is an irrelevant ground and if that ground is vitiated by irrelevance, then the entire detention order must fail because it is not possible to separate one ground from the other. (2) Although copies of the first information report, charge sheet and memorandum of evidence were furnished to the detenu with reference to the two cases registered against him in the Harbour Police Station and Muthialpet Police Station, the detenu was not furnished with the copies of the statement of witnesses recorded in those cases under section 161(3), Criminal Procedure Code. (3) The detenu should have been given an opportunity to challenge the finding of the second respondent that he is a goonda and that such an opportunity has been denied to him. (4) The representation sent by the detenu has been considered belatedly and the delay vitiates the order of detention. (5) The Government has not exercised its independent mind in rejecting the representation made by the detenu, but has mechanically followed the opinion of the Advisory Board, and this factor also vitiates the order of detention.” 6. Taking up the first of the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the detenu, we find that the argument is based upon a mis-conception of the provisions of section 2 of the Act. Section 2 of the Act contains definitions in two parts. Taking up the first of the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the detenu, we find that the argument is based upon a mis-conception of the provisions of section 2 of the Act. Section 2 of the Act contains definitions in two parts. The second part comprising of clauses (b), (c), (f), (g) and (h) relate to the definition of persons specialised in certain categories of offences, viz., bootlegger, drug-offender, goonda, immoral traffic offender, and slum-grabber. The earlier part of section 2 sets out the context when the above said persons can be said to have engaged themselves in activities which would affect adversely or are likely affect adversely the maintenance of public order. 7. So far as the definition of the word ‘Goonda’ in section 2(f) is concerned, a person is said to be a goonda who either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal Code. As to when a person classified as a goonda can be said to have indulged in acts prejudicial to the maintenance of public order is set out in section 2(a)(iii) of the Act. ‘Acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order’ in the case of a goonda would include when he is engaged, or is making preparations for engaging in any of his activities as a goonda which affects or are likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order. It is with reference to the acts of a goonda falling under section 2(a)(iii) the detaining authority can pass an order of detention under section 3 of the Act. Thus, it may be seen that section 2 of the Act deals with two distinct aspects of the matter. 8. Instances 1 and 2 contained in the detention order have a bearing upon the status of the detenu as a goonda. They have nothing to do with the formation of the subjective satisfaction of the second respondent that the detenu is engaged in committing acts which will affect the maintenance of public order. 8. Instances 1 and 2 contained in the detention order have a bearing upon the status of the detenu as a goonda. They have nothing to do with the formation of the subjective satisfaction of the second respondent that the detenu is engaged in committing acts which will affect the maintenance of public order. Instances 1 and 2 have relevance only to the detenu being classified as a goonda under section 2(f) of the Act, Having once reached that conclusion, the further question which would fall for consideration is whether the ground on which the detenu has been detained constitutes an act which would adversely affect the maintenance of public order. In other words, the position will be whether a habitual offender has committed or is about to commit an offence which will have an adverse impact on the public order. Therefore, the argument of the learned Counsel that on the basis of all the three instances, the order of detention has been passed is not a correct one. Similarly, the argument that because instance No.1 relates, to a case of theft, it has nothing to do with the maintenance of public order and therefore the entire order is vitiated cannot be accepted. Mr. Kumar cited the judgment of this Court in Mohamed Moosa v. Collector and District Magistrate, Ramnad District Mohamed Moosa v. Collector and District Magistrate, Ramnad District (1984) L.W. (Crl.) 200, to support the argument raised by him. In the said judgment, it has been observed that though the grounds of detention referred to the latest criminal activity of the detenu as forming the basis on which the detention order has been passed and the earlier criminal activity has been referred to only as bringing the detenu to the adverse notice of the authority, the earlier activities can also be considered as grounds of detention. We find that in the judgment referred to above, the distinct aspect of section 2(a) (iii) and section 2(f) have not been discussed. More than that, we find that was a case where a second detention order had been passed on the very same grounds which were found untenable in the earlier order. We therefore hold the view that the said case is distinguishable on facts. More than that, we find that was a case where a second detention order had been passed on the very same grounds which were found untenable in the earlier order. We therefore hold the view that the said case is distinguishable on facts. Moreover, the observation in the judgment was more in the nature of obiter dictum because the main controversy in the case was whether the grounds on which the detention order had been set aside once can again he made use of for passing a second order of detention. Hence, the first ground of attack falls to the ground. 9. As regards the second argument, it is two fold in nature. It was first contended that the second respondent is likely to have taken into consideration the statements of witnesses in Cr.Nos.314 and 621 of 1984, recorded under section 161(3), Criminal Procedure. Code, but he had failed to furnish copies of these statements to the detenu and therefore the detenu has been handicapped in making an effective representation. This argument is based purely on conjecture because there is nothing to show that the second respondent had before him more material than what has been referred to in the grounds of detention. The second limb of the argument was that if the second respondent had failed to go through the statements of witnesses recorded under section 161(3), Criminal Procedure Code, then he has reached his subjective satisfaction without adequate materials and on that ground the order is vitiated. This argument contained the same fallacy as the one pointed out in the first contention. For finding out whether the detenu is a goonda or not, what is required to be seen is whether the detenu is actually engaging himself in the commission of an offence falling under Chapter XVI, XVII or XXII of the Indian Penal Code. Since competent Police Officers have investigated those cases and laid charge sheets, there was no necessity for the second respondent to re-appraise the evidence in the case to find out whether the detenu is actually engaging himself in the commission of the specified offence. Apart from that, the statement recorded under section 161(3), Criminal Procedure Code, besides being of a very limited evidentiary value, should have been reflected in the memorandum of evidence furnished to the detenu. For the aforesaid reasons, the second argument too fails. 10. Apart from that, the statement recorded under section 161(3), Criminal Procedure Code, besides being of a very limited evidentiary value, should have been reflected in the memorandum of evidence furnished to the detenu. For the aforesaid reasons, the second argument too fails. 10. Thirdly, the learned Counsel argued that the detenu should have been given an opportunity to contest the conclusion of the second respondent that he is a goonda. The Act does not provide for any such opportunity being given. As already stated, the Act is intended to deal with the dangerous acts of a specified class of offenders which are bound to affect the maintenance of public order. We may point out that a person may be called a goonda if he had committed theft of sheep 25 times and been convicted on each occasion because theft is an offence falling within Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code. Even so he cannot bedetained under the Act if he commits theft of sheep on the twenty-sixth or twenty-seventh occasion because that will not affect public order. Likewise, a non-goonda who commits an act which is bound to affect maintenance of public order cannot be detained under this Act, because the Act is intended only for goondas, bootleggers, etc. If a non-goonda is to be detained, resort must be had to the National Security Act. It is not disputed by the learned Counsel for the detenu that two cases have been registered against the detenu in the crime numbers referred to above. Therefore, the detenu has come to the adverse notice of the second respondent and having regard to the proximity of the two cases and the nature of the offences involved, the second respondent is entitled to treat him as a goonda and go into the further question whether with reference to the incident which took place on 27th September, 1984, the detenu should be detained under the Act or not. It is however open to the detenu while disputing the validity of the order to contend that he is not a habitual offender. We do not therefore, see any merit in this contention also. 11. The fourth contention related to the alleged delay in the consideration of the detenu's representation. It is however open to the detenu while disputing the validity of the order to contend that he is not a habitual offender. We do not therefore, see any merit in this contention also. 11. The fourth contention related to the alleged delay in the consideration of the detenu's representation. From the counter affidavit of the first respondent it is seen that an undated representation of the detenu was sent by the Superintendent, Central Prison, Madras, with a covering letter dated 10th November, 1984. It has been received by the Government on 17th November, 1984. It was forwarded to the second respondent for parawar remarks. After receipt of the remarks, the Government passed final orders on 3rd December, 1984, rejecting the representation of the detenu. The counter-affidavit gives details as to how the matter was dealt with during the interrugnum. Having regard to the facts stated therein, we see no force in the contention of the learned Counsel for the detenu that there has been inordinate delay in the consideration of the representation. The representation itself had been sent late and there had been many intervening holidays. Therefore, we do not find any undue delay on the part of the Government in considering the representation of the detenu. 12. As regards the last of the contentions, it is seen from the counter affidavit that though a copy of the representation was sent to the Advisory Board, the Government have been independently pursuing its procedures. As such, there is no basis to contend that the Government abdicated its decision to the opinion of the Advisory Board and that the Government had passed orders only after the Advisory Board had considered the matter. For all the aforesaid reasons we find that there are no merits in any of the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the detenu. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. Maheswaran, J.: I respectfully agree with the reasoning given by my learned brother for dismissing the writ petition. I would, however, add my own words in respect of the requirements of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. 14. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. Maheswaran, J.: I respectfully agree with the reasoning given by my learned brother for dismissing the writ petition. I would, however, add my own words in respect of the requirements of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. 14. In this case, the learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that in respect of the first ground of detention (as he calls it) though it is termed as an incident which has come to the adverse notice of the second respondent, the detenu was not served with copies of the statements of witnesses recorded under section 161(3) of Criminal Procedure Code and that has prevented the detenu from making an effective representation. This contention is not well founded, because there is nothing anywhere in the records to indicate that the detaining authority has relied on the statements recorded, under section 161, Criminal Procedure Code. There is not even a passing reference made in the course of the narration of the facts about the statements made under section 161, Criminal Procedure Code. In this case, it is clear that the constitutional requirement under Article 22(5) has been complied with, for, what is required under Article 22(5) is the communication of basic facts and particulars which influenced the detaining authority in arriving at the requisite inference leading to the making of an order of detention so that the detenu may have an opportunity of making an effective representation. It is seen from the record that the first information report and the charge sheet have been furnished to the detenu. In those circumstances, it has to be held that the requirement under Article 22(5) of the Constitution has been complied with. 15. The learned Counsel for the detenu contended that there has been delay in the consideration of the representation by the Government and that each day's delay has to be adequately explained. Even though the Supreme Court took this view earlier in certain cases, it modified its view in L.M.S.Umma Saleema v. B.B.Gujarlal L.M.S.Umma Saleema v. B.B.Gujarlal (1931) Crl.L.J. 889: (1981) 3 S.C.C. 317 : (1981) S.C.C. (Crl.) 720: A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1191. Even though the Supreme Court took this view earlier in certain cases, it modified its view in L.M.S.Umma Saleema v. B.B.Gujarlal L.M.S.Umma Saleema v. B.B.Gujarlal (1931) Crl.L.J. 889: (1981) 3 S.C.C. 317 : (1981) S.C.C. (Crl.) 720: A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1191. In the said decision the Supreme Court observed as follows: “The occasional observations made by this Court that each day's delay in dealing with the representation must be adequately explained are meant to emphasise the expedition with which the representation must be considered and not that it is a magical formula, the slightest breach of which must result in the release of the detenu.” 16. In this case, we are of the view that the representation made by the detenu has been considered by the Government with utmost expedition. B.S. ----- Petition dismissed.