Judgment P. S. Mishra, J. 1. The plaintiff-appellants suit for declaration of title in schedule 1 properties and in the alternative for partition of the properties described in Schedule 2 of the plaint has been dismissed by the 2nd Additional subordinate Judge, Chapra. 2. By three separate sale deeds executed on 26-6-1960, Rampati Kuer transferred Schedule 2 lands in favour of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs accordingly claimed title to Schedule 2 properties. The original defendant Shiv baran Rai, her brother-in-law, however, in his written statement has claimed that Rampati Kuer had no interest in the properties on or before 26-6-1960 and accordingly the defendant has claimed that the plaintiffs have neither any title into Schedule 1 properties or equity to seek partition of the lands described in schedule 2. 3. The facts are not in controversy. Bihari Rai died leaving behind three sons, Ram Kishun Rai, Keshwar Rai and Sheo Baran Rai. Ram Kishun rai died leaving behind his widow Mostt. Parkalo Kuer. Mostt. Parkalo kuer also has died. Keshwar Rai died leaving behind Ramrati Kuer, the plainitffs vendor. 4. According to the plaintiffs Ram Kishun Rai, Keshwar Rai and Shiv baran Rai had separated in mess and properties and accordingly after Ram kishun Rais death Mostt Parkalo Kuer held the properties belonging to his share and after Parkalos death Keshwar Rai and Shiv Baran Rai together inherited ram Kishun Rais share. After Keshwar Rais death Ramrati Kuer, his widow, inherited his interests in the property. She became absolute owner after the hindu Succession Act came into force. She, by executing three sale deeds in favour of the plaintiffs for a consideration of Rs.2,000/ each, conveyed schedule 1 lands to them. They have, accordingly, acquired title to Schedule 1 lands. By amending the plaint they have also said that in case it is found that there has been no partition by mates and bounds between Ramrati Kuer and shiv Baran, the estate should be partitioned half and half and a decree accordingly passed. 5. The defendant, however, has maintained that Ram Kishun Rai died in the state of jointness and his surviving brothers, Keshwar Rai and Shiv Baran inherited the properties of his share as coparceners. Keshwar Rai also died in the state of jointness and on his demise Shiv Baran Rai succeeded to the estate as the sole survining coparcener. 6. Ram Kishun Rai died before the revisional survey. Keshwar Rai also died in the state of jointness and on his demise Shiv Baran Rai succeeded to the estate as the sole survining coparcener. 6. Ram Kishun Rai died before the revisional survey. In the revisional survey, however, his wife Parkalo Kuer was shown to own the properties of the joint family along with Keshwar Rai and Shiv Baran Rai. She, however, died and it is not in dispute that Keshwar Rai and Shiv Baran Rai succeeded to the interests of Ram Kishun Rai. Keshwar Rai died in the year 1930 or 1931, that is to say, before the Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 came in force. If the coparcenery was in existence on Keshwars death, Shiv Baran succeeded as the sole surviving coparcener. If, however, the coparcenery was not in existence and Keshwar Rai died in the state of separation from his brother Shiv Baran rai, his widow Ramrati Kuer succeeded to his estate. 7. The learned Subordinate Judge has found that the plaintiff have failed to prove that there was any partition between the coporceners. and/or that the coparcenery had ceased to exist and having so found rejected the plaintiffs case of any title or interest in the joint estate of the family of Keshwar Rai and Shiv baran Rai in favour of Ramrati Kuer. He has, accordingly, dismissed the suit either for declaration of title it Schedule 1 lands in favour of the plaintiffs or to partition Schedule 2 properties. 8. An issue on the question, whether the three sale deeds dated 26-6-1960 executed by Ramrati Kuer in favour of the plaintiffs were valid for consideration or not, has also been gone into by the learned Subordinate Judge. He has held that the plaintiffs have not been able to prove any payment of consideration and, thus, failed to prove that the sale deeds have been validly executed by Ramrati kuer in their favour. 9. On the issue of the validity of the sale deed for consideration, however there appears to be an evident erroneous approach by the learned Subordinate judge as to the burden of proof upon the plaintiffs. In all cases, in which disposition of property is required by law to be reduced to the form of document, section 91 of the Evidence Act says that no evidence shall be given in proof of such disposition of properties. In all cases, in which disposition of property is required by law to be reduced to the form of document, section 91 of the Evidence Act says that no evidence shall be given in proof of such disposition of properties. Sec.92 of the Evidence Act says that no evidance of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted as between the parties to any such instruments or their representative-in-interest for the purpose of contracting, varying adding to or substracting from its terms subject to the exceptions enumerated in the proviso thereto. Proviso 1 to Sec.92 says that any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document or which would entitle any person to any decree or order relating thereto, such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want of capacity in any contracting party, want or failure of consideration or mistake of fact or law. These provisions do recognise the right of a contracting party or any representative-in-interest to question the validity of the document of disposition of property by proving want or failure of consideration, but they leave no manner of doubt that a person holding the document of disposition and proving its execution will bs the owner of the disposition and the terms incorporated in the document shall be proof therefor. The party questioning ths validity may resort to extrinsic or parol evidence to prove want or failure of consideration, but the burden shall be heavy on him and the presumption shall always be in favour of the document. Such cases are covered by Sec.101 of the Evidence Act which says that the party desirous of the judgment as to any legal right or liability on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. The learned Subordinate judge has erred in asking the plaintiffs beyond the document to prove that they " had paid consideration before the documents are held valid. 10. The existence of the legal right of the plaintiffs, however, depends upon the right Ramrati Kuer had on 26-6-1960 in the properties covered by the three sale deeds executed by her in favour of the plaintiffs. Ramratis right to the property is subject to the existence of the coparcenery on the date of death of Keshwar Rai. 10. The existence of the legal right of the plaintiffs, however, depends upon the right Ramrati Kuer had on 26-6-1960 in the properties covered by the three sale deeds executed by her in favour of the plaintiffs. Ramratis right to the property is subject to the existence of the coparcenery on the date of death of Keshwar Rai. The moot question, therefore, in this case is, whether Keshwar rai died in the state of jointness with his brother Shiv Baran Rai and whether shiv Baran Rai succeeded to the estate as the sole surviving coparcener or keshwar Rai died in a state of separation from his brother Shiv Baran Rai and hence on his death his wife Ramrati inherited the properties as the widow and a limited owner which limited right became absolute when the Hindu Succession act came in force. The burden in this regard is obviously upon the plaintiffs because they must, before they rely upon the transfers made by Ramrati Kuer in their favour, grove that Ramrati Kuer had title in the properties which she transferred in their favour on 26-6-1960. 11. Mr. K. P. Sinha, learned counsel for the appellants, has frankly conceded that there is no evidence showing either partition by metes and bounds or declaration in the life time of Ram Kishun Rai and Keshwar Rai that they intended to disrupt the coparcenery. His sheet anchor is the entry in exhibits 10 and 10-A, the survey Khatians which show that in the year 1919 or before that Parkalo Kuer, Keshwar Rai and Shiv Baran Rai were together owners of the estate having l/3rd interest therein. Texts on Mitakshra emphasise the existence of a coparcenery in respect of ancestral estate and inheritance by surviving coparceners excluding those who do not qualify to become members of the coparcenery. The presumption is always in favour of the existence of the coparcenery and jointness of the coparceners. But the courts in India have also acknowledged the right of a coparcener to declare his intentions to severe the coparcenery and once such declaration is proved the estate may be joint yet the coparcenery may cease. Both exhibits 10 and 10-A do not in any way indicate whether Ramkishuu Rai had separated from his brothers and died in the state of separation from them. Both exhibits 10 and 10-A do not in any way indicate whether Ramkishuu Rai had separated from his brothers and died in the state of separation from them. But by showing Farkalo Kumar to the extent of l/3rd interest in the estate belonging to the three brothers, they apparently take notice of the incidents following the death of Ramkishun Rai. Parkalo Kuer could get no interest had Ramkishun Rai not separated from his brothers, because in the event of Ramkishun Rai dying in the state of jointness with his brothers, Parkalo Kuer could get no interest whatsoever except maintenance. But can it be said that exhibits 10 and 10-A dealt with the rights or interests of the parties and entries made therein show that Parkalo Kuer inherited the interests of her husband after his death. 12. Section 35 of the Evidence Act says that an entry in any public or other official book, register or record stating a fact in issue is a relevant fact if it is shown to have been made by a public servant in discharge of his official duties or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law. In Nageshar Baksh Singh V/s. Mr. Gancsha (AIR 1920 Privy Council 46) it has been pointed out that the presumption is, until the contrary is proved, that the family continues joint. The presumption is peculiarly strong in the case of sons of one father. A definition of share in revenue and village papers affords by itself but a slight indication of an actual separation in a Hindu family. Such a definition of shares standing alone cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence open to find contrary to the presumption in law as to jointness with the family to which such definition referred had separated. Testing the evidentiary value of entries in the settlement records, the Privy Council has also pointed out that records of this character take their place as part of the evidence in the case. They do no more. Their importance may vary with circumstances and it is not any part of the law of India that they are by themselves con-clusive evidence of the facts which they purport to record. It may turn out that they are in accord with the general bulk of the evidence in the case. They do no more. Their importance may vary with circumstances and it is not any part of the law of India that they are by themselves con-clusive evidence of the facts which they purport to record. It may turn out that they are in accord with the general bulk of the evidence in the case. They may supply gaps in it and they may in short form not an important part of the testimony as to fact which is available to give them any higher weight than that might open they way for much injustice and afford temptation to the manupulation of records or evidence of the materials for the first time. This view has been reiterated in several cases including the case reported in anurago Kuer V/s. Darshan Rout (AIR 1938 PC 65); Mt. Afii V/s. Mt. Sukini (AIR 1939 Patna 23) and Raghunaridan Prasad V/s. Mahabir Mahton and another (AIR 1926 Patna 545 ). In the case of Smt. Savitri Devi V/s. Jiwan Chaudhary and others, (AIR 1960 Patna 548 ). Kandaiya Singh, J. , as he then was, has considered a case raising the question who should prove partition and how to appreciate record of shares of individual branches in record of rights. He has stated the law thus - "it is thus clear beyond doubt that a mere definition in revenue and village papers would not by itself, be conclusive evidence even that an actual partition was then intended. In order to establish separation, it must further be proved that such definition of shares was with a view to obtain partition. In absence of such evidence, mere definition of share by itself affords a very slight indication of actual separation and is insufficient to displace the presumption of jointness. " In Bharat Singh and others V/s. Mat. Bhagirathi (AIR 1966 Supreme; Court 405) also a similar view has been expressed. The Supreme Court has said- "there is a strong presumption in favour of Hindu brothers constituting a joint family. It is for the person alleging severance of the joint hindu family to establish it. . . . . . " In Bharat Singh and others V/s. Mat. Bhagirathi (AIR 1966 Supreme; Court 405) also a similar view has been expressed. The Supreme Court has said- "there is a strong presumption in favour of Hindu brothers constituting a joint family. It is for the person alleging severance of the joint hindu family to establish it. . . . . . The mere fact that mutation entry after the death of Ram Narain was made in favour of three brothers and indicated the share of each to be one-third, by itself can be no evidence of the severance of the joint family which after the death of Ram Narain, consisted of the three brothers who were miners. " 13. Exhibits 10 and 10-A thus take us no further than making a slight indication that Parkalo as the widow of Ramkishun Rai was having some interests of her own to the extent of the share of her husband in the joint family. But this slight indication is not enough to give up the presumpation of jointness and accept the plaintiffs case of severance of the coparcsnery. Mr. Sinha has, however, relied upon exhibit 6, a Zarpeshgi deed executed jointly by Shiv Baran rai and Mostt. Ramrati Kuer in respsct of a portion of the properties covered by Schedule I. He has submitted that Ramratis interest is fully recognized in the said Zarpeshgi deed dated 5-6-31, that is to say soon after the death of keshwar Rai. Shiv Baran Rais case about this document has been that in the mortgage deed Ramrati was allowed to join as a m irtgagor because she had suffered widowhood only recently and because the mortgages desired her also to join as a mortgagor lest any dispute may not arise. The contents of exhibit 6 do not go to the question of partition or inheritance of Ramrati from Keshwar rai. All that exhibit 6 shows is that Shiv Baran agreed to the execution of the deed of mortgage with Ramrati Kuer in respect of the properties belonging to the family. Mr. Sinha, however, has submitted that the severance of copar-cenery should be accepted for in such as noticed in the survey entries and the conduct of the parties. He has submitted that slight though this evidence is, but it finds full corroboration from the oral evidence of P. Ws.3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 15. Mr. Sinha, however, has submitted that the severance of copar-cenery should be accepted for in such as noticed in the survey entries and the conduct of the parties. He has submitted that slight though this evidence is, but it finds full corroboration from the oral evidence of P. Ws.3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 15. They do appear to depose that the parties lived separately, that Ramrati held separate cultivation and that the parties enjoyed their respective shares as owners thereof. It is not possible, however, to accept such evidence particularly when a large number of documents have been produced on behalf of the defendant showing independent dealings by Shiv Baran by executing mortgage deeds and offering the lands in security. 14. Documents, exhibit h series have been considered by the learned subordinate Judge which go a long way to show the properties in complete control of Shiv Baran Rai. These documents are executed between January, 1931 and June, 1951. There are several other documents referred to by the parties and the learned Subordinate Judge has given due consideration to them. He has considered the oral evidence of the parties in the light of the document ary evidence and has not accepted the plaintiffs case that there has been any severance of the coparcenery of the family of Shiv Baran Rai. It is not possible on such, state of evidence of the plaintiffs on the question of partition or severance of the coparcenery to hold that Ramrati inherited the interests of her husband, Keshwar Rai and exercised her title and possession accordingly. 15. Two facts, however, have emerged from the case pleaded by the parties and the evidence adduced by them. All that Ramrati Kuer could inherit from Keshwar Rai, if the plaintiffs case of inheritance by her is accepted, is covered by the three sale deeds executed on 26-6-1960. The plaintiffs, thus, take the entire share to which Ramrati, according to them, is entitled to. There is nothing shown or suggested how Ramrati Kuer lived after disposing of all that she claimed in favour of the plaintiffs. The defendant also admits that he ceased to maintain Ramrati Kuer after 26-6-1960 when she executed the three sale deeds in favour of the plaintiffs and he had driven her, out from the ancestral house in the year 1933. 16. The defendant also admits that he ceased to maintain Ramrati Kuer after 26-6-1960 when she executed the three sale deeds in favour of the plaintiffs and he had driven her, out from the ancestral house in the year 1933. 16. Assuming that Ramrati Kuer had no independent inheritance from her husband, Keshwar Rai, yet she had a right to maintenance from the estate in which her husband had interest. Compulsion to execute the three sale deeds is decipherable from such facts which go to show that Ramrati received no maintenance from Shiv Baran and his family. I have already noticed that the plaintiffs have been able to prove valid execution of the sale deeds in their favour by Ramrati. The defendant has not been able to show any material on his side showing that Ramrati did not receive consideration for the transfers made by her. The plaintiffs have sued for declaration of title and possession or in the alternative for partition and possession by virtue of the sale deeds. But, as I have noticed, they have failed in proving inheritance by Ramrati from keshwar Rai and thus proving the title of their vendor. Shivbaran Rai and other defendants cannot say or suggest that they have no liability to maintain Ramrati kuer and once they admit that Ramrati Kuer sutfered neglect, they stand under the obligation to discharge the liability created by Ramrati. The three sale deeds, each for a consideration of Rs.2,000/ executed by Ramrati although failed to convey any valid title in favour of the plaintiffs nonetheless the plaintiffs appear to have performed their part and paid to Ramrati the consideration therefor. The plaintiffs are not total strangers. They are, according to the defendants, sisters sons of Ramrati. 17. It has come in evidence that Ramrati Kuer lived with the plaintiffs. Why should the court then not take notice of the neglect of Ramrati Kuer by the defendants and compensate those who maintained her by atleast ensuring the return of the consideration money to them by the defendants. 18. For the reasons that I have stated, while 1 hold that the plaintiffs have no claim to succeed, either for the declaration sought for or partition, I hold that they are entitled to a decree for recovery of the consideration money from the maintence to which Ramrati was entitled to. Ramrati is dead. 18. For the reasons that I have stated, while 1 hold that the plaintiffs have no claim to succeed, either for the declaration sought for or partition, I hold that they are entitled to a decree for recovery of the consideration money from the maintence to which Ramrati was entitled to. Ramrati is dead. The defendant escaped the liability to maintain her any further due to the said reason, but the plaintiffs, who maintained Ramrati Kuer and paid the considera-tion money to her, must recover the same from the respondents. 19. In the result, while the findings recorded by the court below are affirmed, the appeal is allowed to the extent that there shall be decree in part as indicated above, and the decree be -prepared accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal partly allowed.