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1985 DIGILAW 27 (CAL)

Dipti Kumar Basu v. Fourth Industrial Tribunal

1985-01-21

PUDMA KHASTGIR

body1985
ORDER: The partners of the Orr Dignam & Co., a firm of solicitors being aggrieved by an interim order passed by the Fourth Industrial Tribunal moved the writ jurisdiction of this Court for necessary reliefs. 2. The first contention of the petitioners was that the practice of the legal profession was dependent upon professional qualification, legal knowledge, experience and intellectual ability of the partners of the firm and it was not an activity of commercial or industrial nature. The work carried on by the said firm is through their partners and assistants applying their legal skill and knowledge independently to each other. The firm, although employed a number of clerks, stenographers, typists, subordinate staff to do ministerial and other work of peripheral in nature but have no direct bearing on the pratice or profession of the partners to carry on their profession. 3. In the year 1982 Orr Dignam & Co.'s employees (hereinafter referred to as the said firm) commenced agitation for further increase of their emoluments and resorted to all sorts of devices including shouting slogans, putting up posters etc. Such activities distracted and diverted the attention of the partners form their professional work. To put an end to such activity the firm agreed to certain increase in the employee's emoluments and in turn the employees called off their agitation. On 4th March, 1982 an agreement was entered into between the firm and such employees. According to the petitioners when the negotiations resulting in the agreement dated 4th March, 1982 were afoot, a number of subordinate staff including Car Driers, Peons formed a separate union under the name and style of "Orr Dignam & Company Workmen's Union' and presented a Charter of Demands to the firm and raised an industrial dispute before the Asst. Labour Commissioner, Govt. of West Bengal. There it was the case of M/s. Orr Dignam & Co. that the firm did not come within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but in spite of that by a reference dated 9th of August, 1982, the Govt. of West Bengal referred the purported industrial dispute stating to be existing between the firm and its employees to the Fourth Industrial Tribunal of West Bengal for adjudication of the issues in the nature of grades, scales of pay, medical aid and tiffin allowance. of West Bengal referred the purported industrial dispute stating to be existing between the firm and its employees to the Fourth Industrial Tribunal of West Bengal for adjudication of the issues in the nature of grades, scales of pay, medical aid and tiffin allowance. There the firm contended that the jurisdictional point to be heard and determined first as a preliminary issue and the respondents also made applications for interim reliefs which the firm opposed. The petitioner's firm contended that the activities of the firm did not constitute an industry within the meaning of S.2 sub-s.(j) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 and so far the respondent’s claim for interim relief was concerned, the petitioners contended that prima facie no case had been made out by the respondents for such interim relied. Hence, no award could be passed by the Tribunal. In the course of hearing the petitioner gave evidence but no evidence was tendered on behalf of the respondents. After hearing the parties by order dated 23rd of May, 1984, the respondent tribunal held overruling the petitioner’s contention that the firm was not an industry. Further the respondent tribunal held that the respondent made a prima facie case for interim relief and were entitled to the interim relief and directed the firm to pay the subordinate staff the difference of the amount which the firm was giving to its other subordinate staff under the agreement dated 4th of May, 1982. It was the case of the petitioners that the tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction and had acted without authority. 4. Mr. P.P. Ginwala, the learned lawyer on behalf of the petitioners contended that the Industrial Tribunal failed to appreciate the legal implications of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board reported in AIR 1978 SC 548 and submitted that the said decision was not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. On the contrary the Tribunal should have come to the conclusion that the firm dealing with the nature of professional work was covered by the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1968 SC 554 . On the contrary the Tribunal should have come to the conclusion that the firm dealing with the nature of professional work was covered by the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1968 SC 554 . It was also the case of the petitioners that the Tribunal's finding that the respondent workmen made out a prima facie case for interim relief was also erroneous in as much as no prima facie case had been made out by the workmen in the absence of the fact that there was no evidence as to what other solicitors in Calcutta paid their employees. 5. On the contrary it was the case of the union that the writ jurisdiction of this Court could not be invoked in the instant case. Orr Dignam & Co. is an industry, the success of the firm as also the functioning depends on the services rendered by the workmen and the number of workmen maintained by the said firm was by way of necessity. The firm deeds with legal matters in a larger scale that an individual attorney working on his own. Being dissatisfied with the existing scale of emoluments the workmen raised industrial dispute with the management. One section of the workmen under the Employee's Union resorted to shouting slogans, putting up posters and/or otherwise ventilate their grievance. But a substantial section of the workmen who were members of Orr Diangm & Co Workmen's Union pursued the machinery provided under the Industrial Disputes Act and sought the intervention of the conciliation officer which ultimately resulted in an order of reference made by the government The increase in the emoluments offered by Orr Dignam & Co were not acceptable by such workmen on the ground being unreasonable and insufficient There was an agreement only between the firm and the employee's union which was binding only on the members of the employee's union. This workmen's union was formed in the year 1979 and was registered in March, 1980 which fact had been duly communicated to M/s. Orr Dignam & Co. The charter of demand was submitted, by the workmen's union on 27th of February, 1981 in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Bangalore water Supply Corpn. which is binding on all courts subordinate thereto. The petitioner's contention that the solicitors firm did not come within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act was untenable. The charter of demand was submitted, by the workmen's union on 27th of February, 1981 in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Bangalore water Supply Corpn. which is binding on all courts subordinate thereto. The petitioner's contention that the solicitors firm did not come within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act was untenable. It further denied that no prima facie case had been raised by the second respondent for interim relief. The evidence had already been given on behalf of the firm and on the basis of such evidence and the materials already on record the Tribunal passed the interim award. 6. In the case Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa reported in AIR 1978 SC 548 it was held that the industry as defined under S. 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act has a wide import where three tests had been laid down like (i) Systematic activity (ii) organised by co-operation between employer and employee and (iii) for production and/or distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes inclusive of material things or services. In that event prima facie there would be an industry in that enterprise. The true focus is functional and the decisive test is the nature of the activity with the special emphasis on the employer and employees relations. The applications of those guidelines would enable one to come to the conclusion whether a particular institution is an industry or not. As a consequence, profession, clubs, educational institution, co-operative research institutes, charitable projects and other adventures if they fulfil the triple test they cannot be exempted form the scope of S.2(j) it held in paragraph 96:- "Liberal professions-When the delimiting line is drawn to whittle down a wide definition, a principled working test, not a projected wishful though, should be sought. This conflict surfaced in the Solicitor’s case (1962 Supp.(3) SCR 157) (: AIR 1962 SC 1080 ). Before us too, a focal point of contest was as to whether the liberal professions are, ipso facto, excluded from 'industry'. Two grounds were given by Gajendragadkar, J. for overruling Sri. A. S .R. Chari’s submissions. The doctrine of direct co-operational and the features of liberal professions were given as good reason to barricade professional enterprises from the militant clamour for more by lay labour. Two grounds were given by Gajendragadkar, J. for overruling Sri. A. S .R. Chari’s submissions. The doctrine of direct co-operational and the features of liberal professions were given as good reason to barricade professional enterprises from the militant clamour for more by lay labour. The learned Judge expressed himself on the first salvational plea : "When in the Hospital case ( AIR 1960 SC 610 ) this Court referred to the organisation of the undertaking involving the co-operation of capital and labour or the employer and his employees, it obviously meant the co-operation essential and necessary for the purpose of rendering material service or for the purpose of production It would be realised that the concept of industry postulates partnership between capital and labour or between the employer and his employees It is under this partnership that the employer contributes his capital and the employees their labour and the joint contribution of capital and labour leads directly to the production which the industry has in view. In other words, the co-operation between capital and labour or between the employer and his employees which is treated as a working test in determining whether any activity amounts to an industry, is the co-operative which is directly involved in the production of goods or in the rendering of service. It cannot be suggested that every form or aspect of human acaivity in which capital and labour cooperate or employer and employees assist each other is an industry The distinguishing feature of an industry is that for the production of goods or for the rendering of service, co-operation between capital and labour or between the employer and his employees must be direct and must be essential Co-operation to which the test refers must be co-operation between the employer and his employee which is essential for carrying out the purpose of the enterprise and the service to be rendered by the enterprise should be the direct outcome of the combined efforts of the employer and the employees". 7. In paragraphs 99, 100 and 101 it was held :- "An engineer may lose a competitive contract if his typist typed wrongly or shabbily or despatched late. He is a direct contributory to the disaster. No lawyer or doctor can impress client or court if his public relations job or home work were poorly done, and that part depends on smaller men, adjuncts. He is a direct contributory to the disaster. No lawyer or doctor can impress client or court if his public relations job or home work were poorly done, and that part depends on smaller men, adjuncts. Can the great talents in administration, profession, science or art shine if a secretary fades or faults? The whole theory of direct co-operation is an improvisation, which, with great respect, hardly impresses. 8. Indeed, Hidayatullah, C.J. in Gymkhana Club Employees Union ( 1968 (1) SCR 742 ): ( AIR 1968 SC 554 ) scouted the argument about direct nexus, making specific reference to the Solicitor's case (AIR 1962 SC 1018) at p. 560 of AIR 1968 SC) : "........ The service of a solicitor was regarded as individual depending upon his personal qualifications and ability, to which the employees did not contribute directly or essentially. Their contribution, it was held, had no direct or essential nexus with the advice or services. In this way learned professions were excluded". 9. To nail this essential nexus theory, Hidayatullah, C.J. argued (at pp. 560, 561 of AIR). "What partnership can exist between the company and/or Board of Directors on the one hand and the menial staff employed to sweep floors on the other? What direct and essential nexus is there between such employees and production? This proves that what must be established is the existence of an industry viewed from the angle of what the employer is doing and if the definition from the angle of the employer's occupation is satisfied, all who render service and fall within the definition of workman come within the fold of industry irrespective of what they do. There is then no need to establish a partnership as such in the production of material goods or material services. Each person doing his appointed task in an organisation will be a part of the industry whether he attends to a loom or merely polishes door handles. The fact of employment as envisaged in the second part is enough provided there is an industry and the employee is a workman. The learned professions are not industry not because there is absence of such partnership but because view form the angle of employer’s occupation, they do not satisfy the test". The fact of employment as envisaged in the second part is enough provided there is an industry and the employee is a workman. The learned professions are not industry not because there is absence of such partnership but because view form the angle of employer’s occupation, they do not satisfy the test". "Although Gajendragadkar, J. in Solicitor's case ( AIR 1962 SC 1080 ) and Hidayatullah, J. in Gymkhana case ( AIR 1968 SC 554 ) agreed that the learned professions must be excluded on the question of direct or effective contribution in partnership, they flatly contradicted each other. The reasoning on this part of the case which has been articulated in the Gymkhana Club Employees Union (supra) appeals to us. There is no need for insistence upon the principle of partnership, the doctrine of direct nexus or the contribution of values by employees. Every employee in a professional office, be he a paralegal assistant or full fledged-professional employee, or down the ladder, a mere sweeper or janitor, everyone makes for the success of the office, even the mali who collects flowers and places a beautiful bunch in a vase on the table spreading fragrance and pleasantness ground. The failure of anyone can mar even the success of everyone else. Efficient collectivity is the essence of professional success. We reject the plea that a member of a learned or liberal profession, for that sole reason, can self-exclude himself form operation of the Act". 10. Mr. Ginwala, the learned lawyer on behalf of the petitioner contended that in that case there was no lis between the solicitor as a result they were not truly represented for the purpose f representation of that case. The observation in that case of the learned Judges according to Mr. Ginwala was academic and/or hypothetical in as much as there was no dispute which lay for determination by the learned Judges of the Supreme Court as to whether solicitor’s firm was an industry or not. The observation in that case of the learned Judges according to Mr. Ginwala was academic and/or hypothetical in as much as there was no dispute which lay for determination by the learned Judges of the Supreme Court as to whether solicitor’s firm was an industry or not. In the Bangalore water supply case justice chandrachud observed at page 970 as follows : - "A systematic activity which is organized or arranged in a manner in which trade or business is generally organized or arranged would be an industry dispite the fact that it proceeds form charitable motives, if any principle can be said to be settled law in this vexed field it is this : the twin consideration of profit motive and capital investment is irrelevant for determining whether an activity is an industry. Therefore, activities which are dominated by charitable motives, either in the sense that they involve the rendering of free or near-free services or in the sense that the profits which they yield are diverted to charitable purposes, are not beyond the pale of the definition in S. 2(j). The legislature will find a plausible case for exempting the learned and liberal professions of Lawyers. Doctors, Engineers, Chartered Accountants and the like form the operational of industrial laws. But until that happens, I consider that in the present state of the law it is difficult by judicial interpretation to create exemptions in favour of any particular class. The case of the clubs, on the present definition, is weaker still and not only do I consider that the definition squarely covers them, except to the limited extent indicated by Brother Krishna Iyer in his judgment, but I see no justification for amending the law so as to exclude them form the operation of the industrial laws." 11. Mr. Ginwala relied upon the observation of the learned Judges of the Supreme Court in Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co. v. M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. reported in air 1983 SC p. 239 where it was held that Court should be concern itself with hypothetical or academic questions and the learned Judges had serious reservation on the question whether it is open to a Court to answer academic or hypothetical questions when serious issues are involved. v. M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. reported in air 1983 SC p. 239 where it was held that Court should be concern itself with hypothetical or academic questions and the learned Judges had serious reservation on the question whether it is open to a Court to answer academic or hypothetical questions when serious issues are involved. There the learned judges felt that the Judges were not authorised to made disembodied pronouncements on serious and cloudy issues of constitutional policy without battle lines being properly drawn. The judicial pronouncement cannot be emmaculate legal conceptions. It is but right that an important point of law should be decided with a proper lis between the parties properly ranged on other side and of crossing swords. The learned Judges felt that it was inexpedient for the Supreme Court to delve into the problems which do not arise an express opinion thereon. Under the circumstances, Mr. Ginwala contended that in the Bangalore Water Supply case, the Solicitor's firm not being a party to the proceeding, the learned Judge's observation was in respect of a matter when there was no lis before them for determination. 12. In the case reported in AIR 1962 SC p. 1080 National Union of Commercial Employees & Anr. v. M.R. Meher, Industrial Tribunal, Bombay & Ors. the question whether the Solicitor's firm was an industry or not came for determination before the Supreme Court. There the Judges P.B. Gajendragadkar laid down the working test as to whether any activity amounts to an industry or not and after laying down the test to this effect- "The concept of industry postulate partnership between capital and labour or between the employer and his employees, it is under this partnership that the employer contributes his capital and the employees their labour and the joint contribution of capital and labour leads directly to the production which the industry has in view. In other words, the co-operation between capital and labour or between the employer and his employees which s treated as a working test in determining whether any activity amounts to an industry, is the co-operation which is directly involved in the production of goods or in the rendering of service. It cannot be suggested that every form or aspect of human activity in which capital and labour co-operate or employer and employees assist each other is an industry. It cannot be suggested that every form or aspect of human activity in which capital and labour co-operate or employer and employees assist each other is an industry. The distinguishing feature of an industry is that for the production of gods or for the rendering of service, co-operation between capital and labour or between the employer and employee must be direct and must essential". The learned Judges came to the conclusion that a solicitor's firm carrying on work of an attorney did not satisfy the test of an industry within the meaning of S. 2(j). A person following a liberal profession it was held did not carry on his profession in any intelligible sense with the active co-operative of his employees. Hence a liberal profession like that of an attorney was held deemed to be outside the definition of an industry as given under S. 2(j). 13. In the case reported in AIR 1968 SC 554 , the Secretary, Madras Gymkhana Club Employees Union v. The Management of the Gymkhana Club it was held : - "The definition of 'Industry' is in two parts. In its first part it means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers. This part of the definition determines as industry by reference to occupation of employers in respect of certain activities. These activities are specified by five words and they determine what an industry is and what the cognate expression 'industrial' is intended to convey. This is the denotation of the term or what the word denotes. We shall presently discuss what the words "business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling" comprehend. The second part view the matter form the angle of employees and is designed to include something more in what the term primarily denotes. By the second part of the definition any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen is included in the concept of industry. This part gives the extended connotation. If the activity can be described as an industry with reference to the occupation of the employers, the ambit of the industry, under the force of the second part, takes in the different kinds of activity of the employees mentioned in the second part. But the second part standing alone cannot define 'industry'. This part gives the extended connotation. If the activity can be described as an industry with reference to the occupation of the employers, the ambit of the industry, under the force of the second part, takes in the different kinds of activity of the employees mentioned in the second part. But the second part standing alone cannot define 'industry'. An individual who employs a cook gets service form his employee whose avocation is to serve as a cook but as the activity of the individual is neither business, nor trade, nor an undertaking, nor manufacture, nor calling of an employer, there is no industry. By the inclusive part of the definition the labour force employed in an industry is made an integral part of the industry for purposes of industrial disputes although industry is ordinarily something which employers create or undertake. "Every human activity in which enters the relationship of employers and employees, is not necessarily creative of an industry. Personal services rendered by domestic and other servants, administrative services of public officials, service in aid of occupations of professional men, such us doctors, and lawyers, etc, employment of teachers and so on may result in relationship in which there are employers on the one side and employees on the other but they must be excluded because they do not come within the denotation of the term 'industry' Primarily, therefore, industrial disputes occur when the operation undertaken rests upon co-operation between employers and employees with a view to production and distribution of material goods, in other words, wealth, but they may arise also in cases where the co-operation is to produce material services The normal cases are those in which the production or distribution is of material goods or wealth and they will fait within the expression trade, business and manufacture". 14. In view of the positive finding of the Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply case, this Court is of the view that there is no scope for any re-agitating the said point. That case (Bangalore water Supply Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa) from paragraph 96 onwards had expressly overruled the earlier decisions and held that exclusion of solicitors from the definition of industry would be an infliction of injury on the statutory intent and effect. In paragraph III the learned Judge expressly overruled the solicitor's case reported in AIR 1962 SC p 1080. In paragraph III the learned Judge expressly overruled the solicitor's case reported in AIR 1962 SC p 1080. In Bangalore Water Supply case at paragraph 174 Chief Justice Chandrachud held:- "Judged by these tests, I find myself unable to accept the broad formulation that a Solicitor's establishment cannot be an industry. A solicitor, undoubtedly, does not carryon trade or business when be acts for his client or advises him or pleads for him. If and when pleading is permissible to him. He persues a profession which is variously and justifiably described as learned, liberal or noble But, with great respect, I find it difficult to infer from the language of the definition in S. 2(j) as was done by this Court in The National Union of Commercial Employees v. M. R. Meher, 1962 Supp. (3) SCR 157: ( AIR 1962 SC 1080 ) that the legislature could not have intended to bring a liberal profession like that of an attorney within the ambit of the definition of industry. In Hospital Mazdoor Sabha ( AIR 1960 SC 610 ) the Court while evolving a working principle stated that an industrial activity generally involves, inter alia the co-operation of the employer and the employee. That the production of goods or the rendering of material services to the community must be the direct and proximate result of such co-operation is a further extension of that principle and it is broadly by the application thereof that a Solicitor's establishment is held not to attract the definition clause. These refinements are, with respect, not warranted by the words of the definition, apart from the consideration that in practice they make the application of the definition to concrete cases dependent upon a factual assessment so highly subjective as to lead to confusion and uncertainly in the understanding of the true legal position. Granting that the language of the definition is so wide that some limitation ought to be read into it, one must stop at a point beyond which the definition will skip into a domain too rarefled to be realistic. Whether the co-operation between the employer and the employee is the approximate cause of the ultimate product and bears direct nexus with it is a test which is almost impossible of application with any degree of assurance or certitude. Whether the co-operation between the employer and the employee is the approximate cause of the ultimate product and bears direct nexus with it is a test which is almost impossible of application with any degree of assurance or certitude. It will be as much true to say that the Solicitor's Assistant, Managing Clerk, Librarian and the Typist do not directly contribute to the intellectual and product which is a creation of his personal professional skill as that, without their active assistance and co-operation it will be impossible for him to function effectively. The unhappy state of affairs in which the law is arroned will continue to baffle the skilled professional and his employees alike as also the Judge who has to perform the unenviable tasks of sitting in judgment over the directness of the co-operation between the employer and the employee, until such time as the legislature decides to manifest its intention by the use of clear and indubious language. Besides the fad that this Court has so held in National Union of Commercial Employees, the legislature will find a plausible case for exempting the learned and liberal professions of Lawyers, Solicitors, Doctors Engineers, Chartered Accountants and the like form the operation of industrial laws. But until that happen, I consider that in the present state of law it is difficult by judicial interpretation to create exemptions in favor of any particular class." 15. In view of such observation that until the legislature finds a plausible case for exempting the learned and liberal professions of Lawyers, Solicitors, Doctors, Engineers, Chartered Accountants and the like form the operation of industrial laws and until that happened in the present state of law it was difficult by the judicial interpretation to create exemption in favour of any particular class. 16. In view of that, this court is unable to accept the contention of Mr. Ginwala that the Solicitor’s firm did not form in the category of industry as defined under S.2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 17. So far the second point of granting of interim relief, is concerned, the tribunal had come to a conclusion that a prima facie case had been made out by the workmen for grant of such interim relief. Ginwala that the Solicitor’s firm did not form in the category of industry as defined under S.2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 17. So far the second point of granting of interim relief, is concerned, the tribunal had come to a conclusion that a prima facie case had been made out by the workmen for grant of such interim relief. This court, not sitting over appeal of such finding and in the absence of any patent error apparent on the finding of Tribunal should not interfere with such finding of the Tribunal. In the case reported in 1980 Labour & Industrial Cases p. 1004 Gujrat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujrat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha & ors. where it was held tat the High Court in its jurisdiction under Article 226 would interfere with an award if it is based on a complete mis-conception of law or it is based on no evidence or that no reasonable man could have come to the conclusion to which it had arrived Such power is discretionary and the Court while discharging such jurisdiction does not sit as a Court or Appeal over the award but exercises such jurisdiction to see that the Tribunal has functioned within the scope of its legal authority. It paragraph 73 it was held :- "While the remedy under Art. 226 is extraordinary and is of Anglo-Saxon vintage, it is not a carbon copy of English processes. Article 226 is a sparing surgery but the lancet operates where injustice suppurates. While traditional restraints like availability of alternative remedy hold back the court, and judicial power should not ordinarily rush in where the other two branches fear to tread, judicial daring is not daunted where glaring injustice demands even affirmative action. The wide words of Article 226 are designed for service of the lowly numbers in their grievance if the subject belongs to the court's province and the remedy is appropriate to the judicial process. There is a native hue about Article 226, without being anglophilic or anglophobic in attitude Viewed from this jurisprudential perspective, we have to be cautious both in not overstepping as if Article 226 were as large as an appeal and not failing to intervene where a grave error bas crept in. There is a native hue about Article 226, without being anglophilic or anglophobic in attitude Viewed from this jurisprudential perspective, we have to be cautious both in not overstepping as if Article 226 were as large as an appeal and not failing to intervene where a grave error bas crept in. Moreover, we sit here in appeal over the High Court's judgment, And an appellate power interferes not when the order appeared is not right but only when it is clearly wrong. The difference is real, though fine". 18. Hence it was the view of the Supreme Court that the High Court would only interfere when such award is clearly wrong and not when it is not right only. 19. In paragraph 72 the learned Judges of the Supreme Court in the case Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. observed :- "Once we assume that the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to enquire into the alleged misconduct was exercised, was there any ground under Article 226 of the Constitution to demolish that holding ? Every wrong order cannot be righted merely because it is wrong. It can be quashed only if it is vitiated by the fundamental flaws of gross miscarriage of justice, absence of legal evidence, perverse misreading of facts, serious errors of law on the face of the order, jurisdictional failure and the like". 20. Even if the finding of the Tribunal was erroneous un1ess it resulted, in manifest injustice this Court should not interfere under the writ jurisdiction with such finding. The workmen had demanded payment by way of interim relief at the rate which is being received by the other employees of the same institution. Various guidelines for wage fixation on region cum industry basis is laid down in the various decisions of the Supreme Court lends support to the finding of the Tribunal. 21. In the case reported in AIR 1962 SC page 1175 The Kamani Metal & Alloys Ltd. v The Workmen certain principles wee enumerated by the Court on which wages were fixed The minimum wage must be paid irrespective of profit, the financial condition of the establishment or the availability workmen on lower wages. This minimum wage is independent of the kind of industry and applies to all alike big or small. It sets the lowest limit below which wages cannot be allowed to sink in. all humanity. This minimum wage is independent of the kind of industry and applies to all alike big or small. It sets the lowest limit below which wages cannot be allowed to sink in. all humanity. The second principle is that the wage must be fairly, sufficiently high to provide a standard family with food, shelter, clothing medical care and education of children. But fair wage is not living wage. Fair wage lies between minimum wage which must be paid in any event and the living wage which is the goal. The principle of industry-cum region is that fixation or revisions of scales of wages pays or dearness allowances must not be out of tune with the wages prevalent in the industry of the region. This is always desirable so that unfair competition may not result between an establishment and any diversity in the wages in the region may not lead to industrial unrest Here, in the instant Case the question of comparing one unit with another in the same region is not applicable inasmuch as in the same industry other employees are paid higher than the respondent workmen. Hence the interim award granted by the Tribunal in the same par with the employees discharging similar functions in the same establishment cannot be held to be erroneous. 22. In the case reported in AIR 1963 SC p. 1327 French Motor Car Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen similar principle of fixation wages on the principle of industry-cum-region had been approved. In the instant case, Mr. Ginwala submitted that Off Dignam & Co. paid higher wages and higher emolments to its employees compared to the other Solicitor's firm working in the same region. Be that as it may, the petitioners having aggrieved to pay higher rate to one section of its employees cannot complain that the fixation of the interim award for the other section of the employees discharging similar functions be arbitrary and irrational. 23. Be that as it may, the petitioners having aggrieved to pay higher rate to one section of its employees cannot complain that the fixation of the interim award for the other section of the employees discharging similar functions be arbitrary and irrational. 23. From the series of cases starting from AIR 1957 SC p. 227, AIR 1960 SC p.407, AIR 1976 SC p. 907, AIR 1978 SC p. 995 and 1981 (1) SCC p. 405 lays down the same principle and under the cloak of appeal in disguise, this Court should not interfere with the finding of the Tribunal unless the award passed by the Tribunal was without jurisdiction in the case of jurisdiction or there had been an error apparent on the fact of the record. A mere error would not call for any interference unless it resulted in manifest injustice to the oponent. 24. Under the circumstances, this Court is not inclined to interfere at this stage with the finding of the Tribunal. However, this would not prevent the petitioners from urging these points before the Tribunal at the time of final hearing. No order as to costs. On the prayer of Mr. A. Chaudhuri, stay granted for a fortnight. Rule discharged.