JUDGMENT : S.B. SANYAL, J. 1. Initially the writ petition was filed by Rajeshwar Das an employee of the North Eastern Railway, for quashing the ORDER :of the Divisional Mechanical Engineer (Annexure 4) as well as the decision in appeal by the Divisional Railway Manager (Annexure 5) and for all consequential benefits. On 13.8.1982 by an ORDER :of this Court on and upon the death of the petitioner his heirs were substituted leaving open the question of maintainability of the petition by the heirs. The substituted heirs sought for amendment of the prayer portion by claiming arrear salary and other benefits which Rajeshwar Das would have been entitled to in the absence of an ORDER :of dismissal from service. 2. The facts germane for adjudication of the points involved in this writ petition are that the petitioner was appointed as a fitter khalasi in the North Eastern Railway on the 10.10.1956 and thereafter in the year 1975 he was promoted to the post of basic fitter from which post he had been dismissed by the impugned ORDER :dated the 19.5.1978 (Annexure 4). The said ORDER :of dismissal was found upon two charges, namely, while on duty on 14.7.1976 he was asked to put right the engine spring balance but refused to work and thus committed disobedience of the ORDER :of his superior and misbehaved. Secondly, during the period while functioning as basic fitter his attendance between July 1975 and July 1976 had been irregular showing carelessness towards duty (Annexure 1 and 7). The said charges were enquired upon by an Enquiring Officer, who submitted his report on the 7.10.1977, and found that charge no. 1 was not found to be proved on consideration of the oral evidence and other relevant facts. As far as charge no. 2 was concerned, it was held that Rajeshwar Das was responsible for irregular attendance which showed his utter carelessness towards duty (Annexure 6). The Enquiring Authority being other than the Disciplinary Authority, the latter issued a show cause to the effect:– "On a careful consideration of the enquiry report aforesaid, the undersigned agrees with the finding (s) of the Inquiry Officer and holds that the articles of charge is proved. The Enquiring Authority being other than the Disciplinary Authority, the latter issued a show cause to the effect:– "On a careful consideration of the enquiry report aforesaid, the undersigned agrees with the finding (s) of the Inquiry Officer and holds that the articles of charge is proved. The undersigned has, therefore, provisionally come to the conclusion that Sri Rajeshwar Das is not a fit person to be retained in service and so the undersigned proposes to impose on him the penalty of removal from service. Sri Rajeshwar Das is given an opportunity of making representation to the penalty proposed but only on the basis of the evidence adduced during the enquiry (Annexure 2)." The petitioner filed his show cause wherein it was contended that charge no. 2 was not issued when he was put off duty by the authorities on 14.7.1976 on the alleged disobedience and an ORDER :of suspension was passed on 31.7.1976 but the same was added in the memorandum of charge later on at the instance of some one prejudiced to the petitioner. It was contended that his wife during the said period used to be ill and for unavoidable circumstances he had to absent himself from duty for which P.M.C. was submitted every time. The absence used to be unavoidable and was not intentional and medical certificate about the illness of the petitioner's wife used to be always submitted before resumption of duty. He used to be allowed to resume duty after acceptance of the private medical certificate. It was, therefore, contended that the question as to the second charge at belated stage did not at all arise more particularly when his period of absence was treated as leave without pay. It was further submitted that the proposed punishment of removal from service had not been weighed properly because out of the two charges the petitioner had been exonerated from the graver one. It was, therefore, prayed that the petitioner be allowed to continue in service and be paid the difference of pay for the period he was put off duty viz., 14.7.1976 the date of suspension (Annexure 3). On 19.5.1978 respondent no. 3 passed the following ORDER ::– "I have carefully considered your representation dated 10.2.1978 in reply to the memorandum of show cause notice No. P/PC/ 15 dated 10.11.1977 & 5.1.1978. On 19.5.1978 respondent no. 3 passed the following ORDER ::– "I have carefully considered your representation dated 10.2.1978 in reply to the memorandum of show cause notice No. P/PC/ 15 dated 10.11.1977 & 5.1.1978. I do not find your representation to be satisfactory and I hold you guilty of the charge leveled against you viz., irregular attendance during the period July 1975 to July 1976 showing carelessness to duty." (Annexure 4) The petitioner preferred an appeal under the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, hereinafter referred to as, the Rules, before the Divisional Railway Manager, who by a cryptic ORDER :hereunder stated dismissed the appeal:– "I have carefully considered the appeal of Sri Rajeshwar Das, Ex. Basic Fitter, Garhan shed. I am fully satisfied that the punishment has been properly imposed and I see no reason to modify the ORDER :s passed by the DME." (Annexure 5) Being aggrieved by the ORDER :of dismissal as well as the ORDER :passed on appeal, the petitioner sought for the reliefs already indicated above. 3. Before I consider the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, I would like to quote rules 10 (1), (2), (5) (a) (b), 18(ii) and 22(i), (2) (a), (b), (c) (i), (ii) and (3) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules in force from 1.10.1968 with respect to action on the inquiry report and consideration of appeal:– "10 (1)-If the disciplinary authority, having regard to its own findings where it is itself the inquiring authority, or having regard to its decision on all or any of the inquiring authority, is of the opinion that the penalty warranted is such as is within its competence, that authority may act on the evidence on the record or may, if it is of the opinion that further examination of any of the witnesses is necessary in the interests of justice, recall the witness and examine, cross-examine and re-examine the witness and may impose on the railway servant such penalty as is within its competence in accordance with these rules. Where such disciplinary authority is of the opinion that the penalty warranted is such as is not within its competence, that authority shall forward the records of the inquiry to the appropriate disciplinary authority who shall not in the manner as hereinafter provided." "10(2) The disciplinary authority, if it is not itself the inquiring authority, may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, remit the case to the inquiring authority for further inquiry and report and the inquiring authority shall thereupon proceed to hold further inquiry according to the provisions of Rule 9 as far as may be." "10. (5) (i) If the disciplinary authority, having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge, is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of sub-rule (i) of Rule 6 should be imposed on the railway servant, it shall:– (a) Furnish to the railway servant a copy of the report of the inquiry held by it and its findings on each article of charge, or, where the inquiry has been held by an inquiring authority, appointed by it, a copy of the report of such, authority and a statement of its findings on each article of charge together with brief reasons for its disagreement, if any, with the findings of the inquiring authority. (b) Give the railway servant a notice stating the penalty proposed to be imposed on him and calling upon him to submit within a specified time, ordinarily not exceeding fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the notice subject to a minimum of seven days, such representation as he may wish to make on the proposed penalty on the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry held under Rule 9." "18. Subject to the provisions of Rule 17, a railway servant may prefer an appeal against all or any of the following ORDER :s, namely:– (ii) An ORDER :imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 6 whether made by the disciplinary authority or by any appellate or reviewing authority." "22. (1) In the case of an appeal against an ORDER :of suspension the appellate authority shall consider whether in the light of the provisions of Rule 5 and having regard to the circumstances of the case the ORDER :of suspension is justified or not and confirm or revoke the ORDER :accordingly. (1) In the case of an appeal against an ORDER :of suspension the appellate authority shall consider whether in the light of the provisions of Rule 5 and having regard to the circumstances of the case the ORDER :of suspension is justified or not and confirm or revoke the ORDER :accordingly. (2) In the case of an appeal against an ORDER :imposing any of the penalties specified in rule 6 or enhancing any penalty imposed under the said Rule, the appellate authority shall consider:– (a) Whether the procedure laid down in these rules has been complied with and, if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in the violation of any provisions of the Constitution of India or in the failure of Justice. (b) Whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on the record. (c) Whether the penalty or the enhanced penalty imposed is adequate, inadequate or severe; and passed ORDER :s:– (i) Confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty. (ii) Remitting the case to the authority which imposed or enhanced the penalty or to any other authority with such directions as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. Provided that (i) the Commission shall be consulted in all cases where such consultation is necessary. (ii) If the enhanced penalty which the appellate authority proposes to impose is one of the penalties specified in clause (v) to (ix) of sub-rule (i) of Rule 6 and an inquiry under Rule 9 has not already been held in the case, the appellate authority shall, subject to the provisions of Rule 14, itself hold such inquiry or direct that such inquiry be held in accordance with the provisions of Rule 9 and thereafter, on a consideration of the proceedings of such inquiry and after giving the appellant a reasonable opportunity, as far as may be in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule (5) or Rule 10 of making a representation against the penalty proposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such ORDER :s as it may deem fit. (iii) If the enhanced penalty which the appellate authority proposes to impose is one of the penalties specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of sub-rule (i) of Rule 6 and an inquiry under Rule 9 has already been held in the case, the appellate authority shall, after giving the appellant a reasonable opportunity, as far as may be in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule (5) pf Rule 10 of making a representation against the penalty proposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry, make such ORDER :s as it may deem fit. (iv) No ORDER :imposing an enhanced penalty shall be made in any other case unless the appellant has been given a reasonable opportunity, as far as may be in accordance with the provisions of Rule 11 of making a representation against such enhanced penalty. (3) In an appeal against any other ORDER :specified in Rule 18, the appellate authority shall consider all the circumstances of the case and make such ORDER :s as it may deem just and equitable." 4. The learned lawyer appearing for the petitioners contended that the ORDER :s contained in Annexure 4 and 5 are per se illegal, being violative of rules extracted above in as much as in forming the opinion that a particular penalty is warranted the disciplinary authority has not rendered its decision on all or any of the findings of the inquiry authority. Further, while passing the punishment of removal it did not consider, as was required of it, the representation beyond making a bald statement of having carefully considered the same. The reply of petitioner Rajeshwar Das to the show cause raised serious contentions in the background of the gravamen of the charge of insubordination having failed; but there is nothing to show that these circumstances were borne in mind while rejecting the reply to the show cause. Similarly, it was contended that even though. under rule 22(3) the appellate authority is statutorily required to consider all the circumstances of the case and make such ORDER :s as it may think fit and equitable, the appellate authority rejected the appeal by merely stating "I have carefully considered the appeal" which is no substitute for a speaking ORDER :and/or consideration of all the circumstances of the case. Learned Counsel further contended that from the scheme of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules it should be manifest that the Disciplinary Authority in forming the opinion must bear in mind all aspects of the matter and it should be so manifest from the ORDER :passed. Learned Counsel fairly stated that by this he does not mean that the Disciplinary and the Appellate Authorities should discuss evidence as if a JUDGMENT : of a judicial tribunal but must record such reason for rejecting the representation, and in support thereof he relied upon various decisions which I will consider. 5. Learned Counsel for the Railways, on the contrary, submitted that since the Disciplinary Authority was affirming the inquiry report and its decision was in agreement, there is no requirement for giving reasons beyond the fact that the ORDER :must indicate that there has been a consideration of the inquiry report. Learned Counsel further raised the question that the cause of action being personal to the deceased petitioner, his legal heirs cannot continue the writ and obtain the relief sought for in the case whereas learned Counsel for the petitioners contends that the present petitioners are persons aggrieved since they are entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased. According to the petitioners' contention if the ORDER :s passed are declared null and void, the present petitioners will be entitled to recover the salary due to the deceased petitioner as well as the pecuniary benefits. They being thus persons affected, a decision to withhold remedies against unlawful action may make inroads upon the rule of law and defeat the advancement of justice. 6. So far as the first question is concerned, learned Counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decisions of R. Venkata Rao vs. Divisional Superintendent, South Eastern Railway, Waltair, 1979 (1) S.L.R. 363, Chandrashanker Chunilal vs. State of Gujarat 1977 (2) S.L.R. 270 and the Union of India vs. Sashi Bhushan Biswas, A.I.R. 1970 Calcutta 545. 6. So far as the first question is concerned, learned Counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decisions of R. Venkata Rao vs. Divisional Superintendent, South Eastern Railway, Waltair, 1979 (1) S.L.R. 363, Chandrashanker Chunilal vs. State of Gujarat 1977 (2) S.L.R. 270 and the Union of India vs. Sashi Bhushan Biswas, A.I.R. 1970 Calcutta 545. In the case of Chandrashanker Chunilal, which related to a case under section 311 (2) of the Constitution, as it stood before its amendment, D.A. Desai, J. (as be then was), while considering a situation where the Enquiry Authority and the Disciplinary Authority are two different bodies, at the second stage where the delinquent officer interposed himself in response to the notice as to the proposed punishment and pointed out certain defects and the Disciplinary Authority disposed it of by merely stating that having considered the reply, it chose to accept the finding of the Enquiry Officer without giving reasons, observed:– "it is alibi for not applying the mind and not giving reasons and it cannot be countenanced. And if a cryptic statement like this, that the Government has come to the conclusion that the charge against the delinquent officer is proved, amounts to giving reasons, the whole gamut of quasi-judicial inquiry and duty to give reasons would stand defeated. The reply of the delinquent officer questioning the correctness of the finding, the legality of the enquiry and other contentions provide a stage which calls for application of mind and in ORDER :to show that mind has been applied, reasons will have to be given, because, when the reasons are given, any other body including the High Court under Article 226 can ascertain from those given reasons whether mind was applied or not. The magic formula of carefully considering the reply given cannot be an adequate substitute for giving reasons." This decision of the Gujarat High Court has been affirmed while dealing with the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in R. Venkata Rao's case (supra). The magic formula of carefully considering the reply given cannot be an adequate substitute for giving reasons." This decision of the Gujarat High Court has been affirmed while dealing with the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in R. Venkata Rao's case (supra). Similar view has been taken by the Calcutta High Court in the case of Union or India vs. Sashi Bhushan Biswas (supra) while considering Rule 1713 of the Railways Establishment Code, Volume I which reads:– "The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it is not the Inquiring Authority, consider the record of the Inquiry and record of its findings on each charge." D. Basu, J., speaking for the Court, observed that the relevant provisions of the Railway Code "palpably go beyond the requirements of Article 311(2) of the Constitution, and require the punishing authority to apply his mind to the materials on the record over again even where he may agree with the findings of the Inquiry officer". Mr. Ojha, on the other hand, submitted that the decision rendered by the Calcutta High Court has gone a little too far in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Union of India vs. K. Rejappa Menon, A.I.R. 1970 Supreme Court 748, where the Supreme Court while dealing with Rule 1713 observed that all that the Rule requires is that the record of the enquiry should be considered and the Disciplinary Authority should proceed to give its findings on each charge. This does not and cannot mean that it is obligatory on the Disciplinary Authority to discuss the evidence and the facts and circumstances established at the departmental enquiry in details and write as if it were an ORDER :or a JUDGMENT : of a judicial tribunal. Learned Counsel further referred to the decision in Tara Chand Khatri vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, A.I.R. 1977 Supreme Court 567 to the effect that although it may be necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to record its provisional conclusions in the notice calling upon the delinquent officer to show cause why the proposed punishment be not imposed upon him if it differs from the findings arrived at by the Enquiring Officer with regard to the charge, it is not obligatory to do so in case the Disciplinary Authority concurs with the findings of the Enquiring officer. He has also referred to the decisions in Krishna Chandra Tandon vs. The Union of India, 1974 (2) S.L.R. 178. The Union of India vs. Mahabir Prasad Srivastava, 1973 (1) S.L.R. 813 and State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Om Prakash Gupta, 1969 S.L.R 890 to the effect that in the event of the Disciplinary Authority concurring with the findings of the Enquiring Officer it is not necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to give any detailed reasons or discuss the evidence as if it were a JUDGMENT : of a judicial tribunal. It is true, as laid down in the case of the State of Assam vs. Bimal Kumar Pandit, A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court 1612 by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court that it is not the requirement of Article 311(2) that in every case the punishing authority should in its ORDER :require the civil servant to show cause not only against the punishment inflicted upon him but also the reasons for coming to that conclusion. It was further clarified in the said case that the view is not Justified that the appropriate authority must state the grounds or reasons for proposing to take any specific action against the delinquent Government servants, therefore, agree with Mr. Ojha that the show cause notice (Annexure 2) cannot be seriously questioned because of the failure of the authority in passing a reasoned ORDER :as to why the proposed punishment is sought to be inflicted. "The desirability of writing a self-contained speaking ORDER :in disciplinary proceeding culminating in an ORDER :of removal of the delinquent from service cannot be over-emphasised." Nand Kishore Prasad vs. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1978 Supreme Court 1277 at 1281. It has been rightly observed in Tara Chand Khatri's case (supra) that every case has to be judged in the light of its own fact and circumstances and that as a general rule an ORDER :cannot be stated to be non-speaking simply because it is brief and not elaborate. This observation was made while dealing with the question of a disciplinary or administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions to state reasons. 7. This observation was made while dealing with the question of a disciplinary or administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions to state reasons. 7. Coming to the instant case, we are concerned with the stage where the delinquent officer had interposed himself by filing a detailed show cause giving, cogent reasons as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted, he having already been found not guilty of the charge of insubordination which was really the major charge against him. He had further stated to have been all supported by the medical certificates in relation to his wife's illness and at all relevant times those certificates were accepted and he was allowed to resume duty treating his absence as leave without pay. The Disciplinary Authority in spite of such contentions having been put forth rejected the same by making a bald statement of having carefully considered the representation and imposed the penalty of removal from service. As against this ORDER :an appeal lies under the statutory rules. As the ORDER :is appealable it has to be a speaking one as has been held in the case of Bhagta Raja vs. Union of India, A.I.R. 1967 Supreme Court 1606 and Mahabir Prasad vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1970 Supreme Court 1302 otherwise the remedy of appeal would be an empty formality. "Having carefully considered" has been held to be not a substitute for a speaking ORDER :–See Travancore Rayons vs. Union of India, A.I.R. 1971 Supreme Court 862. It has also been authoritatively settled by their Lordships of their Supreme Court in Bachhitar Singh vs. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court 395 and Union of India vs. H.C. Goel, A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 364, that both the stage of enquiry against a delinquent Government officer are equally judicial and, therefore, any action decided to be taken against a Government servant found guilty of misconduct is to be taken in a quasi-judicial manner. That being so, the punishing authority was bound to support its ORDER :removing the petitioner with reasons and it became still greater because of the provisions of rule 18 of the Rules conferring on the petitioner a statutory right of appeal against the ORDER :of dismissal. That being so, the punishing authority was bound to support its ORDER :removing the petitioner with reasons and it became still greater because of the provisions of rule 18 of the Rules conferring on the petitioner a statutory right of appeal against the ORDER :of dismissal. In the absence of any reason whatsoever, what to speak of some reasons in support of the ORDER :, this court is left guessing as to why the petitioner's explanation was not found satisfactory. Was it because the medical certificates were subsequently found to be false or fabricated? Under what circumstances he was allowed to resume his duty after return from leave? Why earlier action was not initiated against him for his remaining absent from duty? Why initially this was not the charge formulated against him while putting him off duty and scores of other questions as to why a minor punishment could not have met the situation. The High Court is thus placed under a great disadvantage for the authorities not giving reasons while disposing of the statutory representation which is of a quasi-judicial nature. This disadvantage was not removed even by the appellate ORDER :which mandates "the appellate authority to 'consider' all the circumstances of the case and make such ORDER :s as it may deem just and equitable." Here also this Court is faced with the same disadvantage as the ORDER :of the appellate authority gives no reasons beyond stating that after careful consideration the appeal is dismissed. The word 'consider' appearing under rule 22(3) has definite import. H.R. Khanna, J., in the case of Barium Chemicals vs. A.J. Rana, A.I.R. 1972 Supreme Court 591, speaking for the Court, observed:– "The words 'considers it necessary' postulate that the authority concerned has thought over the matter deliberately and with care and it has been found necessary as a result of such thinking to pass the ORDER :. The dictionary meaning of the word 'consider' is to view attentively, to survey, examine, inspect (arch) to look attentively to contemplate mentally, to think over, meditate on give heed to, take note of, to think deliberately, bethink oneself, to reflect (vide Shorter Oxford Dictionary). According to Words and Phrases-Permanent Edn. Volume 8-A to 'consider' means to think with care. The dictionary meaning of the word 'consider' is to view attentively, to survey, examine, inspect (arch) to look attentively to contemplate mentally, to think over, meditate on give heed to, take note of, to think deliberately, bethink oneself, to reflect (vide Shorter Oxford Dictionary). According to Words and Phrases-Permanent Edn. Volume 8-A to 'consider' means to think with care. It is also mentioned that to 'consider' is to fix the mind upon with a view to careful examination, to ponder, study, meditate upon, think or reflect with care." In my opinion, therefore, both the original ORDER :and the appellate ORDER :are required to be a speaking one under rules 10 and 22 of the Rules and that not having been done there was an error of law apparent on the face of the ORDER :s and are thus declared to be null and void. There does not appear to be really any application of mind to the representation filed either by the original court or by the appellate court. I, therefore, uphold the submission of learned Counsel for the petitioners that the ORDER :contained in Annexure 4, the ORDER :of removal, and the appellate ORDER :(Annexure 5) affirming the same are void and inoperative in law and, the before, the deceased petitioner would be deemed to be in service irrespective of the said two ORDER :s and shall be entitled to all the benefits as if he has continued in service till the date of his death. Giving of reasons in support of a quasi-judicial ORDER :is also a basic principle of natural justice, Siemens Engineering vs. Union of India, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1785. 8. The next question, however, is whether after the death of the original petitioner his legal heirs are entitled to the said declaration having been substituted in this Court and other consequential benefits. The legal heirs have claimed that after declaring the ORDER :of dismissal to be null and void which was initiated by the employee himself, they may be paid the amount of salary due to him as well as other consequential reliefs since they are entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased. "In ORDER :to seek judicial review upon administrative action, one has to satisfy the Court that he has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates. "In ORDER :to seek judicial review upon administrative action, one has to satisfy the Court that he has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates. He has to be a person aggrieved which means one whose legal rights have been infringed or who has any other substantial interest in impugning an ORDER :, may be awarded a certiorari ex debito justitiae if he can establish any of the recognised grounds for quashing but the court retain, a discretion to refuse his application if his conduct has been such as to disentitle him to relief." See De Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Act, Fourth Edition, pages 415 and 418. Who is said to be 'any person aggrieved' to invoke the remedy under the Constitution of India? This phrase used at common law to define standing for obtaining certiorari and prohibition bears a very wide meaning, so that virtually anyone concerned in any way falls within it. To withhold remedies even though to be exercised carefully with respect to unlawful administrative act, which is ex hypothesi ultra vires, may amount to inroads upon the rule of law (See Administrative Law by H.W.R. Wade at pages 592 and 619). In the case of Ibrahimbhai Karimbhai vs. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1968 Gujarat 202, it was held that the legal heirs in the circumstances aforesaid, who are entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased, are the aggrieved parties and they have a right to sue viz., right to obtain the relief sought for. The Supreme Court in the case of L.G. Chaudhari vs. The Secretary, L.S.G. Department, Government of Bihar, A.I.R. 1980 Supreme Court 383, permitted the legal heirs to obtain the declaration that the termination of the employee's probationary period was unlawful and that he should be treated to have been appointed permanently to the post of Town Planner and directed the Government after such a declaration to pay all arrears to the legal representatives. Similar relief was granted by the Supreme Court to the legal heirs in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Mohd. Sharif, A.I.R. 1982 Supreme Court 937. The relief granted was to make available to the legal heirs of the deceased the payment of arrears of salary and other emoluments payable to the deceased. Similar relief was granted by the Supreme Court to the legal heirs in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Mohd. Sharif, A.I.R. 1982 Supreme Court 937. The relief granted was to make available to the legal heirs of the deceased the payment of arrears of salary and other emoluments payable to the deceased. The learned lawyer for the railways has drawn my attention to the recent single Judge decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Dr. U. Sadashiva Shetty vs. Chief Executive Officer, 1985 Labour and Industrial Cases 273, where it was held that the cause of action dies with the death of the petitioner and "if this is not read, then all pending proceedings in a court will have to be permitted to be continued by the legal representatives irrespective of the fact whether the cause of action survives or not." By this observation the learned Judge differed from the Division Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court in Ibrahimbhai Karimbhai case (supra). Learned Counsel also strongly relied upon the case of P.V. Sarma vs. Chairman, Committee of Management, the S.C. Railway Employees Co-op. Credit Society, Secunderabad, A.I.R. 1977 Andhra Pradesh 319. In this case the only prayer in the writ petition was to quash the ORDER :of removal from service. The Court disagreed with the views expressed in Ibrahimbhai Karimbhai (supra). It preferred to follow the view taken by the Punjab High Court in the case of Manmohan Anand vs. State of Punjab, 1972 S.L.R. 852 and the view expressed by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Jagdish Prasad Mathur vs. United Provinces Government, A.I.R. 1956 Allahabad 114 and observed "whether a particular right of action survives to the legal representatives or not the correct approach in our view is to consider what the right claimed in the proceeding is. If the right is purely a personal one then the right to sue cannot survive. The mere fact that there is a possibility of the petitioner obtaining further reliefs in case he succeeds in establishing the right which he claims in the particular proceeding cannot be taken into account in determining whether the right to sue survives or not". If the right is purely a personal one then the right to sue cannot survive. The mere fact that there is a possibility of the petitioner obtaining further reliefs in case he succeeds in establishing the right which he claims in the particular proceeding cannot be taken into account in determining whether the right to sue survives or not". And after having so observed it held that the writ petition abated since the legal representatives were not entitled to the declaration and as such the question of granting the second relief did not arise. In P.V. Sarma's case (supra) their Lordships of the Andhra Pradesh High Court had no occasion to notice the two decisions of the Supreme Court where much a relief was allowed to the legal representatives. Presumably the legal representatives have substantial interest in impugning the ORDER :and they are very much concerned with the unlawful action sought to be remedied. In my opinion, the view taken by the Gujarat High Court is in accord with the views of the Supreme Court, which I respectfully follow. I may incidentally refer to another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Press Trust of India vs. Union of India, A.I.R. 1974 Supreme Court 1044, where their Lordships permitted the legal heirs to be substituted as it would further the interest of justice instead of driving the legal heirs in filing a separate writ petition. In the case of Vridhachalam vs. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1966 Madras 260, the Court while refusing the writ for a declaration observed that the legal representatives of the delinquent officer had to file a fresh suit to recover from toe State such emoluments and other monetary benefits which the delinquent officer would have been entitled to during the period he was kept out of office. According to the said decision, the issue of a writ was only sought as a step towards further legal steps which the legal representatives of the deceased officer proposed to take. This case was rightly dissented in Ibrahimbhai's Karimbhai case (supra) because that would not be in furtherance of advancement of justice but prolonging the litigation which was countenanced by the Supreme Court In the case of Press Trust of India (supra). This case was rightly dissented in Ibrahimbhai's Karimbhai case (supra) because that would not be in furtherance of advancement of justice but prolonging the litigation which was countenanced by the Supreme Court In the case of Press Trust of India (supra). I, therefore, find no merit in the second submission of learned Counsel that on and upon the death of the concerned employee the writ petition abated and the legal representatives are not entitled to any relief whatsoever. 9. In the result, the writ petition is allowed, the ORDER :removing the petitioner from service (Annexure 4) and the ORDER :in appeal affirming the said decision (Annexure 5) are hereby quashed as being void and inoperative in law. I further direct the Railway to pay to the legal representatives all salaries due to the concerned employee as if he continued in service till the date of his death and to pay them also other benefits admissible to the concerned employee including pension etc. The payments to the legal representatives must be made within six months from today. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 250/-.