JUDGEMENT In this application under Ss. 397, 401 and 482, Cr. P.C., heard as contested application, the petitioner has prayed for setting aside the judgment delivered by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, 6th Court, Sealdah, in Case No. M-7 of 1984, so far as her prayer for getting maintenance from her husband is concerned. 2. The petitioner-wife filed an application against her husband, the opposite party No. 1, under S. 125, Cr. P.C. for her maintenance and maintenance of her two daughters. Her case was that she was married with the opposite party No. 1 on 15-4-1975 according to Hindu rites. With a short period of the marital life, the husband began to torture the petitioner both physically and mentally. The husband demanded money through the petitioner from her father. After four months of the marriage, the husband drove out the petitioner from his house without any cause and asked her not to come back. At the intervention of the petitioner's father, the matter was settled and the petitioner was taken to the house of her husband. The husband assaulted the petitioner mercilessly very often and even asked her to commit suicide. In Feb. 1980, the opposite party No. 1 drove away again the petitioner from his house after assaulting her. The petitioner took shelter in the house of her father with her children. At the intervention of the brother and father of the petitioner, the matter was again settled mutually and the petitioner was taken to her husband's house. Two daughters and a son were born out of the wedlock of the petitioner with the opposite party No. 1. The husband kept the son with him. On 23-12-1983, the petitioner along with her two daughters went to her father's house. It was decided that the opposite party No. 1 would go to her father's house on 25-12-1983. Accordingly, on 25-12-1983, the opposite party No. 1 went to the house of the petitioner's father and took lunch there. At about 2 p.m. on 25-12-1983, when the husband-opposite party No. 1 was about to leave the house of the petitioner's father, he suddenly took his shoe and assaulted the petitioner and asked her not to return to his house. All attempts for mutual settlements failed thereafter. As such, the petitioner filed the petition under S. 125 Cr. P.C., claiming maintenance at the rate of Rs. All attempts for mutual settlements failed thereafter. As such, the petitioner filed the petition under S. 125 Cr. P.C., claiming maintenance at the rate of Rs. 400/- for herself and at the rate of Rs. 400/- for her two daughters per month on alleging that the opposite party No. 1 was an Assistant Director of the Bureau of Applied Economics and Statistics, Government of West Bengal, and drew salary of Rs. 1,600/- per month. 3. The case was contested by the opposite party No. 1 by filing a written objection wherein all the material allegations by the petitioner were denied. It was alleged that the opposite party No. 1 went to bring back the petitioner to his house and that the father and the elder brother of the petitioner instigated the petitioner not to come with him. It was also alleged that the opposite party No. 1 remitted money to the petitioner by money order for her expenses and that the money order was refused. 4. Three witnesses were examined by the petitioner, including herself. The petitioner examined herself as P. W. 1. Her brother, Aloke Banerjee, was examined as P.W. 2. P.W. 3 was a constable, who was examined to prove a G.D. entry, Ext. 4, by the petitioner at Manicktala P.S. at 2-20 p.m. on 26-12-1983, after the alleged occurrence of assault on the petitioner by the opposite party No. 1 at about 2-30 p.m. on 25-12-1983. The opposite party No. 1 did not examine himself. He did not examine any witness. A bunch of letters were marked exhibits in the case. On a scrutiny of the evidences of the P.Ws. and the documentary evidences, the learned Magistrate passed an order for maintenance for each of the two daughters of the petitioner at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month. The learned Magistrate did not pass any order for maintenance of the petitioner on holding, inter alia, that there was no just or reasonable ground for the petitioner to live separately from her husband. It was observed by the learned Magistrate that during trial the opposite party No. 1 filed an application expressing his desire to take back his wife and that the petitioner did not respond to his application. It was observed by the learned Magistrate that during trial the opposite party No. 1 filed an application expressing his desire to take back his wife and that the petitioner did not respond to his application. The learned Magistrate was also of the opinion that there was no neglect or refusal by the opposite party No. 1 to maintain his wife as the money order sent by the opposite party No. 1 was refused by the petitioner. It is against this order of the learned Magistrate, rejecting the prayer of the petitioner for her maintenance, that the present revisional application has been filed. The contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner is that the learned Magistrate erred in not passing any order for maintenance for the petitioner. The learned Advocate for the State has also argued that the learned Magistrate ought to have allowed the prayer of the petitioner for maintenance. The learned Advocate for the opposite party No. 1 has submitted that, on the basis of the materials on record, the learned Magistrate was justified in passing the order, refusing maintenance of the petitioner. He has drawn my attention to several facts to justify his contention. According to him, the evidences of the petitioner (P.W. 1) and her brother (P.W. 2) are that the opposite party No. 1 came to the house of the father of the petitioner on 25-12-1983 and took lunch before the alleged occurrence. The G.D. entry, Ext. 4, however shows that at about 2-30 p.m. on 25-12-1983, the husband went to his father-in-law's house, where the petitioner was staying from 23-12-1983 and assaulted the petitioner with shoe across the face on trifle affairs. The learned Advocates for the O.P. No. 1 has also drawn my attention to the evidences of P.Ws. 1 and 2 that it was decided after lunch on 25-12-1983 that they would return on that date, though it was stated in one letter dated 17-12-1983, Ext. B, written by the father of the petitioner to the mother of the opposite party No. 1 that he would take them (the petitioner and her daughters) to the house of the opposite party No. 1. The contention is that these discrepancies read with another letter, Ext. B, written by the father of the petitioner to the mother of the opposite party No. 1 that he would take them (the petitioner and her daughters) to the house of the opposite party No. 1. The contention is that these discrepancies read with another letter, Ext. 1/3, dated 7-3-1984, written by the husband to the wife, show that the opposite party No. 1 was all along willing to live with the petitioner and that the petitioner had refused to stay with the opposite party No. 1 without any sufficient reason. The contention is that, on the basis of the provisions in S. 125(4), Cr. P.C., the wife is not entitled to receive any maintenance allowance from her husband as she, without any sufficient reason, has refused to live with her husband. The learned Advocate for the opposite party No. 1 has supported the findings of the learned Magistrate that there was no torture or cruelty by the opposite party No. 1 on the petitioner and that there was no refusal or neglect by the opposite party No. 1 to maintain the petitioner. 5. After considering the submissions of the learned advocates for the respective parties, I am unable to persuade myself to believe that there was no cruelty towards the petitioner by her husband. There is no clear-cut definition of cruelty for any matrimonial offence. There can be judicial separation under S. 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, if the husband treats the wife with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the wife that it will be harmful or injurious for the wife to live with the husband. Cruelty, thus, postulates a treatment of the petitioner with cruelty and is not confined only to physical cruelty. One view appears to be that, in considering the question of cruelty, one should consider as to whether the wife would be called upon to endure the conduct of the opposite party No. 1 even if it was cruel and whether the conduct of the opposite party No. 1 was excusable, considering the relationship of husband and wife between the parties. Such a view is not a proper view as there cannot be two standards or discrimination between the husband and wife for judging legal cruelty. As already stated, the opposite party No. 1 did not venture to face the witness-box. Such a view is not a proper view as there cannot be two standards or discrimination between the husband and wife for judging legal cruelty. As already stated, the opposite party No. 1 did not venture to face the witness-box. The evidences of the petitioner about the alleged cruel treatment meted out to her by the husband by assaulting her and driving her out from the house of her husband on at least two occasions, once after about four months of the marriage and for the second time in Feb. 1980, remain, thus, practically unchallenged. Taken with these facts one is to consider the G.D. entry, Ext. 4. No doubt, there is delay of about one day in lodging information at Manicktala P. S. at 2-20 p.m. on 26-12-1983. No doubt, again there is a discrepancy of the contents of the G. D. entry vis-a-vis the evidences of the P.Ws. 1 and 2 as to whether the alleged assault on the wife took place just after the petitioner's husband went to the house of the father of the petitioner at about 2-30 p.m. on 25-12-1983 or after the husband had earlier been to that house and had taken lunch. These discrepancies are to be considered along with the other fact that the wife is complaining about assault on her face by the husband with shoe. So far as the story of assault with shoe is concerned, there is no discrepancy in the evidences of the P.Ws. 1 and 2 or in the G. D. entry. The learned Advocate for the opposite party No. 1 drew my attention to the cases reported in AIR 1934 Cal 766 : (36 Cri LJ 364) Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, Bengal v. Forhad and AIR 1975 SC 308 Kanwar Lal v. Amarnath and has argued that, though the G. D. entry, Ext. 4, was admissible in evidence under S. 35 of the Evidence Act, it was a very weak type of evidence, specially when it is in the cross-examination of P.W. 3 that he had no personal knowledge about the contents of the G. D. entry. Even the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kanwar Lal (Supra) goes to show, that the G. D. entry could be considered as a corroborative piece of evidence. When the handwriting of the G. D. entry, Ext. Even the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kanwar Lal (Supra) goes to show, that the G. D. entry could be considered as a corroborative piece of evidence. When the handwriting of the G. D. entry, Ext. 4, has been proved by P.W. 3, there is no reason why it cannot be used to corroborate the evidence of P.W. 1 about assault on her by her husband by shoe on 25-12-1983. The standard of proof in a case of cruelty for a matrimonial offence is not one of beyond reasonable doubt and a slight corroboration is sufficient to uphold the contention of either the wife or the husband. The learned Magistrate referred to two letters, Exts. 1 and 1(3), and remained satisfied with observing that these letters showed the strenuous relationship between the opposite party No. 1 and his brother-in-law (P.W. 2). Besides showing their strenuous relationships, these letters Exts. 1 and 1/1, reveal that the husband was emphatic in these letters that there would be no place for his wife in his house. It is stated in one of these letters that if his wife had told that the opposite party No. 1 had kicked her on her face, he had assaulted. These letters written even by the opposite party No. 1 corroborate the evidences of P.W. 1 about physical and mental torture to her by her husband. In such circumstances, it cannot be at all stated that there was no cruelty or torture on the wife by the husband. The learned Advocate for the opposite party No. 1 has drawn my attention to the evidences of P.W. 1 to the effect that she would go to her husband's house if her husband allowed her relatives to see her and did not drive them away. It has been argued that this showed that the wife was willing to go to the house of the opposite party No. 1 and that some other person or persons were pulling the strings from behind so that the wife did not return to her husband's place. This contention cannot be accepted, on a scrutiny of the other evidences of P.W. 1. At one place in cross-examination, P.W. 1 stated that she would certainly go to her husband's place if her husband behaved with her well and promised not to assault her. This contention cannot be accepted, on a scrutiny of the other evidences of P.W. 1. At one place in cross-examination, P.W. 1 stated that she would certainly go to her husband's place if her husband behaved with her well and promised not to assault her. P.W. 1 then stated that every woman wanted to live with her husband. This is actually the mental make-up of practically every married woman. Every married woman wants to live with her husband. If the husband be cruel towards the wife and ill-treats the wife, the wife may reasonably expect promise from her husband not to ill-treat her before returning to her husband's place. This is nothing unnatural on the part of the wife. It is in the evidence of P.W. 1 that her mother-in-law used to like her. Naturally, if the letters, Ext. A collectively, from the petitioner to her mother-in-law during the period from 3-7-1976 to 27-3-1981 did not mention about the alleged ill-treatment on her by her husband, no inference can be drawn that there was no ill-treatment of the wife by the husband. Similarly, if, in the letters, Ext. C collectively, the father of the petitioner does not complain about any ill-treatment of the wife by the husband by writing these letters to the opposite party No. 1 or his mother, it cannot be inferred that there was no torture or ill-treatment of the wife. Every such father-in-law wants that a dispute between his daughter and his son-in-law should be settled amicably as far as possible, specially when there were three children born out of the wedlock and the son, born out of the wedlock, was being kept by the husband. If mention of ill-treatment of wife by husband adds fuel to the fire, a father-in-law is not expected to mention it by writing to his son-in-law or the mother of the son-in-law so as to erode possibility of mutual settlement and reconciliation between the spouse, which is always hoped by the father-in-law. The learned Magistrate was not, thus, justified in disbelieving the torture or ill-treatment due to non-mention of any ill-treatment or torture in any of these letters. The learned Magistrate opined about non-corroboration of the evidences of P.W. 1. As already stated, the G. D. entry, Ext. 4, corroborates P.W. 1. The learned Magistrate mentioned about non-examination of any parent of P.W. 1. The learned Magistrate opined about non-corroboration of the evidences of P.W. 1. As already stated, the G. D. entry, Ext. 4, corroborates P.W. 1. The learned Magistrate mentioned about non-examination of any parent of P.W. 1. The non-examination of any parent of P.W. 1 is to be viewed in the context of non-examination of the opposite party No. 1 himself. Moreover, the petitioner examined her brother as P.W. 2. The learned Magistrate observed about non-examination of any member of the tenanted family in the house. It is in the evidence of P.W. 1 that one tenanted family stayed in the floor, in the stair-case of which the occurrence of assault by shoe occurred. It is not expected that a husband will assault his wife in presence of any tenant. It is not the evidence that at the time of the assault, any tenant or any of the parents of the petitioner was present. The non-examination of any tenant does not, thus, call for any adverse inference against the petitioner's case. 6. The fact that the husband thought it prudent to send a money order, which was refused, as well as the fact that the husband filed a petition in the court below for taking back his wife with him, without going to the house of the petitioner's father even for a single day after 25-12-1983 for bringing back the petitioner, go to show the mind of the opposite party No. 1. The opposite party No. 1 wants to prove by sending the money order that he has not refused or neglected to maintain his wife. The neglect of the husband to maintain his wife is, however, evident from the fact that apart from sending one money order, which was refused, the husband did not send any other money order to the wife and did not even care to go to the house of his father-in-law even for a single day after 25-12-1983 for bringing back the petitioner with him. 7. In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that the learned Magistrate erred in holding that there was no neglect or refusal by the husband to maintain his wife or that there was no just or reasonable ground for the petitioner to live separately from her husband. 7. In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that the learned Magistrate erred in holding that there was no neglect or refusal by the husband to maintain his wife or that there was no just or reasonable ground for the petitioner to live separately from her husband. In my opinion, the ill-treatment and cruelty of the husband towards his wife is a sufficient cause for the wife's refusal to live with her husband. The provisions of S. 125(4), Cr. P.C. cannot, thus, debar the wife to claim maintenance. I am also of the opinion that the wife has proved that she is. unable to maintain herself and that the husband has neglected to maintain the wife. The revisional application is, accordingly, to be allowed. 8. The revisional application is, accordingly, allowed. The judgment of the learned Magistrate in Case No. M-7 of 1984. in so far as it relates to rejection of the prayer of the petitioner for her maintenance from her husband, is set aside. The case is sent back on remand to the court of the learned Magistrate for fixation of the quantum of maintenance to be paid by the opposite party No. 1 to the petitioner and the date from which it will be payable, on the basis of the evidences on record. None of the parties will be entitled to adduce any further evidence in the court below. The learned Magistrate will try to dispose of the case as early as possible and preferably within three months of the receipt of this order. 9. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the court below by special messenger at the cost of the petitioner. Revision allowed.