Judgment :- 1. The short question for consideration in this criminal miscellaneous petition is whether a criminal appeal disposed of by this Court could be reopened and reheard invoking the inherent powers under S.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. Very old criminal appeals and revision petitions are pending disposal in this Court. Parties and counsels have lost interest in most of them. Even after continuous posting in the hearing list nobody turns up even to ask for an adjournments. Sending messengers to get the counsel usually turns out to be futile attempts for consecutive days. Those cases cannot be kept pending indefinitely. Disposal for default is not permitted. In such cases the only course open to the Court is to dispose of them on the merits after perusing evidence, if possible, by hearing the Public Prosecutor or the available counsel or party. That was the fate of Crl. A. 157 of 1982. Since there was no other go, the Public Prosecutor was heard and evidence perused. The appeal was disposed of on the merits on 7-8-1985. It was an appeal by the State against acquittal. The appeal was allowed and the respondents were convicted and sentenced. Now counsel for the respondent in his affidavit says that he was waiting in some other Court thinking that his case before this Court may not be taken up at that time. He may be correct. But that is not the question. The question is whether law permits such reopening and rehearing. The prayer could be allowed only if it is either permitted or not prohibited by law. 3. Even though the petition is filed under S.482 of the Code, what is involved is only review of the judgment. The Code of Civil Procedure contain specific provisions for setting aside dismissals for default, reopening exparte decrees and reviewing judgments or orders. Corresponding provisions are not there in the Code of Criminal Procedure for obvious reasons. In fact S.362 of the Code contains an express prohibition that save as otherwise provided, no court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. 4. It is evident that the prayer in the present petition is what is expressly prohibitted by S.362. That prohibition cannot be overcome under the cover of S.482. 4. It is evident that the prayer in the present petition is what is expressly prohibitted by S.362. That prohibition cannot be overcome under the cover of S.482. S.482 is intended to give effect to orders, prevent abuse of process of courts or otherwise to secure the ends of justice in the absence of any specific provision of law. Where there is a specific provision parties must have recourse to that provision and not invoke S.482 So also what is prohibited by an express provision cannot be sought to be achieved under S.482. In Madhu Limaye's case (AIR 1978 SC 47) the Supreme Court has exhaustively discussed the law relating to inherent powers of the High Court in criminal matters and held that for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, if interference by the High Court is necessary, nothing in any other provision will limit or affect the exercise of such power. But that power is intended to be exercised very sparingly in cases where the High Court is of opinion that otherwise there is grave danger or abuse of the process of court or miscarriage of justice. Self restraint alone is the restriction in the exercise of that power and that restriction has to be adhered to scrupulously in order to avoid the power being misused, taking into account the purpose for which such power exists. In the absence of the appellant or the respondent or their counsel the court is entitled to dispose of an appeal or revision on the merits after perusing the evidence if such a course is considered necessary in the circumstances of the case. That is well within the competence of the Court. In doing so the Court is not doing an illegality or irregularity even if it subsequently turns out that the party of pleader was absent due to unavoidable reasons beyond their control. It may be true that instead of the court looking into the evidence itself, if the Court was assisted by the party or counsel they could have persuaded the Court to come to a different conclusion. It may be true that instead of the court looking into the evidence itself, if the Court was assisted by the party or counsel they could have persuaded the Court to come to a different conclusion. On account of such contingencies alone, an order or judgment passed by the Court, which is otherwise legal and within the competence of the Court, cannot turn out to be an abuse of process of court requiring interference for the purpose of securing the ends of justice under the inherent powers of the Court. The inability of the party or counsel, what ever be the justification for the inability, cannot make the decision, which is otherwise legal, an abuse of process of Court requiring interference for securing the ends of justice. 5. In this connection the petitioner's counsel drew my attention to the decision in Kailash Nath v. Shantilal Khushaldas & Bros. (1977 Crl.L.J.1520) wherein a Single Bench of the Goa High Court held: "What S.362 forbids is the alteration or review of the "final order disposing of a case", but it does not prohibit the total obliteration of such order. The alteration or review presupposes the continuation of the initial order and the effectuation of some changes in it, whereas the setting aside of the order means the complete abrogation of it. There is therefore no specific bar contained in S.362 or in any other section of the Code against the setting aside of an order of dismissal for default. It follows that the inherent powers of High Court are not taken away as far as the setting aside of the orders of dismissal exparte are concerned". 6. There is no provision in the Code for obliteration or abrogation of the final order or judgment. It is a universal principle of law that when a matter has been finally disposed of by a Court, in the absence of direct statutory provision, the Court is functus officio and cannot entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless and until the previous order of final disposal has been set aside. The judgment of a criminal court is final so far as that Court is concerned. The judgment of a criminal court is final so far as that Court is concerned. On signing and pronouncing the judgment such Court has no power to review, override, alter or interfere with the judgment in any manner except where it is otherwise provided for by the Code or any other law for the time being in force or for the purpose of correcting clerical or arithmetical errors. There is no provision anywhere for reviewing, overriding, altering, obliterating, or otherwise interfering with the judgment or final order otherwise than under S.362. S.362 must, therefore, be considered as imposing a prohibition in altering or reviewing the judgment which includes obliteration, abrogation or setting aside also. With due respect, I am unable to subscribe to the views expressed in Kailash Nath's case (1977 Crl.L.J.1520). 7. The other decisions cited by the petitioner's counsel are Shyam Sunder v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1982 SC. 1175) and Padmachandran v. Radhakrishnan (1984 KLT 416). Shyam Sunder's case (AIR 1982 SC 1175) has absolutely no application to the facts of the case in hand. The Supreme Court was dealing with an appeal under Art.136 of the Constitution. The criminal appeal filed by the appellant before the Rajasthan High Court was initially presented in Jodhpur. A counsel from Jodhpur was engaged. While so the appeal was transferred to the Jaipur Bench without notice to the appellant. The appeal was heard by the Jaipur Bench in the absence of the appellant or his counsel and without notice to them. Before the Supreme Court it was represented on behalf of the State that since the appeal was disposed of in the absence of the appellant and counsel and without notice to them, the State has no objection for remitting the appeal to the High Court for rehearing in the presence of the appellant. It was under such circumstances that the Supreme Court said that though the High Court has given reasons in the judgment for dismissing the appeal, the fact remains that the appellant could have persuaded the High Court to take a different view. The disposal of that case was by an appellate court and not by the same court. The appeal was allowed under different considerations which were those not under the Criminal Procedure Code but under Art.136 of the Constitution. The disposal of that case was by an appellate court and not by the same court. The appeal was allowed under different considerations which were those not under the Criminal Procedure Code but under Art.136 of the Constitution. Under Art.136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court could pass any order to prevent miscarriage of justice. I fail to understand how that decision could be applied to the facts of the case in hand where we are concerned only with the right of the court which passed the judgment to alter or review the same. I am of opinion that the above decision of the Supreme Court is inapplicable for our purpose. 8. Under Art.141 of the Constitution the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. Therefore even if a decision by a Bench of this Court has gone against the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, I could go only by the principles pronounced by the Supreme Court. I said so only because the petitioner's counsel relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Padmachandran's case (1984 KLT 416) as laying down the law that in such cases this Court is justified in invoking the jurisdiction under S.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to reopen a judgment which was pronounced without hearing the counsel. In that case a Single Judge of this Court disposed of a criminal revision petition for default in the absence of the counsel. Subsequently, on the application of the counsel the judge was satisfied that the absence of the counsel was justified and the Crl. R. P. required rehearing. But the respondents' counsel objected on the ground that such a course will be against the decision in Bhanu v. Vilasini (1980 KLT 13) which relied on two Supreme Court decisions in Sankatha Singh v. State of U. P (AIR 1962 SC 1208) and State of Orissa v. Ram Chander (AIR 1979 SC 87) and observed that Rajan's case (1970 KLT 495) and Kunhammad's case (1977 KLT 840) which held that if a petition is disposed of without hearing the opposite party it can be reopened and reheard or reviewed, cannot be taken to lay down the correct law. Therefore the Single Judge referred the case to a Division Bench with the following observation: "I think a Division Bench of this Court should consider the scope and ambit of the decisions of the Supreme Court in AIR 1962 SC 1208 and AIR 1979 SC 87". That is how the case came before a Division Bench and the decision reported in 1984 KLT 416 happened to be rendered. But the scope and ambit of those two decisions or the decision in Bhanu's case (1980 KLT 13) were not considered by the Division Bench. The Division Bench considered that the case before it deserved a rehearing. Referring to the decision in Raj Kapoor v. State (AIR 1980 SC 258) it was observed that limitation in respect of inherent power is only self-restraint, nothing more. Then Shyam Sunder's case (AIR 1982 SC 1175) referred to by me earlier was considered and followed and the petition was allowed I have earlier stated that Shyam Sunder's case (AIR 1982 SC 1175) is not applicable to the facts of the case before me. It is true that Raj Kapoor's case (1980 SC 258) held that S.482 can be used for securing ends of justice even where express provisions prohibit such a course and the only restraint is self-restraint. But that decision further held: "Even so, when a specific provision is made easy resort to inherent power is not right except under compelling circumstances. Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but that inherent power should not invade areas set apart for specific power under the same Code. There is no total ban on the exercise of inherent power where abuse of process of the court or other extra-ordinary situation excites the court's jurisdiction". No such grounds could be called in aid in this case. 9. In Sankatha Singh's case (AIR 1962 SC 1208) it was held: "An appellate court has no power to review or restore an appeal which has been disposed of. A Sessions Judge cannot set aside his first order passed in appeal dismissing the appeal, when neither the appellants nor their counsel appeared and cannot order the rehearing of the appeal. 9. In Sankatha Singh's case (AIR 1962 SC 1208) it was held: "An appellate court has no power to review or restore an appeal which has been disposed of. A Sessions Judge cannot set aside his first order passed in appeal dismissing the appeal, when neither the appellants nor their counsel appeared and cannot order the rehearing of the appeal. S.369, read with S.424 of the Code, makes it clear that the appellate court is not to alter or review the judgment once signed, except for the purpose of correcting a clerical error." Further, assuming that the Sessions Judge can exercise inherent powers, he cannot pass the order of the re-hearing of the appeal in the exercise of such powers when S.369, read with S.424, of the Code, specifically prohibits the altering or reviewing of its order by a Court. Inherent powers cannot be exercised to do what the Code specifically prohibits the court from doing." 10. State of Orissa's case (AIR 1979 SC 87) which was also referred to in Padmachandran's case (1984 KLT 416) laid down: "Once a judgment has been pronounced by a High Court either in exercise of its appellate or its revisional jurisdiction, no review or revision can be entertained against that judgment as there is no provision in the Code which would enable the High Court to review the same or to exercise revisional jurisdiction. Ss. 369 and 424 do not restrict the prohibition under S.369 to the trial Court alone. The purpose of S.424 is to prescribe mode of delivering of judgment, the language and the contents of the judgment, while S.369 is general in its application and prohibits all courts from altering or reviewing its judgment when once it has signed it. Nor does S.430 deal with the prohibition imposed under S.369 prohibiting the court from altering or reviewing its judgment when once it has signed it. The provisions of S.561-A cannot be invoked for exercise of a power which is specifically prohibited by the Code". 11. Bhanu's case (1980 KLT 13) which followed the above two Supreme Court decisions held: "A party would get an opportunity for being heard if he is given notice of the case and the posting. His being not present at the time of hearing is his not availing of that opportunity. 11. Bhanu's case (1980 KLT 13) which followed the above two Supreme Court decisions held: "A party would get an opportunity for being heard if he is given notice of the case and the posting. His being not present at the time of hearing is his not availing of that opportunity. There is no power conferred on the court by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code for restoration of revision petitions which have been disposed of, also. Restoration to file and rehearing prayed for here is not to give effect to any order under the Code. Nor is it to prevent abuse of the process of the court because no abuse of the process of the court is involved here. As the disposal here was after perusal of records and after hearing those counsel who were present in the court it was in accordance with law. The words "or otherwise to secure the ends of justice" occurring in S.482 also cannot take in a case of the present kind. Those words have to be read ejusdem generis. Restoration and hearing of a revision petition disposed of without hearing the respondent's counsel is not a purpose analogous to "giving effect to an order under the Code" or preventing abuse of the process of any Court." On the other hand to restore and rehear a criminal revision petition which has been disposed of would be to go against the mandatory provision in S.362 of the Criminal Procedure Code that except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error a judgment or order should not be altered or reviewed after it is signed, unless otherwise provided, and inherent power cannot be used to do what is expressly prohibited by the Code. S.482 of the Code is not meant to give a second inning to a party in a case which has already been decided against him." 12. Padmachandran's case (1984 KLT 416) has not laid down any law which will help the petitioner. That decision has not stated that whenever a counsel is not heard, rehearing should be ordered. The decision only held, on the facts of that case, that there is no total ban in the exercise of inherent power to order rehearing where abuse of process of court or other extraordinary situation excites the court's jurisdiction. That decision has not stated that whenever a counsel is not heard, rehearing should be ordered. The decision only held, on the facts of that case, that there is no total ban in the exercise of inherent power to order rehearing where abuse of process of court or other extraordinary situation excites the court's jurisdiction. That was only on the facts of that case and it cannot be taken as a uniform rule applicable in all cases. The case in hand does not have any such extraordinary situation. Therefore there is no question of Padmachandran's case (1984 KLT 416) operating as a bar to view thai I am taking in this case. 13. The decision of the Supreme Court in Naresh v. State of U.P. (AIR 1981 SC 1385) was rendered in appeals from judgment of High Court where the first judgment of conviction under S.302 IPC was on its own motion corrected by the High Court into one under S.304 Part I in purported exercise of power under S.362 of the Code. The Supreme Court said: "The High Court was wholly wrong in altering the judgment pronounced by them disposing of the Criminal Appeals. That was clearly in contravention of the provisions of S.362 Code of Criminal Procedure." 14. In the light of the above authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court I am of opinion that ordering rehearing under S.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure will not be justified. There is no order to be given effect to. There is no abuse of process of court involved and there is no question of otherwise securing the ends of justice also. S.362 of the Code operates as a bar to the petition. The petition is dismissed. Dismissed.