Judgment S. S. Sandhawalia, C. J. 1. Whether the transfer of a decree for execution to a court (other than the trial Court) would clothe such executing court with jurisdiction to entertain a suit, challenging the very validity of the original decree is the somewhat interesting question necessitating this reference to the Division Bench. 2. The facts are not in dispute and lie in a narrow compass. Way back in 1971, the defendant petitioner instituted a money suit against the plaintiffs opposite party in the Court of Civil Judge of Gyanpur in the district of Varanasi, in the State of Uttar Pradesh, and obtained and ex pane decree therein. The said decree was later transferred to the Court of Arrah and thereafter sent for execution to the Court of Subordinate Judge at Buxar, where it is pending in execution Case No.14 of 1972. The plaintiffs opposite party, thereafter, instituted title Suit Mo.154 of 1973 on 6th of December, 1973, in the Court of the subordinate Judge, Buxar, to challange the very validity of the said decree on the ground that it had been obtained by fraud etc. and the cause of action arose from the knowledge of such fraud committed within the jurisdiction of the Buxar court. Therein they further claimed the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendant petitioner from enforcing the decree. On the 31st of December 1974, a written statement was filed in which no question with regard to the jurisdiction of the Court of Buxar, was raised and the issues in the suit were settled on the 16th of January, 1975, Later, after due notice and hearing the parties, the learned Subordinate Judge, Buxar, by his order dated the 8th of June, 1976, granted a temporary injunction to the plaintiffs opposite party on their furnishing security to the satisfaction of the Court. 3. It was only on the 29th of April, 1980, that an application was filed on behalf of the defendant-petitioner taking an objection that the Court at Buxar had no jurisdiction to try the suit because the original decree had been granted by the Subordinate Judge of Gyanpur, in the district of Varanasi, in Uttar pradesh, and, therefore, this suit should have been filed in the said Court. The trial Court by order dated 9th of April, 1981, which is under revision, rejected the application on the twin ground that it had jurisdiction to try the suit, and further on the ground that originally no objection whatsoever was taken on behalf of the defendant-petitioner to jurisdiction which was now sought to be raised after a lapse of nearly seven years. 4. This civil revision originally came up for hearing before my learned brother, Lalit Mohan Sharma, J. , sitting singly. Apparently, a significant question being involved, the matter has been referred to the Division Bench. 5. Basic reliance has been placed by the learned for the petitioner on sampat Lal and others V/s. Kaluram Brijmohan and others, AIR 1940 Patna 444 for contending by way of analogy that a suit to set aside a decree obtained by fraud cannot be maintained in any district outside the district in which the decree was obtained or in which the fraud was committed. Reference was also made to the Division Bench Judgment in Umrao Sing V/s. Hardeo and another, ILR 29 allahabad 418. On the basis of the aforesaid precedents, submission was that the suit to challange the validity of the decree would only be filed in the district of varanasi in the State of Uttar Pradesh and not in the Buxar Court. 6. A close perusal of the judgment in Sampat Lais case would plainly indicate that the same is patently distinguishable. Therein an ex pane decree in a mortgage suit had been obtained at Bombay. The same was not transferred to Saran district nor any proceeding therefore had commenced. Only a notice intimating that the Court at Bombay would be moved for certain relief in the matter of sale of the mortgaged property was sent to the judgment-debtor who then filed a suit in Saran for a declaration that the decree obtained at Bombay was illegal, fraudulent and a nullity. It was on those peculiar fact that the court held that no cause of action arose within the district of Saran and, therefore, the court there had no jurisdiction to try the case. Indeed, there is a clear indication in the very case that in case execution proceeding had been instituted in saran, the Court would at once have become clothed with the jurisdiction. Indeed, there is a clear indication in the very case that in case execution proceeding had been instituted in saran, the Court would at once have become clothed with the jurisdiction. It was observed as under :- "it may be pointed out that this is not a case in which execution has been taken out by attachment of any property or any similar over act or issue of process within the district of Saran in which the suit is instituted. " from the above it follows that Sampat Lal and others V/s. Kaluram Brijmohan and others (Supra) does not, in any way, advance the petitioners case. 7 In fairness to the learned counsel for the petitioner, it must be noticed that undoubtedly there are observations in Umrao Singhs case (supra) which would tend to support his stand. In the said case a money decree on a promissory note obtained from a Small Cause Court at Calcutta was transferred to Agra for execution. A suit was instituted at Agra to have the said decree set aside on the ground that it was obtained by fraud. The Letters Patent Bench repeated and took pointed notice of the fact that no other relief whatever apart from the setting aside of the decree had been sought. It came to the conclusion on examination of authorities that barring the special circumstances noticed therein a suit to set aside a decree obtained by fraud in which no other relief whatever is claimed could be maintained only in the jurisdiction where the said decree had been secured. It would appear that pointedly the case wherein a decree has been transferred for execution and the proceedings therefor have commenced was not directly considered and adjudicated upon. It seems to have been examined from a somewhat different angle. However, if this judgment is to be construed as a warrant for the authority that despite the fact that a decree has been transferred to a court for execution, still no suit for challenging such a decree would lie in the same executing court, then with the deepest difference I would wish to record my dissent therefrom. 8. Within this jurisdiction reference must also be made to the earlier authority in The Banaras Bank Limited V/s. Surendra Narain Singh and others (AIR 1924 Patna 831 ). 8. Within this jurisdiction reference must also be made to the earlier authority in The Banaras Bank Limited V/s. Surendra Narain Singh and others (AIR 1924 Patna 831 ). Therein it was observed that :- "no doubt if an application for execution had been presented as against the opposite party in Patna, that itself would have given rise to a cause of action of which the respondents might have taken advantage; but it is conceded that the petitioner Bank has not presented any application for execution of the decree which it has obtained as against the opposite party (from the court at Banaras) and it does not seems to us right that this suit should have been instituted in the patna Court. " However, the direct decision on the point is that of the Division Bench in Asgar ally and Co. and others V/s. Vuppala Satyanarayana and others, AIR 1957 Calcutta 317. Therein a decree obtained from the court of Vizigapattam was transferred to calcutta for execution. A suit was preferred in Calcutta to declare that the decree is fraudulent and for perpetual injunction to restrain its execution P. B. Mukherji, J. speaking for the Bench unequivocally observed :- "we are of the opinion that a suit for a perpetual injunction to restrain the execution of a decree challanged as invalid and void on the ground of fraud is maintainable and can be brought in the court in the jurisdiction of which the decree is sought to be executed. The court of the place of execution can entertain such a suit although the decree impugned is the decree of another Court beyond the jurisdiction of the Court on the place of execution. The injury in such a case arises from the encroachment of or the attempt to enforce the decree which constitutes the cause of action. When such enforcement of the decree or an attempt to enforce decree is the cause of action, then we do not see how this Court cannot have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. " I am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid enunciation. 9 To conclude, the answer to the question posted at the very outset is rendered in the affirmative and it is held that the transfer of a decree for execution to another court would clothe such executing court with jurisdiction to entertain a suit challenging the very validity of the original decree. 9 To conclude, the answer to the question posted at the very outset is rendered in the affirmative and it is held that the transfer of a decree for execution to another court would clothe such executing court with jurisdiction to entertain a suit challenging the very validity of the original decree. 10. In the light of the above, primary and, indeed, the sole contention raised on behalf of the petitioner must be rejected. The civil revision, consequently, fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.