B. N. DASH, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision is directed against the judgment of the learned Add 1. Sessions Judge. Jeypore whereby he had upheld the conviction of the accused-petitioner under sections 332 and 426 I. P. C. and the sentence passed There under. ( 2 ) IN short, the prosecution case is that on 9. 8. 1983 at about 10. 45 a. m. while Sri Krushna Mohan Acharya, Superintending Engineer. Balimcla Dam Circle (P. W. I) was discharging his official duty in his office chamber at Chitrakonda the petitioner who was the President of the Workers Union along with two others namely, Dhanapati Sarangi and P. Ganapati wanted to have discussion with him mainly regarding the playing of the school bus to the Dykes. Accordingly, they all sent a chit seeking permission through the orderly peon of the Superintending Engineer (P. W. 5) and after obtaining permission they went inside the chamber and requested the Superintending Engineer to direct playing of the school bus to the Dykes. The Superintending Engineer having replied that he had already v referred the matter to the Engineer-in-chief and after obtaining necessary instruction he would pass appropriate order. Not being satisfied with such reply, top accused-petitioner asked the Superintending Engineer as to why he had not yet passed order inspite of recommendation of the Executive Engineer and insisted on passing an order approving the plying of the bus and then gave a fist blow to the left side of his face resulting in the breaking his spectacle and bleeding injuries on his nose. Thereafter, the Superimending Engineer lodged the F. I. R. (Ext 1) at Chitrakooda P. S. at 12 noon. in course of investigation, the police seized the bloodstained shirt (M. O. I) and the broken spectacle (M. O. II), as per seizure list, Ex. 2 and the Superintending Engineer (P. W. 2) was medically examined. After completion of investigation Charge-sheet having been submitted the accused petitioner and his two above named associates faced trial under sections 448, 332, 426 all read with section 34 I. P. C. ( 3 ) THE defence did not dispute that the accused-petitioner and his associates had gone into the office chamber of P. W. I but they specifically denied any assault on him. According to them, when they requested P. W. Ito allow the school bus to ply to the Dykes he abused them in filthy language and asked them to leave his room for which they had to return disappointed. So far as the injury on the person of P. W. I was concerned. They pleaded that while coming out of his office chamber in an angry mood his face dashed against the door leaves of the said room. It was also asserted that for the conduct of P. W. I the accused petitioner lodged a report at the P. S. and in order to escape from the case initiated on the basis of the report, this case was falsely filed against them. The accused-petitioner examined himself in support of the defence plea. ( 4 ) THE prosecution, in order to prove its case examined as many as 11 witnesses out of them P. Ws. 2 and 5 have already been introduced above; P. Ws. 2, 3,4,6,7 and 9 are the immediate post occurrence witness; P. W. 8 is a seizure witness and P. Ws. 10 and ii arc respectively the medical officer who examined P. W. 1 and the investigating officer. ( 5 ) ON a consideration of the entire evidence on record, the learned S. D. J. M. , Malkangiri came to the conclusion that while P. W. 1 was discharging official duty the accused-petitioner dealt a fist blow as a result of which the spectacle of P. W. I broke down and he received injuries on the left side of his nose. The other two accused persons neither took part in the discussion nor assaulted P. W. 1. It was also found that there was no criminal trespass into the office chamber of P. W. 2. Accordingly, while acquitting accused Dhanapati and P. Ganapati of all the charges and the accused-petitioner of the charge under section 448 I. P. C. , the trial court convicted the accused petitioner under sections 332 and 426 I. P. C. and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year for the first said offence and rigorous imprisonment for one month for the second said offence with a direction that the sentences shall run concurrently. In appeal, the order of conviction and sentence having been confirmed, the present revision has been filed. ( 6 ) MR. In appeal, the order of conviction and sentence having been confirmed, the present revision has been filed. ( 6 ) MR. Palit, the learned counsel for the petitioner has raised three contentions. His first contention is that the finding of the learned Addi Sessions Judge that the injuries to the person of P. W. 1 were caused by a single fist blow given by the petitioner is perverse particularly when the petitioners plea that P. W. I came by the injuries by being dashed against the order is more probable. His second contention is that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case an offence under section 332 I. P. C. could not be held to have been established and as such, the conviction of the petitioner there under is not sustainable. The last contention is that if the petitioner is not acquitted, the provisions of the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act (for short, the Act') is liable to be extended to him because after a lapse of about ten years from the date of judgment of the trial court, it will not be expedient to send the petitioner behind the prison bar. ( 7 ) COMING to the first contention, it would be apposite to note the details of the injuries received by P. W. I in order to appreciate the contention of Mr. Palit. P. W. 10 Dr. Bhagirathi Misra who, at the material time, was the Medical Officer of B. O. P. Hospital, Chitrakonda examined P. W. I on 9. 8. 1983 at 11. 30 a. m. on police requisition and his injury report is Ext. 5. From his evidence and injury report, Ext. 5, it is seen that at the time of his examination P. W. I had three injuries on his person i. e. one bruise, 3x2, over the left temporal region of the face 1 away from the outer angle of left eye; one linear lacerated wound with a bruise all around on the left side of nose; and one linear lacerated wound with a bruise all around on the left side of the nose 14th inch apart from the other wound on the nose. It is the argument of Mr. It is the argument of Mr. Pal it for the petitioner that if the positions of the injuries are taken into consideration, it becomes highly improbable that all of them could have been caused by a single fist flow, as asserted by P. W. 1. No question was put to the Medical Officer whether all the injuries in question could be possible by a single fist blow or not. The best person who could have deposed on that score was the Medical Officer himself. P. W. 1 was using a spectacle at the time when the fist blow was allegedly given. Taking that fact into consideration when both the courts below have clealiy recorded a finding that all the three injuries Here possible by a single blow, this Court sitting in revision cannot alter the same because the trial court had the opportunity of seeing the broken spectacle and had heard and seen P. W. I on this score. This is alithe more so because the concurrent finding on that score by both the courts below cannot be said to be perverse on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. That being so, the first contention must fail. ( 8 ) SO far as the second contention is concerned, it is necessary to note the ingredients of section 332 I. P. C. Those are: that the accused voluntarily caused hurt to public servant and that the hurt was caused (a) when the public servant was discharging his duty as such; or (b) with the intention to disturb him from discharging his duty; or (c) in consequence of anything done and attempted to be done in the lawful discharge of his duty as such. In this case, the petitioner went to the office chamber of P. W. 1 along with two others and demanded that he should immediately pass order directing the school bus to ply to the Dykes and on his refusal to do so, the petitioner dealt a fist blow causing injuries. From these facts, there remains no room for doubt that the case is covered under the first clause to section 332 I. P. C. and when the appellate court has found those facts in favour of the prosecution, it cannot be said that the ingredients have not been established. From these facts, there remains no room for doubt that the case is covered under the first clause to section 332 I. P. C. and when the appellate court has found those facts in favour of the prosecution, it cannot be said that the ingredients have not been established. In this connection, my attention has been invited to D. Challaish and another v. State of Andhra Pradesh. Therein, the acts disclosed that a public servant was assaulted while in office as a sequel of an earlier private quarrel and the assault had no real nexus or casual connection, or consequential relation with the performance of the public servants duty as public servant. According to their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the charge framed against the accused was under the second part of section 332 I. P. C. and on the facts of the case they were of the view that the accused could not be charged and convicted under section 332 I. P. C. This decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case inasmuch as I have already held above that the case falls under the first clause to section 332 I. P. C. and on the facts proved the ingredients have been duly established. That being so, the second contention must also fail. ( 9 ) AS regards the last contention, it is seen that the courts below have refused to extend the benefit of the Act on the ground of high-handedness in the conduct of the accused-petitioner to his far above superior officer i. e. P. W. 14. The object of the Act is to prevent conversion of youthful offenders into obdurate criminals as a result of their association with hardened criminals of mature age in case the youthful offenders are sentenced to undergo imprisonment in jail. This object was founded on the Criminal Jurisprudence that no one is a born criminal and that a good many crimes are the product of socio economic milieu. While dealing with youthful offenders, the Act has also taken care of the society by saying that the benefit of the Act shall not be extended to persons convicted of serious offences. So, while dealing with the Act courts will have to take care whether the society will not in any way be affected by the release of convicts. While dealing with youthful offenders, the Act has also taken care of the society by saying that the benefit of the Act shall not be extended to persons convicted of serious offences. So, while dealing with the Act courts will have to take care whether the society will not in any way be affected by the release of convicts. If the court will come to the conclusion that the release of a convict under the Act will have a detrimental effect on the society it will be slow to release him under lie Act. On the other hand, if it win find that the offender has committed an offence of minor importance due to economic backwardness and there is possibility of his reformation it win be quick to extend the benefit under the Act. So, while deciding as to whether the benefit under the Act should be extended to a convict, not the courts shall have to take into consideration the nature and character of lie offender, the seriousness of lie offence with which he was charged and the interest of the society. As already noted above the accused petitioner, a mere mechanic working in the office of P. W. I, put forth a particular cause on behalf of the workerts union as its president before P. W. I and insisted on fulfilling the demand immediately and on the refusal of P. W. I to fulfil the demand immediately, he assaulted him in his office chamber, a public place, in presence of two other workers. An educated person, like the accused petitioner heading an association is expected to behave in a very orderly manner but instead of doing that he assaulted P. W. I in a public place. If the benefit of the Act is extended to him, the same may not have a salutary, effect amongst the other workers of the union of which he was the president. There is every likelihood that the other workers of the union may be emboldened in future to deal with any officer of the superior rank in an indisciplined manner. In Rajbir v. State of Haryana on which reliance has been placed, the accused had been convicted under section 323 and sentenced to imprisonment for six months. There is every likelihood that the other workers of the union may be emboldened in future to deal with any officer of the superior rank in an indisciplined manner. In Rajbir v. State of Haryana on which reliance has been placed, the accused had been convicted under section 323 and sentenced to imprisonment for six months. The Supreme Court extended the benefit of the Act because the accused had already suffered imprisonment for over one year and he was a first offender and he was closely related to the injured. The case of Han Singh and others v. State of U. P. , which has been referred to, has absolutely no application because therein the point for consideration was whether a Government employee can be exonerated from a disciplinary proceeding if the benefit of the Act had been extended to him. In the present case, it is seen that the accused petitioner has not gone behind the prison bar at all and he is not related to P. W. 1. so, the case of Rajbir (supra) has also no application to the facts of the present case. In order to arrest fast growing indiscipline in all walks of life, it is not considered fit and expedient to extend the benefit of the Act to the accused-petitioner. However, it is seen that the sentence of imprisonment of one year imposed for the offence under section 332 I. P. C. is somewhat severe and the same is, therefore, reduced to rigorous imprisonment for six months. The sentence passed under section 426 I. P. C. and the other direction given by the trial court and confirmed by the appellate court regarding running of sentences do not need modification. ( 10 ) SUBJECT to modification in the sentence passed under section 332 I. P. C. , the revision is dismissed. Revision dismissed except modification in sentence. .