GULAB C. GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners No. 1 and 2 were the candidates for selection for appointment as Manager pursuance to the advertisement (Annexure 'f') and were not found qualified for the purpose. They feel aggriev, ed by the selection and appointment of respondents 5 to 57 as Managers and challenge the legality thereof in this petition filed under Article 226 of the constitution. The petitioner No. 3 claims to be a registered Trade Union representing the employees of respondent No. 3 and challenges the process of selection and appointment of Managers including respondents 3 to 57 in its representative capacity. ( 2 ) FACTS of the case are within a very narrow campus and are as under : respondent No. 3 is a Central Co-operative Bank registered under the m. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and employs several persons for purposes of its business. The terms and conditions of its employees are governed by statutory Rules framed by the respondent registrar under Section 55 (1) of the Act. The Rules are known as the M. P. Co-operative Central Bank Employees Services Rules, 1977 and were brought into force on 1-4-1977. The membership of the respondent-Bank consists of individuals as also registered primary co-operative societies at village level. The managers under reference are tbe persons appointed to manage the affairs of these primary societies. These primary societies are separately registered under the Act and have their own Managing Committee to look after their work. The respondent-Bank advances loan to these societies who on their turn distribute the amounts to their individual members. Since most of these societies in so far as Mandi District is concerned deal with Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in backward areas. They are known as 'adimjati Sewa Sahkari Samiti. Since these Societies are affiliated to the respondent-Bank, respondent-Bank has been directed by the respondent-Registrar to select and appoint Managers for them and see that their financial interest are completely safeguarded in this manner. The employees working for these primary societies draw their salary from a "pool fund", as maintained by the respondent-Bank and created by annual contributions made to it by each member Society, the respondent-Bank and the state Government. The employees working for these primary societies draw their salary from a "pool fund", as maintained by the respondent-Bank and created by annual contributions made to it by each member Society, the respondent-Bank and the state Government. It is not disputed that in case the Managers are also held to be the employees of the respondent-Bank their appointment would also be governed by the Rules. The case of the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3, however, is that these Managers, though appointed by the respondent-Bank, are really the employees of the Individual Co-operative Societies and hence the Rules do not apply to their selection and appointment. From the return filed by the respondents state Government it appears that the question of recruitment of Managers for Adhim Jati Sewa Sahakari Samities was considered by the Cabinet Subcommittee for Tribal Sub-Plan in its meeting dated 13-8-1976 when it was decided that recruitment and training of Managers of these Societies should be controlled and co-ordinated by the respondent-Registrar. It appears that another state level committee considered the question of qualification of Managers and managing Directors to ba appointed in these Societies in its meeting dated 10-10-1976 and not only their pay scale but also their qualification, experience and mode of recruitment also fixed. A perusal of the minutes of this meeting (Annexure R-3) does not however indicate that this committee considered the matter in the context of the provisions of the Act or the Rules. ( 3 ) IT further appears that in pursuance to the decision taken in the meeting dated 10-10-1976, an advertisement inviting applications for appointment of persons against these posts was issued by the M. P. State Co-operative Central bank, (Annexure R-4) and appointments were made against the post of managers. It is the case of the respondent-State that inspite of the aforesaid recruitment by the M. P. State Co-operative Bank, some posts of Managers remained vacant and hence the respondent-Registrar issued instructions to yarious Banks on 25-2-1978 (Annexure R-2) to fill those vacancies by issuing advertisement and making selection in accordance with instructions contained therein. These instructions are said to have been issued under Section 55 (1) of the Act, and were binding upon the respondent-Bank. In pursuance to these instructions, the respondent-Bank selected and appointed respondents 5 to 57. These instructions are said to have been issued under Section 55 (1) of the Act, and were binding upon the respondent-Bank. In pursuance to these instructions, the respondent-Bank selected and appointed respondents 5 to 57. The petitioners No. 1 and 2 also applied for these appointments but they were found ineligible to be called for interview, as according to the respondents, they do not fulfil the requisite 7 years service experience requirement on 1-11-1976. ( 4 ) SUBMISSION of the petitioners in this regard, is that the appointment of respondents 5 to 57 is contrary to Rules 10, 22 (iv) and 23 (iii) of the Rules inasmuch as these appointments were made without notifying vacancies to the employment Exchange as required, without holding written test as prescribed and in complete violation of quota rule provided under Rule 23 (iii) of the rules. The learned Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, however, defended the appointment on the ground that the Rules stand superseded by the instructions issued by respondent-Registrar on 25-2-1978 (Annexure R-2) and hence there was no necessity to follow the provisions of the Rules. These respondents also challenge the locus standi of the petitioners to file the present petition, as according to them they have no connection whatsoever with the subject-matter of the petition. These submissions are also vehemently urged by the learned Counsel for the respondent-Bank who, in addition, submitted that the petitioners cannot be said to be the employees of the Bank and hence the question of applying the rules for their selection and appointment would not arise. ( 5 ) BEFORE examining the matter further, the question of locus standi may be examined first. Though the old Rule was that only the "person aggrieved" should be permitted to be a petitioner before this Court, this rule has been givea a go-bye not only in India out also in England where it originated The conventional rule was given by Lord Justice James in 1880 In re-Sidebottham, Exparte-sidebotham [ (1880) 14 Ch. D. 458 3 42 LT 783 (C. A.)] and has been exploded by Professors Schwartz and Wade in their "legal control of Government" where they opined that "restrictive rules about standi or inimical to a healthy system of administrative law. D. 458 3 42 LT 783 (C. A.)] and has been exploded by Professors Schwartz and Wade in their "legal control of Government" where they opined that "restrictive rules about standi or inimical to a healthy system of administrative law. " In this country Hon'ble Justice Krishna iyer in Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardhichand, [ air 1980 SC 1622 ] noted the peculiar characteristic of our system of justice and emphasised the need to improve the same. In Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union v. Union of India, [ air 1981 SC 344 ] the Supreme Court held that "when a citizen belongs to an organization which has special interest in the subject-matter, if he has some concern deeper than that of a busybody, a writ petition by such a citizen would have been permissible under Article 226 of the Constitution. " The view of the supreme Court was that, "the law can no longer bs a closed shop". Later decisions of the Supreme Court have almost exploded the conventional concept and recognized the right of an organization and even an individual's locus standi when aclass and section in interest is affected. See Sunil Batra v. Delhi administration, [ air 1980 SC 1579 : 1980 (3) SCC 488 ] ; Dr. Upendra Bakshi v. State of U. P. , [1983 (2) SCC] ; and Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, [ air 1982 SC 1473 : 1982 (2) SCC 494 ]. The Supreme Court in Judges Transfer case i. e. S. P. Gupta v. Union of India, [ air 1982 SC 149 : 1981 (Suppl.) SCC 87], after examining recent developments in law oa the subject, observed that, " The Court would therefore unhesitatingly and without the slightest qualms of conscience cast aside the technical rules of procedure in the exercise of its dispensing power and treat the letter of the public-miaded indivi dual as a writ petition and act upon it". / (para 17 ). After this it is no longer open to the respondents to challenge the locus standi of the petitioners who were not only the candidates for this selection but also of the respondent No. 3 which is a union of such employees having necessary interest in proper selection and appointment of employees in the respondent-Bank. ( 6 ) WE may now examine the contents of 1977 Rules. ( 6 ) WE may now examine the contents of 1977 Rules. It is not disputed that these Rules were made by the respondent-Registrar in exercise of its statutory powers under Section 55 (1) of the Act. Section 55 (1) of the Act permits the Registrar to frame Rules governing the terms and conditions of the employees in a Society and reads as under :"the Registrar may, from time to time, frame rules governing the terms and conditions of employment in a Society or class of Societies and the Society or class of Societies to which such terms and conditions of employment are applicable shall comply with the order that may be issued by the Registrar in this behalf". This provision was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Hemant kumar Gupta v. District Co-operative Central Bank, [ 1983 MPLJ 461 ] in the context of appointments of Managing Directors to "adimjati Sewa Sahakari samiti' in Sarguja District along with Section 95 of the Act which confers rule making powers on the State Government and was held to be constitutionally valid. Rule 2 (f) of the Rules defines "employees" to include not only the persons employed directly in the Bank but also persons employed in Societies affiliated to the Bank. The definition reads as under ;" 'employees' means persons employed in the Bank and/or Societies affiliated to it on the date these rules come into force, and those appointed by the Bank thereafter to do any work of the Bank or societies affiliated to it and includes an employee who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched from employment or whose employment has been otherwise terminated and shall, in respect of matters relating to such dismissal discharge, retrenchment or termination be deemed to be an employee". The relationship of a Manager appointed by the Bank to look after the affairs of an affiliated Society was also considered by the Division Bench in Hemant kumar Gupta's case (supra) when it was held that the Manager so appointed remained the employee of the Bank. This conclusion was reached by the division Bench even without referring to the definition aforesaid. Rule 4 of these Rules provide for conditions and procedure of recruitment. As far as managers are concerned their qualification is dependent on the class of Society in which they are to be posted. This conclusion was reached by the division Bench even without referring to the definition aforesaid. Rule 4 of these Rules provide for conditions and procedure of recruitment. As far as managers are concerned their qualification is dependent on the class of Society in which they are to be posted. The Registrar, however, has been given the authority to lay down qualifications for such posts in respect of which the minimum qualification has not been prescribed under these Rules. Rule 10 requires notification of vacancies to the Employment Exchange and also publication of the advertisement in the. local newspaper. Rule 22 provides for method of selection of suitable candidates. Sub-rule (iv) of this rule provides that candidates for all the posts, excepting drivers, peons and chowkidars, shall have to undergo a written test in the manner prescribedby the Registrar. It is further provided that candidates qualifying in the test shall only be eligible for final selection by the Selection Committee. Rule 23 (iii) provides that, "in making appointments, excepting the posts of Peons/watchmen/drivers and lower Division Clerks, the Bank would be able to fill a maximum of 40 per cent. posts by direct recruitment". This rule, therefore, lays down the "quota rule" and restricts recruitment only to 40 percent of the posts. There is no dispute that these Rules have not been followed in the Instant case inasmuch as educational qualifications prescribed for these recruitments were higher than provided in the Rule, written test was not held aad almost all vacancies have been filled by direct recruitment over-steping 40 per cent limit laid down in the rule. The submission of the respondents, however, is that the order dated 25-2-1978 (Annexure R-2) was also given by Registrar in exercise of bis powers under Section 55 (1) of the Act and has the effect of superseding 1977 Rules. It is, therefore, submitted that breach of the Rules, as aforesaid, has no effect on the appointments of the respondents. Since this submission goes to the root of the matter it may be examined now. ( 7 ) SECTION 2 (36) of the M. P. General Clauses Act, 1957 which is almost identical to the provisions in the General Clauses Act defines the 'rule' to mean a rule made in exercise of powers conferred by any enactment and includes a regulation made as a rule under any enactment. ( 7 ) SECTION 2 (36) of the M. P. General Clauses Act, 1957 which is almost identical to the provisions in the General Clauses Act defines the 'rule' to mean a rule made in exercise of powers conferred by any enactment and includes a regulation made as a rule under any enactment. It is, thus clear that the rule as generally understood is made by the authority empowered by a statute to make such rules while exercising such statutory powers in this behalf. It is the case of the respondents themselves that 1977 Rules were made in exercise of such statutory powers under Section 55 (1) of the Act. The aforesaid Rule, quoted earlier, is thus statutory and is in two parts. The first part permits the registrar to frame Rules, from time to time governing the terms and conditions of employment in a Society or class of Societies. The second part requires the society or class of Societies to which these Rules are applicable, to comply with the order that may be issued by the Registrar in this behalf. The first part is really the rule making authority conferred upon the Registrar whereas the second part is the order making authority of the Registrar. General distinction between "rule" and "order" is now no longer in doubt. The rule making function is usually regarded legislative in nature. As far as the present provision is concerned, the rule making power conferred on the Registrar has been held to be in the nature of legislative power in Hemant Kumar Gupta's case (supra ). As far as the order making power is concerned, such a power is generally used to describe the exercise of executive power or the power to take judicial or quasi-judicipl decisions. In some cases the resultant order is also considered as belonging to the class of delegated legislation having force of law but that does not obliterate the distinction between the "rule" and the "order". This distinction is also apparent in the language of Section 55 (1) itself. The second part of this provision gives power to the Registrar to issue orders "in this behalf". The words "in this behalf" were interpreted by the Division Bench in Hemant kumar Guptas case (supra) to mean that the order must be in the context of terms and conditions of employment laid down by the Rules. The second part of this provision gives power to the Registrar to issue orders "in this behalf". The words "in this behalf" were interpreted by the Division Bench in Hemant kumar Guptas case (supra) to mean that the order must be in the context of terms and conditions of employment laid down by the Rules. According to the division Bench, "the object of conferring on the Registrar the power to issue orders to the Societies appears to be to enable him to see that the rules relating to the terms and conditions of the employment are complied with. " (para 5 ). The aforesaid reasoning not only appears to be just and proper but is in line with the judicial thinking and cannot be called in question. It must, therefore, be held that powers vested in the Registrar by the second part of Section 55 (1)of the Act to issue orders to the Societies are the powers to secure compliance of Rules made in exercise of powers conferred upon him by the earlier part of the section. It is also clear that the two powers are separate and for different purposes. Though the rule makingpower of first part is legislative in nature, the order making authority of the Registrar is intended to secure compliance of the Rules and is therefore administrative or executive in nature. Under the circumstances, though the principles of natural justice would not be attracted while making a rule under the first part of Section 55, the principles of natural justice may be attracted in the process of issuing orders to secure compliance of the Rules under the second part of Section 55. It must, as a logical corollary, be held that the powers vested in the Registrar to issue order to secure compliance of Rules made by him cannot be used to amend, modify, or repeal the rules. It is the settled law that to bring about an effective amendment or can-cellation of a rule, the rule effecting amendment or cancellation must be made in the same manner in which the original rule was made. This is also the purport of Section 21 of the M. P. General Clauses Act, 1957. ( 8 ) THE aforesaid interpretation of Section 55 (1) of the Act knocks down the very bottom of the respondents' case. That the selection and appointment of respondent Nos. This is also the purport of Section 21 of the M. P. General Clauses Act, 1957. ( 8 ) THE aforesaid interpretation of Section 55 (1) of the Act knocks down the very bottom of the respondents' case. That the selection and appointment of respondent Nos. 5 to 57 are not in accordance with 1977 Rules is not disputed. What has been stated is that the order dated 25-2-1978 which purports to have been made under Section 55 (1) substitutes 1977 Rules in so far as these societies are concerned. The argument, in view of the aforesaid analysis of section 55 (1), must be rejected without hesitation. The Rules have been framed in exercise of statutory powers and are part of the Act. Having being validly framed, they remain binding even upon the Registrar. Indeed, the second part of Section 55 (1) obliges the Registrar to issue orders to secure their compliance. The order dated 25-2-1978 cannot, therefore, be accepted as an amending exercise of 1977 Rules. The Rules inspite of the order dated 25-2-1978 (Anaexure R-11) remained valid and binding. It is implicit in the second part of Section 55 (1) that an order has to be in accordance with the rules and not in violation thereof. Even on general principle of law a statutory rule can not be amended or superseded by an executive order. Babulal Choudhary v, Editor and Publisher of Local Hindi Daily Nav Bharat, [ 1981 MPLJ 777 ]. Since the order dated 25-2-1978 (Annexure R-2) is in violation of the Rules and hence the selection and appointment of respondent Nos. 5 to 57 made in pursuance of this order and in contravention of the Rules, cannot be sustained. These appointments must, therefore, be declared illegal. ( 9 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion, it is not necessary to discuss specific violation complained of by the petitioners. It must however be observed that rule 10 of these Rules regarding notification of vacancies to the Employment exchanges remain substantially complied with in the instant case inasmuch as requisition has been sent to the Employment Exchange concerned. Rule 22 (4)regarding written test for selecting candidates to appear before the Selection committee secures better talents ia an impartial manner and therefore lays down a very salutary provision. Rule 22 (4)regarding written test for selecting candidates to appear before the Selection committee secures better talents ia an impartial manner and therefore lays down a very salutary provision. There is no reason why the Registrar should not follow this provision and require selection to be made by holding written test. Rule regarding "quota" for direct recruitment is also iatended to be followed. There is no reason why the Registrar should not follow this Rule. What has not been appreciated by the respondent-Registrar is the fact that he is the executive Head of the co-operative movement which is intended to provide strength to the worker sections of the community and is based on contribution through aa open door policy. The Registrar is supposed to be the "friend, philosopher and guide" and is required to see that tbe movement remains within the prescribed limits. This nature and principle governing tbe cooperative movement has been fully stated by this Court in Brij Gopal Denga v. State of M. P. [l979 MPLJ 695] and it should be the obligation of the Registrar to see that the movement gains strength and becomes effective instrument of removing economic disperaties and help development of the State. The wisdom, for this purpose, lies in giving effect to the policy laid down in the Act and the rules made thereunder, and not in ignoring them. This Court hopes and believes that the respondent-Registrar would spare some of his valuable time to go through not only this order but also the other relevant decisions of this court and see that his functions, at least in future, are regulated by the law as clarified by these decisions. ( 10 ) THE next and important question is about the relief to be granted to the petitioner. Since selection and appointment of respondent Nos. 5 to 57 has been held to be illegal, it should be the obligation of this Court to quash these appointments. This would necessarily create a vacuum in the administrative set up of the Societies and therefore, their interests would be adversely affected. This, however, can be safeguarded by continuing the respondents on the present posts on adhoc basis without conferring any benefit upon them. In the meantime the respondent-Bank may be required to invite application from eligible candidates, select suitable candidates for being appointed and appoint such candidates in accordance with law. This, however, can be safeguarded by continuing the respondents on the present posts on adhoc basis without conferring any benefit upon them. In the meantime the respondent-Bank may be required to invite application from eligible candidates, select suitable candidates for being appointed and appoint such candidates in accordance with law. ( 11 ) THE petition consequently succeeds and is allowed. Though the appointments of respondents 5 to 57 are quashed, they are permitted to continue on their present position on adhoc basis for a period of six months during which the respondent-Bank is directed to hold fresb selection and fill vacant posts in accordance with law. No orders as to costs. The outstanding amount of security deposit, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition allowed. .