Judgment :- 1. The 2nd defendant in O. S. No. 868 of 1966, Munsiff's Court, Palghat, is the appellant herein. The plaintiffs in the suit are the respondents. This Second Appeal is preferred from the order of the court below rendered in I. A. No. 743 of 1979 dated 18-3-1982, which was confirmed by the Subordinate Judge, Palghat in A. S. No. 61 of 1981 by judgment dated 30-7-1984. The suit was one for partition. A preliminary decree was passed on 5-10-1967. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed I. A. 2529 of 1967 for passing the final decree. A Commission was issued. The Commissioner filed a plan and report. But the application was dismissed for default. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed I. A. No. 743 of 1979 under 0.26 R.13 CPC. to pass a final decree. The Ist defendant was ex parte. The 2nd defendant challenged the maintainability of the second application for passing a final decree. This objection was not accepted by the trial court. Plaintiffs' application was allowed. In appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge concurred with the decision of the trial court. It was held that the application filed by the plaintiffs for passing the final decree is not barred by limitation. The learned Subordinate Judge also held that the grievance of the defendants that sufficient opportunity was not given to them to substantiate their case, is without any foundation. The 2nd defendant has come up in Second Appeal. 2. Mr. C. Chitambaresh, counsel for the appellant, contended that the present application for passing a final decree is barred, since the earlier application was dismissed for default more than three years ago. There is no substance in this contention. It fails to give effect to the nature and scope of a partition suit and the preliminary decree passed therein As stated in Law of Limitation and Prescription, U. N. Mitra, 9th Edition, Volume III (1979 Edn.) Page 2440: "A suit for partition in which a preliminary decree has been made continues to be pending on the file of the trial Court until a final decree is drawn up in accordance with law and the duty of drawing up the final decree is a duty of the Court and neither the Civil Procedure Code nor the Limitation Act specifically provides for any application being made for drawing up a final decree. To such an application there is no limitation." So also, the Limitation Act, AIR. Commentaries, Volume II, 1976 Edition page 891 after referring to an application for final decree in a partition suit, it is stated: "There is in fact no limitation for such an application, inasmuch as the rule does not contemplate any such application being made by the party, it being the duty of the Court to pass the final decree after the necessary enquiries." 3. In the light of the above statement of the law, the contention of the appellant's counsel that I. A. No. 743/79 filed by the plaintiffs for passing the final decree is barred by limitation, is without substance. The learned Subordinate Judge has adverted to this aspect of the matter in para 4 of his judgment. He held: "In the Limitation Act no period of limitation is prescribed for filing application for passing final decree in a suit for partition. A suit for partition is only adjourned on passing a preliminary decree and it does not come to an end until the final decree is passed. Final decree applications are to be treated only as reminders to the court to pass the decree in the suit. Therefore, till the final decree is passed the suit for partition has to he deemed to be pending. In that view of the matter, the present application is not barred by limitation Therefore, I find that the learned Munsiff has correctly overruled the objection raised by the appellant and passed the final decree." 4. The only further question that was raised by the appellant before the lower appellate court was that she was 'not given an opportunity to substantiate her case. The courts below have found that, it is not correct. This is a concurrent question of fact. No question of law arises for consideration in this Second Appeal. 5. The judgments and decrees of the courts below are affirmed. The Second Appeal is without merit. It is dismissed in limine.