JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition has been referred by a learned Single Judge of this Court as he felt that the matter involved in this writ petition requires consideration by a larger bench of this Court. 2. Petitioner, Bhura Lal was elected as Sarpanch of village Panchayat Partapgarb, under Panchayat Samiti Thanagazi in the district of Alwar, in the year 1981. While he was continuing to hold the office of Sarpanch, one Laxmi Narain made a complaint to the Collector, Alwar on January 12, 1984 alleging that Bhura Lal had committed misconduct in the discharge of his duties as Sarpanch by promoting the interests of Prabhu Uayal and that he had knowingly caused loss to the Panchayat by failing to prosecute the defence on behalf of the Panchayat in a suit filed by Prabhu Dayal in the court of Munsif, Thanagazi against the Gram Panchayat, Partapgarh. A preliminary inquiry in the matter was conducted by the Additional District Development Officer, Alwar at the instance of the Collector, Alwar. The Additional District Development Officer gave a notice to show cause to the petitioner along with a copy of the complaint. The petitioner submitted his reply to the said notice on April 5, 1984. 3. The Additional District Development Officer, after making a (preliminary inquiry into the matter, submitted his report to the Collector, Alwar on May 10, 1984. He took the view that Bhura Lal Sarpanch intentionally did not defend the suit filed by Prabhu Dayal against the Gram Panchayat, with a view to support the financial interests of Prabhu Dayal and deliberately, intending to cause loss to the Panchayat. The report of the preliminary inquiry was considered by the Collector, who in turn forwarded the same to the State Government with his opinion that the charges of the nature specified in sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Rajasthan Panchavat Act. 1953 (hereinafter called 'the ALt') were prime facie made out against the petitioner. The State Government after considering the report of the Collector, Alwar relating to the preliminary inquiry, got a statement of charges prima facie made out against the petitioner, drawn up on July 6, 1984. A statement of such charges was sent to the petitioner alongwith a notice filing upon him to show-cause in writing as to why they should not be enquired into. A statement of such charges was sent to the petitioner alongwith a notice filing upon him to show-cause in writing as to why they should not be enquired into. Together with the charge-sheet and the show-cause notice, an order passed under sub section (4-A) of Section 17 of the Act dated July 6, 1984 was also forwarded to the petitioner, suspending him from holding the office of Sarpanch and debarring him from taking part in toe proceedings of the Panchayat or from doing any act as Sarpanch while under suspension. 4. The petitioner, in his writ petition, alleged that neither the charge-sheet nor a copy of the suspension order dated July 6, 1984 was served upon him but on July 8, 1984 he found an order issued by the Collector, Alwar dated July 7, 1994 pasted out-side his house, directing the Tchsildar, Thanagazi to get the charge of the office of Sarpanch delivered from the Sarpanch to the Up-Sarpanch, because of the fact that Sarpanch Bhura Lal was suspended from the office of Sarpanch by the order of the State Government dated July 6, 1984 with immediate effect. According to the petitioner, he thereupon went to Jaipur and obtained a certified copy of the order of suspension dated July 6, 1984 and then he also became aware of the charges framed against him. 5. Two main contentions were advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner before us. Firstly, it was submitted that the order of suspension dated July 6, 1984 was passed by the State Government in contravention of the provisions of Section 17(4-A) of the Act and Rule 21 of the Rajasthan Panchayat and Nyaya Panchayat (General) Rules, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'). According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the inquiry conducted under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act cannot be said to have "started" until the show-cause notice is served upon the concerned Panch or Sarpanch and further that in response to such a notice, the person concerned submits a representation in respect of the charge-sheet and the said representation is considered by the competent officer or authority, referred to in sub-rule (4) of Rule 20, and then such officer or authority decides not to drop the proceedings, but proceeds to appoint an officer or authority to enquire into the charges. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is only after the enquiry officer is appointed to enquire into the charges that the inquiry can be said to have started, within the meaning of Section 17(4) read with Rule 21. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the order of suspension passed at an earlier stage was invalid, being in contravention of the provisions of Section 17(4-A). The second contention of the learned counsel was that the principles of natural justice were violated inasmuch as the petitioner was suspended from the office of Sarpanch without giving him an opportunity of hearing in the matter. It has also been emphasised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Sarpanch held an elected office and his valuable right to bold such an elected office could not be lightly interfered with by the State Government at its whim, sweet will or pleasure. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents contested both the aforesaid propositions Sought to be made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and it was argued by them that the inquiry under Section 17(4) of the Act started as soon as the State Government, after considering the report of the preliminary inquiry, declines to drop the proceedings against the concerned Panch or Sarpanch but proceeds in the manner laid down in Rule 21. In the present case, it was urged that the order of suspension was passed by the State Government even after the charge-sheet was drawn up and a show-cause notice along with the charge sheet was issued to the petitioner. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the respondent the order of suspension in the present case could not be set aside on account of its being premature, as it was passed after the inquiry under sub-section (4) of Section 17 had started and was, therefore, valid and in accordance with law. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the respondent the order of suspension in the present case could not be set aside on account of its being premature, as it was passed after the inquiry under sub-section (4) of Section 17 had started and was, therefore, valid and in accordance with law. As regards, the second contention, it was argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that under sub-section (4-A) of Section 17 the order of suspension is passed only as an interim measure ane at the stage the service of a show-cause notice or giving an opportunity of hearing to the Panch or Sarpanch concerned was not necessary before making an order of suspension as such an order is designed to last only until the decision of the inquiry conducted under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act. It was also pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents that as the order of suspension was passed in the present case by the State Government in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (4-A) of Section 17 the question of interference with the special rights of the Sarpanch did not arise, inasmuch as the suspension of Panch or Sarpanch was regulated by statutory provisions and not merely by the sweet will or pleasure of the State Government. 7. 7. Before considering the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to refer to the relevant provisions of sub-sections (4) and (4-A) of Section 17 of the Act, which are as under:- Sec. 17 (4) - The State Government may, by order in writing and after giving him an opportunity of being heard ana making such Inquiry as may be deemed necessary, remove any Panch, Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch who (a) refuses to act or becomes incapable of acting as such or (b) in the opinion of the State Government, has been guilty of misconduct or neglect in the discharge of his duties or of any disgraceful conduct: Provided that any such inquiry as is referred to in this subsection may be initiated even after the expiry of the term of a Panchayat or if already initiated before such expiry, may be continued thereafter and in any such case, the State Government shall, by order in writing record its finding on the charges levelled against a Panch, Sarpancti or Up-sarpanch of the Panchayat during its term of office." "(4-A) The State Government may suspend any Panch, Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch against whom an inquiry has been started under sub-section (4) or the proviso thereto or against whom any criminal proceedings in regard to an offence involving moral turpitude is pending trial in a court of law and debar him from taking part in any act or proceedings of the Panchayat while 'under suspension." 8. Clause (v) of subsection (2) of Section 89 of the Act authorisest to State Government to make rules consistent with the Act, to carry out the purposes thereof. in relation to suspension and removal of office bearers. Rules 20 and 21 which have been made by the State Government under the aforesaid power vested in it, under section 89 (2) of the Act are as under : "20. Preliminary inquiry for removal.-(1) The Collector may, on his own motion or upon requisition of the State Government initiate a preliminary inquiry under sub-section (4) of Section 17 against any Panch, Sarpanch or Up-sarpanch of a Panchayat or against any member or Chairman of a Nyaya Panchayat. (2) For the purpose of sub-rule (1) any officer subordinate to him may be deputed by the Collector to hold such preliminary inquiry and to make a report to him. (2) For the purpose of sub-rule (1) any officer subordinate to him may be deputed by the Collector to hold such preliminary inquiry and to make a report to him. (3) Any preliminary inquiry against the Chairman or a member of a Nyaya Panchayat at may also be initiated as aforesaid by the Munsif, or where there is no munsif by the Civil Judge, or the Magistrate of the first class, having jurisdiction over the Nyaya Circle. (4) If as a result of such preliminary inquiry, the Collector or the munsif or the Civil Judge or the Magistrate of the first class initiating the inquiry is satisfied that any charges of the nature specified in sub-section (4) of section 17 are prima facie made out against such Panch, Sarpanch or Up-sarpanch or against such Chairman or Member as the case may be, a report thereof alonwith the recommendations of such officer the matter shall be made accordingly to the State Government or to any officer or authority to whom the powers of the State Government under Sub-section (4) of Section 17 may be delegated by a notification under section 70. (5) The provisions of the Rajasthan Disciplinary Proceedings (Summoning of witnesses and Production of Documents) Act, 1959 (Rajasthan Act No. 28/1959) and the rules made thereunder, shall also apply mutatis mutandis, to the enquiries against Panch Sarpanch or Up-sarpanch of the Panchayat or against any member or Chairman of a Nyava Panchayat as the case may be, being conducted under the provisions of the Act, and the rules made thereunder." "21. Final inquiry -(1) The State Government or the officer or authority referred to in sub-rule (4) of rule 2 shall consider the report of the preliminary inquiry and may either drop the proceedings or get drawn up a statement of charges prima facie made out against the parson against whom the preliminary inquiry has been made, specifying such details as may be deemed sufficient for him to understand the nature thereof. (2) A copy of such statement shall be sent to the person charged, alongwith a notice calling upon him and to show cause in writing why they should not be inquired into. (2) A copy of such statement shall be sent to the person charged, alongwith a notice calling upon him and to show cause in writing why they should not be inquired into. (3) Upon reading the representation if any, of the person charged, in response to the notice under sub-rule (2) the State Government or the officer or authority referred to in sub rule (4) of rule 2.; may either drop the proceedings or may appoint an officer or authority to inquire into the charges, hereinafter referred as to the inquiring officer, to whom the record of the preliminary inquiry, the statement of charges, the explanation of the person charged and all other relevant papers shall be forwarded. (4) The inquiry officer shall:- (a) issue a notice to the person charged to appear before him on a date and at the time, and place specified in the notice. (b) read out the person charged, when he so appears, the charge or charges levelled against him. (c) hear the explanation, if any (d) take and consider such evidence, oral or documentary, as may be produced in support or in rebuttal of the charge or charges. and (e) record his finding on each of them. (5) The record of the inquiry, together with his finding shall be forwarded by the inquiring officer to the State Government or the officer or authority referred to in sub rule (4 of rule 20." 9. Now, sub-section (4-A) of Section 17 authorises the State Government to suspend any Panch, Sarpanch or Up-sarpanch against whom an inquiry has been started under sub-section (4) or the proviso thereof. Thus the stage at which an order of suspension could be passed by the State Government must necessarily be one as soon as or after an inquiry under Section 17 (4) has been started Thus, the crucial question which arises for determination in this case is as to when the inquiry under Section 17 (4) can be said to have started. According to the petitioner, the inquiry under Section 17 (a) can be said to have started only when the stage of sub-rule (3) of Rule 21 is reached and the State Government after reading the representation of the Panch or Sarpanch concerned, if any, in response to the notice issued under sub-rule (2) of Rule 21 either drops the proceedings or proceeds to appoint an inquiry officer to enquire into the charges. On the other hand, according to the learned counsel for that respondents the stage of starting of an inquiry, within the meaning of section 17 (4-A), should be considered to have been reached when the report of the preliminary enquiry is received by the State Government or the officer authorised under sub-rule (4) of Rule 20 and alter considering the report of the preliminary inquiry, the State Government or the authority concerned declines to drop the proceedings but decides according to the provisions of sub rule (1) of Rule 21. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the respondents, the inquiry should be deemed to have started as soon as the State Government decides to make a final inquiry into the matter, after considering the report of the preliminary inquiry. 10. Learned counsel for both parties relied upon a decision of a division bench of this Court, in (1) State of Rajasthan v. Pukhraj, 1970 R.L W. 125 , in support of their respective contentions. A learned Single Judge, Jagat Narain. J. as he then was, had taken the view that the enquiry referred to in sub-section (4-A) of Section 17 is the final enquiry which is ordered by the State Government under sub-rule (3) of Rule 21. But the Division Bench of this Court (Bhandari, C.J. as he then was and Tyagi. J. ) did not agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge and observed that the view taken by him is too narrow an interpretation of the word 'enquiry' occurring in Sections 17(4) and 17 (4-A) of the Act. The division bench observed as under in Pukhraj's case (I): X X X X 11. A similar question was considered by another Division Bench of this Court in (2) Bajranglal v. State of Rajasthan and others, AIR 1981 Raj. 298 . The division bench observed as under in Pukhraj's case (I): X X X X 11. A similar question was considered by another Division Bench of this Court in (2) Bajranglal v. State of Rajasthan and others, AIR 1981 Raj. 298 . In that case the State Government after a preliminary enquiry, did not drop the proceedings against the Sarpanch but drow up a statement of charges and sent the same to the Sarpanch along with a notice calling upon him to show cause why they should not be enquired into. The Sarpanch also submitted his explanation and thereafter an enquiry officer was also appointed. Their lordships observed as under in Bajranglal's case (2) : X X X X X 12. The Division Bench which decided Bajranglal's case (2) referred with approval to the decision in Pukh Raj's case (1) although some observations create an impression that after the report of the preliminary enquiry is considered by the State Government and the enquiry is not held to be worth dropping, but a statement of charges is drawn up and after service of the statement of charges and the show cause notice upon the delinquent Sarpanch and after considering his reply, the State Government could exercise the power of suspension under Section 17 (4-A) of the Act when it holds that the matter requires regular inquiry and appoints on inquiry officer. However, such observations appear to have been made with regard to the facts of that particular case and not for the purpose of laying down general proposition of law. 13. In Bajranglal's case (2), the learned Judges emphasised that the elaborate procedure that after the State Government considers the report of the preliminary enquiry and holds that the inquiry is not worth dropping and draws up a statement of the charges made out against the Sarpanch and after service of the statement of the charges and the show-cause notice and considering the reply of the delinquent elected office holder, the State Government holds that the matter needs a regular inquiry and appoints an Enquiry Officer, has been laid down by law in order to safeguard the rights of the elected Panchas or Sarpanch and is in the nature of restriction on the supervisory power of the State Government; so that the Panchas or Sarpanch may not be lightly suspended or removed. However, even in Bajranglal's case also the division bench clearly laid down that the stage of Section 17 (4A) would be reached when the State Government after considering the report of the preliminary enquiry decides that a charge-sheet is to be served on the holder of the elective office and finds that a prima facie case is established and further considers that the continuance in office of the delinquent elected office holder would not be in the public interest or in the interest of the Panchayat fund or the working of the Panchayat. The learned Judges appears to be clearly of the view that at that stage the Government should be left free to exercise its supervisory control and in an appropriate case it may pass an order of temporary removal or suspension of the incumbent, after carefully scrutiny of the preliminary report submitted before it. Thus, there does not appear to be any departure in Bajranglal's case (2) from the law laid down in Pukhraj's case (1) nor there is any inconsistency between the two decisions The further observations both in Pukhraj's case (1) and in Bajranglal's case (2) pertain to the facts on the particular cases before their Lordships. In the last mentioned case it has been observed that the State Government had applied its mind twice in that case, firstly, at the time of drawing up of the statement of the charges on the basis of the preliminary enquiry and, secondly at the time of appointment of the Enquiry Officer for conducting the inquiry into the charges. That observation was made with regard to the question as to whether the principles of audi alteram partem should be complied with in the case of suspension of a Sarpanch and not with regard to the stage at which an order of suspension could be pissed against a Sarpanch, 14. In (2-A) Radheyshyam Vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., (S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 784 of 1984 decided on August 31, 1984 ) Agrawal J. had again an occasion to consider the matter and he expressed the view that in Bajranglal's case (2) there was no departure from the law laid down in Pukhraj's case (1), but the law laid down earlier was reaffirmed. The learned Judge observed as under in Radheyshyam's case (supra): "An order of suspension passed under Section 17 (4A) is in the nature of an interim order pending final adjudication and since the continuance of a Panch. Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch during the pendency of the enquiry proceedings may cause irreparable damage, pre-decisional opportunity to be heard cannot be afforded to him and he can only be afforded post- decisional opportunity to be heard. Although the Act and the Rules do not expressly provide for such a post decisional opportunity after the passing the order of suspension, the Panch, Sarpanch or Up-sarpanch who has been suspended, has a right to make an appropriate representation seeking a review of the order of suspension and asking the State Government to rescind the said order after he has submitted his reply to the show cause notice issued to him under sub rule (2) of pule 21. Even in the absence of such a representation it is incumbent upon the State Government to consider the question as to whether the order of suspension should be continued or rescind after the reply of the Panch, Sarpanch or Up-sarpanch to the show-cause notice issued under sub-rule(2) of Rule 21 is received and if from the said reply it appears that there is no substance in the charges that have been levelled or that the mis-conduct is of not such a serious magnitude as to warrant the suspension of the Panch, Sarpanch or Up-sarpanch, from the office to which he has been duly elected, the State Government should immediately review the order of suspension. The need for such a reconsideration at this stage is all the more necessary because under the Act and the Rules no period has been prescribed for completion of the enquiry into the charges and the State Government is duty bound to ensure that the holder of the elected office of Panch, Sarpanch or Up-sarpanch is prevented from discharging the functions of his office only for good cause," 15. In (3) Ram Chandra v. State of Rajasthan, 1981 WLN (UC) 496 , Agrawal J. held that suspension of a person from an office during the pendency of an enquiry into charges of misconduct against him is in the nature of a protective measure to prevent such a person from misusing his office to cause further harm till suitable action is taken against him. Thus, by its very nature suspension pending enquiry presupposes immediate action. 16. The learned Single Judge (K.S. Sidhu, J.), while making the reference, has expressed the view that for the purpose of taking a decision under Section 17 (4A) as to whether a Sarpanch should be suspended or not during the pendency of the enquiry under Section 17(4), the date and time when such a decision could be lawfully taken cannot be earlier then the date and time when the State Govt. considered the representation of the Sarpanch under Rule 21(3) in response to the notice served on him under Rule 21(2), showing cause why the charges framed against him should not be enquired into it was observed that the order of suspension of the Sarpanch made prior to the service of the statement of the charges and the notice under rule by 2'(2) would be, in contravention of both sub rule 2 and 3 of Rule 21. The learned Judge felt himself by unable to accept by the, view taken by Agrawal J. in Radhey Shyam's case (supra). However, learned single Judge failed to notice the fact that in Pukhraj's case (I) the division bench overruled similar view taken by the learned single Judge (Jagar Narain J) in that case. Sidhu J. in his order of reference observed that in Pukh Raj's case, as the Sarpanch had already submitted a reply to the statement of the charges before he was suspended, the State Government may be presumed to have considered the reply of the Sarpanch under Rule 21(3) and to have decided against the dropping of the proceedings and in favour of holding an enquiry against the delinquent Sarpanch, before he was suspended. With great respect to the learned Single Judge, after carefully going through the decision of Pukhrafs case (1) we are unable to hold that such a presumption could be made, as was sought to be raised by the learned Judge in face of clear enunciation of law in Pukhraj's case (1) where it has been clearly and unambiguously held that the point of time at which the enquiry can be deemed to have begun for the purposes of sub-section (4-A) of Section 17 is the stage when after considering the report of the preliminary enquiry the State Government considers it necessary to frame the charges and decides to issue a notice to the delinquent Sarpanch to show cause why the charges should not be enquired into. With great respect, we are unable to agree with the view expressed by Sidhu J. in his referring order that if the State Government proceeds to suspend a Sarpanch without even serving upon him a statement of charges and a show cause notice under sub rule (2) of Rule 21 and without waiting for his reply, the provisions of sub-rules (2) and (1) of Rule 21 would be meaningless and otiose.It may be pointed out that the provisions of Rule 21, inclusive sub-rules (2) and (3) thereof, provide the procedure for making a final inquiry against a Sarpanch against whom a prima facie case is held to be made out and sub-rules (2) & (3) of rule 21 provide the steps to be followed during the course of final enquiry against the delinquent Sarpanch. It is no doubt true that a panch or Sarpanch could not be allowed to be suspended in the same manner as an employee. In the matter of passing of an order of suspension requisite safeguards have been provided to protect the interest of the elected representatives of the people and that is why the holding of a preliminary enquiry. in accordance with the procedure laid down in Rule 20, and then the consideration of the report of the preliminary enquiry by the State Government so as to find out as to whether a prima facie case has been made out against the elected representative concerned or not, have been made conditions precedent before an order of suspension can be passed. It may be observed that a preliminary enquiry by the Collector is undoubtedly a safe-guard against whimsical, capricious or mala fide exercise of the power of suspension by the State Government. Moreover, after the preliminary enquiry report is carefully considered by the State Government and it is of the view on the basis of the material placed on the record that there is some foundation for the charges and that a prima facie case is made out against the Sarpanch concerned, then there is no reason why the enquiry should not be considered to have begun, so as to enable the State Government to exercise the power of temporary removal of the delinquent public office holder. As a result of the consideration of the report of the preliminary enquiry, the State Government may come to a prima facie conclusion that further continuance of the Sarpanch in office may not be in the public interest or in the interest of the Panchayat, Moreover as pointed out by Agrawal, J. in Ramchandra's case, such a protective measure like suspension may become necessary to prevent the person concerned from missing his offence to cause further harm to the public interest or the interests of the Panchayat. What is required is that the State Government should carefully scrutinise the preliminary enquiry report submitted to it and form a prima facie opinion whether the charges have a reasonable basis and should be enquired into or they should be dropped. If the Government deicide to drop the charges the question of suspension of' the Sarpanch would not arise. But if the Government comes to the conclusion that a prima facie case is made out against the Sarpanch and the State Government is further of the view that the charges are serious enough and the Sarpanch should be temporarily removed from holding the elective office to prevent him from further acting pre-judicially at the stage the State Government should be free to pass an order of suspension in exercise of its supervisory authority. In such circumstances, it may be necessary or even desirable to save the Panchayat property or its funds from being ruined or misappropriated We would not be justifying in holding that because the State Government had waited so long until the report of the preliminary enquiry was received and considered by it, could still wait for some more time until the charge-sheet and show cause notice are served upon the delinquent Sarpanch and he files a reply thereto and that reply is considered by the State Government before proceeding to appoint an Equity Officer. Such as interpretation would unreasonably delay the matters which may require quick and serious action on the part of the State Government as a result of its consideration of the preliminary enquiry report and leave such matters to utter uncertainty. The giving of a show-cause notice to the person sought to be suspended before exercising the power of suspension would result in postponement of the exercise of the said power and would rob the power of its object and efficacy. Moreover, the giving of the show-cause notice to the person sought to he suspended would only involve duplication of the process of enquiry because the charges which would form the basis of the order of suspension are the same which are subject natter of the enquiry conducted against the person to he suspended. There is no scope for the applicability of the principle of audi alteram partem at the stage of passing an order of suspension during the pendency of an enquiry and such a requirement cannot be read into the provisions contained in sub section (4A) of Section 17. In some cases, the panchas or Sarpanchs may try to evade service of show-cause notice and the statement of charges. Some others may take unreasonably long time in filing their replies on some pretext or the other like asking for inspection of some documents or records, though relevant or irrelevant, or on the basis of medical certificate or otherwise If a prima facie case of embezzelement or misappropriation is made out against a Sarpanch, it would be prejudicial to the interest of the Panchayat and result in considerable danger to the funds of the Panchayat in allowing him to remain in custody of the funds of the Panchayat even after a prima facie case is found to be established against him. In a case of tempering with the record of the Pancha' at even after a prima facie is made out against the Sarpanch, as a result of preliminary enquiry how could the records of the Panchayat be allowed to remain in the custody of such a person ? It the Sarpanch becomes incapable of acting for some reason or otherwise or in case the Sarpanch refuses to act or neglects in the discharge of his duties, then the State Government would he justified in exercising its power of supervisory control, if it proceeds to pass an order suspension of the parch or Sarpanch concerned, so that the work of the Panchayat may not suffer in future. Similarly, when a prima facie case of misconduct or disgraceful conduct is made out against a Sarpanch of serious nature after a c ireful scruff my of the preliminary enquiry report submitted by the Collector, the Mate Government would be justified in passing an order of suspension in exercise of its power of supervisory control. 17. In our view the provisions relating to a preliminary enquiry envisaged under rule 20 and a careful consideration of the preliminary enquiry report by the State Government, as provided in Sub-rule(1) of Rule 21, provides an effective safeguard against undue interference by the State Government in the working of the local Government or the Panchayats. Thus, we agree with the view taken by Bhandari.' C J in Pukhraj's case (I) and Agrawal J. in Radheyshyam's case (supra) that the stage at which the State Government may pass an order of suspension of Panch or Sarpanch under sub-section 17 would he reached when after a careful scrutiny of the preliminary enquiry report of the Collector, the State Government comes to the conclusion that a prima facie case has been made out against a Panch or Sarpanch and a statement of the charges is drawn up and a copy of the statement of the charges is sent to the person charged along with a show cause notice Drawing up of the statement of the charges and issuance of a show cause notice is expedient in the interest of justice. before passing an order of suspension so that the State Government may not unnecessarily delay the drawing up of the statement of the charges and sending the show-cause after passing the order of suspension. before passing an order of suspension so that the State Government may not unnecessarily delay the drawing up of the statement of the charges and sending the show-cause after passing the order of suspension. In our view, sufficient safeguards have also been provided by Rule 21(3), because after the service of the show-cause notice, the delinquent Panch or Sarpanch may submit his reply or representation and after considering the same, the Stare Government may feel satisfied, then it would proceed to drop the enquiry and also revoke the order of suspension. But even after the receipt of the representation or reply from the delinquent Sarpanch or Panch, the State Government feels dissatisfied, it may proceed to appoint as enquiry officer to make an enquiry into the charges. Thus, the proper stage at or after which an order of suspension under Section 17(4A) could be passed by the state Government is when the stage of rule 21(2) is reached and a copy of the statement of the charges Prima facie proved against the delinquent Panch or Sarpanch along with a notice to show cause is sent to him. 18. Thus in our view, from a combined reading of the provision of sub-section (4) and (4-A) of Section 17 and Rules 20 and 21, the following propositions clearly emerge: (1) That the Panch, Sarpanch or Upsarpanch holds a evective office for a period of 5 years and he should not ordinarily be removed or suspended from his office before the expiry of his term, except under and in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. (2) The State Government exercises supervisory control over the Panch, Sarpanch and Upsarpanch. (3) The Panch, Sarpanch or Up-sarpanch can be suspended by the State Government under Section 17(4A) of the Act, in case an enquiry has been started against him under sub-section (4) of Section 17 or any criminal proceedings in regard to an offence involving moral turpitude is pending trial against him in a court of law. (4) While the Panch, Sarpanch or Up-sarpanch remains under suspension, he shall be debarred from taking part in any act or proceedings of the Panchayat. (4) While the Panch, Sarpanch or Up-sarpanch remains under suspension, he shall be debarred from taking part in any act or proceedings of the Panchayat. (5) The State Government has power to suspend a Panch, Sarpanch or Upsarpanch when it is satisfied after carefully considering the report of such these preliminary enquiry it finds a prima facie case made out against the delinquent elected officer, the State Government decides not to drop the proceedings but a statement of charges, prima facie made out against him, is drawn up specifying such details as may be considered sufficient for him to understand the nature of charges. (6) On the basis of the material placed on the record of the preliminary enquiry and the report of such enquiry, the State Government issues a notice to the erring Panch, Sarpanch or Up-sarpanch to show cause in writing why the charges should not be enquired into and such notice is accompanied by a copy of the statement of charges. 19. At that stage the enquiry contemplated under sub-section (4-A) of Section 17 must be taken to have started. 20. Coming to the second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that if a Panch or Sarpanch or Up-sarpanch is not afforded an opportunity of hearing before an order of suspension is passed, the principles of natural justice would be violated, it may be pointed out that the order of suspension resulting in the temporary removal of the Panch, or Sarpanch is only an interim measure pending an enquiry into the charges drawn against the delinquent bolder of the public office and at that stage it is not necessary to afford an opportunity of hearing to the person sought to be suspended. It may be pointed out that suspension may be by why of punishment or by way of an interim measure. When it is by way punishment, the principles of audi alteram partem must he complied with, When it is only by way of temporary deprivation of office or as an interim measure, it should not be insisted upon that an opportunity of hearing should be aforeded to the person concerned before passing an order of suspension. When it is by way punishment, the principles of audi alteram partem must he complied with, When it is only by way of temporary deprivation of office or as an interim measure, it should not be insisted upon that an opportunity of hearing should be aforeded to the person concerned before passing an order of suspension. Lord Denning M. R. in (4) Lewis v. Heffer (1978) 3 All E.R. 354 , pointed out the distinction between the two types of suspension orders : "These words apply, no doubt, the suspensions which are inflicted by way of punishment, as for instance when a member of the Bar is suspended from practice for six months, or when a solicitor is suspended from practice. But they do not apply to suspension which are made, as a holding operation, pending enquiries. Very often irregularities are disclosed in a Government department or in a business house and a man may be suspended on full pay pending enquiries Suspicion may rest on him; and so he is suspended until he is cleared of it. No one, so far as I know, has ever questioned such a suspension on the ground that it could not be done unless he is given notice of the charge and an opportunity of defending himself and so forth The suspension in such a case is merely done by way of good administration. A situation has arisen in which something must be done at once. The work of the department of the office is being affected by rumours and suspicions. The other will not trust the man in order to get back proper work the man is suspended. At that stage, the rules of natural justice do not apply." 21. It may be observed that there cannot be any fixed or rigorous yard- stick regarding principles of natural justice the concept of natural justice cannot be put into a straight jacket. The giving of a pre-decisional hearing to the person affected, before an administrative decision is taken by the authority concerned, should undoubtedly be adhered to when suspension is brought about by way of punishment and the court should he extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing, short of all its formal trappings and dilatory practices, at the pre-decisional stage. However, it is well recognised that in exceptional circumstances, pre-decisional hearing may be avoided where compulsive necessity so demands or where it is likely to paralyse the administrative progress or frustrate the very need for prompt action. Undoubtedly, a pre-decisional hearing forms part of the fair play or natural justice, but it need not necessarily mean an oral hearing. The cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner relate to administrative proceedings involving civil consequences in which final orders were passed in violation of the doctrine of natural justice. The audi alteram partem rule is flexible. It is necessary to adjust and harmonise the need for speed and the obligation to act fairly. (5) Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala and others, AIR 1969 SC 198 , (6) State of Orissa v. Dr (Miss) Binapani Dei and others AIR 1967 SC 1269 and (7) Smt. Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India and another AIR 1978 SC 597 (7) , are instances of cases where final orders were passed in administrative actions involving civil consequences and we have no doubt that the final orders passed must be consistent with the principles of natural justice. But as already observed above, a distinction should always be made in the order of suspension by way of punishment and as an interim measure pending and enquiry into the matter, in cases where urgent preventive action is called for. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (8) Liberty Oil Mills and others v. Union of India and others AIR 1984 SC 1271 , observed as under: The procedural fairness embodying natural justice is to be implied whenever action is taking affecting the rights of parties. It may be that the opportunity to be heard may not be pre-decisional; it may necessarily have to be post-decisional where the danger to be averted or the act to be prevented is imminent or where the action to be taken can be brooke no delay:- " Ad inteim orders may always be made ex parte and such orders may themselves provide for an opportunity to the aggrieved party to be heard at a letter stage. Even if the interim orders do not make provision for such an opportunity, an aggrieved party has, nevertheless, always the right to make an appropriate representation seeking a review of the order and asking the authority to rescind or modify the order. Even if the interim orders do not make provision for such an opportunity, an aggrieved party has, nevertheless, always the right to make an appropriate representation seeking a review of the order and asking the authority to rescind or modify the order. The principles of natural justice would be satisfied if the aggrieved part. is given an opportunity at his request." "We, however, take care to say that we do not mean to suggest that natural justice is not attracted when orders of suspension or like orders of an interim nature are made. Some orders of that nature, intended to prevent further mischief of one kind, may themselves be productive of greater mischief o another kind. An interim order of stay or suspension which has the effect of preventing a person, however, temporarily may say, from pursuing his profession or line of business, have substantial, serious and even disastrous consequences to him and may expose him to grave risk and hazard. Therefore, we say that there must be observed some modicum of residual, care natural justice, sufficient to enable the affected person to make an adequate representation." In (9) Kashmiri Lal v. The Deputy Commissioner, Sonepat, AIR 1980 P & H 29 , a full bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, while dealing with an identical question of suspension of a Panch or Sarpanch under the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1953 drew a distinction between an order of suspension passed as a quasi-judicial order and an order of suspension passed as an executive order and it was observed that while in the former case the order of suspension would be almost by way of punishment and as such an opportunity of hearing should be afforded to the Panch or Sarpanch before ordering suspension, but in the later case there is no such requirement of affording an opportunity of hearing to the Punch or Sarpanch. In Kashmiri Lal's case (9) the earlier Full bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in (to) Gurcharan Singh v. State of Haryana and others AIR 1979 P & H 61 , was approved wherein the following observations ware made in the matter of suspension order being passed in emergent and urgent situations: "If in the context of such an urgent or emergent action, me relatively tardy requirements of principles of natural justice requiting the necessary to issue a show cause notice, affording time for the filing of a reply, the consideration of the same and perhaps to afford the opportunity to lead evidence and thereafter to decide the same were to be imported it may well in effect lead to defeating the very purpose of an emergent provision of this nature If that be so, it is squally well settled that a construction which would tend to defeat rather than advance the intent of the legislature ha, inevitably to be avoided." 22. In (11) Namdeo Ragho Arote v. State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 1979 Bom. 285 , it was observed that the power of suspension of a Sarpanch or Upsarpanch under the Bombay Village Panchayat Act, 109, has been vested to be exercised in the discretion of the authority, and the authority is expected to act reasonably. with justice and after applying its mind to the facts of the case. Evidently, when discretion is given, it is not expected that power should be exercised by the authority as an automatem, merely because the requirements of the statute are complied with. It was held that the authority entrusted with the discretion must act reasonably and involves application of mind. 23. The decision in (12) Swadeshi Cotton Mills etc. etc. v. Union of India etc., AIR 181 SC 818 , has also no application to the matter in issue before us as that case relates to taking over of an undertaking without investigation and affording of a minimal hearing at the pre decisional stage even when the order of taking over was of a drastic nature, having for reaching consequences on the rights and interest of the owner of the undertaking and was deprivatory in nature. 24. 24. Thus it is firmly established that the duly to act fairly is applicable not only to judicial or quasi-judicial matters, but it is also equally applicable to the executive or administrative functions. Good administration and an honest or bonafide decision must require not merely impartiality, not merely bringing one's mind to bear on the problem, but also a duty to act fairly, which denotes the requirement of acting honestly and without bias or caprice. In (18) Ridge v. Baldwin (1961) 1 Q.B 539 , it was held that the right of fair hearing was a rule of universal application even in the case of administrative acts or decision affecting legal rights However, it must be emphasised that the rules of natural justice or of acting fairly are not cut and dried. It is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to be applied nor as to their scope and extent, as for the application of the concept of fair play there must be real flexibility. It has often been observed that the requirement of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the authority is acting, the subject matter to be dealt with and so forth. The principle of acing fairly is undoubtedly an essence of good and considerate administration in a democratic set up. But some times urgent action is necessary on the ground of public policy, public health or safety or with a view to prevent a person from continuing any activities injurcus to the society or prejudicial to public interest. In such cases, the normal presumption that a hearing must be given is rebutted by the urgency of the situation. Even in cases not involving urgency, when in is necessary to prevent a person from doing any mischief or coot owing to indulge in acts harmful to the society or a section thereof or where prior warning would frustrate the very object, action may be taken without a pre-decisional hearing. 25. Similar is the situation when the suspension of a Panch, Sarpanch or Up-sarpanch is necessary to be brought about in order to prevent him from continuing to commit serious acts of misconduct, misappropriation of funds, falsification of accounts, tempering with the records or misusing his official position and the like. 25. Similar is the situation when the suspension of a Panch, Sarpanch or Up-sarpanch is necessary to be brought about in order to prevent him from continuing to commit serious acts of misconduct, misappropriation of funds, falsification of accounts, tempering with the records or misusing his official position and the like. In such case a pre-decisional hearing can be dispensed with particularly when ample opportunity of hearing has to be afforded to the delinquent holder of public office during the statutory enquiry under Section 17 (3) of the Act read with Rule 21 of the Rules. 26. As pointed out by us above, the order of suspension under Section 17 (4A) is an order of interim nature and it could be passed only after an active application of mind by the State Government to the question as to whether an emergent or immediate action is called or on the basis of the preliminary enquiry report and its decision to send a charge sheet and show cause notice to the Panch or Sarpanch concerned. Moreover, it is envisaged in rule 21 (3) that an opportunity of hearing shall be afforded to the person concerned in the sense that after a show cause notice along with a statement of charges is served upon him, he will have an opportunity to submit his representation in answer to the charges. At that stage he could also seek a review of the order and ask the authority to rescind or modify the same. As held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Liberty Oil Mills' case (8) the principles of natural justice would be satisfied is a post decisional hearing is given in such matters and the aggrieved party is afforded an opportunity at his request. As held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Liberty Oil Mills' case (8) the principles of natural justice would be satisfied is a post decisional hearing is given in such matters and the aggrieved party is afforded an opportunity at his request. If an urgent or emergent action is required to be taken as a result of the consideration of the preliminary enquiry report made by the Collector to be the State Government, then there could be no doubt that the order of suspension of the Panch, or Sarpanch could be passed at the stage of giving the show cause notice along with a copy of the order of sheet as a review or reconsideration of the order of suspension is naturally envisaged after the Panch or Sarpanch submits his representation in reply to the show cause notice, as on consideration of the same, the State Government may drop the charges or proceed to appoint an Enquiry Officer to hold the enquiry into the charges. It needs to be emphasised that an order of suspension of an elected office holder should only be passed by the State Government when the charges levelled against him involve misconduct of serious magnitute and are of such a nature as to warrant immediate or emergent action. 27. In the case before us, there can be no doubt that during the course of the pre-liminaty enquiry the Sarpanch was given an opportunity to submit his explanation by the Collector, Alwar and the petitioner had submitted his representation on April 5, 1984 which was considered by the Collector while making the preliminary enquiry report. The State Government, after a consideration of the preliminary enquiry report, directed that a statement of the charges prima facie found proved against the Sarpanch may be framed and a show cause notice may be issued. It may be pointed out that the order holding that a prima facie case is made out and that further proceedings be taken under Section 17 (4) against the Sarpanch as also the order of suspension under Section 17 (4A) were passed on the very same day i.e. July 6. 1984. Thus the order of suspension was passed by the State Government apparently after consideration of the report of the preliminary enquiry and after coming to the conclusion that a prima facie case has been made out against the Sarpanch concerned. 1984. Thus the order of suspension was passed by the State Government apparently after consideration of the report of the preliminary enquiry and after coming to the conclusion that a prima facie case has been made out against the Sarpanch concerned. As a matter of fact the show cause notice and a copy of the statement of charges was sent to the petitioner along with the order of suspension. 28. In the present case, as the statement of charges has been issued, it will he open to the petitioner to submit his representation in respect thereof to the State Government and thereafter the State Government would undoubtedly consider his representation in accordance with the procedure prescribed in sub- rule (3) of Rule 21 and either drop the proceedings or proceed to appoint an Enquiry Officer to enquire into the charges. 29. Before parting with the case, we would like to observe that in the case of an elected representative of the people holding the office of Panch or Sarpanch or Unsarpanch, it would be in the fitness of things that the enquiry envisaged under Rule 21 should be completed as early as possible so that the elected representative should not be kept away from the office for a long time, merely on the ground that an enquiry is bring proceeded with against him. 30. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, we are unable to hold that the order of suspension dated July 6, 1984 (Annexure 3) is void or in any manner invalid. The writ petition is consequently dismissed, subject to the observations made above.Petition Dismissed. *******