JUDGMENT : K.N. Goyal, J. The Petitioner is a tenant who made an application for deposit of rent in the Court of Munsif u/s 30(1) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The deposit was made but the landlord opposite-party filed objections on various grounds. One ground was that the building was not covered by the Act and another was that a suit for ejectment was pending in the Small Cause Court and that if any deposit was to be made it should be made in that suit and not in the court of Munsif. The learned Munsif however took the view that the merits of the controversy were not to be decided by him. Accordingly, be refused to consider the objections and permitted the deposit to be made. The landlord opposite party filed a revision. The Additional District Judge, on revision, set-aside the order of the Munsif and remanded the case back to him for considering the merits. Aggrieved by this order, the tenant has come to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The first question that arises is whether a revision was maintainable u/s 115, Code of Civil Procedure. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has urged that only provision for revision contained in the Act is that in Section 18. Sections 37 and 38 of the Act have also been relied on is support of the argument that no revision was maintainable. He has also relied on the authority of Ram Bharosey Lal v. Munsif 1980 ARC 427. 3. As regards the decision in Ram Bharosey Lal (supra), it is sufficient to mention that the decision was based on concession of counsel. In view of the concession no reasons were given for the view that a revision was not maintainable. Thus, the decision does not operate as a precedent. 4. Examining the point on its merits we find that Section 30 uses the words "the court of Munsif". It is not with the Prescribed Authority or with the Munsif as persona-designata that the deposit is required to be made. It is in the court of Munsif which is the lowest court in the hierarchy of the regularly constituted civil courts. As such Section 115, Code of Civil Procedures should apply. Section 37 of the Act has no bearing on the question. It is in the court of Munsif which is the lowest court in the hierarchy of the regularly constituted civil courts. As such Section 115, Code of Civil Procedures should apply. Section 37 of the Act has no bearing on the question. It merely says that any order of any authority under the Act shall not be called in question in any court. What we are dealing with here is an order of a court itself and if that decision is revisable under Code of Civil Procedure, Section 37(1) cannot operate as a bar to such revision. Section 38 does over-ride the CPC but only to the extent of any inconsistency with the provisions of the Act. There is nothing in the Act to shut out a revision u/s 15 against an order of a court of Munsif. Of course, no revision lies against orders of Prescribed Authority or even of a District Judge as an appellate authority under the Act. But when something is done by a regular court then the Code of Civil Procedure, including Section 115, should apply, as there is nothing in the Act which is inconsistent with the application thereof. 5. The next question that arises is whether the Munsif's court ought to have gone into the merits. On this question learned Counsel for the Respondent Sri H.N. Tilhari placed reliance on Fateh Chard v. Bal Saroop Goel 1969 ALJ 979 in which a Division Bench of this Court held that before issuing notice to the landlord u/s 7-C(4) of the old Act the Munsif should satisfy himself as to whether the jurisdictional facts were prima facie made out and thereafter on the landlord's questioning the existence of those facts It would be within the powers of the Munsif and his duty to go again Into that question. This decision is binding on me. Accordingly, we have to assume that the learned Additional District Judge was right in holding that the Munsif should decide the case on merits. 6. However, as explained in Haji Abdul Karim v. Mohammad Ismail 1978 UPRCC 691 by Hon'ble M.N. Shukla, J., as his lordship then was, any finding given in proceedings u/s 7-C of the old Act or Section 30 of the new Act would not operate as resjudicata in any regular suit. 6. However, as explained in Haji Abdul Karim v. Mohammad Ismail 1978 UPRCC 691 by Hon'ble M.N. Shukla, J., as his lordship then was, any finding given in proceedings u/s 7-C of the old Act or Section 30 of the new Act would not operate as resjudicata in any regular suit. The deposit u/s 30 is a neutral act and it has no effect on the rights of the parties. Of course, Section 30(6) lays down that it shall be deemed that the person making a deposit under this section has paid it on the date of such deposit to the person in whose favour it is deposited in the case referred to in Sub-section (1) or to the landlord in the case referred to in Sub-section (2). This provision would be attracted only when the conditions precedent for the deposit are satisfied. If a deposit was made when those condition precedents were not satisfied, in other words, when the jurisdictional facts necessary before a right to deposit could accrue did not exist, then the mere fact that the deposit was made will not help the depositor vide Chhedi Lal Gupta v. Ankul Chand 1966 ALJ 418 and Remayan Ram v. Bharat Ram 1964 AWR 590. 7. It is not disputed before me that an ejectment case is pending in the Small Cause Court. In view of the pendency of that suit and in view of the authority of Haji Abdul Karim (supra) it will not be expedient of the court of Munsif were to go into the merits at this stage inasmuch as the entire controversy will have to be decided by the Small Cause Court independently of any view expressed by the Munsif's Court. Although, thus, the order of the Additional District Judge is correct in so far as the legal position is concerned, yet in the light of the circumstances mentioned above must be set aside so that there may be no possibility of conflict in findings of the two courts in two different proceedings. 8. In the result the writ petition is allowed and order dated 31-7-80 passed by IInd Additional Distiict Judge-annexure-8-is quashed but no order is made as to costs.