JUDGMENT : S.B. Majmudar, J. The petitioner who is a detenu under the provisions of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Ordinance, 1985 ('the Ordinance' for short) has challenged the order of his detention on diverse grounds. The order is at annexure 'C' to the petition. It is issued by the Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad and it reads that the authority is statisfied with respect to the person known as Dilipsing Darshansingh Bharodia (the petitioner herein), that with a view to maintenance of public order in the area of Ahmedabad city, it is necessary to make an order that the said Dilipsing be detained. The grounds of detention dated 1-6-1985 are also supplied to the detenu. By an amendment to this petition, which was granted by us on 4-10-1985, a contention is raised in para 12B that when the detenu got the knowledge from the others dated 12-9-85 that he has right to make the representation to State Government against the detention order, with the help of others, he had sent the representation to the State Government and the detaining authority but till today, it is not considered. Thus, on one hand, the fundamental right of the petitioner is violated by making delay in considering it. It is also illegal and unjust and continued detention of the petitioner becomes illegal. Earlier, when this petition was admitted to final hearing, the Commissioner of police who is the detaining authority had filed his affidavit-in-reply seeking to meet all the grounds raised originally in the petition. So far as the aforesaid ground 12B brought on record by amendment is concerned, Mr. M.T. Parmar, Under Secretary, Home Department has filed his affidavit-in-reply on behalf of the State of Gujarat which is the authority that had to consider the representation. In connection with aforesaid ground 12B, regarding delay in consideration of the representation, the following reply is submitted in para 3 of the affidavit-in-reply: "With reference to the averments and allegations made in ground (12B) of the petition, I say that representation dated 21st of September, 1985 was received through the Jailor, Ahmedabad Central Prison, Ahmedabad by the Home Department on 23-9-1985. I say that thereafter the notes were prepared on 7th October, 1985 and along with the report, it was placed for consideration of the State Government. I say that after carefully considering the representation of the detenu, the same was rejected on 8-10-1985. I say that thereafter the notes were prepared on 7th October, 1985 and along with the report, it was placed for consideration of the State Government. I say that after carefully considering the representation of the detenu, the same was rejected on 8-10-1985. During this period many other representations were also received from different detenus, wherein report was required to be prepared for the purpose of consideration of the representation by the State Government. Apart from that, many other papers were received, wherein the Government had to approve the detention orders passed by different detaining authorities under different Acts. I say that the detention matters are being handled by special 6-Branch of the Home Department, wherein only three persons are working, one Section Officer and two Assistants. Thus, in spite of paucity of staff and heavy pressure of work, the representation of the detenu was considered carefully and was rejected on 8-10-1985 without any avoidable delay and as soon as possible." 2. Mr. H.L. Patel for Miss Kach-havah for the petitioner placed in the forefront the aforesaid ground 12B for consideration along with other grounds. Having heard Mr. Patel for the petitioner and Mr. Panchal, learned Assistant P.P. for the respondents, we have come to the conclusion that this petition deserves to be allowed only on that ground. Hence, we have not thought it necessary to dilate on other contentions which Mr. Patel wanted to urge in support of the petition. 3. So far as the question regarding expeditious disposal of the representation filed by the detenu in the light of the constitutional mandate under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and also in the light of the statutory requirement of Section 9(1) of the Ordinance is concerned, it becomes obvious that the statutory provision itself lays down that the concerned detenu has to be communicated the grounds on which the order of detention has been made and has to be afforded earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the State Government. The same is the mandate of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. Therefore, the short question which arises for our consideration is as to whether the time taken by the State Government in disposal of the representation of the petitioner against his detention can be said to have been satisfactorily explained on the facts of this case. The same is the mandate of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. Therefore, the short question which arises for our consideration is as to whether the time taken by the State Government in disposal of the representation of the petitioner against his detention can be said to have been satisfactorily explained on the facts of this case. Before we turn to tire factual aspect of the matter in the light of the pleadings of the parties, it will be profitable to have a look at a few relevant decisions on the point to which our attention was invited by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties: Legal Matrix: The constitutional bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Jayanarayan v. State of W.B., AIR 1970, SC 675, had an occasion to consider this very question. Ray, J. speaking for the Supreme Court laid down the law on the point as under: "Broadly stated, four principles are to be followed in regard to representation of detenu. First, the appropriate authority is bound to give an opportunity to the detenu to make a representation and to consider the representation of the detenu as early as possible. Secondly, the consideration of the representation of the detenu by the appropriate authority is entirely independent of any action by the Advisory Board including the consideration of the representation of the detenu by the Advisory Board. Thirdly, there should not be any delay in the matter of consideration. It is true that no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the measure of time taken by the appropriate authority for consideration but it has to be remembered that the Government has to be vigilant in the governance of the citizens. A citizen's right raises a correlative duty of the State. Fourthly, the appropriate Government is to exercise its opinion and judgment on the representation before sending the case along with the detenu's representation to the Advisory Board. If the appropriate Government will release the detenu the Government will not send the matter to the Advisory Board. If however the Government will not release the detenu the Government will send the case along with the detenu's representation to the Advisory Board. If thereafter the Advisory Board will express an opinion in favour of release of the detenu the Government will release the detenu. If however the Government will not release the detenu the Government will send the case along with the detenu's representation to the Advisory Board. If thereafter the Advisory Board will express an opinion in favour of release of the detenu the Government will release the detenu. If the Advisory Board will express any opinion against the release of the detenu the Government may still exercise the power to release the detenu." The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court has been consistently followed and applied to the facts of the concerned cases by subsequent benches of the Supreme Court before which such question arose for consideration. We may refer to a few of them on the point. In the case of Pushpa v. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 1953 , D.A. Desai, J. as a vacation Judge spoke for the Supreme Court in para 14 of the report on this point as under: "Where there are specified time limits which could not be transgressed, an action beyond the prescribed time may be cither incompetent or without jurisdiction or without the authority of law. Where a citizen is deprived of his liberty and grounds of detention are furnished to him, his representation must be examined as expeditiously as possible, but as has been said in Sukul's Case, there is no hard and fast rule as to the measure of time taken by the authority for consideration of the representation. However, a caution was administered that the Government should be vigilant in the governance of the citizens." On the facts of the case before the Supreme Court, it was, however, held that looking to the long list of documents copies of which were asked for by the detenus, the time taken for supplying the copies and then considering the representation did not appear to be unreasonable. 4. Out attention was then invited by the learned Advocate for the petitioner to two decisions of the Supreme Court reported in the same volume of AIR 1980. The first is in the case of Frances Coralie v. W.C. Khambra, AIR 1980 SC 849 . In that case, O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the Supreme Court observed in para 5 of the report: "The role of the court in cases of preventive detention it has to be one of eternal vigilance. The first is in the case of Frances Coralie v. W.C. Khambra, AIR 1980 SC 849 . In that case, O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the Supreme Court observed in para 5 of the report: "The role of the court in cases of preventive detention it has to be one of eternal vigilance. No freedom is higher than personal freedom and no duty higher than to maintain it unimpaired." It was further observed: "Art. 22 (5) vests in the detenu the right to be provided with an opportunity to make a representation. Here the law reports tell a story and teach a lesson. It is that the principal enemy of the detenu and his right to make a representation is neither high-handedness nor mean-mindedness but the casual indifference, the mindless insensibility, the routine and the red-tape of the bureaucratic machine." It was further observed: "The time imperative can never be absolute or obsessive. The court's observations are not to be so understood. There has to be lee-way, depending on the necessities (we refrain from using the word 'circumstances') of the case. One may well imagine a case where a detenu does not make a representation before the Board makes its report making it impossible for the detaining authority either to consider it or to forward it to the Board in time or a case where a detenu makes a representation to the detaining authority so shortly before the Advisory Board takes up the reference that the detaining authority cannot consider the representation before then but may merely forward it to the Board without himself considering it. Several such situations may arise compelling departure from the time imperative. But no allowance can be made for lethargic indifference. No allowance can be made for needless procrastination. But, allowance must surely be made for necessary consultation where legal intricacies and factual ramifications arc involved. The burden of explaining the necessity for the slightest departure from the time imperative is on the detaining authority." 5. The next judgment in the same volume is in the case of Narinder Singh Suri v. Union of India and Others, AIR 1980, SC 945. In that case, the Supreme Court speaking through Fazal Ali, J. noted that the representation of the detenu dated 5-10-1979 was received by the respondents on 10-10-1979 and it came to be rejected on 20-10-1979. The next judgment in the same volume is in the case of Narinder Singh Suri v. Union of India and Others, AIR 1980, SC 945. In that case, the Supreme Court speaking through Fazal Ali, J. noted that the representation of the detenu dated 5-10-1979 was received by the respondents on 10-10-1979 and it came to be rejected on 20-10-1979. On these facts, it was held that it vitiated continued detention of the detenu under Article 22 (5) as time intervening between the receipts of the representation and its consideration by appropriate Government was not at all explained by the authority. 6. We may now turn to the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1981 SC. The first judgment is in the case of Kamla v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 814. In that case, Fazal Ali, J. held that when delay of 25 days in considering the representation remained unexplained, it vitally affected the continued detention of the detenu. In that connection, the following pertinent observations were made in para 8 of the report: "It is a matter of great concern and deep dismay that despite repeated warnings by this court, the detaining authorities do not care to comply with the spirit and tenor of the constitutional safeguards contained in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. It is manifest that when the detaining authority applies its mind to the documents and materials which form the basis of the detention, the same are indeed placed before it and there could be no difficulty in getting photostat copies of the documents and materials, referred to in the order of detention, prepared and attaching the same along with the grounds of detention, if the detaining authority is really serious in passing a valid order of detention. Unfortunately, the constitutional safeguards are not complied with, resulting in the orders of detention being set aside by the court, even though on merits they might have been justified in suitable cases. We feel that it is high time that the Government should impress on the detaining authority the desirability of complying with the constitutional safeguards as adumbrated by the principles laid down in this regard. We feel that it is high time that the Government should impress on the detaining authority the desirability of complying with the constitutional safeguards as adumbrated by the principles laid down in this regard. We would like to suggest that whenever a detention is struck down by the High Court or the Supreme Court, the detaining authority or the officers concerned who are associated with the preparation of the grounds of detention, must be held personally responsible and action should be taken against them for not complying with the constitutional requirements and safeguards (viz. delay in disposing of the representation, not supplying the documents and materials relied upon in the order of detention pari passu the order of detention, etc. etc.) or, at any rate, an explanation from the authorities concerned must be called for by the Central Government so that in future persons against whom serious acts of smuggling are alleged, do not go scot free. In the instant case, not only were the documents and materials not supplied along with the order of detention, but there has been a delay of about 25 days in disposing of the representation of the detenu and no explanation for the same has been given. These are matters which must be closely examined by the Government." As we will show presently, despite the aforesaid note of caution expressed by the Supreme Court, the said note appears to have been completely lost sight of or is found to have no effect on the respondents when they tried to justify continued detention of the detenu on the facts of the present case. The next judgment in the same volume is in the case of Khatoon Begum v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 1077 . Chinnappa Reddy, J. in the aforesaid case had to examine this very question. In that connection, it was observed: "The right of a detenu to have his representation considered 'at the earliest opportunity' and the obligation of the detaining authority to consider the representation 'at the earliest opportunity' are not a right and an obligation flowing from either the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 or the National Security Act or, for that matter any other Parliamentary or State law providing for preventive detention. They arc a right and an obligation created by the very Constitution which breathes life into the Parliamentary or State law. Article 22 (5) enjoins a duty on the authority making the order of detention to afford the detenu 'the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order'. The right and obligation to make and to consider the representation at the earliest opportunity is a Constitutional imperative which cannot be curtailed or abridged. If the Parliament or the State Legislature making the law providing for preventive detention devises a circumlocutory procedure for considering the representation or if the inter-departmental consultative procedures are such that delay becomes inevitable, the law and the procedure will contravene the constitutional mandate. It is essential that any law providing for preventive detention and any authority obliged to make orders for preventive detention should adopt procedures calculated towards expeditious consideration of representations made by detenus. It will be no answer to a demand for liberty to say that administrative red tape makes delay inevitable." It is further observed: "The constitutional mandate brooks no unreasonable delay in the consideration of a representation. In the cases before us, in criminal writ petitions Nos. 293 of 1981 and 392 of 1981 no explanation was offered by the detaining authority for the delay in the consideration of representations and in criminal writ petition No. 391 of 1981, administrative red tape was the only explanation offered. We are satisfied that in all the three cases there was unreasonable delay in the consideration of the representations." The next judgment is in the case of R.K. Porwal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 1126 . In that case, the State Government had received the representation of the detenu on 3-6-80. On 6-6-80, comments were called for from the customs authorities with regard to the allegations made in the representation, such comments were received by the State Government on 13-6-80. On 17-6-80, the State Government referred the representation to the Law Department for its opinion which was furnished on 19-6-80. Rejection of representation was ordered on 24-6-80. On these facts, the Supreme Court speaking through Koshal, J. held as under: "In our opinion, the manner in which the representation made by the appellant has been dealt with reveals a sorry state of affairs in the matter of consideration of representation made by persons detained without trial. Rejection of representation was ordered on 24-6-80. On these facts, the Supreme Court speaking through Koshal, J. held as under: "In our opinion, the manner in which the representation made by the appellant has been dealt with reveals a sorry state of affairs in the matter of consideration of representation made by persons detained without trial. There is no explanation at all as to why no action was taken in reference to the representation on 4th, 5th and 25th of June, 1980. It is also not clear what consideration was given by the Government to the representation from 13th June, 1980 to 16th June, 1980 when we find that it culminated only in a reference to the Law Department, nor it is apparent why the Law Department had to be consulted at all. Again, we fail to understand why the representation had to travel from table to table for six days before reaching the Chief Minister who was the only authority to decide the representation. We may make it clear, as we have done on numerous earlier occasions, that this court does not look with equanimity upon such delays when the liberty of a person is concerned. Calling comments from other departments, seeking the opinion of Secretary after Secretary and allowing the representation to lie without being attended to is not the type of action which the State is expected to take in a matter of such vital import. We would emphasise that it is the duty of the Slate to proceed to determine representations of the character above mentioned with the utmost expedition, which means that the matter must be taken up for consideration as soon as such a representation is received and dealt with continuously (unless it is absolutely necessary to wait for some assistance in connection with it) until a final decision is taken and communicated to the detenu. This not having been done in the present case, we have no option but to declare the detention unconstitutional." The next judgment in the same volume is in the case of L.M.S. Ummu Saleema v. B.B. Gujaral, AIR 1981 SC 1191 . In that case, representation of the detenu against his detention under Section 3 (1) of the COFEPOSA Act was despatched on 5-2-1981 and was received in the office of the detaining authority on 13-2-1981. In that case, representation of the detenu against his detention under Section 3 (1) of the COFEPOSA Act was despatched on 5-2-1981 and was received in the office of the detaining authority on 13-2-1981. It was put up before the detaining authority on 19-2-1981 and was disposed of on that very day. The detaining authority was not available from 13th to 16th as lie had gone abroad. He returned on 16th and considered the matter on 19th. In view of the aforesaid, it was held by the Supreme Court that there was no unaccountable or unreasonable delay in consideration of the representation by the detaining authority. Chinnappa Reddy, J. in that case made the following pertinent observations: "Law deals with the facts of life. In law, as in life, there are no invariable absolutes. Neither life nor law can be reduced to mere but despotic formulae." In the case of Smt. S. Gayathri v. Commissioner of Police, Madras, AIR 1981 SC 1172 , the detenu had made representation against the detention on 11-5-1981. The said representation was examined and rejected on 15-5-1981. In these circumstances, it was held that there was avoidable delay in considering the representation and hence continued detention was not vitiated. 7. We may now turn to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ibrahim Ahmad v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1982 SC 1500 . The Supreme Court speaking through Tulzapurkar, J. had to examine the question regarding supply of Urdu translation of statements recorded against the detenu and the effect of non-supply thereof on the continued detention of the detenu. In that report, the Supreme Court considered the defence of the detaining authority in connection with non-supply of Urdu translation to the detenu within five days of the detention on the ground that due to Ramzan, sufficient translators in Urdu were not available. In that report, the Supreme Court considered the defence of the detaining authority in connection with non-supply of Urdu translation to the detenu within five days of the detention on the ground that due to Ramzan, sufficient translators in Urdu were not available. While rejecting this defence, the Supreme Court speaking through Tulzapurkar, J. observed as under: "The Government with all its power and resources could have arranged to get the documents translated and made available to the detenu within 5 days." It was further observed: "It is difficult to swallow the proposition that the State Government (which is detaining authority here) with all its power and resources could not find requisite number of qualified persons to do that job so as to make Urdu translation of the concerned documents and statements available to the detenu within the normal period of five days. With tire previous detention order having been vitiated on the very ground greater vigilance and expedition was expected from the detaining authority. In all the facts and circumstances, it is impossible to hold that exceptional circumstances obtained in the case justifying the delay and as such the same constitutes a breach of the constitutional as well as the legislative mandate." The learned counsel for the petitioner also invited our attention to two decisions of this court, one of which is a reported decision in the case of Dilipbhai v. District Magistrate, Surat, 25 (2) GLR 919. In that case, G.T. Nanavati, J. speaking for the Division Bench considered the effect of non-consideration of the representation of the detenu for a period from 29-9-1983 when the representation was received by the detaining authority till 6-10-1983. It was observed: "It is not at all explained how the representation was dealt with at various levels from 29-9-1983 to 6-10-1983. It is neither explained in the affidavit nor was any material produced before us to show how the file moved from one officer to another after tire representation was received and till it was disposed of. It was observed: "It is not at all explained how the representation was dealt with at various levels from 29-9-1983 to 6-10-1983. It is neither explained in the affidavit nor was any material produced before us to show how the file moved from one officer to another after tire representation was received and till it was disposed of. In absence of any valid explanation for the delay in considering the representation, it will have to be held that the Government was guilty of delay in discharging its obligation and that has rendered the continued detention of the petitioner illegal." In an unreported decision in Niranjan Jivanlal Shah v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad city and Others, Special Criminal Application No. 847 of 1982, decided by P.D. Desai (as lie then was) and A.S. Qureshi, JJ. on 24-8-1982, P.D. Desai, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Division Bench had to consider the fact that the concerned Secretary had attended to die file on 26-5-1982 and submitted the same to the Home Minister on the same day. The Home Minister considered and rejected the representation on 2-6-1982. It was found that there was no explanation for the delay in disposing of the representation for the delay in disposing of the representation for the period between 26-5-1982 when the file was submitted for orders to June 2, 1982 when the question was considered and the representation was disposed of. It was held that such delay which remained unexplained vitiated the continued detention of the detenu. We may now refer to the decisions of the Supreme Court to which our attention was invited by the learned counsel for the respondents. 8. In the case of Arun Kumar Sinha v. State of W.B., AIR 1972 SC 2371 , the Supreme Court had to consider the question about delay in taking decision on the representation of the detenu which had occurred on account of the fact that employees in the Home Department had resorted to constant demonstrations which impeded the work of the department and the said demonstration had continued even after the date of decision and during the period there was considerable spurt in detention cases. On these peculiar facts, it was held that there was sufficient cause to condone delay on the part of the authority in considering the representation of the detenu. On these peculiar facts, it was held that there was sufficient cause to condone delay on the part of the authority in considering the representation of the detenu. It becomes obvious that the aforesaid decision proceeded on the peculiar facts of that case. The second decision to which our attention was invited was rendered in the case of S.C. Bose v. Dist. Magistrate, Burdwan, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2481, Dua, J. speaking for the Supreme Court held in the case: "The representation by the detenu has to be considered by the State Government after its receipt with reasonable dispatch, and what is reasonable dispatch depends on the facts of each case, it being not possible to set down an arbitrary time limit." In S.C. Bose's case (supra) five reasons were put forward by the detaining authority for explaining delay in considering the representation of the detenu against the order of detention. This representation was received on 23-9-1971, but was considered by the authority on Dec. 6, 1971. The explanation for this delay rested on five grounds as under : (i) influx of reugees; (ii) Pakistani aggression keeping most of officers of the Home Department busy with the serious problems facing the country; (iii) go-slow movement of the workers launched by Co-ordination Committee of the State Government employees during the months of September to November, 1971 giving rise to serious dislocation and delay in the movement of files and disposal of cases; (iv) abrupt increase in the number of detention cases; and (v) spate of anti-social activities by Naxalites and other political extremists in the State. The totality of the effect of the aforesaid grounds was considered by the Supreme Court to furnish reasonable explanation for the delay in considering the representation of the detenu and hence, it was held that the said delay did not vitiate the continued detention of the detenu nor did it violate guarantee of Article 22((5) of the Constitution. The aforesaid decision also proceeded on its own facts. It goes without saying that when extraordinary situation prevails which makes it practically impossible for the Home Department to expeditiously deal with individual cases of detention when national stakes are in the offing, delay in consideration of individual representations would pale into insignificance and in any case would get supported by sufficient cause for non-consideration of the representation prior to the time when it got considered. 9. 9. Our attention was also invited to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Babul Mitra v. State of W.B.A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 197. There was delay of one month by the State Government in considering the detenu's representation. Delay was sought to be explained by the State Government on the ground that at the relevant time of the detention of the detenu, the State was preoccupied with the colossal refugee problem and there was also a spurt of extremists activities engaging attention of the State Government. On these facts, the Supreme Court held that there was no inordinate delay in considering the representation and consequently continued detention was not rendered void or illegal. In that case also, there were peculiar facts beyond the control of the authority which made it impossible for the authority to deal with individual representations of the detenus earlier. There were problems of national security which naturally preoccupied the attention of the State Government. 10. The learned counsel for the respondents next invited our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Manilal, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 456. In the said case, detenu had made representation against the detention order on 21-10-1974 and it was received by the District Magistrate on the same day. The District Magistrate dispatched representation to the first respondent which was the proper authority for considering the representation together with his parawise comments to the State Government on 24-10-1974 and it was received by the Home Secretary on 25-10-1974. The Home Secretary endorsed the matter to the Deputy Secretary and the Deputy Secretary in his turn endorsed it to the concerned section in his department for examination. The Secretariat was closed for the Pooja holidays from 20-10-1974 to 27-10-1974 (both days inclusive) and 30-10-1974 was also a holiday on account of Kumar Purnima. The Assistant dealing with the matter could not therefore, place the record in regard to the representation before Head Assistant until 31-10-1974. The Head assistant examined the representation and submitted his remarks on 2-11-1974 and on 4-11-1974, the Deputy Secretary dealt with the representation. The representation then went to the Secretary and he made his remarks on it on 5-11-1974. The Assistant dealing with the matter could not therefore, place the record in regard to the representation before Head Assistant until 31-10-1974. The Head assistant examined the representation and submitted his remarks on 2-11-1974 and on 4-11-1974, the Deputy Secretary dealt with the representation. The representation then went to the Secretary and he made his remarks on it on 5-11-1974. The representation was then processed by the Additional Chief Secretary on 6-11-1974 and finally on 7-11-1974 the file was endorsed to the Chief Minister who was in charge of the Home Department. The Chief Minister was absent from headquarters between 7-11-1974 and 12-11-1974 and immediately on return to head-quarters, she disposed of the representation and rejected it on 12-11-1974. On these facts, Bhagwati J. (as he then was) held that there was no undue delay in disposing of the representation. In this connection, the following pertinent observations were made : "Now, the law is well settled by several decisions of this court, of which we may refer only to one namely Rashid v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1973 SC 324; that the representation made by the detenu against the order of detention should be considered by the State Government as soon as possible, that is, with reasonable despatch and if that is not done, it would have the effect of vitiating the order of detention... But, as pointed out by this court in the same case, it is neither possible nor advisable to lay down any rigid period of time untimely applicable in all cases within which the representation of a datenu must be considered by the State Government. The court would have to consider judicially in each case on the available material whether the gap between the receipt of the representation and its consideration by the State Government is so unreasonably long and the explanation for the delay offered by the State Government so unsatisfactory as to render the detention order thereafter illegal." Applying the aforesaid test to the facts of the case before the Supreme Court, Bhagwati, J. observed as under: "The representation could not straightway be placed before the Chief Minister for her consideration. It had to be sent to the concerned department for examination and nothings and naturally it took time for the representation to move from a lower officer to a higher officer before it reached tire Chief Minister. It had to be sent to the concerned department for examination and nothings and naturally it took time for the representation to move from a lower officer to a higher officer before it reached tire Chief Minister. What is important to note is that there was no delay at any stage in this movement of the representation from one officer to another. Every officer dealt with the representation promptly and after examining it and making his nothings, submitted it to the higher officer. The representation undoubtedly went to the Chief Minister on 7th November 1974 but since the Chief Minister was out of Cuttack, it had to wait till the Chief Minister returned and it is important to note that as soon as she returned, she immediately, without any delay at all, disposed of the representation. We do not, therefore, see any gap between the receipt of the representation and its consideration by the State Government which can be said to be unreasonably long." It can at once be noticed that on the facts of the aforesaid case, it was well established on record by the detaining authority that the representation, after its receipt, was promptly dealt with from day to day and from stage to stage by the concerned officers till it ultimately reached the Chief Minister who on her arrival from outside, promptly dealt with the same and rejected it. The aforesaid decision, therefore, is rendered in the light of the peculiar facts of that case. Mr. Panchal for the respondents then invited our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Suresh v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1983 SC 181 . In that case, representation of the detenu was received in the Ministry on 14-5-1982 through the Superintendent of Central Prison. The representation was placed before the Central Government which considered the same and rejected it on 20-5-1982. On the aforesaid facts, the Supreme Court held that the delay cannot be said to be unreasonable. This decision also proceeded on its own facts. Mr. Panchal, however, vehemently contended that the aforesaid decision was rendered in the light of the fact that the detaining authority had furnished no explanation for six days' delay in considering the representation. This is no doubt true. This decision also proceeded on its own facts. Mr. Panchal, however, vehemently contended that the aforesaid decision was rendered in the light of the fact that the detaining authority had furnished no explanation for six days' delay in considering the representation. This is no doubt true. However, six days' unexplained delay appears to have been condoned by the Supreme Court in the light of the peculiar facts of that case. 11. The resume of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court and this court to which our attention was invited by the learned Advocates of the respective parties, it appears clear that the concerned authorities have to consider the representation of the detenu against the order of detention as expeditiously as possible. However, the question whether on the facts of a given case, consideration of the representation has been done expeditiously or not or whether delay in considering the representation is justified on the facts of the case or not will depend upon the stand taken by the authorities when such question crops up before the court and it also depends upon the facts brought on record in that connection. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, we have already referred to the pleadings of the parties. The affidavit-in-reply filed by Mr. Parmar for meeting ground No. 12B points out that the representation was received on 23-9-1985 as noted earlier, and the notes were prepared on 7-10-85 thereon and along with the report, it was submitted for consideration of the State Government and the concerned authority exercising powers of the State Government rejected the same on 8-10-1985. Delay between 23-9-1985 and 7-10-1985 is tried to be explained in the affidavit in reply on the ground that Special 6-Branch was overburdened with the work and many other papers were received wherein the Government had to approve the detention orders passed by the different detaining authorities under different Acts and many representations were also received from different detenus. That there were only three persons working in Special 6-branch, one Section Officer and two Assistants and it was because of the paucity of staff and heavy pressure of work that the representation of the detenu could be disposed of only on 8-10-1985. That there were only three persons working in Special 6-branch, one Section Officer and two Assistants and it was because of the paucity of staff and heavy pressure of work that the representation of the detenu could be disposed of only on 8-10-1985. It must be noted that so far as time lag between submission of the representation, after proper noting, to the authority for its consideration and the date on which representation was considered by the authority is concerned, there does not appear to be any delay as notes were prepared on 7-10-1985 along with the report and they were placed before the State Government and the State Government considered the same on 8-10-1985. However, delay between 23-9-1985 when the representation was received by the Home Department and preparation of notes along with report on 7-10-1985 remains absolutely unexplained. It is no ground to submit that because the Home Department was overburdened with the work and there was paucity of staff and, therefore the representation which was received could not be attended to. As held by the Supreme Court in Ibrahim Ahmad's Case (supra), mere paucity of staff is no ground to deprive the detenu of his constitutional right under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of making his representation and getting it disposed of as expeditiously as possible. The State Government with all its might and resources can easily visualise and understand the pressure of work which the special branch may have to undergo in given circumstances. When procedure enjoined by Article 22 (5) of the Constitution is to lie followed, proper machinery has to be evolved by the State for meeting such procedural requirements. Consequently, such explanation about the paucity of staff standing by itself cannot furnish a reasonable ground or proper defence to the ground of delay in considering the representation. This is not a case in which the Home Department of the State Government can be said to have been undergoing pressure of work on account of certain unforeseen contingencies over which it had no control. There was no emergent problem of national importance which was staring in the face of the Home Department which could have afforded a valid reason for the State Government for the procedural delay in considering the representation nor did exist any situation akin to the situations in AIR 1972 SC 2371 and AIR 1973 SC 197 (supra). There was no emergent problem of national importance which was staring in the face of the Home Department which could have afforded a valid reason for the State Government for the procedural delay in considering the representation nor did exist any situation akin to the situations in AIR 1972 SC 2371 and AIR 1973 SC 197 (supra). As the affidavit-in-reply was laconic and as it did not put forward any reasonable explanation for the delay in processing the representation between 23-9-85 and 7-10-1985, we inquired of the learned Advocate for the respondents as to who there was anything in the file pertaining to the case which could throw any light on this aspect. He was good enough to place before us the relevant file. We have gone through the file and we have also made it available for inspection to the learned counsel for the petitioner. From the perusal of the file, it is found that though the representation was received on 23-9-1985, it came to be processed for the first time on 7-10-1985 by the Under-Secretary, Home Department. It is on that day that the concerned Under-Secretary seems to have made noting in connection with the representation. The said file appears to have been submitted to the Deputy Secretary, Home Department who made his endorsement below the said noting on 8-10-1985 and on that very day, it appears to have been submitted to the Additional Chief Secretary who acting as the delegate of the powers of the State Government and as proper authority, rejected the said representation. That endorsement also appears on the file as dated 8-10-85. There is no indication in the file as to what happened between 23-9-1985 when the representation was received by the department and 7-10-85 when it was taken up for processing by the concerned Under-Secretary. On this aspect, there is a total black-out on the file. In view of this state of record, it is obvious that the affidavit-in-reply as filed by Mr. Parmar, Under-Secretary cannot be more pecise and more illuminating than what it is. It must, therefore be held that the respondents have not satisfactorily explained the delay in considering the petitioner's representation and processing it for the period from 23-9-1985 and 7-10-1985. For about two weeks, the representation lay unattended in the office of the Home Department. Parmar, Under-Secretary cannot be more pecise and more illuminating than what it is. It must, therefore be held that the respondents have not satisfactorily explained the delay in considering the petitioner's representation and processing it for the period from 23-9-1985 and 7-10-1985. For about two weeks, the representation lay unattended in the office of the Home Department. That itself violates the guarantee of procedural provision of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and renders the continued detention of the petitioner unlawful. Moment this conclusion is reached, the result becomes obvious. The detention order at Annexure 'C' becomes liable to be quashed and set aside. We accordingly do so. 12. Rule issued in the petition is, therefore, made absolute by issuance of writ of mandamus, the impugned order at Annexure 'C' and as confirmed by the State Government at Annexure 'A' is quashed and set aside. The respondents arc directed to set the petitioner at liberty forthwith if not otherwise required in any other case. Rule made absolute.