JUDGMENT Kaushal Kishore, Member - These two appeals have been filed against the judgment and decrees dated 30-3-1982 confirming the learned trial courts judgment and decree dated 14-10-1981 in two suits relating to different khatas and different shares between the parties under Section 176 of the UPZA & LR Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record. 3. There were two suits in the trial court, no. 30 of 1980 having share of the plaintiff Smt. Usha in khata 124 and 231 and suit no. 31 of 1980 having share of the plaintiff Usha Devi in khata 170. The shares are not disputed. In both the suits the lekhpal prepared lots and filed them with map separately in each suit and gave his statement in support and proving the lots, on 3-6-1981. Later, both the parties compromised in both the suits and filed their joint compromise in each suit separately on 21-7-1981, specifying each parties lots specifically. There was objection about some difficulty of passage to the plaintiff for plot number 716M/10 biswansis in her kura but the other party assured of giving passage. However, the learned trial court upholding the compromise dated 21-7-1981 by its order dated 14-10-1981 presumed that the kuras filed on 3-6-1981 provided a solution to the difficulty of passage without checking that the kuras filed on 3-6-1981 were very much different than the lots given in the mutual compromise dated 21-7-1981, confirmed the kuras filed on 3-6-1981. The learned Additional Commissioner decided the two respective appeals nos. 7 and 8 by separate judgments and without considering the question of compromise found the kuras filed on 3-6-1981 good on merits and dismissed the appeals. 4. Peculiarly enough the learned Additional Commissioner has prepared a common judgment for both cases and both appeals but has marked them separately as separate judgments. It should have been one judgment for both the appeals. But the glaring mistake is that the learned first appellate court did not consider the only question of compromise on which the appeals were based. 5. Here, again in the second appeals, the same argument has been put up that while upholding the compromise the learned trial court could not confirm the different kuras filed on 3-6-1981. The compromise in the two suits nos. 30 and 31 are at page nos. 5. Here, again in the second appeals, the same argument has been put up that while upholding the compromise the learned trial court could not confirm the different kuras filed on 3-6-1981. The compromise in the two suits nos. 30 and 31 are at page nos. 17 and 20 respectively and the lots contained therein are very much different than the earlier filed lots of 3-6-1981 which the lekhpal proved in his statement of same date. 6. There is no doubt that the learned trial court was under a misconception that the two sets of lots of 3-6-1981 and 21-7-1981 were the same. They are not the same. The learned counsel for the appellants has cited rulings in support of his contention that a compromise is binding on parties in terms of Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC and the court had to pass the decree in terms of compromise. The rulings are AIR 1970 SC 669 and 1974 RD (Suppl.) 235. In the former ruling the Honble Supreme Court held that where factum and validity of compromise was not disputed, even the withdrawal of appeal in terms of compromise could be enforced. In the instant case, not only the parties did not challenge the validity of the compromise but the learned trial court had also found it duly verified and without any fraud or even not executed in ignorance, still in its anxiety to find a passage to 10 biswansis of the plaintiff, reverted to the earlier kuras of 3-6-1981. This was clearly illegal. 7. The learned counsel for the respondents argued that the lots were duly prepared and proved on 3-6-1981 and the learned Additional Commissioner decided the two appeals on the basis of arguments before him. I do not think this argument can lend any support to the learned first appellate court, it is a funny way of deciding the first appeal, by not considering the only question of law involved and contained in the memo of appeals and to consider an extraneous matter of the plaintiffs interest in plot numbers 29 and 32 lying on the way side, which is not borne out from the record. The appellate courts have to guard against such lapses. 8. The appellate courts have to guard against such lapses. 8. Since the only matter of finding a passage to plot number 716M/10 biswansis of the plaintiff has not yet been solved, but the lots in compromise have also to be accepted subject to finding a passage, in my view the cases will have to be remanded. 9. Accordingly, I allow the two appeals, set aside the decrees/judgments by the learned Additional Commissioner dated 30-3-1982 and in the learned trial courts order dated 14-10-1981, I confirm the first part from beginning to the ending with - " esjs fopkj esa bl lqygukes dks iw.kZr;k ekuuk U;k;ksfpr gksxk ;fn nksuksa i{kksa dk vius vius dqjksa esa tkus dk jkLrs dk izkfo/kku fu;ekuqlkj dj fn;k tk;sA" and the remaining part - " tSlk fd ys[kiky }kjk yxk;s x;s dqjs fnukad 03-06-1981 esa Li"V fd;k x;k gSA vr% U;k; dh n`f"V esa fnukad 03-06-1981 dks yxk;s x;s dqjs mfpr izrhr gksrs gSaA pwafd blds fo:) dksbZ fof'k"V vkifRr fdlh Hkh i{k }kjk ugha mBkbZ xbZ gS vr% ys[kiky }kjk yxk;s x;s dqjs fnukad 03-06-1981 dks rnkuqlkj duQZe fd;k tkrk gSA vfxze dk;Zokgh rnkuqlkj dh tk;sA" being totally inconsistent is hereby set aside. The cases are remanded to the learned trial court with the directions that the lekhpal be called and after preparation of kuras and rasta consistent with the compromise dated 21-7-1981, the kuras be finalised and final decree passed. 10. This judgment shall govern second appeal numbers 189 and 190 of 1981 of 1981-82/Muzaffarnagar.