Judgment S.S. Sandhawalia, J. 1. This civil revision under Section 115 of the code of Civil Procedure is directed against the order of the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Muzaffarpur dated the 11th of August 1980. The learned Judge has rejected the application of the petitioner claiming that both the appeal and the suit, from which the same had arisen had abated under Section 4(c) of the Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956. 2. The plaintiff petitioner had instituted a title suit No. 54 of 1965 in the court of the subordinate Judge, Muzaffarpur, for declaration that he is the next reversioner of late Chatradhari Singh, primarily on the ground that the deed of surrender dated 13th of July, 1955 executed by opposite party No. 2 in favour of opposite party No. 1 (describing herself as Ram Dulari) was illegal and not binding on the petitioner after the death of opposite party No. 2. The case set up on behalf of the plaintiff petitioner is that the said Chhatradhari Singh before his death in the year 1935, had executed a deed of gift in respect of his property in favour of his two widows, namely Suphalman Kuer and Ram Sakhi Kuer on the 13th of December, 1934 giving them a life interest in the estate. Suphalman Kuer later died on the 24th of February 1952 and according to the principles of survivorship her share also devolved upon opposite party No. 2. The further case of the petitioner is that Ram Dulari, who was the daughter of the said Chhatradhari Singh, had died in the year 1950. However opposite party No. 1 who is the daughter of the sister of opposite party No. 2 had, with the dishonest intention of defeating the claim of the petitioner and usurping the property got a fraudulent and illegal deed of surrender executed by opposite party No. 2 describing herself as Ram Dulari aforesaid. 3. Briefly, the case set up on behalf of opposite party No. 2 is that she is in fact Ram Dulari daughter of the aforesaid Chhatradhari Singh and, therefore the petitioner being the agnate of the late Chhatradhari Singh had no right to maintain the suit. 4. The title suit aforesaid was dismissed by the learned 2nd Additional subordinate Judge, Muzaffarpur by his judgment and decree dated the 15th of June, 1973. 4. The title suit aforesaid was dismissed by the learned 2nd Additional subordinate Judge, Muzaffarpur by his judgment and decree dated the 15th of June, 1973. Thereby he categorically held that opposite party No. 1 is really Ram Dulari, daughter of late Chhatradhari Singh, and therefore, the petitioner being only a presumptive reversioner had no superior right and the suit was not maintainable. Against the said judgment and decree, the petitioner preferred title appeal No. 66 of 1973 in the court of the District Judge, Muzaffarpur. It would appear that during the pendency of the said appeal a notification under Section 3 of the Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) was duly issued with respect to the suit property. The petitioner thereupon preferred an application before the appellate court claiming that in view of the provision of Section 4(c) of the said Act both the suit and the appeal had abated. The learned appellate court, however, held that prima facie the surrender deed can not be said to be void and, indeed, needed investigation and appraisal of evidence for holding whether it suffers from any invalidity. By a detailed and lucid order under revision the learned court further repelled the argument raised on behalf of the petitioner to come to the conclusion that neither the appeal nor the suit came within the mischief of Section 4(c) of the Act and, consequently rejected the application, as stated above. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, in essence, has repeated the identical arguments raised before the court below. The primal stand is that the deed or surrender is a void document and relying upon Gorakh Nath Dubey v. Hari Narain Singh and Ors. A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2541 it was argued that both the appeal and the title suit would abate. 6. The stand of the learned Counsel for the petitioner has only to be noticed and rejected for a triple reasons. Firstly, it is plain that on the petitioners own pleading the basic stand is that the surrender deed has been collusively and fraudulently executed. Now, it is well settled that the allegations of fraud have both to be pleaded and established for setting aside a contract or a deed. Firstly, it is plain that on the petitioners own pleading the basic stand is that the surrender deed has been collusively and fraudulently executed. Now, it is well settled that the allegations of fraud have both to be pleaded and established for setting aside a contract or a deed. Consequently the allegation of fraud does not render the transaction or the deed void ab initio but only voidable on establishing the alleged fraud. Therefore, on the petitioners own pleading apart from the mere labelling of the transaction as such, the surrender deed cannot even prima facie be held as void ab initio. Secondly, it is common ground that the trial court on a full appraisal of evidence, far from holding that the surrender deed was void ab initio or even viodable had in fact up held the document as a valid one. Those considered findings are as yet the subject matter of appeal, thus strongly rebut any stand of the document being instrinsically void. Lastly, the learned Additional District Judge has, in a very considered order, come to the conclusion that prima facie the surrender document is not void. After hearing the learned Counsel for the petitioner at considerable length, I see no reason to take a contrary view. It must, therefore, be concluded that the impugned deed of surrender could, at the highest, be held a viodable document. 7. Once it is held as above, it is plain that the revision petition must fail both on principle as also on precedent. It has been categorically held in Gorakh Nath Dube v. Hari Narain Singh and Ors. (supra) that if the document on which the suit is primarily based is one the legal effect of which can only be taken away by setting if aside or by its co cancellation, the the suit would not abate. The ratio in the said case has been further discussed and elaborated by the recent Full Bench in Sheoratan Chamar and Ors. v. Ram Murat Singh alias Kishori Raman Singh and Ors. The ratio in the said case has been further discussed and elaborated by the recent Full Bench in Sheoratan Chamar and Ors. v. Ram Murat Singh alias Kishori Raman Singh and Ors. 1985 (33) B.L.J.R. 45 (F.B.) wherein it was summed up as follows: To conclude, following the ratio Gorakh Nath Dubeys case (Supra) it is held that under Section 4(C) of the Act, all cases where the lis is rested wholly on a document or transfer deed, the proceeding would abate, if such document is void, but no such abatement would result, if the same is viodable and has to be set aside by the court after adjudication. 8. In the light of the aforesaid authoritative enunciation and on the firm finding that the surrender deed would at test be a voidable document, there remains no merit whatsoever in this civil revision. The same is here by dismissed without, however, any order as to cost.