JUDGMENT - DHABE H.W., J.: - This is an appeal by the defendant against whom the suit of the respondents/plaintiffs for possession of the suit house and for damages is decreed by the courts below. According to the plaintiffs, the suit house was purchased by them by the registered sale deed dated 5-12-1966 (Ex. 24), from one V. Balaji and his wife Shantabai. The defendant was a tenant in the suit house when the sale deed was executed in favour of the plaintiff. However, according to the plaintiffs, the defendant denied the title of the plaintiff to the suit hose and also that they were his landlords. He had set up a title in the third person by name Rishinarayan Trivedi, who, it appears, filed a civil suit registered as C.S. No. 318 of 1972, which was subsequently amicably settled. It appears that the disclaimer of the title of the plaintiff is in writing because it is contained in a notice of the defendant (Ex. 26) dated 27-10-1971. The plaintiffs, then, served a notice dated 24-11-1971 upon the defendant under section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act (for short T.P. Act) communicating their intention to determine the lease of the defendant and brought the instant suit for possession and damages. 2. It appears that the defendant had raised a preliminary objection by filing an application (Ex.13) that the suit was not maintainable. Upon the said Ex.13 the learned trial Court passed an order directing the defendant to deposit the arrears of rent. The defendant challenged this order by filing a revision in this Court registered as Civil Revision Application No. 142 of 1973. In the said revision, this Court passed an order on 10-4-1973 staying the proceedings in the trial Court. The defendant filed an application (Ex.22) on 12-4-1973 in the trial Court informing it that this Court had stayed the further proceedings before it. However, since there was no authentic communication of the said order to the trial Court, the learned trial Court passed an order dated 13-4-1973 rejecting the said application. It thereafter decreed the suit of the plaintiff by the judgment dated 16-4-1973. The defendant challenged the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court by filing an appeal in the District Court at Nagpur. The learned Appellate Court by judgment dated 18-12-1973 affirmed the decree of the learned trial Court. It thereafter decreed the suit of the plaintiff by the judgment dated 16-4-1973. The defendant challenged the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court by filing an appeal in the District Court at Nagpur. The learned Appellate Court by judgment dated 18-12-1973 affirmed the decree of the learned trial Court. Being aggrieved, the defendant has preferred the instant second appeal in this Court. 3. The learned Counsel appearing for the defendant has raised three contentions before me. The first contention is that the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court affirmed by the learned Appellate Court is illegal and without jurisdiction, because the same was passed after this Court had stayed further proceedings in the trial Court by the order dated 10-4-1973. His submission also is that the said stay order was duly communicated to the Court by his application dated 12-4-1973. His second contention is that the notice of forfeiture of tenancy, which is mandatory under section 111(g) of the T.P. Act, was not proved in the instant case. It is also his contention that even assuming that the said notice was proved, the said notice did not comply with the requirements of section 111(g) of the T.P. Act. His third and the most important contention is that the permission of the Rent Controller under the provisions of Clause 13(1)(a) of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (for short, “the Rent Control Order”) was necessary to be obtained by the plaintiffs before filing the instant suit and since the same was not obtained by them the instant suit was not maintainable. It is not necessary for me to consider the first two contentions raised on behalf of the defendant because as I will presently point out, his appeal must succeed on the third contention raised by him regarding the necessity of permission to be obtained before giving a notice of forfeiture of tenancy under section 111(g) of the T.P. Act. 4. A perusal of Clause 13(1)(a) of the Rent Control Order shows that a landlord cannot give notice to a tenant to determine his lease if the lease is expressed to be determinable at his option. I am not in the instant case concerned with the sub-clause (b) as it relates to the leases determinable by efflux of time. 4. A perusal of Clause 13(1)(a) of the Rent Control Order shows that a landlord cannot give notice to a tenant to determine his lease if the lease is expressed to be determinable at his option. I am not in the instant case concerned with the sub-clause (b) as it relates to the leases determinable by efflux of time. However, even in a case where the lease is determinable by efflux of time it is clear that the protection of the Rent Control Order is granted to the tenant. The relevant Clause 13(1)(a) of the Rent Control Order provides that if any lease is determinable at the option of the landlord, then before giving notice to determine such a lease, previous written permission of the Rent Controller is necessary. Clause 13(2) of the Rent Control Order casts an obligation upon the landlord to make an application in writing for seeking permission of the Rent Controller under Clause 13(1), and Clause 13(3)(iii) shows that the Rent Controller can grant permission to the landlord for giving notice to terminate the tenancy if any of the grounds enumerated therein exists. It is only after obtaining the permission of the Rent Controller as provided in Clause 13(1) and 13(3) of the Rent Control Order that the landlord can give notice to the tenant for determining his lease before filing the suit for ejectment against him. 5. The crucial question, therefore, would be whether in a case of forfeiture of tenancy by disclaimer, the relationship of landlord and tenant automatically ceases upon the disclaimer by the tenant or whether it is determinable at the option of the landlord by giving a notice. It is clear from reading section 111(g) of the T.P. Act that a lease of an immovable property by forfeiture in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself determines when the lessor or his transferee gives a notice in writing to a lessee of his intention to determine the lease. It is clear from the aforesaid provision that by mere disclaimer the relationship of landlord and tenant does not come to an end but there is an option thereunder to the landlord or his transferee to determine the lease by giving a notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to do so as the said lease is merely voidable. A notice in writing to determine the lease in the case of forfeiture of lease is thus mandatory. See (Tatya Saolya v. Yeshwanta Kondiba)1, A.I.R. 1951 Bom. 283. The relationship of landlord and tenant would, therefore, continue and would not come to an end even in a case of forfeiture of lease unless the notice required by section 111(g) of the T.P. Act is given. 6. Once it is held that a notice in writing by the lessor i.e. the landlord is necessary to determine the lease, or in other words the lease is determinable at the option of the landlord even in the case of forfeiture of tenancy the provisions of Clause 13(1)(a) of the Rent Control Order would step in and require the landlord to obtain previous permission in writing from the Rent Controller before giving such as notice. There is nothing in the provisions of Clause 13 or in any other provision of the Rent control Order which would show that the notice required to be given in the case of forfeiture of tenancy is excluded from its application. Thus even in a case of forfeiture of tenancy the protection of the Rent Control Order is intended to be and is granted to the tenant. A notice of intention to determine the lease in the case of forfeiture of tenancy is a notice which is thus as shown above clearly covered by Clause 13(1)(a) of the Rent Control Order. It was, therefore, necessary for the plaintiffs to obtain previous permission of the Rent Controller as required by Clause 13(1)(a) of the Rent Control Order before giving a notice of forfeiture of tenancy and before filing a suit on the basis of the same. Since the said requirement is not fulfilled, the instant suit was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed. 7. The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs has, however, relied upon a judgment of this Court in the case of (Ratanlal Manikchand Shah v. Chanbasappa Sanganbasappa Chincholi and others)2, A.I.R. 1978 Bom. Since the said requirement is not fulfilled, the instant suit was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed. 7. The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs has, however, relied upon a judgment of this Court in the case of (Ratanlal Manikchand Shah v. Chanbasappa Sanganbasappa Chincholi and others)2, A.I.R. 1978 Bom. 216 to show that in the case where the relationship of landlord and tenant has ceased due to disclaimer of the tenant of the title of the landlord, the provisions of the Rent Control legislation would not apply. The said decision is rendered upon the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (for short “the Bombay Act”). In my view, the relevant provisions of the Bombay Act and the Rent Control Order are not in pari materia. The schemes of the two enactments are entirely different. Under the Bombay Act there is a direct forum created under section 28 for deciding the disputes between landlords and tenants. The said section 28 postulates the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant for its application. Therefore, when the relationship of landlord and tenant has ceased after due compliance with the provisions of section 111(g) of the T.P. Act, the forum created under the Bombay Act would not have any jurisdiction. However, Clause 13(1)(a) of the Rent Control Order operates before the relationship of the landlord and tenant has ceased because before the landlord is allowed to determine lease at his option on the ground of forfeiture of tenancy, the said provision casts an obligation upon him to obtain previous permission in writing of the Rent Controller. As is clear, before giving notice in writing to determine the lease on the ground of forfeiture of tenancy, the tenancy cannot be said to have come to an end. The ratio of the above decision would not, therefore, the applicable to the instant case arising under the provisions of the Rent Control Order. 8. It is then urged before me that the finding of the courts below about the title of the plaintiffs to the suit house deserves to be upheld in the instant case. The ratio of the above decision would not, therefore, the applicable to the instant case arising under the provisions of the Rent Control Order. 8. It is then urged before me that the finding of the courts below about the title of the plaintiffs to the suit house deserves to be upheld in the instant case. In my view, since this is a suit based upon title, the finding of the learned lower courts below as regards the title of the plaintiffs to the suit house which is a finding of fact based upon the evidence on record deserves to be upheld. Both the courts below have found that the plaintiffs have proved their sale-deed on the basis of which the title to the suit house is claimed by them. However, the suit for possession is liable to be dismissed because no permission of the Rent Controller is obtained by the plaintiffs before giving notice to determine the lease on the ground of forfeiture of tenancy. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The impugned judgments and decrees of the courts below are set aside. But it is declared that the plaintiffs are the owners of the suit house. However, the suit of the plaintiffs for possession and damages against the defendant is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there would be no order as to costs. Appeal partly allowed. -----