JUDGMENT - KANTHARIA H.H., J.: - These two writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are being disposed of by this common judgment as the facts and points of law in both the matters are the same. 2. The petitioners are highly qualified and well experienced teachers and educationists in their own rights following the pious and noble calling of teaching the teachers for the blind. Thus Mrs. Swaran S. Ahuja (in W.P. No. 96 of 1985) is an Honours Graduate from Delhi University. She received training in teaching blind children in U.K. in 1957-58. She has had further training in the field at the Perkins School for the blind in U.S.A. in 1962-63, where her training included a special observation of teacher-education methodology. She had presented many papers relating to the education of the blind and the teacher training at the national and international level. She was an invitee lecturer at the National Academy of Teachers of the blind, Palayamkalli and National Institute for the visually handicapped, Government of India, Dehradoon. She had served on many Committees appointed by the Government of India, National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration and National Association for the Blind. She has compiled the “Hind Braille Shikshak” the only publication in India. Her pamphlet for the guidance of parents of the blind children published by all India Confederation of the Blind, has been translated in many Indian languages. Likewise, Mrs. S.V. Padbidri (in W.P. No. 97 of 1985) is B.A. (Hons.) and holds Diploma in Education issued by the Secondary Teachers Education Board. She also hold a Diploma in Education for the Blind issued by the Perkings Institute, U.S.A. She was Honorary Secretary of Blind Mens' Association from 1952 to 1959. She was instrumental in starting a Braille Library in 1955 for the first time. She worked as an assistant teacher at the Victoria Memorial High School for the blind from 1955 to 1965. She was Honorary Secretary of the National Association of Instructors for the Blind from 1979 to 1983, in which capacity she had convened. All India Conference for the teachers for the blind at Ludhiana in 1985. She had also translated pamphlets in Marathi for the guidance of parents of blind children published by All India Confederation for the blind, New Delhi. All India Conference for the teachers for the blind at Ludhiana in 1985. She had also translated pamphlets in Marathi for the guidance of parents of blind children published by All India Confederation for the blind, New Delhi. But irony of fate is that both the petitioners, unfortunately, got a very shabby and ungrateful treatment at the hand of those who themselves have been rendering yeomen service in the very field of humanitarian cause of helping the blind. 3. Mrs. Ahuja was appointed as Lecturer with effect from July 1, 1967 in the salary grade of Rs. 170-10-290-EB-15-350 by the Honorary Director of the Training Centre for the Teachers of the Visually Handicapped (respondent No. 3). This Centre was formerly known as the Training Institute/Centre for the Teachers for Blind. Similarly, Mrs. Padbidri was appointed as Supervisor in Practice Teaching with effect from July 1, 1965 in the same salary grade. Both were granted five advance increments. They continued working for respondent No. 3 at the place of Victoria Memorial High School for the Blind, Tardeo, Bombay (respondent No. 4) upto the academic year 1983-84 which concluded at the end of April, 1984. Their service record for the entire period was unblemished. There was not even a whisper that they were in any way incompetent in the discharge of their duties. However, when the new academic year 1984-85 began, they were not permitted to join duties by respondent No. 3. New teachers were appointed in their place. Thereafter some correspondence was exchanged between them and their employer respondent No. 3 and others who were connected with their work and ultimately the honorary Secretary of respondent No. 4 wrote to both the petitioners on October 19/29, 1984 that their management had decided not to have them (petitioners) as lecturer and supervisor respectively at the training centre for the teacher of visually handicapped for the current year 1984-85 course. This gave rise to these two writ petitions. 4. The petitions have been very vehemently resisted by and on behalf of respondents Nos. 3 and 4. Whereas respondent No. 3 opted not to file returns, the Secretary of respondent No. 4 Jayantilal Ranchordas Mehta, filed an affidavit on behalf of respondents Nos. 3 and 4 at the admission stage and relied upon the same at the final hearing stage also. 3 and 4. Whereas respondent No. 3 opted not to file returns, the Secretary of respondent No. 4 Jayantilal Ranchordas Mehta, filed an affidavit on behalf of respondents Nos. 3 and 4 at the admission stage and relied upon the same at the final hearing stage also. The Union of India (respondent No. 1) and respondent No. 2 did not file any returns controverting the contentions raised by the poisoners in their petitions. In substance, the case of respondents Nos. 3 and 4 is that they are not “the State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and are thus not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226. Further according to them, respondent No. 3 is not a legal entity because it is not a statutory body and is not incorporated under any law or Act of Parliament and that no rules are prescribed in respect of respondent No. 3 and its functioning. It is then contended that the petitioners have sought the specific performance of contract of employment between private parties which is not permissible under Article 226. It is further contended that if respondent No. 3 is held to be “the State”, no relief can be granted against respondent No. 4. A contention was also raised that the petitioners were not appointed under letters of appointment but their appointments were under a scheme evolved and published by the Government of India for training the teachers for the blind and as per that scheme the petitioners were not permanently appointed but they were appointed on contract on year to year basis for courses and there was no vested right in favour of the petitioners for being continued in the employment for the year 1984-85. 5. Now, the law as to under what circumstances institutions like respondents Nos. 3 and 4 can be considered as “instrumentality” or “agent” of the Government and thus “the State” within the meaning of Article 12 is well-settled. Mr. Mehta, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents Nos. 5. Now, the law as to under what circumstances institutions like respondents Nos. 3 and 4 can be considered as “instrumentality” or “agent” of the Government and thus “the State” within the meaning of Article 12 is well-settled. Mr. Mehta, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents Nos. 3 and 4, urged that as held by the Calcutta High Court in case of (Kalpana Bishui v. State of West Bengal and others)1, 85 Cal.W.N. 1069 in order to be an “authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, the institution or the Corporation or the corporate body must be created by the statute and it must owe its existence to the statute or in other words such an institution or corporate body must be a statutory body and since in the instant cases respondents Nos. 3 and 4 are not created by any statute they cannot be termed as “the State” within the meaning of Article 12, I do not think, there is any substance in the submission of Mr. Mehta because a careful reading of this ruling would show that a corporate body though not created by a statute but formed under a general statute will also be an “authority” within the meaning of Article 12, if it is an “agency” or “instrumentality” of the Government, in other words, according to the Calcutta High Court, if a corporate body is entirely under the control and supervision of the Government and though outwardly such a corporate body has a separate personality of its own yet if the veil is lifted, it would be clear and apparent that it is in fact the State which owns, controls, manages and finances such a corporate body or a society or a company. If it is so, it is an “instrumentality” or “agency” of the Government and thus “the State” within the meaning of Article 12. It is true that in the facts and circumstances of the case before it the Calcutta High Court held that Victoria Institution was not an “agency” or “instrumentality” of the State and, therefore, not an “authority” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Thus the ruling of the Calcutta High Court is of no avail to Mr. Mehta. It is true that in the facts and circumstances of the case before it the Calcutta High Court held that Victoria Institution was not an “agency” or “instrumentality” of the State and, therefore, not an “authority” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Thus the ruling of the Calcutta High Court is of no avail to Mr. Mehta. And in case of (Reghunandan Prasad v. The Institute for the Physically Handicaped, New Delhi and others)2, 1985 Lab.I.C. 148 the Delhi High Court has held that cases where there is an element of public employment the Court will grant administrative law remedies and that law confers a status on the man by reason of the statue and if there is no statute the Constitution protects him. I shall shortly point out the element of public employment in the cases before us. It may be noted here that the Calcutta High Court ruling was of a Single Judge whereas that of the Delhi High Court of a Division Bench. Again, the Supreme Court in case of (Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and others)3, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 487 held as under: “It is immaterial for determining whether a Corporation is an authority whether the Corporation is created by a statute or under a statute. The test is whether it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government and not as to how it is created. The inquiry has to be not as to how the juristic persons is born but why it has been brought into existence. The Corporation may be a statutory corporation created by a statute or it may be a Government company or a company formed under the Companies Act or it may be a society registered under the Societies Registration Act or any other similar statute. Whatever be its genetical origin, it would be an “authority” within the meaning of Article 12 if it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government and that would have to be decided on a proper assessment of the facts in the light of the relevant factors. Whatever be its genetical origin, it would be an “authority” within the meaning of Article 12 if it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government and that would have to be decided on a proper assessment of the facts in the light of the relevant factors. The concept of instrumentality or agency of the Government is not limited to a corporation created by a statute but is equally applicable to a company or society and in a given case it would have to be decided, on a consideration of the relevant factors, whether the company or society is an instrumentality or agency of the Government so as to come within the meaning of the expression “authority” in Article 12. A juristic entity which may be “State” for the purpose of Parts III and IV would not be so far the purpose of Part XIV or any other provision of the Constitution.” 6. In the instant case, the facts are so eloquent that there is no difficulty in coming to a conclusion that respondents Nos. 3 and 4 are the “instrumentalities” or “agencies” of the Government and thus “the State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Thus the very scheme, for the implementation of which the petitioners were appointed, was conceived and evolved by the Government of India through its Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Welfare. According to the said scheme, which was to be operated in collaboration with UNICEF, the American Foundation for Overseas Blind, the National Association for the Blind and the National Academy of Teachers for the Blind, the entire cost of the course was borne by the Central Government. The Director of the Centre where this scheme was being implemented had to maintain accounts and the same had to be submitted to the Government of India in such a manner and at such intervals as may be prescribed. The training institution had to follow the syllabus prescribed by the Central Government. The Advisory Committee for the implementation of the scheme, among others, consisted of two representatives of the State Department of Education an Social Welfare. The preparation of hand-book, covering important subjects included in the syllabus, had to be undertaken by the Central Government in consultation with the appropriate experts. The translation of a few standard textbooks was undertaken by the Central Government on a priority basis. The preparation of hand-book, covering important subjects included in the syllabus, had to be undertaken by the Central Government in consultation with the appropriate experts. The translation of a few standard textbooks was undertaken by the Central Government on a priority basis. Thus the scheme itself shows that it was financed, controlled and implemented by the Central Government assisted by two representatives of the State Government on the Advisory Committee. Moreover, the correspondence touching the appointments of the petitioners also shows that the appointments were approved by the Government of India and they were granted five advance increments with the approval of the Central Government. The petitioners were granted dearness allowance and other allowances at the Central Government rates. The Director of the course had in terms written to Mrs. Ahuja that his suggestion to re-designate her as Assistant or Deputy Director was not accepted by the Government but he was hopeful to receive a confirmation in that regard in future. The letters of appointment to both the petitioners were written in the above terms by the Director of respondent No. 3. The affidavit of Mrs. Ahuja shows that respondent No. 4 also received grant-in-aid from the Government of Maharashtra and Bombay Municipal Corporation for its activities. This is not denied by respondents Nos. 3 and 4. All this goes to show that the employment of the petitioners was a public appointment. Under the circumstances, it is futile for respondent No. 3 and 4 to contend that they are not the “other authorities” and the” State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. In this connection we may usefully refer to and rely upon a Supreme Court judgment in the case of (Manmohan Singh Jaitla v. Commissioner, Union Territory, Chandigarh and others)4, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 365. In that case the aided school received 95% of expense by way of grant from the public exchequer and under the Punjab Aided Schools (Security of Service) Act, 1969 the employees received the statutory protection subject to the regulation made by Education Department of the Union Territory of Chandigarh as also the appointment of Head Master to be valid had to be approved by the Director of Public Instruction. Under such circumstances the Supreme Court held hat the said aided school was amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Under such circumstances the Supreme Court held hat the said aided school was amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. In our case, as a matter of fact, the Government of India gave 100% grant for the implementation of the Scheme and, therefore, there is no difficulty in coming to a conclusion that respondents Nos. 3 and 4 were amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. And Delhi High Court in case of Raghunandan Prasad v. The Institute for the Physically Handicapped, New Delhi and others, 1985 Lab.I.C. 148 has in terms held that the Institute for the Physically Handicapped, New Delhi, is an “authority” within the meaning of Article 12. These being the facts and circumstances of the case and the law on the point, I have unhesitatingly come to a conclusion that respondents Nos. 3 and 4 are “the State” within the meaning of Article 12 and are thus amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. 7. Now, the facts stated as above show that after the academic year 1983-84 ended on April 30, 1987 respondent No. 3 was on summer vacation and the next Academic term should have, in the ordinary course, started on July 2nd, 1984. Both the petitioners made their sincere attempts to reach the school to report for duty but were informed by Miss Aria, the Honorary Director of respondent No. 3, that they would be informed later as to when to report for work. This is not denied by respondent No. 3 by filing an affidavit of Miss Aria. The petitioners continued making inquiries in order to join their duties but in vain and ultimately the Honorary Secretary J.R. Mehta of respondent No. 4 by his letter dated 19/29 October, 1984 informed the petitioners that the management had decided not to have them as a Lecturer and a Supervisor respectively at the Training Centre for Teachers of Visually Handicapped for the current year 1984-85. No reasons were assigned for such a decision of the management. It is, therefore, crystal clear that the act of respondent No. 3 in not allowing the petitioners to join duty in the beginning of the academic year 1984-85 in July 1984 and that of respondent No. 4 in terminating the Services of the petitioners were arbitrary. In this connection Mr. It is, therefore, crystal clear that the act of respondent No. 3 in not allowing the petitioners to join duty in the beginning of the academic year 1984-85 in July 1984 and that of respondent No. 4 in terminating the Services of the petitioners were arbitrary. In this connection Mr. Mehta vehemently urged that the petitioners were not in permanent employment of respondent No. 3 as they were working every year for the course of approximately 40 weeks and at the end of each course every year their services came to an end. In other words, the submission of the learned Counsel is that there was no vested right in the petitioners to claim employment during the academic year 1984-85. To buttress his argument Mr. Mehta relied upon on e of the clauses of the Scheme in question regarding appointment of the staff which reads as under: “Appointment of Staff: The Director of the Centre shall be selected by the Central Government. A. The whole-time staff hall be appointed by the Director on the Scales of pay indicated in Appendix 'A' in consultation with the Advisory Committee. They will be the employees of the institution where the course is located. At the commencement of each course, the Director shall formulate a panel of lecturers and guest lecturers in consultation with the Advisory Committee. The lecturers shall be appointed for the entire duration of the course while the guest lecturers may be asked to give lectures on any of the specialised subjects included in the syllabus. The panel of guest lecturers shall be paid at the rates indicated in Appendix 'A'. Every Centre shall have not more than 6 guest lecturers to lecture on any one or more of the following subjects:” I find no substance in the submission of Mr. Mehta that the petitioners were appointed every year for the course of approximately 40 weeks. The abovementioned clause of the Scheme only indicates that there were two categories of lecturers viz. (i) panel lecturers and (ii) guest lecturers. The guest lecturers were to give lectures on any of the specialised subjects and that was their limited duty. So long as the panel lectures were concerned, they were in the regular employment of the institute and the Director was only supposed to formulate a panel of such lecturers at the commencement of each course. The guest lecturers were to give lectures on any of the specialised subjects and that was their limited duty. So long as the panel lectures were concerned, they were in the regular employment of the institute and the Director was only supposed to formulate a panel of such lecturers at the commencement of each course. From such formulation it cannot be said that panel lecturers were appointed every year afresh. Mr. Damania correctly submitted that the petitioners' services were continuous for all these years and they were never given any break during the summer vacations. On the contrary, according to Mr. Damania, the petitioners were also paid their salaries during the vacations which goes to show that the petitioners were in the continuous permanent employment of respondent No. 3 who had appointed them. It is also important to note here that the petitioners were appointed in the salary scales as mentioned above. They were not appointed on a fixed and/or consolidated salary every year. There is nothing in the appointment letters of the petitioners, given to them by respondent No. 3, that they were appointed for particular course or courses in any particular year or years. On the contrary, the letters of appointment clearly show that they were appointed in the running salary scale. It is not the case of respondent No. 3 that they were issuing appointment letters to the petitioners every year. I, therefore, find no substance in the argument made by Mr. Mehta that the petitioners were not in the regular permanent employment of respondent No. 3. Hence, termination of services of the petitioners the manner in which it was done, amounted to mala fide and arbitrary action on the part of respondent No. 3 which violated the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. 8. It is the specific case of the petitioners that they were appointed by respondent No. 3 and were thus entitled to reinstatement and backwages from respondent No. 3. This issue is sought to be confused by respondents Nos. 3 and 4 in the affidavit of Jayantilal R. Mehta filed on their behalf. Thus according to this affidavit, respondent No. 3 worked under the supervision and control of respondent No. 4 and respondent No. 3 is not a legal or statutory body but is a part of respondent No. 4. 3 and 4 in the affidavit of Jayantilal R. Mehta filed on their behalf. Thus according to this affidavit, respondent No. 3 worked under the supervision and control of respondent No. 4 and respondent No. 3 is not a legal or statutory body but is a part of respondent No. 4. He further stated that office bearers of respondent No. 4 are also office bearers of respondent No. 3 as it is a part of respondent No. 4. In other words, according to him, there is no difference between respondents Nos. 3 and 4. Mrs. Ahuja in her affidavit in rejoinder dated February 28, 1985 categorically stated that respondent Nos. 3 and 4 are two distinct entities and are separately registered as employers for the purpose of professional tax payable to the State of Maharashtra. She has in fact stated that different registration numbers are given to these two institutes for the purpose of paying professional taxes. She further stated that professional tax deducted from her salary was paid by respondent No. 3 as the employer and not by respondent No. 4. She also stated that respondent Nos. 3 and 4 have separate balance-sheets and separate books of account. These averments made by Mrs. Ahuja are not denied by a counter-affidavit. Therefore, I accept the case of the petitioners that respondent No. 4 is a school run by a trust registered with the Charity Commissioner in whose school premises respondent No. 3 runs the course for teaching the teachers for the blind sponsored by the Ministry of Social Welfare of the Government of India. The appointments of the petitioners were made by respondent No. 3 after being approved by the Government of India and, therefore, the petitioners are the employees of respondent No. 3. Since respondent No. 3 did not permit the petitioners to join their duties for the academic term 1984-85 from July 1984, the irresistible conclusion is that respondent No. 3 illegally terminated the services of the petitioners from July 2, 1984. Therefore, Mr. Damania is perfectly right in stating that the letter dated October 19/29, 1984 written by respondent No. 4 to the petitioners informing that the management had decided not to have them as lecturer/supervisor at the training centre for the teachers for the visually handicapped for the current year 1984-85 is non est. 9. Therefore, Mr. Damania is perfectly right in stating that the letter dated October 19/29, 1984 written by respondent No. 4 to the petitioners informing that the management had decided not to have them as lecturer/supervisor at the training centre for the teachers for the visually handicapped for the current year 1984-85 is non est. 9. I have already observed in the foregoing paragraphs that there is no substance in the submission of Mr. Mehta that the petitioners were appointed every year all afresh but if there is any truth in the submission of Mr. Mehta, in this regard, the practice followed by respondent No. 3 has to be deprecated in the strongest terms. Respondent No. 3 was dealing with respectable teachers following the noble called of teaching the teachers for the blind. They were not to be treated in such a shabby manner. Respondent No. 3 cannot be tolerated for indulging in such a practice of a naked 'hire and fire' rule, the time for banishing which altogether from employer-employee relationship is fast approaching. Gone are the days when an employer could indulge in such a 'hire and fire' rule. Such a practice cold exist only in the days of Henry VIII. Recently, the Supreme Court in case of (Ratan Lala and others v. State of Haryana and others)5, 1985(4) S.C.C. 43 has in strong terms condemned State Governments' practice of appointing a large number of teachers on ad hoc basis at the commencement of academic session, terminating their services before the next academic session and has held that such ad hoc teachers were subjected to unreasonable and arbitrary 'hire and fire' policy. 10. The reasons why respondent No. 3 indulged in arbitrarily terminating the services of the petitioners are not far to seek. The record shows that of some technical reasons the petitioners were not paid their salaries from October 1983 and they were persistently demanding the arrears which seems to have annoyed respondents Nos. 3 and 4. 10. The reasons why respondent No. 3 indulged in arbitrarily terminating the services of the petitioners are not far to seek. The record shows that of some technical reasons the petitioners were not paid their salaries from October 1983 and they were persistently demanding the arrears which seems to have annoyed respondents Nos. 3 and 4. It further appears that National Institute for Visually Handicapped (respondent No. 2) which is a branch of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Government of India decided to pay grant-in-aid to the National Association for the Blind, Bombay, with effect from July 1, 1984, for conducting the same programme under their management, after withdrawing the said grant from respondent No. 4 in whose premises respondent No. 3 was conducting the programme of training the teachers for the blind. This added fuel to the fire and the anger of respondents Nos. 3 and 4 then knew no bounds. These were the reasons for respondents Nos. 3 and 4 to lose their balance because they felt that the petitioner Swaran Ahuja's husband (Suresh Ahuja himself a blind person) who was a Committee Member of the National Association for the Blind was trying for the grant for the National Association for the Blind so that petitioner Mrs. Ahuja could occupy a high position in that institute. 11. In this view of the matter both the petitions succeed. Rule in each of the petitions made absolute in terms of prayer Clauses (a) and (b) with costs. Respondent No. 3 is further ordered and directed to pay full amount of backwages to both the petitioners right from the day their services were illegally terminated till the day they are reinstated in their original posts. Petitions allowed. -----