ORDER The petitioner filed an application for preemption under S.8 of the west Bengal Land Reforms Act in respect of two sale deeds executed by the opposite parties on the 22nd and 23rd February, 1973 transferring 1.79 acres in plots nos. 80 and 85. The opposite parties contested. Their plea was that the petitioner had purchased in 1962 a portion of plot no. 117 which was a tank and hence it was not land as defined in the Land Reforms Act and so he was not a co-sharer of the holding. The application for pre-emption was not maintainable. The trial Court found that the preemptor had purchased in 1962, 07 acre of plot no.117 which was a doba. Deba is tank. Tank was outside the definition of land in the Land Reforms Act. Therefore the pre-emptor was not a co-sharer of the holding. The application for preemption was dismissed. The preemptor went up on appeal. The appellate Court held that doba was a tank and so the pre-emptor was not a co-sharer. It rejected the submission that doba was different form a tank. He held that both tank and doba are reservoirs of water and so doba is not a land as defined. He also held that admittedly no notice was served on the preemptor but since he was not a co-sharer, he was not entitled to preemptor. The appeal was dismissed. 2. Aggrieved, the preemptor has come to this Court in revision. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to a decision in Niranjan Das v. Lakshmi Mani Dasi, 86 CWN 318. In this case it was held that doba does not come within the mischief of the word ‘tank’ as is apparent form the Wilson’s Glossary that doba means low or swampy or inundated land. Therefore, in my opinion, the doba is low land. But it is never a tank which can be said to be excluded from the word ‘land’ as defined in S.2(7) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. This authority is on all fours and supports the petitioner. In this view it has to be held that by virtue of the purchase of the doba, the petitioner purchased land as defined in the Land Reforms Act and became a co-sharer of the holding in which the doba, plot no. 117 was situate. This authority is on all fours and supports the petitioner. In this view it has to be held that by virtue of the purchase of the doba, the petitioner purchased land as defined in the Land Reforms Act and became a co-sharer of the holding in which the doba, plot no. 117 was situate. Admittedly the holding was the same and a portion of which was transferred b y the sale deed in question. 3. The learned Counsel for the opposite party then submitted that the petition for pre-emption was barred by time because it was not filed within three months as provided in S.8 of the Land Reforms Act. The period of three months commenced from the date of service of the notice on the preemptor. In this case admittedly no notice was served on the preemptor. As such the aforesaid period of limitation was not applicable. No other objection to the preemption application was taken in any of the two Courts below. It is hence unnecessary to send the case back. 4. It was argued on behalf of the opposite party that the Additional District Judge who disposed of the appeal was not a Court within the meaning of S. 115 CPC. He relies upon a decision in lshan Chandra Ghatak v. Sasadhar Maity, AIR 1978 NOC 193 (Cal). In that case it was held that an appellate authority under S. 9(16) is not a Court but a persona designate Application under S.115 C.P.C. is not maintainable. Its order is revisable under Article 227 of the Constitution. Power to interfere under S. 115 C.P.C. as well as under Article 227 of the Constitution vests in the High Court and the High Court can in a proper case interfere in exercise of any of the powers which may be applicable. 5. In the result, the Rules are made absolute. The impugned orders are set aside. The applications for pre-emption are allowed. No order is made as to costs Rule made absolute.