Deceased Maneswar left his house for going to Gohpur on 4.2.82 to see his ailing aunt's husband. He was met on the way at Bhogpur Chariali Railway Station by the accused-appe­llant who took him to the latter's house where he was made to consume liquor. It is the case of the prosecution that the accused thereafter wanted to take away the money which Mane­swar was carrying to which the latter did not agree, whereupon there was an altercation between the two. The accused took out a dagger and gave blows on the person of Maneswar when he became unconscious and was carried on a bi-cycle and thrown by the side of a nearby river. Maneswar, however regained his senses and somehow crawled to the house of Raman Singh Deori (P.W. 5) and narrated the occurrence to him. Words were sent to the mother and sisters of Maneswar who came in the next morning where after the injured was taken to the State Dispen­sary where some first aid was given and brought back home where he succumbed to the injuries after two days. Information was lodged with the police by P.W. 2 on 7.2.82 which set it in action. After completion of investigation, the accused was charge sheeted under section 302 I.P.C. In the course of the trial, prosecution examined 9 witnesses and the learned trial court after going through the evidence was satisfied that the injuries which caused the death of Maneswar had been inflicted by the accused; but having noted that as the occurrence had taken place on the wake of consumption of liquor by both the sides, and as there was no premeditation or intention to cause death, the appellant was convicted under section 304(11), also because, if proper treatment would have been given Maneswar would have perhaps survived. For this offence, the appellant has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for five years and a fine of Rs. 500/-. 2. Shri Tanti, who has ably assisted the court as amicus curiae, at first submits that the present is a case of clear acquittal inasmuch as there is no clinching evidence on record relating to the infliction of injuries found on the person of Maneswar by the appellant. He places reliance in this connec­tion on the statement in the F.I.R. where it was stated by P.W. 2 that Maneswar had died "due to assault by miscreants''. He places reliance in this connec­tion on the statement in the F.I.R. where it was stated by P.W. 2 that Maneswar had died "due to assault by miscreants''. This statement had been made after mother of Maneswar had met the informant on the night of 6.2.82, whereas the occu­rrence had taken place on 4.2.82. He also refers in this connection to Darshan Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 554 . What has been held in this decision is that the fact that the names of some accused are not mentioned in the F.I.R. is a strewn stance which the prosecution has to explain, though it cannot be held as a rule of law that an accused whose name is not mentioned in the F.I.R. is entitled to acquittal. A perusal of the impugned judgment shows that the learned Sessions Jugs took a view that P.W. 2 might not have named the appellant in the either for two reasons - first, he did not want to involve himself in the matter; and secondly, as appears from the evidence of the informant, the mother being in a very per­plexed and shocked condition could not say anything about the care of the assailant. These explanations appear satisfactory, more particularly, the shocking state of mind of the mother which might have stood in the way of naming the assailant. Further, as the F.I.R can be used to contradict only the ma­ker, we can use the same to contract the informant alone. I do not think that this fact or itself should sound the death knell of the prosecution story, when it has been supported by independent witnesses like P. Ws. 3 and 4 who were Home Guard personnel at the relevant time, and so also by P. Ws. 5 and 6. 3. According to P. W. 3 and 4 they were on patrolling duty at the Railway Station from where Maneswar was to catch train. They had their camp by the side of Station and when P.W. 3 was preparing meals, Kanta, the brother of the appe­llant, came to the camp and informed that he had been very much insulted by a boy of Bhulabori gaon from which place the deceased came. They had their camp by the side of Station and when P.W. 3 was preparing meals, Kanta, the brother of the appe­llant, came to the camp and informed that he had been very much insulted by a boy of Bhulabori gaon from which place the deceased came. Receiving this information, these witnesses went to the house of the accused and saw that both the accused and the deceased were fully drunk and further noticed that the appellant gave dagger blows on Maneswar. From their evidence it does not, however, appear that the altercation bet­ween the deceased and accused had anything to do with the money which the deceased was said to be carrying with him. It rather seems that when they arrived at the house of appe­llant, he was altercating with a "Mia boy'' at which point of lime the deceased took the cycle of the appellant but after going some distance had fallen down. The appellant then rushes towards the deceased and caught hold of his cycle. The deceased wanted to snatch the cycle to which the appellant his not agree. This was said to be the cause of altercation. Be that as it may, these two witnesses clearly stated about the appellant having given dagger blows on the person of the decea­sed. I do not find anything in their cross-examination to disbelieve them. They have also to be regarded as independent witnesses Jiving no grudge whatsoever against the appellant. 4. Besides these eyewitnesses, we have on record the state­ments of P. Ws. 5, 6, and 7 who have deposed about the dying declaration of Maneswar. As already pointed out, Maneswar went crawling up to the house of P. W. 5 where he had appeared at about 2 A.M. and stated to the witness that he had been stabbed by the appellant with dagger. P. W. 5 had then noted three injuries on the person of the deceased. On early dawn P. W. 5 brought the matter to the notice of P W. 6, the Gaonbura, who has also deposed about the statement of the deceased that he had been assaulted with dagger by the appellant. P. W. 7, mother of the deceased, has also testified about the statement of the deceased relating to his having been assaulted by the appellant. P. W. 7, mother of the deceased, has also testified about the statement of the deceased relating to his having been assaulted by the appellant. It is a settled law that a conviction can be founded solely on dying declaration, if it inspires full confidence, which the declaration does in the instant case. This view was expressed affirmatively by the Hon'ble Supreme Court first in Khushal Rao vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 22 which has since been followed in innumerable decisions. 5. In view of the above, I do not entertain reasonable doubt about the involvement of the appellant in this crime, and it has to be held that Maneswar died because of the injuries sustained by him at the hand of the appellant. His conviction under sec­tion 304(11) as awarded by the learned Sessions Judge is, there­fore, upheld. This takes us to the question of sentence. It is ob­vious that there can be no rule of thumb in selecting a proper sentence to be awarded 01 an accused for the offence of which he has been found guilty. It is also apparent that there can be on ready-made formula in this regard and the sentence has to be tailored to match the gravity of the crime and the personal trails of the accused. Indeed, at this stage the personal circumstances of the accused have inevitably to be borne in mind. It is for this reason that pacify; provision has been made in section 235(2) Cr. P. C. to hear the accused on the question of sentence. 6. As the appellant has been found guilty under section 314(11), it may be mentioned that that section visualizes the sentence of imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years or with fine or with both. The Legislature has, there­fore, visualised imposition of fine only as and of the sentences for offence under section 304(11). The learned Public Prosecutor, however, draws my attention in the first instance to the decision in The lan vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1984 SC 759 where in sentence of five years was awarded for the offence under section 304 (11). Not only this, reference to the other cases noted in this decision would show that in all of these cases except Jagrup Singh ( AIR 1981 SC 1552 ) the sentence awarded was rigorous imprisonment for five years. 7. Not only this, reference to the other cases noted in this decision would show that in all of these cases except Jagrup Singh ( AIR 1981 SC 1552 ) the sentence awarded was rigorous imprisonment for five years. 7. It cannot follow from the aforesaid decisions that whenever a Court convicts a person under section 304(11), he must be awarded the sentence of five years. This would be apparent from certain other decisions of the Apex Court to which my attention has been invited fairly by the learned Public Prosec­utor himself, and to some by Shri Tanti. In Mahinder Pal vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1979 SC 577 the sentence of the factory owner at Jullundur was reduced to the imprisonment already undergone for the altered conviction under section 304(11), which was of a period of about 13 months, after pointing out that the occurrence bad taken place more than a decade ago beca­use of which the appellant had to pass long ordeal both mental and financial. The sentence of fine amounting to Rs. 10,000/- had however been not altered by the Court. 8. In Yogendra Morarji vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1980 SC 660 also the appellant was a businessman and his sentence under section 304(11) was ultimately reduced to 6 months rigor­ous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000/-. State of Punjab vs. Mann Singh, AIR 1983 SC 172 was a case where the con­viction was ultimately under section 304(11) on all the accused persons. The sentence awarded was, however different for the two respondents before the Supreme Court. Respondent No. 1 was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three years and with a fine of Rs. 3,000/-, whereas the respondent No. 2 was awarded the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 18 months. This clearly indicates that a sentence has to be awarded keep­ing in view many factors. 9. Shri Tanti has brought to my notice a judgment of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 9 of 1983 (Nila Saikia vs. State of Assam, disposed of on 15.12.83) wherein the appellant was ultimately convicted under section 304(11) for which offence tie was sense need to rigorous imprisonment for one year only. 10. From what have been stated above, it is apparent that awarding of proper sentence cannot be put in any formula. 10. From what have been stated above, it is apparent that awarding of proper sentence cannot be put in any formula. All, will depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case including the personal factors relating to the accused. The accused in the case at band was aged about 25 years at the time of occurrence (6.2.82). The assault on the deceased was when he was under the influence of liquor, and as deposed by P. Ws. 3 and 4 an altercation had preceded the assault which had something to do with a quarrel relating to a "Mia boy". These witnesses have not said anything about the appellant taking away any money of the deceased which has come out from the evidence of the witnesses who have deposed the dying declaration. It also appears from the impugned judgment that the appellant-accused is married having minor children. Though it has been mentioned in the judgment, that there are several criminal cases pending against the appellant, the mere fact of pendency of some other cases cannot be a ground to award higher sentence on an accused for the offence for which he is ultimately found guilty. 11. Keeping in view the circumstances under which the offence was committed, the fact that the appellant is quite young in age and that he has to look after his family and is a mere cultivator, I am satisfied that the period of imprisonment already undergone, which is about two years, as stated to me by the learned Public Prosecutor, would meet the ends of justice, and therefore, I reduce the sentence to the period of imprisonment already undergone. The fine of Rs.500/- is left unaltered which; in case of payment, shall be paid to the mother of the victim; and in case of default the appellant would undergo groups imprisonment for one month. This sum is not being enhanced keeping in view the status of the appe­llant who was not been able to afford to engage a counsel because of which he has been provided State defence in this Court. The fine would be paid within a period of two months, from the date of communication of this order to the appellant. 12. The result is that the appeal is dismissed, subject to the alteration in substantive sentence which is reduced to the period of imprisonment already undergone. The fine would be paid within a period of two months, from the date of communication of this order to the appellant. 12. The result is that the appeal is dismissed, subject to the alteration in substantive sentence which is reduced to the period of imprisonment already undergone. Shri Tanti who has appeared as adieus curiae and duly assisted the Court would be paid fees at the rate applicable to the Additional Public Prosecutor of this Court.