JUDGMENT : M.B. Shah, J. The petitioner wife has filed Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 18 of 1980 under section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad for maintenance. It was her case that she married with opponent No. 1 on 22nd May, 1972 at village Biliya, Taluka Vijapur. District Mehsana ; she was physically and mentally ill-treated by opponent No. 1 and his family members ; as she was not in a position to bear any child and opponent No. 1 along with his family members pressurised her for giving divorce ; on 21st March, 1980 in the morning opponent No. 1 and his mother near her ; she was thereafter brought to the Court and her signatures were taken on three or four blank papers : at about 4.00 p.m. the uncle of opponent No. 1 dropped her near her parent's house and she was informed that she has been divorced. It is her say that immediately her father sent a telegram to opponent No. 1 contending that the petitioner had not agreed to divorce and under coercion her signatures were taken on blank papers. She further alleged that she had complained to Social Security Wing of the Police Department. 2. As opponent No. 1 refused to keep the petitioner with him she had filed the aforesaid application for maintenance. It is her say that opponent No. 1 was earning salary of Rs. 700/- and, therefore, she prayed that the maintenance at the rate of Rs. 300/- be awarded. 3. The Metropolitan Magistrate (Court No. 13), Ahmedabad by his judgment and order dated 30th October, 1980, allowed the said application and awarded maintenance at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month from 27th March, 1980. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate held that divorce deed was executed willingly and voluntarily, but he held that it cannot be believed that the petitioner had abandoned her fight to maintenance. 4. Against the said judgment and order opponent No. 1 filed Criminal Revision Application No. 326 of 1980 before the City Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad. The said matter was heard by the Additional City Sessions Judge (Court No. 2). 4. Against the said judgment and order opponent No. 1 filed Criminal Revision Application No. 326 of 1980 before the City Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad. The said matter was heard by the Additional City Sessions Judge (Court No. 2). The Court held as under : "I am not inclined to accept the contentions of the husband that the respondent wife had initiated the talk about the divorce, that she had taken the husband to the court, that she had taken the stamp papers, that she had engaged the advocate and fixed the fees, that she had dictated the divorce deed and that she had read it and approved it but this is not the proper forum and proper stage to decide upon these matters. This is summary proceedings and unless the divorce deed has been challenged and set aside by proper procedure. I cannot over look that deed in these proceedings under section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973." The learned Judge held that because of the divorce deed which was on record the petitioner was not entitled to have maintenance under section 127(3) (c) of the Criminal Procedure Code. 5. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the judgment and order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, the petitioner-wife has filed revision application. 6. The learned advocate for the petitioner vehemently submitted that once the learned Additional City Sessions Judge arrived at a conclusion that he was not inclined to accept the contention of the husband that the wife and initiated the talk about divorce and that she had taken paper, engaged the advocate, fixed the fees, dictated the divorce deed and had read it and approved it, it cannot be said that the said divorce deed can be relied upon for holding that under section 127(3) (c) the petitioner was not entitled to have maintenance because she had voluntarily surrendered the right to maintenance. 7. Under section 127(3) (c) of the Code the Magistrate is empowered to cancel the order of maintenance passed under section 125 if he is satisfied (1) that the woman had obtained divorce from her husband and (2) she had voluntarily surrendered her right to maintenance after her divorce. In the present case the alleged divorce deed is produced on record. Looking to the tenor of the said deed it cannot be said that the wife had obtained divorce from the husband. In the present case the alleged divorce deed is produced on record. Looking to the tenor of the said deed it cannot be said that the wife had obtained divorce from the husband. It only provides that both the parties to the deed willingly and with free consent took the divorce from each other. 8. The learned advocate for opponent No. 1, however, submitted that in this case the stamp paper for divorce deed was purchased by the petitioner as it was in her name. In my opinion that finding of the learned Additional City Sessions Judge is contrary and, therefore, it cannot be said that stamp paper for divorce deed was purchased by the petitioner. As such the evidence on record clearly shows that at the time of execution of the alleged divorce deed no relatives of the petitioner were present. Even the advocate who is examined on behalf of opponent No. 1 had deposed that the wife was standing at a distance when the husband was giving instructions for drafting divorce deed. He had also admitted that opponent No. 1 contracted him for preparing the deed for divorce. He has stated that he had seen both (husband and wife) quarrelling and both of them were alone. No amount was paid by anybody in his presence to the petitioner. Now from this admission of the witness it is abundantly clear that the wife had not taken any part at the time of execution of the divorce deed. It is her husband who had obtained divorce from the petitioner even it' it is assumed that the a1l divorce deed is signed by the petitioner voluntarily because in this proceeding it would not be necessary for me to decide whether the said divorce deed is voluntarily and willingly signed by the petitioner. It is not alleged that the wife obtained divorce because she wanted to remarry. Once it is held that the petitioner wife has not obtained divorce from her husband then she is entitled to have maintenance and provisions of section 127(3) (c) would not he applicable. 9. In any case it cannot be said that there was any reason for the wife to surrender her right to maintenance under section 125 of the Code. It is clear that the wife had not engaged any advocate or had taken any legal advice. 9. In any case it cannot be said that there was any reason for the wife to surrender her right to maintenance under section 125 of the Code. It is clear that the wife had not engaged any advocate or had taken any legal advice. It is an admitted position that the husband has not paid any lump-sum amount for the maintenance of wife. It would, therefore, be difficult to gulp down the contention of the husband that the wife had willingly voluntarily surrendered her right to maintenance under section 125 of the Code. As such she would not he even knowing that she had any such right. 10. It would be worthwhile to make a reference to the decision of Supreme Court in Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fissali, reported in AIR. 1979 Supreme Court at page 362. While considering the provisions of section 127(3) (b) of the Code the Supreme Court has made pertinent observations which are reproduced as under : "The point must he clearly understood that the scheme of the complex of provisions in Chapter IX has a social purpose. Ill-used wives and desperate divorces shall not be driven to material and moral dereliction to seek sanctuary in the streets. This traumatic horror animates the amplitude of section 127. Where the husband, by customary payment at the time of divorce, has adequately provided for the divorce, a subsequent series of recurrent doles is contra-indicated and the husband liberated. This is the teleological interpretation, the sociological decoding of the text of section 127. The key note thought is adequacy of payment which will take reasonable care of her maintenance." The Supreme Court has further observed that the maintenance provisions should not be interpreted in such a way which would stultify the project and that the law is dynamic and its meaning cannot be pedantic but purposeful. 11. In this view of the matter the Revision Application is allowed. But considering the facts and circumstances of the case it is ordered that petitioner would be entitled to have maintenance at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month as awarded by the Metropolitan Magistrate only from 1st January, 1985 onwards. 11. In this view of the matter the Revision Application is allowed. But considering the facts and circumstances of the case it is ordered that petitioner would be entitled to have maintenance at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month as awarded by the Metropolitan Magistrate only from 1st January, 1985 onwards. But it is clarified that if any amount of maintenance is paid by the husband then he would not be entitled to have refund and the order passed by the learned Additional City Sessions Judge for refund of the amount of maintenance paid by the husband to the petitioner-wife is set aside. 12. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Petition allowed.