A. M. BHATTACHARJEE, AG. C. J. ( 1 ) THE suit giving rise to this appeal has been filed by the appellant-landlord for the eviction of the respondent-tenant from the suit-premises let out to the respondent under a written instrument for a period of one year fixed on three grounds, namely, (1) that the lease has expired by efflux of time, (2) that the respondent-tenant has committed default in payment of rent for two consecutive months and (3) that the respondent has unlawfully let out a portion of the floor on the top of the suit-premises. The learned District Judge has held against the plaintiff on all the three grounds and has dismissed the suit. Hence this appeal by the plaintiff-appellant. ( 2 ) AS to the letting out by the tenant without the consent of the landlord, the learned Judge has held that, firstly, there is no satisfactory evidence to prove such letting and that, secondly, the portion alleged to be let out by the tenant being admittedly not a part of the suit-tenancy, the same obviously cannot amount to sub-letting by the tenant of a portion of the suit-premises to furnish any ground of ejectment. Mr. Moitra, the learned counsel for the appellant, has not been able to draw our attention to anything on the record to warrant any interference with this finding. ( 3 ) AS to the second ground relating to the alleged default made by the tenant-respondent in payment of rent for two consecutive months, it must be noted that under the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act of 1956, default in payment of rent, in order to furnish a ground of ejectment, must be for four months or more. It is true that the terms of the written instrument of lease, vide Exhibit P-7, Clause 9 (9), provide that the tenant was liable to be evicted for default in payment of rent for two consecutive months. The learned District Judge has, however, held that there was no such default as alleged as the rent for the relevant period was duly tendered within proper time. The learned District Judge has, however, held that there was no such default as alleged as the rent for the relevant period was duly tendered within proper time. But the question whether there was such a default for two months can be material only if it is held that such a written agreement, providing for eviction on two months' default only, can outweigh the statutory provisions of the Gangtok Eviction Act requiring default for not less than four months to warrant eviction. In fact, the question whether the provisions of the written agreement, providing for eviction on grounds other than those specified in the Gangtok Eviction Act, can at all operate in spite of and notwithstanding the said Act providing for eviction on certain grounds only, would also be very material in deciding the merits of the first ground also where the material question for our consideration would be whether efflux of the time fixed is still available as a ground for eviction when the relevant statute does not provide therefor. It may be noted that Mr. Moitra has fairly conceded that if the written agreement between the parties, providing for eviction on grounds other than those specified in the Gangtok Eviction Act, cannot legally operate in view of the said Act, the question of default in payment of rent for two months only, when the statute required default for not less than four months, can no longer be relevant. So to the first ground. ( 4 ) UNDER the general law relating to landlord and tenant, as contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a tenant can be sued for ejectment at any time after the contractual tenancy stands determined in one of the modes provided in Section 111 of the Act, e. g. , by efflux of the period fixed or by notice to quit etc. , and the tenant thus ceases to be tenant. But from the time of the First World War and particularly during and immediately after the Second World War when accommodation became very scarce, it was found necessary to give special protections, to the tenants against enhancement of rent and also eviction in supersession of the ordinary law of landlord and tenant as contained in the Transfer of Property Act. But from the time of the First World War and particularly during and immediately after the Second World War when accommodation became very scarce, it was found necessary to give special protections, to the tenants against enhancement of rent and also eviction in supersession of the ordinary law of landlord and tenant as contained in the Transfer of Property Act. Though, as Sir Henry Maine observed, "the movement of progressive societies had been" (at least up to the time when Maine wrote his "ancient Law") "from status to contract", but as pointed out by Lord Simonds in Johnson v. Merston (1978 - 8 All England Reporter 37), since the days of Maine, the movement of the progressive societies in various fields has been almost the reverse, that is, from contract to status. As in the field of master and servant, the legislative tendency during the last several decades in matters relating to landlord and tenant is also obviously a march from contract to status and the tenants have now been clothed with some status not terminable save on specified grounds, very much unlike as it was before under the earlier laws when the relationship being mainly, if not solely, contractual, was terminable according to the terms of the contract. A bare perusal of those legislations would leave no manner of doubt that the tenants have now acquired a very much secured status which cannot be put an end to except by a judicial order passed on certain specific grounds provided under the relevant enactments and does not come to an end in any of the ways mentioned in Section 111, Transfer of Property Act, like efflux of time, or by service of a notice to quit. All these enactments have defined a "tenant" to include a person continuing in possession even after the determination of his tenancy, until a decree or order for eviction is passed by a proper Court or tribunal. In other words, extra-judicial termination or determination of tenancy would not, by itself, divest a tenant of his status until a judicial order of eviction is passed. In other words, extra-judicial termination or determination of tenancy would not, by itself, divest a tenant of his status until a judicial order of eviction is passed. And on this point, all the relevant enactments operating in the different States speak almost in unison and reference, by way of example, may be made to Section 2 (h) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, that being the enactments operating in the nearest State, which provides that "tenant" means "any person by whom or on whose account or behalf, the rent of any premises is, or but for a special contract would be, payable, and includes any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy, but shall not include any person against whom any decree or order of eviction has been passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction. " Reference, for another example, may be made to the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, that being the enactment operating in the capital of this country, Section 2 (1) whereof also provides that a tenant includes any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy. . . . but does not include. . . any person against whom an order or decree for eviction has been made. . . . ". Reference to the other State Acts need not be multiplied as it would suffice to note that the seven-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yasodai Ammal, AIR 1979 SC 1745, while considering the various State Acts relating to premises-tenancy, also noted that such definition of tenant is "as in other State Acts", and observed Cat p. 1748) that "the jural relationship of lessor and lessee will come to an end on the passing of an order or decree for eviction" and that"until then, under the extended definition of the word 'tenant' under the various Rent Acts, the tenant continues to be a tenant even though the contractual tenancy has been determined. . . ". One may profitably refer to the observations of Bachawat, J. , in the Special Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Krishna Prosad v. Sarajubala, AIR 1961 Cal 505 at p. 507 as hereunder : -"the Rent Control and the Tenancy Acts create a special world of their own. They speak of life after death. . . ". One may profitably refer to the observations of Bachawat, J. , in the Special Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Krishna Prosad v. Sarajubala, AIR 1961 Cal 505 at p. 507 as hereunder : -"the Rent Control and the Tenancy Acts create a special world of their own. They speak of life after death. The statutory tenancy arises phoenix-like out of the ashes of the contractual tenancy. The contractual tenant may die but the statutory tenant may live long thereafter. The statutory tenant is an ex-tenant and yet he is a tenant". These observations have been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Damadilal v. Parashram, AIR 1976 SC 2229 at 2236. ( 5 ) UNDER these various State Acts, many of which have been considered in some details by the Supreme Court in the seven-Judges Bench decision in V. Dhanpal Chattiar AIR 1979 SC 1745 (supra), the position, as pointed out by the Supreme Court therein, appears to be that under such expanded definition of "tenant" as in those State Acts, a tenant continues to be a tenant in spite of the termination of his tenancy until a decree or order for eviction is passed against him in due course of law, and, as under those State Acts such a decree or order can be passed only on the grounds specified in those Acts, the position further appears to be that termination of tenancy, in any manner whatsoever, would not, by itself, entitle the landlord to sue the tenant for ejectment, unless the former can make out a case for a decree or order on one or more of the grounds specified in those Acts. And, if that be the position, then a mere efflux of the period fixed for the tenancy, which would only bring about a termination of the contractual tenancy, would not, by itself, entitle a landlord to evict a tenant in a case governed by any of these Rent Restriction Acts. And, if that be the position, then a mere efflux of the period fixed for the tenancy, which would only bring about a termination of the contractual tenancy, would not, by itself, entitle a landlord to evict a tenant in a case governed by any of these Rent Restriction Acts. This position appears to have been accepted by the Federal Court in Kai Khurshroo Bezonjee CAPadia v. Bai Jerbai Hirjibhoy Warden, AIR 1949 FC 124, where Mukherjea J. speaking for the majority, observed that "in cases of tenancies relating to dwelling house to which the Rent Restriction Acts apply, the tenant may enjoy a statutory immunity from eviction even after the lease has expired" and that "the landlord cannot eject him except on specified grounds mentioned in the Acts themselves". To the same effect is the observation of the Supreme Court in Sardari Lal v. Pritam Singh, AIR 1978 SC 1518 where it has been observed as hereunder : -"the lessor, on the introduction of the Rent Restriction Act, could not seek to evict the lessee on the only ground that the lease determined by efflux of time. The lessee was clothed with the protection of Rent Restriction Act. "the observation in Moti Lal v. Pooran Chand, AIR 1962 Raj 100, on which reliance has been placed by the learned District Judge, is also to the same effect. ( 6 ) THE net result is that once the provisions of the Rent Restriction Acts are available to a tenant, he begins to enjoy some sort of non-ejectability and such status of irremovability cannot be got rid of by the landlord except on grounds specified in those Acts and, therefore, even if the tenant agreed to a tenancy for a fixed period only, automatically terminable on the expiry of the period so fixed, no Court would be competent to decree his eviction on the ground of such expiration alone, unless such expiration of the period fixed is also one of the grounds specified in the relevant enactment. ( 7 ) AT some stage during the argument and also thereafter, I have considered the question that, notwithstanding the position in law as stated above, namely, that a tenant, even after termination of his tenancy, becomes a statutory tenant under the Rent Restriction Acts, and as such becomes further entitled to all the benefits under those Acts including that of non-ejectability except on the grounds specified in those Acts, whether or not the tenant, when he has voluntarily agreed to a tenancy for a fixed period only, shall be deemed, by such agreement, to have waived all the benefits available to him under the relevant Act and whether or not the Court can or should give effect to such an agreement. If the relevant enactment contains any non-obstante clause to the effect "notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law or in any contract", as contained in Section 14 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, or Section 13 (1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, or some such outweighing provisions over-throwing all contracts as in the various State Acts, then there would obviously be an end to all such contracts. But otherwise, I thought that the question may require some consideration. ( 8 ) IN Lachoomal v. Radhey Shyam AIR 1971 SC 2213, a two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the question as to whether it was open to a landlord to waive the benefit of a provision enacted for the benefit of the landlord under the Rent Control Act and, while holding that the landlord could do so, the Supreme Court observed that if a provision is enacted for the benefit of a person or class of persons, there was nothing which precludes him or them from contracting to waive the benefit, provided no question of public policy was involved. But a later two-Judge bench decision of the Supreme Court in Muralidhar v. State of U. P. , AIR 1974 SC 1924 has, however, while considering the provisions of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, has held (at 1929-1930), after referring to the earlier decision in Lachoomal v. Radhey Shyam (supra), that the provisions enacted therein for the benefit of the tenants are not to be viewed merely as provisions enacted just for the benefit of one class or one section of the community, but "to protect a weaker section of the community with a view to ultimately protecting the interest of the community in general by creating equality of bargaining power" and that "although the section is primarily intended for the protection of tenants only, that protection is based on public policy". It has accordingly been held that such benefits conferred on grounds of public policy could not be waived by the tenants and, therefore, notwithstanding expiration of the lease in that case, the tenant could not be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of the Rent Control and Eviction Act. ( 9 ) IT is true that, as noted by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid seven-Judge Bench decision in V. Dhanpal Chattiar (AIR 1979 SC 1745 at p. 1752) (supra), there may be "many landlords who are also, compared to some big tenants, sometimes weaker section of the society". A helpless widow or a minor may have been compelled to let out with great difficulty a portion of the dwelling house to meet some sudden financial stringency and may have let out the same only for a short fixed period to tide over the financial difficulty and the law would really be operating very harshly if the law is that notwithstanding the free and voluntary agreement of the landlord and the tenant to a tenancy only for some short and fixed period, the tenant, who may be financially or otherwise a big gun and not at all weaker compared to the landlord, cannot be ejected except on one more of the grounds specified in the Rent Control Act. But even then, as generally the "have" are in fact stronger than the "have-nots", the house-owners, by and large, are to be regarded to belong to the stronger section compared to the tenants who are to be regarded to belong to the weaker section. And as in the present structure of our society, the house-owners are small in number compared to the large number of persons who do not own houses and have got to live in rented accommodations, provisions enacted for the benefit of the tenants are to be regarded to be in the interest of the community in general and, therefore, as embodiment of public policy. That is what one can deduce from the observation of Mathew, J. , in Murlidhar v. State of U. P. (AIR 1974 SC 1924) (supra) and we would have, therefore, to be governed by the proposition that provisions enacted for the benefit of tenants embody principles of public policy and cannot be waived by the tenants. That the legislative schemes to give protections to tenants are based on public policy would also appear from the observations of the Supreme Court in Deccan Merchant Co-operative v. Dalichand AIR 1969 SC 1320 at p. 1328 to the effect that "the scheme of the various Rent Acts and the public policy underlying them are clear; the policy is to give protection to the tenants". These observations have been quoted with approval by a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in a rather recent decision in Natraj Studios v. Navrang Studios, AIR 1981 SC 537 at p. 543 and it has been observed further that "public policy requires that contracts to the contrary which nullify the rights conferred on tenants by the Act cannot be permitted. " ( 10 ) IT has, however, been argued on behalf of the appellant-landlord that the law as stated hereinabove, namely, that a tenant, even after the expiration of his tenancy, can not be evicted except on one or more of the grounds specified in the Rent Control Acts, has really emanated from the expanded definition of "tenant" in those Acts, which expressly includes a person continuing in possession even after the termination of his tenancy and also from the mandatory provisions, armed with suitable non-obstante clauses, prohibiting eviction of any tenant except on the grounds specified in those Acts. But the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956, does not contain any such expanded definition, or for the matter of that, any definition of the word "tenant", nor does any express non obstante provision find place in the Gangtok Act to provide that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law or any contract, no such tenant shall be evicted except on grounds specified in the Act. And it has accordingly been urged that the absence of such expanded definition and of the non obstante clause should make all the difference and, therefore, under the Gangtok Act a contractual tenant would not be entitled to any further protection after the termination of his contractual tenancy, which are available to statutory tenants under the other State Acts. Let us, therefore, consider the relevant provisions of the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956, to ascertain whether no protection under the Act was meant to be available to a tenant whose contractual tenancy has stood determined. ( 11 ) THE Gangtok Act was enacted, as declared in the Preamble thereto, to control eviction of tenants and Section 4 of the Act runs as hereunder : -"a landlord may not ordinarily eject any tenant. When however, the whole or part of the premises are required for the bona fide occupation of the landlord or his dependents, or for thorough overhauling (excluding additions and alterations) or, whether the rent in arrears amount to four months' rent or more, the land-lord may evict the tenant on filing a suit for ejectment in the Court of the Chief Magistrate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 12 ) AS pointed out by this Court in a series of decisions, e. g. , Paul Sangay v. Mahabir Prasad, AIR 1980 Sikk 13, Naurang Lal v. Basant Kumari, AIR 1981 Sikk 22, Jiwan Ram v. Topgyal Wangchuk AIR 1985 Sikkim 10, Phup Tshering v. Gauri Shanker 1984 (2) Ren CJ 150, the Preamble of the Act shows that the avowed and the proclaimed object of the Act is to control eviction of tenants and that the language of Section 4 of the Act opening with a declaration that "a landlord may not ordinarily eject any tenant", and providing further that "however", when anyone of the three grounds mentioned therein is made out, "the landlord may evict the tenant on filing a suit", would inevitably give rise to the impression that the law-making authority regarded continuity of tenancies as the ordinary and the desired state of affair and eviction of tenant as something extraordinary, or, to put in other words, non-ejectment of tenants to be the rule, while ejectment to be the exception. ( 13 ) THE relevant provisions also make it clear that a tenant would continue to be a tenant until a judicial order is passed in a civil suit on one or more of the grounds specified in the Act and that, until such order, the tenancy continues in law. As is well-known, in the case of a contractual tenancy not governed by the Rent Control Acts, but governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act only, a tenant could never be sued for ejectment and who could be and was in fact sued was an ex-tenant, i. e. , whose contractual tenancy has stood determined by the efflux of time, by a notice to quit or the like. The Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, by providing for a suit against the tenant, has made it quite clear that the tenancy is to continue until determined by a judicial order in a suit and that pre-suit termination of tenancy is of no relevance. The Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, by providing for a suit against the tenant, has made it quite clear that the tenancy is to continue until determined by a judicial order in a suit and that pre-suit termination of tenancy is of no relevance. That being so, under the Gangtok Eviction Act also, a tenant would be enjoying all the benefits and protections of the Act, in spite of the termination of his contractual tenancy, and the position is similar to that under the other State Acts, even though the Gangtok Act, unlike the other State Acts, has not expressly defined a tenant to include a person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy. ( 14 ) NOR the absence of any express non-obstante clause, as exists in the other State Acts, in Section 4 of the Gangtok Act, would make any difference in the legal position. The object of a non obstante clause may very well be achieved, not necessarily by a negative prohibition only, by a positive mandate also. Once Section 4 has declared that ordinarily a tenant shall not be ejected and has specified some specific grounds for which only a tenant can be evicted, the position would be that the tenant shall not be ejected under any other circumstances. The net result, therefore, is that under the Gangtok Act also a tenant continues to be a tenant until a judicial order for his eviction is passed in a suit, and that such a suit can be filed only on one or the other ground specified in the Act and that any extra-judicial termination of his tenancy prior to such suit would be of no consequence. ( 15 ) UNDER the general law, as contained in Section 111 (h), Transfer of Property Act, a contractual tenancy terminates by a notice to quit also. If such a termination of tenancy swould have still been available as a ground of eviction of a tenant, there would have been no point in declaring in Section 4 that a landlord may not ordinarily eject a tenant but may evict him only by filing a suit on one or the other ground mentioned therein. If such a termination of tenancy swould have still been available as a ground of eviction of a tenant, there would have been no point in declaring in Section 4 that a landlord may not ordinarily eject a tenant but may evict him only by filing a suit on one or the other ground mentioned therein. And if such extra-judicial termination of tenancy by a notice to quit as provided in Section 111 (h), Transfer of Property Act is of no avail to a landlord in evicting a tenant, an extra-judicial termination of tenancy by efflux of time as provided in Section 111 (a), Transfer of Property Act should also be of no avail. Such a construction of the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956, would make the law uniform with what it is under the other State Acts and, may it be noted that, in the seven-Judge Bench decision in V. Dhanpal Chettiar (AIR 1979 SC 1745 at p. 1749) (supra), the Supreme Court has observed that "in all the States law should be uniform". As the celebrated hymn of Rig-Veda says, "sangachchhadhang Sangbadaddham" - let us move as one, speak as one. ( 16 ) THE claim of the plaintiff-appellant for the eviction of the defendant-respondent on the ground of expiration of the period fixed for the lease must, therefore, fail. And, as already noted before, if under the law, a bilateral agreement between the landlord and the tenant providing for any ground of ejectment other than those provided in the Rent Control Act, cannot effectively operate, the claim for ejectment on the ground of two months' default, as provided in the agreement between the parties, must also fail, when the relevant Act requires a default of not less than four months. ( 17 ) THE appeal accordingly fails and is, therefore, dismissed, but with no order as to cost in this appeal. RIPUSUDAN DAYAL, J. : - I agree. Appeal dismissed. --- *** --- .