H. C. Goel, J. ( 1 ) SHRI Sagar Mal Gupta proprietor M/s. S. M. Guptaconstruction Company filed a complaint against Shri H. K. S. Malik and twoothers accused under Sections 406/420/34 Indian Penal Code It was alleged that Shri H. K. S. Malik, accused No. 1, the present petitioner, had represented to the complainant that the three accused persons were the joint owners of plot No. C-5. Rana Pratap Bagh, Delhi, and that it was a commercial plot. They proposedto build anair-conditioned commercial complex consisting of a basement,ground floor, first floor and a mezzanine floor. They had got a sanctionedplan for the same and they would complete construction on the plot withinfour months. On the said representation to the complainant an agreementin writing was entered into between the parties on 27/09/1982. Thecomplainant undertook to book shops and offices for sale in the basement,the ground floor and the first floor of the building at the minimum rates asspecified in the agreement. The further allegations of the complainant arethat he incurred expenditure on giving publicity by advertisement in Hindiand English dailies for sale. On the demand of the accused persons thecomplainant paid a sum of Rs. 60,000. 00 by a demand draft dated 24/09/1982 to the firm M/s. Ch, Harkishan Lal Malik and Company, apartnership firm as constituted by the three accused. The complainantagain paid a sum of Rs. 40. 000. 00 bydemand draft dated 27/09/1982to the accused. According to the complainant the accused had represented tohim that the plot in question was a commercial plot and they had anapproved site plan duly sanctioned for the construction of an air-conditionedcommercial complex in the lay-out plan of the Municipal Corporation ofdelhi and that the construction of the building was in progrees. The complainant received a number of enquiries from public at large for bookingshops/offices in the proposed building, but he could not do that as theaccused persons failed to supply a copy of the alleged sanctioned site planof the proposed air-conditioned market despite the complainant s repeatedrequests in that behalf. The complainant felt suspicious about the representation as made by the accused persons. The complainant felt suspicious about the representation as made by the accused persons. On enquiries from the Delhimunicipal Corporation he found that the accused had only applied for asanction of the plan which had not been sanctioned till then and furtherthat the plot in question was a residential-cum-commercial plot and shopswere permissible to be built only on the ground floor of the plot and thebasement could be Used only for storage purposes and the entire first floorwas meant for residential purposes and there was no application for amezzanine floor or for storage purples. Accarding to the complainant theaccused persons had thus cheated him of a sum of Rs, one lac by thesaid false representations besides the expenditure incurred by him on publicity. The complainant gave his own statement in the preliminary enquiryheld by the learned Magistrate and proved on record the original agreementex. PW1/a as entered into between the parties. Shri D. R. Jain, Metropolitan Magistrate by his impugned order dated 6/09/1983 heldthat there was sufficient ground to proceed against all the three accusedpersons under Sees. 406/420/34 Indian Penal Code All the three accused were accordinglysummoned by him. The accused persons duly put in appearance beforethe learned Magistrate on 3/10/1983 and joined the enquiry proceedings being conducted by the learned Magistrate. In the pre-chargeevidence the complainant gave his further statement and examined twoother witnesses, one of whom was duly cross-examined on behalf of theaccused persons. Shri H K S. Malik, one of the three accused personsthereafter filed this petition under Sec. 482 Cr. P C. before this Court on 5/12/1984 praying that the order of summoning dated 6/09/1983 be quashed and the proceedings against him be ordered to be dropped. ( 2 ) I have heard the petitioner in person who is an advocate byprofession, and Mr. ON. Vohra, learned counsel for the respondents Itis a settled law that the High Court in the exercise of its inherent powersunder Sec. 482 Criminal Procedure Code. shall not ordinarily interfere in interlocutoryorders, pure and simple, and pirticulirly orders at the preliminary stage of an enquiry or a trial The High court may interfere in the case of an interlocutory and preliminary order only if glaring injustice stares the case in theface. Such case? would be few and far between. The High Court mustexercise its inherent powers very sparingly. Such case? would be few and far between. The High Court mustexercise its inherent powers very sparingly. So was observed by thesupreme Court in the ca e Raj Kapoor and others v. State (Delhi Administration) and others, AIR 1980 SC 258 . It was further observed that the onesituation in which it may call for interfeence would be when a criminalproceeding is initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction. The Supreme Court in a recent case Khacheru Singh v. State of U. P. andothers. ( AIR 1982 SC 784 (2) granted Special Leave Petition against the orderof Additional Sessions Judge, Meerut which was affirmed by the Highcourt of Allahabad quashing the order of summoning of an accused personby a Judicial Magistrate and restored the order of the Magistratesummoning the accused persons. The Supreme Court in its short orderobserved that all that the Magistrate had done was to issue a summons toone of the respo. idents and if, eventually, the learned Magistrate comes tothe conclu ion that no offence was made out against the respondent, it willbe open to him to discharge or acquit him, as the case may be. It was furtherobserved that it was difficult to appreciate why the order issuing "summons"to the accused should be quashed. This judgment cleaily shows that anorder of summoning a parson as an accused in a case is normally not to beinterfered with by the High Court inexercise of its inherent jurisdictionunless there are very compelling reasons to do so, as already indicated byme above. Keeping this legal position in view I see no ground for interference in the impugned order of the learned Magistrate. The complainantmade a detailed statement on oath before the learned Magistrate reiteratingbis aforesaid allegations in the complaint. The agreement Ex. Public Witness 1/astates that the accused-builders had represented to the complainant thatthe plot was a commercial plot. It further recites that a sum of Rs. onelac in all was duly paid by the complainant to the accused persons bymeans of the said two drafts. The agreement Ex. Public Witness 1/astates that the accused-builders had represented to the complainant thatthe plot was a commercial plot. It further recites that a sum of Rs. onelac in all was duly paid by the complainant to the accused persons bymeans of the said two drafts. The complainant in his statement as Public Witness lstated that later he found that accused No. 1 had filed an affidavit dated 2/03/1983 before the Municipal Corporation of Delhi wherein hehimself stated that one property dealer had contacted them for letting outshops on the ground floor of the plot; that a property broker has releasedan advertisement without their consent showing the building as commercial complex which is originally commercial-cum-residential in the landuse. The complainant further stared in his statement as Public Witness 1 that onenquiries from the Municipal authorities he found that the plot was notrecorded in the municipal records as meant entirely for commercial purposes. In the agreement in question, a copy of which is Ex. Public Witness 1/a, the accusedpersons clearly stated that the plot in question was a commercial plot. Thusthe evidence as adduced by the petitioner also shows that the plot was infact commercial-cum-residential and not a wholly commercial plot. Thereis also the evidence of the complainant that the accused had represented tohim that they had an approved site plan duly sanctioned for air-conditionedcommercial complex in the lay out plan of the Municipal Corporation ofdelhi relating to the plot in question, which representation of the accusedwas found to be incorrect. There was thus sufficient material on the basisof which the learned Magistrate could form a i opinion that there was aground for summoning the petitioner as an accused for the offence punishable under Sec 420 Indian Penal Code It was submitted by the p;tition r that the complainant did not adduce any evidence nor was there any allegation of thepetitioner disclosing an offence punishable under See. 406 Indian Penal Code and that thepetitioner having been summoned f)r the offence punishable under Sec. 406ipc also the whole order summoning the petitioner for the offence undersec. 420/34 Indian Penal Code was bad in law. I am unable to see any merit in thissubmission. 406 Indian Penal Code and that thepetitioner having been summoned f)r the offence punishable under Sec. 406ipc also the whole order summoning the petitioner for the offence undersec. 420/34 Indian Penal Code was bad in law. I am unable to see any merit in thissubmission. The mere fact that no case for summoning the petitioner forthe offence under Sec. 406/34 Indian Penal Code was made out does not mean that theorder of the learned Magistrate summoning the petitioner for the offenceunder Sec. 420/34 Indian Penal Code also becomes bad thereby. The petitioner alsosubmitted that as per the bye-laws of the Municipal Corporation of. Delhimore than 66% of the total built-up area of a building was permissible to beused for commercial purpose, then such a building is considered as a commercial building. It was submilted that more than 66% or the area to beconstructed on the plot could be used for commercial purposes and a smallportion of the constructed area only was bound to be used for residentialpurposes as the plot was commercial-cum-residential plot, it was underthese circumstances that the petitioner s firm had represented the plot to bea commercial plot, meaning thereby that there was no dishonest intention ontheir part in describing the plot as a commercial plot. The petitioner wasunable to refer me to any bye-law in the bye-laws of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi in that regard. Even otherwise if the plot was acommercial-cum-residential and not wholly commercial the complainantcould be so told and ordinarily speaking the same should have been described as a commercial-cum-residential plot in the agreement and as the plotwas represented to be a commercial plot it could certainly lead the complainant to believe that the plot in question was a wholly commercial plot. There is no ground for interference. The petition is accordingly dismissed. Theparties are directed to appear before the trial court on 22/08/1985.