Judgment :- 1. The appellant, a teacher in a Government High School, "in a heat of passion", had stabbed his wife to death and on this finding he is convicted for the offence under S.302 IPC. and sentenced to imprisonment for life. His plea that the acts, if at all proved, fall under Exception (1) to S.300 IPC. has not been found favour with the trial judge. 2. A profile of the prosecution story is this: The appellant and his wife Pennamma and their two children were residing in their house in Aymanam Village, Kottayam Taluk. There used to arise skirmishes between the spouses and this seems to have been a common occurrence in the house. On 10-4-1982, the appellant came back to his house from outside at about 9.15 p. m. and asked his wife to serve him food. This received only a cool response from his wife, who remained in her cot and told her husband that food is ready on the dining table and if he wants, he can eat it. The appellant then insisted on the food being served to him by his wife herself and if not obeyed, he threatened that the food kept on the table would be flung off to the court-yard. Upon this, his wife curtly replied "you may do as you like". This was followed by the exchange of some words as between them, but the wife was remaining in her bed without getting up. The appellant finally told her, "let me see who is the master of this house, you or P. So saying, he took out a knife from beneath the pillow of a bed and stabbed her on the back as she was lying on a cot inside the bed room. She stood up with that injury and staggered into the next room crying out that she is being stabbed. The appellant came out of the house and told some of the neighbours who reached there by then, that it was he who had stabbed her and that nobody need interfere in that matter. However, pw. !, one of the neighbours, managed to scale over the compound wall and reach the room, wherein the deceased was found lying bleeding. From there she was removed to the Medical College, Kottayam and the Doctor who examined her, pronounced her dead. 3. However, pw. !, one of the neighbours, managed to scale over the compound wall and reach the room, wherein the deceased was found lying bleeding. From there she was removed to the Medical College, Kottayam and the Doctor who examined her, pronounced her dead. 3. On 11-4-1982 at 8 a. m., Pw 1 went to the West Police Station, Kottayam which is situated about 5 Kilometres away from the place of occurrence, and lodged the First Information Statement.- Major part of the investigation was conducted by the Sub Inspector of Police of that Station The accused was arrested by the Circle Inspector of Police on 21-4-1982 and he laid the charge-sheet after completing the investigation. 4. When the learned Sessions Judge had examined the accused under S.313 of the Crl.P.C., he had denied the incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution evidence. At the end, the accused made a statement which can be summarised as follows:-When he reached home, his wife had snubbingly asked him as to why he had not bought a skirt which he had promised to buy and when he offered to buy the same on the next day, his wife had insisted on getting it on that day itself. His wife had then ridiculed him saying that such a husband is a useless one for her as he is incapable of buying even a skirt for her and that he should remember that it was her father who had managed to secure the present job for the accused. Further statement of the accused shows that the deceased had asked him, "Was not your mother a vagabond and living like a prostitute"? These words of his wife had caused considerable mental anguish to him and these words had provoked him to such an extent that he forgot as to what happened thereafter. This statement of the accused shows that he has adopted a twin defence strategy. The first is that he had denied the act alleged against him and the second is that he claims mitigation as per Exception (1) to S.300 IPC. 5. As the accused had not admitted that the deceased had sustained the injury at his hand, the prosecution has the duty to prove the act alleged against the accused. 6. The first is that he had denied the act alleged against him and the second is that he claims mitigation as per Exception (1) to S.300 IPC. 5. As the accused had not admitted that the deceased had sustained the injury at his hand, the prosecution has the duty to prove the act alleged against the accused. 6. The learned Sessions Judge has relied on the testimonies of pws.1 to 3 and S and came to the conclusion that the prosecution has proved beyond doubt that it was the accused who had inflicted the stab injury on the back of the deceased. Although the learned Sessions Judge did not agree that the acts of the accused would come within the purview of Exception (1) to S.300 IPC., be has nevertheless observed that the evidence in this case would show that the "act was done in a heat of passion". In that view of the matter, the learned Sessions Judge had awarded only the lesser sentence under S.302 of the IPC. 7. pw.1 has no claim that he has seen the occurrence as such. According to him, he heard the sound of a cry from the deceased that "I am being stabbed" and when he went in front of that house, he saw the accused standing there and the accused had told him that he himself had stabbed and that he will not allow any outsider to interfere in that matter. The house where the accused and the deceased lived together has a drawing room in the middle and a bed room on the west and a dining room on the east and there is a ventilator on the eastern wall of the dining room. pw. 2 and pw. 3 say that they saw the occurrence by peeping through the eastern ventilator. Both these witnesses have narrated the incident which they claim to have seen through the ventilator. They speak about the request made by the accused to his wife for serving him food and also about the threat of the accused that the food will be thrown out into the court-yard, if she does not serve the food to him. The witnesses say that after some time the accused came back to the room where Pennamma was lying and took out a knife from beneath the pillow and inflicted a stab injury on the deceased. The witnesses say that after some time the accused came back to the room where Pennamma was lying and took out a knife from beneath the pillow and inflicted a stab injury on the deceased. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has contended that the version of pws. 2 and 3 should not be believed because it is rather impossible for any person to witness the incident by peeping through the ventilator. A look at the plan, Ext. P6, prepared by the Village Officer would indicate that there is a ventilator on the eastern wall of the eastern room of the house whereas the room wherein the incident had happened is situated on the western side of the building and that there is a drawing room separating the eastern and western rooms. The plan does not indicate the height at which the ventilator is situated from the ground. Even pw. 10, who had prepared Ext. P8 observation mahazar has not mentioned about the said height of the ventilator. There is a very strong contention from the side of the defence that it is not possible for anyone to see anything taking place in the western room by peeping through the ventilator, In fact, the accused had examined pw. 1, a Photographer in an attempt to show that there is no visibility from outside the ventilator. In the absence of evidence showing the height of the ventilator it is rather difficult for the court to conclude definitely that a person could have witnessed the occurrence through the said ventilator. Even assuming that the claim of pws. 2 and 3 that they, have seen that occurrence cannot be safely acted upon, we find sufficient materials on record to prove that it was the accused who bad inflicted the fatal stab on the back of the deceased. 8. pw. 5 is the eldest son of the accused and the deceased. Though he bad not seen the act of stabbing, he has spoken about certain circumstances which are highly incriminating against the accused. The accused and his wife and their two children are the only inmates of this house. We can safely rule out the possibility of those children inflicting a stab injury on their mother. The only person other than the deceased who was available in that house when the deceased sustained this fatal stab on her back is the accused himself. The accused and his wife and their two children are the only inmates of this house. We can safely rule out the possibility of those children inflicting a stab injury on their mother. The only person other than the deceased who was available in that house when the deceased sustained this fatal stab on her back is the accused himself. The description of the wound is given in Ext. P4, the post mortem certificate prepared by pw. 7, the Asst. Professor of Forensic Medicine in the Medical College, Kottayam who conducted the autopsy during the noon time on 11-4-1982. It is an incised penetrating wound on the left side of the back of the chest and situated 7 cros. below the root of the neck and it had entered the left chest cavity through the 5th intercostal space, pierced the upper back portion of middle lobe of left lung and terminated in the wall of the left ventricle of the heart. The general direction of the wound was forwards, downwards and to the right for a total minimum depth of 10 cros. The possibility of sustaining such an injury in a suicidal attempt can safely be ruled out even on reading the description of that wound. The only other person available in that house capable to do this act is the accused himself. Over and above that, the testimony of pw.1 shows that the accused had made an admission that it was the accused himself who had stabbed the deceased and nobody else need show any concern in it. This is in the nature of an extra judicial confession. This version of pw.1 is corroborated by his earlier statement in Ext. P1. Even the learned counsel for the appellant has not endeavoured much to grope for any material or circumstances to doubt the truth of the version spoken to by pw. 1. 9. From the aforesaid circumstances and evidence, it is clear that the fatal injury on the deceased had been inflicted by the accused in this case and none else. 10. The main line of argument adopted by the learned counsel in this appeal is that the act of the accused falls under Exception (1) to S.300 of the IPC. and hence, at the worst, he is liable to be convicted only under S.304 (Part II) of the IPC. 10. The main line of argument adopted by the learned counsel in this appeal is that the act of the accused falls under Exception (1) to S.300 of the IPC. and hence, at the worst, he is liable to be convicted only under S.304 (Part II) of the IPC. He has contended that the accused had not designed or intended even to assault his wife when the accused came home during night and that the learned Sessions Judge himself has found that "the act was done in a beat of passion". According to the learned counsel, the version of the accused that his wife bad told him at his face that "he is an impecunious man and his mother is a vagabond and prostitute" can be believed to be the true version of the words burled by the deceased. 11. There can be no doubt that the deceased would have uttered some words which would have provoked the accused, because the prosecution evidence itself would suggest that when the accused returned home in that evening he only asked his wife to serve food for him. Apparently, there is nothing to suggest that the accused came home nurturing a thirst for the blood of his wife. Though the prosecution made an attempt to show that bad blood existed between the accused and his wife on previous occasions, the prosecution has failed to prove that allegation and even the learned Sessions judge has refused to believe that the accused did entertain such a design beforehand. The conduct of the accused soon after the act of stabbing, telling others that he had stabbed his wife and that no one else need be concerned about it, would indicate that he was not keeping his composure. pw. 3 has admitted in cross-examination that the conversation between the accused and the deceased was in a strident voice and that it took about 15 minutes time. If so, pw. 3 bad not quoted all what had transpired between the accused and the deceased. When pw. 2 was cross-examined he had admitted that the deceased had told her husband that it was her father who had secured the present job for the accused when he lost it first. pw. 2 has not quoted these words in the examination-in-chief. That means that atleast one provocative sentence uttered by the deceased to the accused had been first withheld by pw. pw. 2 has not quoted these words in the examination-in-chief. That means that atleast one provocative sentence uttered by the deceased to the accused had been first withheld by pw. 2. That had to be ferreted out in cross-examination. It persuades us to believe that more words would have been uttered by her than what pw. 2 and pw. 3 have quoted in their testimonies. In this context, it is worthwhile to consider that pw. 5, whose testimony is relied on by the learned Sessions Judge, has said in cross-examination that his mother had burled epithets against his father. One such sentence quoted by that boy is this:- "Is not your mother walking around the streets like a vagabond". This evidence of pw. 5, though elicited only cross-examination, cannot be jettisoned by the prosecution. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that pw. 5, would not have been able to speak about the more scurrilous imputation against the mother of the accused that she is a "whore" or a prostitute, because a boy aged 10 as pw 5 is, would not have been able to comprehend the meaning or content of that imputation. We find force in the above contention of the learned counsel. 12. While applying Exception (1) to S.300 IPC., the courts will have to consider the evidence in three stages. In the first stage, the court must be satisfied as to what are the words or imputations or acts of the deceased which, according to the accused, aroused the provocation. It has now become well neigh settled that even words or gestures by the deceased in certain circumstances can stir up that kind of provocation in the mind of the offender which can upset his mental composure. It is to be borne in mind in this context, that the burden of establishing facts to bring the case within the Exception is on the accused and the court will initially presume their absence. But this burden on the accused is not equated with the degree of burden cast on the prosecution to prove its case. The burden on the accused would stand discharged, if he succeeds in showing by preponderance of probabilities that the deceased would have hurled the imputations or invectives In that realm it is open to the accused to bring out those facts even from the prosecution evidence itself. The burden on the accused would stand discharged, if he succeeds in showing by preponderance of probabilities that the deceased would have hurled the imputations or invectives In that realm it is open to the accused to bring out those facts even from the prosecution evidence itself. In the second stage, the courts should judge whether those imputations or epithets or invectives are sufficiently grave enough as to suddenly cause a derangement of the mental equanimity of another person. But the standard to be adopted in this respect is not as to how a short tempered person, or one excitable at flippant causes or a hyper-sensitive or a pugnacious individual would get provoked, but as to how a reasonable man with normal senses belonging to the class to which the accused belongs, gets provoked. The makers of the Penal Code were careful enough in adding an Explanation to that Exception which reads: "Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact", Facts and circumstances will vary in different cases and the temperamental dispositions of the persons involved would also be at great variance in different episodes. Anger is a passion to which good men and bad men are both subject and such a fragility or infirmity of the human mind is given due weight by the authors of the Penal Code when they dissected the offence into different degrees. In the third stage, the court has to consider whether those imputations or invectives had in tact incited the provocation in the mind of the accused so suddenly as to deprive him of his power of self control. On a consideration of the evidence in a case in these three stages, if the court reasonably feels that the offender's mental equanimity would have been temporarily suspended on his hearing such words from the mouth of the victim, then there would be justification in bringing the case within the first Exception (I) to S.300 IPC. 13. It would be of advantage, in this context, to refer to certain observations of the Supreme Court in the case of K. M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1962 SC. 605). In Para.84 thereof, their Lordships have observed thus: "Is there any standard of a reasonable man for the application of the doctrine of "grave and sudden" provocation? 13. It would be of advantage, in this context, to refer to certain observations of the Supreme Court in the case of K. M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1962 SC. 605). In Para.84 thereof, their Lordships have observed thus: "Is there any standard of a reasonable man for the application of the doctrine of "grave and sudden" provocation? No abstract standard of reasonableness can be laid down. What a reasonable man will do in certain circumstances depends upon the customs, manners, way of life, traditional values etc; in short, the cultural, social and emotional background of the society to which an accused belongs. In our vast country there are social groups ranging from the lowest to the highest state of civilization. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any standard with precision: it is for the court to decide in each case, having regard to the relevant circumstances". In Amarjit Singh v. State (AIR. 1970 Punjab & Haryana 835) Sarkaria, J had considered the case wherein a deceased, who was unemployed and addicted to drinks had demanded money from his son, the accused, who declined to give it saying that he had no money to waste on drinking and then the deceased had said that the accused must provide him with money, no matter if he had to get his mother prostituted for that purpose. When the accused killed his father on hearing the above words, the Punjab High Court has held that the words uttered by the deceased in the circumstances were grave and sudden enough to entitle the accused to the benefit of Exception (1) to S.300 IPC. Their Lordships had rejected a contention that in villages such abuses in the names of mothers and sisters are hurled by people without realising what they mean and a son was bound to tolerate the abusive words used by the father who was head of the family. A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court has considered the degree of proof in establishing a case under the said Exception, and it is reported in Mansa Ram v. State (1975 Crl. L. J. 1772). A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court has considered the degree of proof in establishing a case under the said Exception, and it is reported in Mansa Ram v. State (1975 Crl. L. J. 1772). The learned judges have observed thus: "It is enough for the purpose of enabling an accused person to get the advantage of a general or special Exception to criminal liability if the Court is left in reasonable doubt based on substantial grounds where circumstances existed which could give the accused the benefit of that Exception". 14. The above principle has been approved by the Supreme Court in some cases where the question considered was regarding the standard or degree of the burden on an accused person who pleads for the application of one of the general Exceptions of the IPC. It would be apposite to quote a passage from the decision reported in Yogendra Morarji v. State of Gujarat (AIR. 1980 Supreme Court 660). In Para.15, their Lordships have observed thus: "The material before the Court to establish such a preponderance of probability in favour of the defence plea may consist of oral or documentary evidence, admissions appearing in evidence led by the prosecution or elicited from prosecution witnesses in cross-examination presumptions, and the statement of the accused recorded under S.313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973". 15. Applying the above tests in this case, there is little difficulty for us to find that the mental equilibrium of the accused would have been suddenly countermined when he heard the imputations describing his mother as a vagabond and a prostitute. pw. 5 has said in cross-examination that his father, the accused was in the habit of chewing and that he was engaged in chewing just before the perpetration of the crime. The suggestion is that a knife would have been easily accessible to the offender as a knife is generally used for slicing the betelnuts by chewers. 16. In the aforesaid circumstances, we are inclined to give the accused the benefit of Exception (I) to S.300 of the IPC. We find that the offence is under S.304 (Part I) of IPC., and not under Part II of that Section. 17. In the result, we alter the conviction to one under S.304 (Part I) of the IPC. and reduce the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for seven years. Appeal is thus partly allowed. We find that the offence is under S.304 (Part I) of IPC., and not under Part II of that Section. 17. In the result, we alter the conviction to one under S.304 (Part I) of the IPC. and reduce the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for seven years. Appeal is thus partly allowed. The appellant will be entitled to be set off as provided in S.428 of the Crl. PC.