Judgment :- 1. A landlord in quest for an order of eviction of his tenant finds that the desired order is within the ken of his sight but yet outside the limit of his reach, drifting like a mirage. The order he seeks for is one under S. H (3) of Act 2 of 1965. 2. A litigation initiated by him in 1978 has already covered a chequered career by now and the present stage is when the District Court has upheld his claim as bona fide, in reversal of a contrary finding by the two Courts earlier. In arriving at that finding the District Court has appointed a Commissioner and basing on the report of that Commissioner, it held that though the landlord is in possession of another building, the same is not suitable for his residential purposes and hence "the possession of that building by the landlord is not a ground to disallow the claim under S.11 (3) of the Act". The said order of the District Court is challenged by the tenant in this revision petition filed under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 3. Some more facts are to be narrated for a proper appreciation of the points urged in this revision. The landlord filed the petition for eviction of the tenant on the ground that he bona fide needs the building for the occupation of his second son, Seetharaman, for a separate residence for him. (Though this landlord had claimed eviction on the ground of arrears of rent also that ground is riot alive for consideration now, as conceded to by both sides). During the first stage, the landlord, for some reasons, did not mount the witness box. The Rent Control Court dismissed the application for eviction mainly on the ground of want of bona fides of his claim. On appeal, the Appellate Authority had remanded the case to the Rent Control Court for affording one more opportunity to the landlord to get himself examined as a witness. The tenant challenged that order of remand by filing a revision before the District Court, and a further revision before this Court, but all without success and the matter went back to the original Court. There, the landlord was examined as pw. 4. Even then, the Rent Control Court was not persuaded to uphold the claim as bona fide and hence the petition was again dismissed. There, the landlord was examined as pw. 4. Even then, the Rent Control Court was not persuaded to uphold the claim as bona fide and hence the petition was again dismissed. The Appellate Authority concurred with that finding. Both the Courts have observed that the landlord is in possession of another building in the same town and that the landlord has not taken out a Commission to report that the said building is not residential. The Appellate Authority further held that the landlord is not entitled to an order of eviction because there are no special reasons to grant that order, in view of the fact that he is already in possession of another additional building of his own in the same locality. 4. When the matter reached the District Court in revision for the second time, the landlord filed an application there as I.A. No. 573 of 1984 praying for the issue of a Commission to ascertain the condition of the other building in his possession. Nothing is stated in the affidavit in support of that petition as to any reason or reasons, why he did not file a similar application either in the Rent Control Court or before the Appellate Authority. Against the objections filed by the tenant, the District Court has allowed that Interlocutory Application and a Commissioner was appointed for the aforesaid purpose. In the report filed by the Commissioner, he has expressed his opinion that the said other building is not residentiable because a flour mill is functioning in the ground floor of that building. The Commission report was marked by the District Court as Ext, C1. That Revisional Court has reappraised the whole evidence in the light of Ext. C1 Commission report and consequently set aside the orders of the two Courts below and found that the other building is not fit for residential use on account of the croaking sound disseminated from the flour mill which is housed in its ground floor. Hence the impugned order was passed, allowing the tenant to be evicted from the premises. 5. The point raised in this revision under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is that the District Court's order is vitiated by jurisdictional error in as much as it has allowed additional evidence to be collected at the revisional stage. Hence the impugned order was passed, allowing the tenant to be evicted from the premises. 5. The point raised in this revision under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is that the District Court's order is vitiated by jurisdictional error in as much as it has allowed additional evidence to be collected at the revisional stage. The argument is that the power of the Revisional Court is only supervisory in nature to satisfy itself as to the legality, regularity and propriety of the orders of the fact finding Courts and when those Courts have expressed that there is lack of evidence for a particular aspect, it is not the function of the Revisional Court to supply that evidence. 6. It was next contended that, even if the revisional court has any jurisdiction to permit additional evidence to be adduced at the revisional stage, such a course can be adopted only for an extremely limited purpose for enabling it to scrutinise the legality or regularity or propriety of the orders of the subordinate Courts, and such a limited jurisdiction cannot be stretched so wide as to receive additional evidence to fill up the lacunae in the evidence. Thus the second line of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that even if there is any limited jurisdiction to allow additional evidence, such a jurisdiction has been exercised in this case with material irregularity. 7. According to the learned counsel for the landlord, the District Court is essentially a Civil Court and its jurisdiction is wide enough to cover such exigencies and by issuing the Commission the District Court has only acted within its jurisdiction. Alternatively, it is contended that even if the District Court has acted irregularly or exercised its jurisdiction improperly, that is not a ground for interference under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. Act 2 of 1965 recognises three authorities when dealing with an application for eviction under S.11 thereof The first two authorities are, the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority, which are the creations of the statute itself and the third authority is the District Court upon whom revisional powers have been conferred. 8. Act 2 of 1965 recognises three authorities when dealing with an application for eviction under S.11 thereof The first two authorities are, the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority, which are the creations of the statute itself and the third authority is the District Court upon whom revisional powers have been conferred. S.23 of the Act confers power on the first two authorities subject to the limitations and conditions as may be prescribed by Rules framed under the Act and those powers include examination of witnesses on oath, reception of evidence taken on affidavits, issuing of Commissions for local inspection as well as for examination of witnesses. R.11(7) and (8) of the Rules provide the manner in which the evidence is to be recorded by those two authorities. S.18 (3) of the Act confers powers on the Appellate Authority to send for the records of the case from the Rent Control Court and give an opportunity to the parties for being heard in the matter, and also to "make such further enquiry as it thinks fit either directly or through the Rent Control Court". It is thus the scheme of the Act that the two authorities conferred with the power to take evidence are the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority. S.18(5) indicates that finality is fixed to the order of the Appellate Authority. The relevant words of that Subsection read thus: "The decision of the Appellate Authority shall be final except as provided in S.20". The Act therefore envisages that the record of evidence is that which the Rent Control Court records and also those which the Appellate Authority adds to it when it conducts a further enquiry, and a decision made on the basis of that evidence shall be treated with a seal of finality as regards the findings on facts. What the Act specifically stipulates is that the finality of the order based on the evidence recorded by the Rent Control Court or those additional evidence collected by the Appellate Authority is only subject to a revision by a District Court and this power of revision is only "to examine the records" to satisfy itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of the order under challenge. A reading of the above provisions makes the position clear that the revisional power alone can be exercised by the District Court and that function is to be confined to "examination of the records" as to the legality, regularity or propriety of the order of the proceedings relating to such record of evidence. Examination of records by the Court refers to the records sent up by two authorities created by the Act. The power of revision itself is limited to make a scrutiny of those records to satisfy itself as to the three tests laid down in S.20 thereof. In so doing, the Revisional Authority cannot create further records of evidence. In the scheme of the Act, the legislature has permitted the District Court to perform only a limited function which is eminently one of supervisory in character. It cannot convert itself into an evidence-collecting or fact-finding court. 9. In the above context, a reference to the observation of Eradi, J. (as he then was) in the decision reported in Doraswami Chettiar v. Nhandammadan Kunhiraman (1969 KLJ. 227) are worth quoting: "It is true that the powers of revision under S.20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act are wider than those conferred on the High Court under S.115 of the Civil Procedure Code and that the words "legality, regularity or propriety of the order" are wide enough to cover both questions of law and fact. But there is nonetheless an essential distinction between an appeal and a revision, a districting based on differences implicit in the two expressions. An appeal is a continuation of the proceedings; in effect the entire proceedings are before the appellate authority and it has power to review the evidence subject to the statutory limits prescribed. But in the case of a revision, even where f the revisional authority is empowered to examine the propriety of the order impugned I before it, its jurisdiction does not extend to a complete reopening and rehearing of the case J and reviewing the entire evidence with a view to substituting the findings arrived at by it in the place of those recorded by the subordinate tribunal The legislature while enacting the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 1965 has thought fit to confer a right of appeal by S.18 of the Act only at the earlier stage when the order of the Rent Controller is sought to be questioned and to provide for only a discretionary remedy of revision at the later stage when the challenge is raised against the appellate authority's order. When it thus introduced the familiar concepts of appeal and revision at the two different stages, it is reasonable to assume that the well known distinction between those two jurisdictions was clearly in the contemplation of the legislature. It would not, therefore, be right to regard the appellate and revisional remedies provided for under S,18 and S.20 as co-extensive". In another later decision. Dr. Kochu Thommen. J. has observed in identical terms and that decision is reported in Kadeersha v. Venkitaswamy (1978 KLT. 260). There are other decisions also reiterating the same principles as regards the power under S.20 of the Act and a reference to all those decisions is not necessary. 10. The learned counsel for the landlord has referred me to the decision reported in Haneefa v Subhalakshmi Ammal (1980 KLT. 627) wherein it is held that "regarding the powers of the revisional court under the Act, namely the District Court and in some cases the High Court, such powers are not enunciated in the Act, because even otherwise they have got the necessary powers, being established courts under the Code of Civil Procedure; therefore the order of the District Judge stating that it has no power for restoring the application dismissed for default is clearly wrong". 11. On the strength of the aforesaid observations of Chandrasekhara Menon, J. the learned counsel has contended that the powers of the District Court are not circumscribed by the items enumerated in S.23 of the Act and hence the District Court is well within its inherent powers to let in additional or further evidence. The context in which those observations are made is entirely different and cannot have application in the present context. In that case, the District Court had dismissed a revision petition for default and a petition for restoring the revision to file was rejected by the District Court on a reasoning that S.23 of the Act does not contemplate a power to restore a dismissed application. In that case, the District Court had dismissed a revision petition for default and a petition for restoring the revision to file was rejected by the District Court on a reasoning that S.23 of the Act does not contemplate a power to restore a dismissed application. It was in that context that this court has pointed out that S.23 does not circumscribe the powers of the District Court, as the District Court is a Civil Court with all the powers of the court as per the Code of the Civil Procedure. In the present case, the material point to be noticed is not whether the District Court's powers are untrammelled by the enumerations contained in S.23 of the Act. Here the power which the District Court is called upon to exercise is only a power of revision and in exercise of that supervisory function, the District Court cannot convert itself into an evidence collecting court. Even that apart, all the Civil Courts are to keep within certain bounds when they exercise different kinds of powers. When the Civil Court exercise appellate powers or the powers of review, or the power to make reference, etc., the Civil Court has to be controlled by certain limitation prescribed for each of those functions, e. g. while hearing an appeal against a decree, the Civil Court's powers to take additional evidence are circumscribed by 0.41 R.27 of the Civil Procedure Code and it cannot allow evidence to be let in at the appellate stage as freely as it is done at the trial stage. Even the High Court's powers while exercising revision under S.115 of the Civil Procedure Code are controlled by the conditions and limitations contained in that Section. Therefore the argument that since the District Court is a Civil Court, whose powers are not limited by S.23 of the Act, the District Court gets jurisdiction to do anything which a Civil Court can do, is apparently erroneous. 12. Therefore the argument that since the District Court is a Civil Court, whose powers are not limited by S.23 of the Act, the District Court gets jurisdiction to do anything which a Civil Court can do, is apparently erroneous. 12. Strong reliance was placed on the decision reported in Narayanan v. Kuttikrishnan (1973 KLT.182) wherein Bhaskaran, J (as he then was) has made the following observations: "It cannot be held that the District Court is barred in appropriate cases from entertaining an application for reception of additional evidence, if in the opinion of the District Court such reception is necessary for a proper scrutiny to ascertain whether the impugned order is vitiated by illegality, irregularity or impropriety. In this view, the District Court, was not correct in declining to exercise the jurisdiction, in the context which was really vested in that court". 13. Admission of a new material by the Revisional Court during revisional stage was permitted in that case for the limited purpose of exercising supervisory jurisdiction because that additional material must be necessary to enable the revisional court to satisfy itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of the order of the Subordinate Court. There may be such instances when the revisional Court may have to receive further materials for the purpose of equipping itself to effectively discharge its revisional functions. A typical instance is the one involved in the said decision Narayanan v. Kuttikrishnan. That is a case where the Rent Control Court was called upon to determine the faff rent under S.5 of the Act. Filing of an application to fix the fair rent under that Section before the Rent Control Court compels that court to fix the fair rent and there is no escape from it. But in determining the fair rent, the Rent Control Court has to ascertain the range within which it has to act as mentioned in S.5 (2). Such a range is to be worked out with the help of the data contained in the property tax register maintained by the local authority during the relevant period. But in determining the fair rent, the Rent Control Court has to ascertain the range within which it has to act as mentioned in S.5 (2). Such a range is to be worked out with the help of the data contained in the property tax register maintained by the local authority during the relevant period. So, in a case where the fair rent happened to be determined by a Rent Control Court or Appellate Authority without the aid of the relevant entries in the property tax register of the local authority concerned, it would be a justifiable course to be adopted at the revisional stage to get the extract of the relevant property tax register, if the same has not been produced in the subordinate Courts, for the limited purpose of examining whether the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, has acted within the range permitted by S.5 (2). Reception of such documents became necessary in that case to effectively exercise the revisional jurisdiction. Only in such limited instances, fresh materials can be brought in for a limited purpose. Such a position cannot be equated with the case where the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority is not satisfied on the evidence regarding the unsuitability of another building for residential purposes and the Revisional Court receiving additional evidence for the purpose of deciding about the unsuitability of that building. Letting in such additional evidence here is not for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or regularity or propriety of the orders under attack. Here what is done is to allow the parties to fill up the lacuna in their evidence at the revisional stage. Hence the decision reported in 1973 KLT.182 (Narayanan v. Kuttikrishnan) is clearly distinguishable on facts and can be explained as above. 14. Thus, in my view, the Revisional Court has no jurisdiction to take additional evidence except for the limited purpose of enabling it to effectively exercise its revisional powers. 15. The result of the discussion made above is that I hold that the District Court's order is vitiated by jurisdictional error in as much as it allowed additional evidence to come on record. The said additional evidence which was illegally brought in, had apparently played a role in arriving at the conclusion made by the District Court. 15. The result of the discussion made above is that I hold that the District Court's order is vitiated by jurisdictional error in as much as it allowed additional evidence to come on record. The said additional evidence which was illegally brought in, had apparently played a role in arriving at the conclusion made by the District Court. The District Judge should have decided the revision ignoring Ext. C. I. Commission report. The proper course open to me now is to set aside the impugned order of the District Court and to remand the case to that court for fresh disposal of that revision petition without in any manner influenced by Ext. C. I. Commission report. 16. Accordingly, I allow this revision and set aside the order of the District Court under attack and remand the case to District Court for fresh disposal of the revision as stated above. No costs. Allowed.