P. R. GOKULAKRISHNAN, J. ( 1 ) THIS Special Civil Application is to quash and set aside Award dated 6-2-1985 given by the Presiding Officer Labour Court Rajkot in Reference LCR No. 347 of 1982. The petitioner further prays that he must be declared as a workman within the meaning of sec. 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 Before the Labour Court. Rajkot before which a dispute was raised as to whether the petitioner who is the Junior Engineer must be reinstated to his original post with full backwages a preliminary objection was -raised to the effect that the petitioner is not a workman since he is drawing a pay of more than Rs. 1000. 00 and was also discharging supervisory duties. The Labour Court addressed itself to the fact as to whether the petitioner is a workman as defined under sec. 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act in as much as he draws a salary of more than Rs. 1000. 00 per month. It is an admitted fact that the salary of the petitioner was Rs. 1 500 per month and according to sec. 2 (s) (iv) if a person draws wages exceeding Rs. 1 600 per month he cannot be said to be a workman but this figure or Rs. 1 600 was inserted in sec. 2 (s) (iv) only by the amended Act 46 of 1982. Prior to this amendment the figure was Rs. 1 0 and such of those who are receiving the wages exceeding Rs 1 0 will not come under the definition of workman. The State of Gujarat by amending Act 22 of 1981 which was published in the Gujarat Government Gazette of 25/06/1981 amended certain provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and while doing so it also inserted sec. 4 in that amending Act which reads as follows:"4 In the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 in its application to the State of Gujarat (hereinafter referred to as the Central Act) in section 2 in clause (s) in sub-clause (iv ). for the words five hundred the words one thousand six hundred shall be substituted". This Act received the assent of the President on 21/06/1981 and it further states that this Act will come into force on such date as the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette appoint. for the words five hundred the words one thousand six hundred shall be substituted". This Act received the assent of the President on 21/06/1981 and it further states that this Act will come into force on such date as the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette appoint. It is seen from the Official Gazette that this amendment was given effect to with effect from 1-8-1981. Thus it is clear that on the date when the reference was made the amended Act 22 of 1981 was in force. This has been overlooked by the Labour Court. Presumably the Labour Court has taken into consideration the amendment carried out by the Central Government in respect of sec. 2 (s) by its Act 46 of 1982 which came into effect as and from 21-8-1982. As far as the State of Gujarat is concerned as we have noticed already such an amendment came as early as 25/06/1981 and came into effect as and from 1-8-1981. If that be so the Labour Court is wrong in rejecting the reference on the preliminary ground as if the petitioner is not a workman as defined under sec. 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ( 2 ) MR. Raval the learned counsel for the respondent alternatively contended that even if it is held that on the date of the reference the amended provision had already come into force with effect from 1 even then no valid reference could have been made in the present case as on the date on which the dispute arose viz. when the petitioners services were terminated on 30/06/1981 the amended provision was not applicable and therefore the petitioner was not a workman at least on the date on which his services were terminated. This submission of Mr. Raval cannot be accepted for the simple reason that as per the definition of the workman under sec. 2 (s) any person who has been dismissed discharged or retrenched in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute is also included within the connotation of the word workman. What is important and relevant is the date of reference. As on that date the requisite conditions of the definition of the term workman as per sec. 2 (s) have to be satisfied. Even this question is no longer res integra. In the case of Workmen G. C. and Co. What is important and relevant is the date of reference. As on that date the requisite conditions of the definition of the term workman as per sec. 2 (s) have to be satisfied. Even this question is no longer res integra. In the case of Workmen G. C. and Co. v. G. C. and Co. AIR 1972 S. C. 319 the Supreme Court made the following pertinent observations in paragraph 13 of the report:"there is no gain-saying the fact that once a Tribunal is vested with the jurisdiction to entertain the dispute which is validly referred it does not cease to continue that jurisdiction merely because the claim made goes beyond the wage which takes workmen out of that category and make them non-workmen. What has to be seen is whether on the date of the reference there was any dispute in respect of the workmen which could be referred under the Act to the Tribunal". Thus on the facts of the present case also what is to be seen is whether on the date of the reference the dispute was such as could be validly referred for industrial adjudication. Admittedly on that date the petitioner satisfied all the requirements of the definition as found in sec. 2 (s ). He was a dismissed workman and his salary on the date of reference was clearly covered by the main definition of the term workman and he did not fall within the excepted category of clause (iv) as amended with effect from 1-8-1981. The contention of Mr. Raval learned advocate for respondents is therefore repelled. ( 3 ) WE may at this stage. mention one submission put forward by Mr. Padival learned advocate for the petitioner for our consideration. He submitted that even if the definition of the term workman might not have been amended from 1-8-1981 and if it would have been amended pending the reference even then the petitioner could have legitimately submitted that he satisfied the requirements of the definition as amended pending the reference. Padival learned advocate for the petitioner for our consideration. He submitted that even if the definition of the term workman might not have been amended from 1-8-1981 and if it would have been amended pending the reference even then the petitioner could have legitimately submitted that he satisfied the requirements of the definition as amended pending the reference. We do not express any opinion on this contention as in our view on the facts of this case it would be sufficient to hold that the reference was validly made as on the date of the reference the petitioner did satisfy the requirements of the definition of workman and did not fall within the excepted category (iv) as amended and operative on date. ( 4 ) MR. Raval finally submitted that in any case when these proceedings are being remanded to the trial Court we may permit the respondent to urge that the petitioner was employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity and therefore he was not a workman on account of the third exception to the definition of workman as contemplated by sec. 2 (s ). This submission of Mr. Raval cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the preliminary objection was raised by the respondent before the Tribunal only to the limited extent that the petitioner was not a workman on account of the fourth exception as envisaged by the definition of the word workman under sec. 2 (s ). In the written statement itself it was made clear by the respondent that the petitioner was employed in a supervisory capacity but as he was drawing wages exceeding Rs. 1 0 on the day he was dismissed he was not a workman within the definition of the term as envisaged by sec. 2 (s ). When the respondent itself pleaded that the petitioner was employed in a supervisory capacity and raised the preliminary objection on the limited ground that his salary was more than Rs. 1 0 it is obviously not open to the respondent now to take a somersault and take a plea that the petitioner was employed in a managerial capacity. When the respondent itself pleaded that the petitioner was employed in a supervisory capacity and raised the preliminary objection on the limited ground that his salary was more than Rs. 1 0 it is obviously not open to the respondent now to take a somersault and take a plea that the petitioner was employed in a managerial capacity. Such a plea was never put forward in the written statement nor was it canvassed in the alternative in support of the preliminary objection before the respondent to urge that such a plea should be kept open as it would amount to entirely making out a new case which would fly in the face of the original written statement. It is therefore not open for the respondent to take up such a contention at this stage. The proceedings will therefore have to be remanded to the trial Court for disposal on merits. Preliminary objection that the petitioner was not a workman at the relevant time shall stand overruled ( 5 ) SINCE the Labour Court has not decided on merits the matter has to be remanded to the Labour Court for deciding the issue referred to it on merits. In these circumstances the rule is made absolute the order passed by the Labour Court to decide the dispute on merits after permitting the parties to let in evidence in respect of the same. There will be no order as to costs. ( 6 ) THE Labour Court is directed to dispose of the matter on or before 30/04/1986 (ATP) petition allowed: Matter remanded. .