JUDGMENT - V.V. VAZE, J.:---Is it lawful for a Board of Directors of a Co-operative Society to resolve that pursuant to Bye-law No. 8(5) one of their Directors has ceased to be a member of the Board consequent upon his absence in four consecutive meetings without affording him reasonable opportunity to explain the cause of his absence ? This is the question that is being thrown up in this writ petition. 2. Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 ('the Act') consolidated and amended the law relating to the Co-operative Societies in the State of Maharashtra. With a view to providing for orderly development of certain type of co-operative societies a new Chapter XI-A was inserted in the Act to deal with the elections of committees of societies belonging to the category specified in section 73-G of the Act. Maharashtra's Specified Co-operative Societies Election to Committees Rules, 1971 dealt with the question of elections to this category of societies. Rule 72 of these rules obligates the Chairman of the society to communicate the occurrence of a casual vacancy to the District Deputy Registrar. 3. Krishna Khore Sahakari Dudh Utpadak and Purvatha Sangh Ltd. ('The Sangh') of Miraj, District Sangli, is one of such specified co-operative Societies within the meaning of section 73-G of Chapter VII of the Act as it is a co-operative sale and purchase organisation. 4. Under Clause (iii) of sub-section (2) of section 165 of the Act, the State Government has been empowered to make rules prescribing the matters in respect of which a society may make or the Registrar may direct a society to make By-laws. In exercise of this power of subordinate legislation, the State Government has framed the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Rules, 1961 ('the Rules'). Rule 8 thereof empowers framing of Bye-laws by the society as a matter incidental to the management of business. In exercise of this power, the Sangh has framed By-laws, A free translation of the Marathi Clause 5 of the By-law No. 8 may be made as follows : "If a Member of the Board of Directors remains absent for three consecutive meetings without showing proper cause, he shall be deemed to have ceased to hold the office of a Directors." 5. Respondent No. 1 Mohanrao Shinde ('Mohanrao') was a Director of the Board of Directors of the Sangh, and admittedly, he was absent from the meetings of the Board held on 15th April, 1985, 27th May, 1985, 25th June, 1985 and 29th July, 1985. A meeting of the Board of Directors convened on 31st August, 1985 (which was also attended by Mohanrao) after taking note of the fact that he has absented himself from four consecutive meetings as aforesaid, passed a resolution that Mohanrao has ceased to remain a member of the Board of Directors. Mohanrao took up the matter with the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies (Dairy) Pune, who by his order dated 9-9-1985 set aside the resolution as it had not been passed in conformity with the provisions of the Act and the rules. Aggrieved, Sangh has filed this writ petition challenging the order of the Deputy Registrar. 6. The supreme Court, in (Shri Bhagwan v. Ram Chand)1, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1767, observed that authorities or bodies which are given jurisdiction by statutory provisions to deal with the rights of citizens must act in accordance with the principles of natural justice before exercising its jurisdiction and its power; obligation to follow principles of natural justice need not be expressly imposed. 7. Even in cases dealing with social bodies the duty to act judicially and follow the principles of natural justice has been affirmed way-back in 1906 in (Lapointe and L' Association De Bienfalisance De Retraita De La Police De Montreal)2, (1906) A.C. 535. 8. Most of the decided cases in this field of administrative law which make the right to be heard before being condemned a de rigueur for the validity of an order depriving a person of property or status owe their origin to (Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works)3, (1863)14 C.B. (N.S.) 180 in which Byles, J., said : .................. "................a long course of decisions......................establish that, although there are no positive words in a statute, requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature." 9. "................a long course of decisions......................establish that, although there are no positive words in a statute, requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature." 9. According to Professor Wade (Administrative Law, Fifth Edition, P. 1449) "that case was forgotten and doubts increased until the law temporarily lost its confidence in its own principle." The result was that there were some decisions of English Courts see (Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne)4, (1951) A.C. 66 which, according to Professor Wade (supra at page 460) "threaten to undo all the good work of earlier Judges. They expose English law to reproach that, though a man must be heard before being expelled from his trade union or his club, he need not be heard before being deprived of his livelihood by licensing authority-------But the true common law tradition was preserved in common wealth jurisdiction overseas more effectively than it was in England." Of (Raman v. Madras)5, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 694, rejecting the view taken by the Privy Council in Nakkuda Ali's case. 10. Admittedly, neither the By-laws nor the parent Act or the Rules made thereunder provide for the giving of an opportunity to the Director to explain his absence, but, the giving of such an opportunity is implicit in the phrase "without showing proper cause" occurring in Clause 5 of the By-law No. 8 framed by the Sangh, and hence, justice of common law requires that the giving of the notice will have to be read into the By-law. 11. As the Sangh has admitted that no notice was given and Mr. Ajit P. Shah, fairly conceded with his usual candour this position, it is obvious that the resolution dated 31st August, 1985 passed by the Sangh is invalid. 12. Nearly all the remedies which are of use in natural justice cases---certiorari, prohibition, injunction and declaration-are discretionary so that the Court has power to withhold them if it thinks fit and from time to time the Court will do so in the case of an unmeritorious plaintiff, even though there has been a clear violation of natural justice. The effect of an order passed in violation of the principles of natural justice has been succinctly described by Lord Denning in (F. Hoffmann-Law Roche Co. The effect of an order passed in violation of the principles of natural justice has been succinctly described by Lord Denning in (F. Hoffmann-Law Roche Co. A.G. others v. Trade Sec.)6, 1975 S.C. 295 at page 320 thus : "A failure to observe that rules of natural justice does not render a decision or order or report absolutely void in the sense that it is a nullity. The legal consequences are best told by recounting the remedies available in respect of it. A person who has been unfairly treated (by reason of the breach of natural justice) can go to the courts and ask for the decision or order or report, or whatever it is, to be quashed, or for a declaration that it is invalid, that it has not and never has had any effect as against him. But it is a personal remedy, personal to him. If he does not choose himself to query it and seek a remedy, no one else can do so; see (Durayappah v. Fernando)7, (1967)2 A.C. 337, 353. But it is within the discretion of the Court whether to grant him such a remedy or not. He may be debarred from relief if he has acquiesced in the invalidity or has waived it. If he does not come with due diligence and ask for it to be set aside, he may be sent away with nothing; see (Reg. v. Aston University Senate, Ex parte Roffer)8, (1969)2 Q.B. 538. If his conduct has been disgraceful and he has in fact suffered no injustice, he may be refused relief; See (Glynn v. Keele University)9, (1971)1 W.L.R. 487 and (Ward v. Braford Corpn.)10, (1971)70 L.G.R. 27. If it is a decision or order or report which affects many other persons besides him, the Court may not think it right to declare it invalid at his instance alone; See (Maxwell v. Department of Trade and Industry)11, (unreported), December 20, 1972, a decision of Wien, J., of which we were supplied with a transcript. Moreover, pending a decision by the Courts as to its validity, other persons may be justified in acting on the footing that it is valid. If the decision or order or report is good on the face of it, and there is no good reason for supposing it to be invalid, other persons can treat it as valid. Moreover, pending a decision by the Courts as to its validity, other persons may be justified in acting on the footing that it is valid. If the decision or order or report is good on the face of it, and there is no good reason for supposing it to be invalid, other persons can treat it as valid. To it I would apply the words of Lord Radcliffe in (Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council)12, (1956) A.C. 736, (769-770). "An order....................is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity upon its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders. 13. It is not necessary to pronounce upon the correctness or otherwise of the subsequent order passed by the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies (Dairy) Pune, cancelling the resolution of the Sangh passed on 31-8-1985 because we have held that the resolution of the Board dated 31-8-1985 declaring that Mohanrao has ceased to be a Member of the Board of Directors is a nullity. 14. We would not be taken to mean that in every case of a decision by a statutory body, principles of natural justice should be implied because there could be cases where the person proceeded against may not and could not, in the circumstances, plead any defence at all. In the instant case it cannot be said that Mohanrao had no defence. In fact, in the meeting held on 31st August, 1985 he himself was present and claims that no such resolution was passed. Mohanrao has produced for our perusal a photostat copy of a certificate issued by the Under-Secretary of the Secretariat of the State Legislature to the effect that he attended the Assembly Session on 25th June, 1985 and 29th July, 1985 and that his presence has been noted in the records of the legislature. Mohanrao claims that he did not receive notice of the earlier four meetings as he was in Bombay but did receive the notice of the meeting to be held on 31st August, 1985 which he attended. Mohanrao claims that he did not receive notice of the earlier four meetings as he was in Bombay but did receive the notice of the meeting to be held on 31st August, 1985 which he attended. Though we would not go into the merits of the question whether Mohanrao had or did not have proper cause to remain absent, the certificate of the State Legislature does show that he has an arguable defence. 15. Lord Denning's observations that, if the conduct of the petitioner has been disgraceful and he has in fact suffered no injustice, he may be refused relief, are most opposite to the facts of the present case. The Sangh, without giving any opportunity to Mohanrao to explain his absence in the meetings of the Board, hurriedly and in violation of principles of natural justice, pronounced that due to his absence he has ceased to be a Member of the Board. Now that Mohanrao tried to obtain redress from the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies (Dairy) Pune, the Sangh has come to Court alleging that the action of the Deputy Registrar is bad in law. It is a case of a kettle calling the pot black. 16. Even if the action of the Deputy Registrar in setting aside the resolution of 31st August, 1985 is open to serious challenge on the grounds of jurisdiction, allowing the present petition would be a remedy worse than the disease. Putting the imprimatur of the Court on the resolution of 31st August, 1985 which we have held to be voidable would work as a reward to an unmeritorious petitioner who has suffered no injustice. Under Rule 72 of the Maharashtra Specified Co-operative Societies Elections to Committees Rules, 1971, the manner in which casual vacancies are to be filled in has been delineated, and, the Sangh or Mohanrao may take such action as advised under the Act, Rules and the By-laws for redress of any grievance as and when necessary. See (Gangabai v. Tumsar Municipality)13, A.I.R. 1970, Bombay, 170, for Interpretation of sections 41, 48, 44 of Maharashtra Municipalities Act and Rule 63 of Maharashtra Municipalities Election Rules, 1966. 17. In view of the foregoing, the petition fails and the same is dismissed. Rule discharged but with no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. -----