JUDGMENT : V.K. Khanna, J. This Writ petition has been filed by the petitioner tenant against the decision of the IVth Additional District Judge, Aligarh dismissing the petitioner's revision filed against the decision of the Judge, Small Causes Court decreeing the plaintiff's suit for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent. 2. For the purpose of deciding the present writ petition certain relevant facts may be noticed. 3. The petitioner is admittedly tenant in the disputed premises. To the accommodation in dispute the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 were not applicable at the time of the filing of the suit and the provisions of the afore-said Act became applicable during the pendency of the revision. As the suit against the petitioner was filed on the ground of default of payment of rent the petitioner claimed benefit of sections 39/40 of the Act. The revisional court held that entire amount which was to be deposited for claiming the benefit of sections 39/40 of the Act had not been deposited by the petitioner and thus he was not entitled to get the benefit. 4. It may be stated that the learned counsel for the petitioner has not challenged before me the aforesaid findings recorded by the revisional court. The only point which has been pressed before me in this writ petition is that the petitioner was entitled to get the benefit of section 20(4) of the Act, as he had deposited the entire amount on the first date of hearing. 5. It may be noticed that at the stage of the admission the contesting respondent was served in this petition and he has put in appearance through an Advocate. A counter affidavit has been filed and in reply rejoinder affidavit too has been filed by the petitioner. The writ petition has thus been finally heard in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of the Court. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention that the provisions of Section 20(4) of the Act had application has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera 1984 All. LJ 102. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention that the provisions of Section 20(4) of the Act had application has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera 1984 All. LJ 102. Learned counsel for the respondent has, however, urged that provisions of Section 20 have application only to a suit to which the provisions of the Act were applicable on the date of the institution of the suit and if during the pendency of the suit, appeal or revision the provisions of the Act start applying, then the only provisions which are applicable are the provisions of sections 39/40 of the Act. It has also been argued that the petitioner has not raised the aforesaid question before the revisional authority and should not be permitted to raise this question in the writ petition as it involves a mixed question of law and fact. 7. It has been frankly conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the aforesaid point which is being sought to be raised in this writ petition has not been raised before the revisional court. If the provisions of section 20 of the Act are applicable to the case, a further enquiry which will involve appraisal of facts will have to be gone into as to whether there has been compliance of the provisions of section 20(4) of the Act. The question raised thus is a mixed question of law and fact which the petitioner is not entitled to raise for the first time in the writ petition. 8. However, I have also heard learned counsel for the parties on the question of applicability of section 20 of the Act to the present case and in my opinion, the argument raised has no force. 8. However, I have also heard learned counsel for the parties on the question of applicability of section 20 of the Act to the present case and in my opinion, the argument raised has no force. Section 20(4) which is relevant runs as follows:- "(4) In any suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section(2), if at the first hearing of the suit the tenant unconditionally pays or tenders to the landlord or deposits in court the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the building, due from him (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent) together with interest thereon at the rate of nine percent per annum and the landlord's costs of the suit in respect thereof, after deducting therefrom any amount already deposited by the tenant under sub-section (1) of section 30, the Court may, in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on that ground, pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction on that ground: Provided that nothing in this sub-section, shall apply in relation to a tenant who or any member of whose family has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state, or has got vacated after acquisition, any residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area. Explanation:-For the purposes of this sub Section - (a) the expression "first hearing" means the first date of any step or proceedings mentioned in the summons served on the defendant. (b) the expression "cost of the suit" includes one half of the amount of counsel's fee payable for a contested suit". 9. Sections 39 and 40 of the Act run as follows:- 39. (b) the expression "cost of the suit" includes one half of the amount of counsel's fee payable for a contested suit". 9. Sections 39 and 40 of the Act run as follows:- 39. Pending Suits For Eviction Relating To Buildings Brought Under Regulation For The First Time - In any suit for eviction of a tenant from any building to which the old Act did not apply, pending on the date of commencement of "this Act, where the tenant within one month from such date of commencement or from the date of his knowledge of the pendency of the suit, whichever be later, deposits in the court before which the suit is pending the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent) together with interest thereon at the rate of nine percent per annum and the landlord's full cost of the suit, no decree for eviction shall be passed except on any of the grounds mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (1) or in clause (g) to (h) of sub-section (2) of Section 20, and the parties shall be entitled to make necessary amendment in their pleadings and to adduce additional evidence where necessary: Provided that a tenant the rent payable by whom does not exceed twenty five rupees per month need not deposit any interest as aforesaid". "40. Pending Appeals In Suits For Eviction Relating To Buildings Brought Under Regulation For The First Time- Where an appeal or revision arising out of a suit for eviction of a tenant from any building to which the old Act did not apply is pending "on the date of commencement of this Act, it shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of section 29, which shall mutatis mutandis apply." 10. It would thus be seen from the perusal of the provisions of Sections 20(4), 39 and 40 that these provisions are meant to provide protection to a tenant in case the suit has been filed on the grounds mentioned in section 20(2) (a) i.e. arrears of rent for not less than four months, that the tenant will be relieved from the decree of ejectment in case he makes deposit as has been contemplated under section 20(4) and 39 of the Act. In case what is being urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is true i.e that section 20(4) of the Act has application to those cases also where the Act starts applying either during the pendency of the suit or during the pendency of the revision/appeal, then in many of the suits the deposit cannot be made on the first date of hearing where the tenant admits that on the date of the application of the suit the provisions of the Act were not applicable as on that date clearly he cannot think of getting the benefit of a section 20(4) of the Act. The provisions of Section 20(4) are; in my opinion, prospective in nature. Moreover, a bare perusal of sections 39 and 40 of the Act would show that special provision has been made in the Act for relieving a tenant from a default committed as laid down in section 20(2)(a). The provisions of section 20 are general provisions meant for all suits and the provisions made in sections 39/40 are special provisions which only apply to pending suits, appeals or revisions. It is well settled that the special provisions will over-rule the general provisions. In so far as the case of Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera (supra) on which reliance has been placed, in my opinion, the same does not lay down what is being contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In para 16 of the aforesaid judgment it has been stated. "The question in the present case is whether by seeking the benefit of section 39 of the new Act, there is a change in the cause of action. Much reliance has been placed on the reference made in paragraph 17 of the judgment when the provisions of section 20 of the Act have been noticed. If one reads the entire paragraph 17 of the aforesaid judgment it would be absolutely clear that reference to section 20 has been made in the case only for the purposes of disclosing the scheme of the legislature in relieving the tenant from the liability of ejectment for the reasons mentioned in section 20(2)(a) of the Act. If one reads the entire paragraph 17 of the aforesaid judgment it would be absolutely clear that reference to section 20 has been made in the case only for the purposes of disclosing the scheme of the legislature in relieving the tenant from the liability of ejectment for the reasons mentioned in section 20(2)(a) of the Act. Paragraph 18 of the judgment concludes the matter in as much as the ultimate direction which has been given by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment is that the court below will determine as to whether the appellant in that case has made the deposit as contemplated by section 29 of the New Rent Act. In the case before the Supreme Court the Act started applying during the pendency of the proceedings and if what is being argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner was true, the Supreme Court would have given final direction for determining the question as to whether the appellant in that case was entitled to the benefit of section 20(4) of the Act also. On merits also, therefore, I am of the opinion that in the present case the petitioner is not entitled to get the benefit of section 20(4) of the Act. 11. No other point has been pressed before me. 12. For the reasons stated above, the present writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. However, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs. 13. After pronouncing the judgment and before I signed the judgment, the learned counsel for the petitioner made a prayer that some reasonable time be granted to the petitioner for vacating the premises in dispute. I have heard learned counsel for the parties also on this question. 13. After pronouncing the judgment and before I signed the judgment, the learned counsel for the petitioner made a prayer that some reasonable time be granted to the petitioner for vacating the premises in dispute. I have heard learned counsel for the parties also on this question. Looking to the entire facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner is granted three months time from today for vacating the premises in dispute subject to the condition that the petitioner files an affidavit before the Judge Small Causes Court within a period of three weeks from today containing an undertaking that he shall handover peaceful possession of the premises in dispute to the landlord within a period of three months from today and shall also pay the entire decretal amount including damages at the rate of rent until the period for which he is being allowed to remain in possession under this order within a period of one month from today. In case of default of any of the conditions i.e. the petitioner does not file the requisite affidavit within the time granted and does not pay the entire decretal amount and damage, the decree holder shall be entitled to execute the decree forthwith.