JUDGMENT B. N. Sapru, J. - This writ petition is directed against the order of Vishwanath Mishra the U. P. Public Services Tribunal III, Lucknow in claim Petition No. 163F/ 111/79 by which the petitioner challenged the order of the Managing Director of U. P. State Agro Industrial Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) dated 10-3-1976 removing the petitioner from service. 2. In the year 1974 the petitioner was posted as the Branch Manager of the U. P. State Agro Industrial Corporation Limited at Faizabad. He was subsequently transferred from there. A charge-sheet No. S. B. 882/ Secy. Branch/74-75 dated October 17, 1974 containing two charges was served on the petitioner. The charge-sheet was signed by the Managing Director of the Corporation. There were two charges framed against the petitioner. Only charge No. 1 was found established against the petitioner and charge No. 2 was not found established against the petitioner, hence no further reference to charge No. 2 is made. Charge No. 1 ran as follows : "That two consignments of Urea weiging 110 M. T. each under R. R. No. 247148 dated 26-2-1974 and 23814 dated 4-3-1974 both were booked in the name of Branch Manager by the F.C.I. The aforesaid R. Rs. had been received in your office on 4-3-1974 and 11-3-1974, respectively. These R.Rs. were endorsed by you to the A.S.O. who received total quantity of fertilizer in the month of March, 1974 on various dates up to 15-3-1974. Out of these 22 M. T. of Urea from the consignment of Rs. 247148 dated 26-2-1974 and 88 M. T. of Urea from the consignment of R. R. No. 232814 dated 4-3-1974 had not been taken in Corporation's stock. It was only on 22-7-74, 3-8-74 and 10-8-74 that the total quantity of fertilizer has been taken in stock. You had been holding the charge of Branch Manager, Faizabad till 20-6-74 but after endorsing the R.Rs. to the A.S.O. never carefully attempted to see whether or not complete stock has been received and taken in Corporation's stock though it was your primary responsibility to do so. You are thus guilty of remissness and negligence in discharging your primary duties as a Branch Manager." 3. The petitioner submitted his reply. After giving the petitioner an opportunity of presenting his case Sri S. R. Singh, who had been appointed an Enquiry Officer, submitted a report. You are thus guilty of remissness and negligence in discharging your primary duties as a Branch Manager." 3. The petitioner submitted his reply. After giving the petitioner an opportunity of presenting his case Sri S. R. Singh, who had been appointed an Enquiry Officer, submitted a report. The conclusion of Sri S. R. Singh was that charge No. 1 against the petitioner was established. In the end while summarising his findings on charge No. 1 the Enquiry Officer wrote as follows :- "All these manipulations were done under the nose of the Branch Manager without his knowledge is far to believe Sri V. N. Mishra's attempt to take shelter behind alleged misconduct of Sri B. P. Upadhyay simply shows his incompetence, carelessness and lack of sense of a conscientious worker. The chain of events which transpires from the cross-examination of Sri B. P. Upadhyay and Sri R. K. Arora and the letter of Sri B. P. Upadhyay dated September 16, 1974 confirm that the whole thing was cooked up in the knowledge of not only Sri V. N. Mishra but the other members of staff also posted at the Faizabad branch. Therefore, the charge of remissness and negligence in the discharge of duties by Sri V. N. Mishra Branch Manager is proved." 4. A show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner and he replied to the same. Thereafter the petitioner's services were terminated as mentioned earlier. The petitioner ultimately filed a claim petition which has, as mentioned above, been dismissed. 5. It is agreed between the parties that no service rules had been framed by the Corporation at the relevant time and that the U. P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956 and All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 apply to the employees of the Corporation. The Rules framed by the U. P. Government are known as U. P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956. Rule 3 of the aforesaid Rules runs as follows :- "3. General.-(1) Every Government servant shall at all time maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty. (2) Every Government servant shall at all time conduct himself in accordance with the specific or implied orders of Government regulating behaviour and conduct which may be in force." 6. The Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules as applicable in U. P. provide that for good and sufficient reason, the penalty prescribed in Rule 14 may be imposed. (2) Every Government servant shall at all time conduct himself in accordance with the specific or implied orders of Government regulating behaviour and conduct which may be in force." 6. The Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules as applicable in U. P. provide that for good and sufficient reason, the penalty prescribed in Rule 14 may be imposed. Among the penalties is the removal from service. 7. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner U. N. Sharma is that it is only for misconduct that a penalty of removal from service can be imposed for good and sufficient reason on an employee. He urges that the charge against the petitioner was only of negligence and remissness in duty that was found to be established against the petitioner. He submits that there was no charge relating to the effect that the petitioner was guilty of an act or omission which showed that his integrity was doubtful. He asserts that the negligence charged against the petitioner was in any way not such as would come within the scope of misconduct as contemplated by the U. P. Government Servants Conduct Rules. The Rules prohibit Government servant from doing certain things. The petitioner is not alleged or charged with having contravened any specific direction contained in the U. P. Government Servants Conduct Rules. 8. Sri R. P. Singh, Additional Chief Standing Counsel, appearing on behalf of the corporation has urged that the Enquiry Officer found that not only was the petitioner guilty of remissness and negligence but was also directly involved in'the sense that he was party to the temporary misappropriation of the fertilizer by the employees of the Corporation. He submits that the petitioner must, therefore, he held to have contravened the whole of Rule 3(1) of the U. P. Government Servants Conduct Rules inasmuch as he did not maintain absolute integrity and also inasmuch as be did not maintain devotion to duty. 9. As seen earlier there was no charge in the charge-sheet, issued to the petitioner, that he had not maintained absolute integrity. Therefore, the finding of the Enquiry Officer, which appears to have been affirmed by the Managing Director about the lack of integrity on the part of the petitioner, was beyond the charge framed against the petitioner and cannot be sustained. 10. Therefore, the finding of the Enquiry Officer, which appears to have been affirmed by the Managing Director about the lack of integrity on the part of the petitioner, was beyond the charge framed against the petitioner and cannot be sustained. 10. The question as to whether negligence can in certain circumstances amount to failure to maintain devotion to duty has been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. J. Ahmad, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1022. In that case a member of the Indian Administrative Service was removed from service on the basis of certain charges. The Supreme Court looked into the charges and found that two of the charges, namely, charge Nos. 2 and 5 enumerated in the judgment referred to inaptitude, lack of foresight, lack of firmness and indecisiveness. These personal failures were held not to amount to misconduct within the meaning of the service rules. Then the Supreme Court went on to consider the other charges, namely, charges Nos. 1, 3, 4 and held that these charges, even if proved, would not constitute misconduct. Inter alia, but in any case, failure to attain the highest standard of efficiency in performance of duty permitting an inference of negligence would not constitute misconduct nor for the purpose of Rule 3 of the Conduct Rules as would indicate lack of devotion to duty. However, in paragraph 12 of the judgment the Supreme Court went on to hold. "The High Court was of the opinion that misconduct in the context of disciplinary proceedings means misbehaviour involving some form of guilty mind or mens rea. We find it difficult to subscribe to this view because gross or habitual negligence in performance of duty may not involve mens rea but may still constitute misconduct for disciplinary proceedings." 11. The Supreme Court in the case of Shri Rasiklal Vaghajibhai Patel v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, (1985) 2 S.C.C. 35 ., has held as follows : "It is thus well settled that unless either in the certified standing order or in the service regulations an act or omission is prescribed as misconduct, it is not open to the employer to fish out some conduct as misconduct and punish the workman even though the alleged misconduct would not be comprehended in any of the enumerated misconduct." 12. This case is strongly relied by Sri U. N. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and he urges that remissness and negligence in the performance of one's duty can never be misconduct and can be punished under the Discipline and Appeal Rules. I cannot accept this extreme argument in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court mentioned above in the case of Union of India v. J. Ahmed, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1022, where the Supreme Court has clearly said that negligence in certain cases can amount to misconduct. The question, therefore, for consideration in this case is whether remissness and negligence attributed to the petitioner were such as would amount to misconduct. The negligence was admittedly serious inasmuch as fertilizer stocks of considerable value were received at the Branch but were not taken into stock. The petitioner endorsed the R. Rs. in favour of Sri. B. B. Upadhyay who was Assistant Branch Manager and did not enquire as to whether the stock had actually been taken into the godown. It has been factually found that no loss was occasioned to the Corporation because the stock of fertilizer was ultimately received by the Corporation. The question can be framed in another way. Was the negligence on the part of the petitioner amount to failure to maintain devotion to duty. The Supreme Court observed in the case of Union of Lydia v. J. Ahmed,A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1022, mentioned above, as follows : "The expression 'devotion to duty' appears to have been used as something opposed to indifference to duty or easy going or light hearted approach to duty. If Rule 3 were the only rule in the Conduct Rules it would have been rather difficult to ascertain what constitutes misconduct in a given situation. But Rules 4 to 18 of the Conduct Rules prescribe code of conduct for members of service and it can safely stated that an act or omission contrary to or in breach of prescribed rules of conduct would constitute misconduct for disciplinary proceedings. This Code of conduct being not exhaustive ;t would not be prudent to say that only that act or omission would constitute misconduct for the purpose of Discipline and Appeal Rules which is contrary to the various provisions in the Conduct Rules. This Code of conduct being not exhaustive ;t would not be prudent to say that only that act or omission would constitute misconduct for the purpose of Discipline and Appeal Rules which is contrary to the various provisions in the Conduct Rules. The inhibitions in the Conduct Rules clearly provide that an act or omission contrary thereto so as to run counter to the expected code of conduct would certainly constitute misconduct. Some other act or omission may as well constitute misconduct. Allegations in the various charges do not specify any act or omission in derogation of or contrary to conduct Rules save the general Rule 3 prescribing devotion to duty. It is, however, difficult to believe that lack of efficiency, failure to attain the highest standard of administrative ability while holding a high post would themselves constitute misconduct. If it is so, every officer rated average would be guilty of misconduct. Charges in this case as stated earlier clearly indicate lack of efficiency, lack of foresight and indecisiveness as serious lapse on the part of the respondent. These deficiencies in personal character or personal ability would not constitute misconduct for the purpose of disciplinary proceedings." 13. The petitioner has been found to be remiss and negligent in the discharge of his duties as he did not take proper steps to see that the consignment of Urea received under the R.Rs., which he had endorsed in favour of Sri B. P. Upadhyay, were not actually taken into stock. This is negligence all right but it is not possible to hold that it amounts to misconduct within the meaning of Discipline and Appeal Rules. 14. There is another aspect of the matter. In the Enquiry Officer's report which was apparently endorsed by the Managing Director the petitioner was not only guilty of remissness and negligence in respect of charge No. 1 but was also a party to the fraud. No charge to this effect had been framed against the petitioner. The Managing Director, when he made the impugned order, evidently took into account this finding of the Enquiry Officer that the petitioner was guilty of fraud when he passed an order for removal of the petitioner from service. No charge to this effect had been framed against the petitioner. The Managing Director, when he made the impugned order, evidently took into account this finding of the Enquiry Officer that the petitioner was guilty of fraud when he passed an order for removal of the petitioner from service. As the lack of integrity on the part of the petitioner had not been attributed in the charge sheet, it was not open to the Managing Director to take into account the fact relating to the lack of integrity on the part of the petitioner while making the impugned order. On this ground alone the order is liable to be quashed. 15. The petitioner had before the U. P. Public Services Tribunal apart from seeking the relief of quashing the order dated 10-3-1976 sought certain additional reliefs. As the Tribunal found the order of termination dated 10-3-1976 to be justified, it naturally did not go into the question as to what further reliefs the petitioner was entitled to. 16. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order of the Managing Director dated 10-3-1976 and the order of the U. P. Public Services Tribunal dated 16-10-1981 in claim petition No. 163F/III/79 are quashed. The claim petition will now go before the U. P. Public Services Tribunal who will decide as to what further reliefs should or should not be granted to the petitioner. The petitioner is entitled to his costs from respondents Nos. 2 and 3.