Judgment :- 1. S.249 of the Criminal Procedure Code reads: "249. Absence of complainant. When the proceedings have been instituted upon complaint, and on any day fixed for the hearing of the case, the complainant is absent, and the offence may be lawfully compounded or is not a cognizable offence, the Magistrate may, in his discretion, notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, at any time before the charge has been framed, discharge the accused". 2. The question for consideration in this Criminal Revision is only whether both the conditions must co-exist or whether one of the conditions alone is sufficient for the Magistrate to get jurisdiction to discharge the accused in the absence of the complainant. Whether the judicial discretion has been properly exercised or not cannot be the moot point because both the Magistrate and the Addl Sessions Judge agreed for valid reasons that the private complainant absented himself continuously in an attempt to protract the proceedings. Therefore if the discharge of the accused was with jurisdiction under S.249 it must stand, otherwise not. 3. The private complaint, C.C. 242 of 1979 filed by the first respondent before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kayamkulam against four accused, of whom petitioners are accused 1 to 3, was taken to file for offences punishable under S.447 and 506 (ii) read with S.34 of the Indian Penal Code and the accused were discharged under S.249 of the Criminal Procedure Code, for the absence of the complainant. In Criminal Appeal 68 of 1981 the Addl. Sessions Judge, Mavelikkara found that in view of the decision reported in Joy v. Abraham, 1967 KLT 800, the discharge cannot be sustained. Therefore, the order was set aside and the case remanded. 4. The Sessions Judge understood 1967 KLT 800 as laying down that a discharge under S.249 could be had only if the offences are lawfully compoundable and non-cognizable and not in cases where any offence is cognizable or non-compoundable. I think 1967 KLT 800 was wrongly interpreted by the Sessions Judge. Since the offence under S.447 is cognizable and that under S.506 (ii) is not compoundable the Sessions Judge found that in view of 1967 KLT 800 a discharge under S.249 cannot be had even though S.447 is compoundable and S.506 (ii) is not cognizable. I think 1967 KLT 800 was wrongly interpreted by the Sessions Judge. Since the offence under S.447 is cognizable and that under S.506 (ii) is not compoundable the Sessions Judge found that in view of 1967 KLT 800 a discharge under S.249 cannot be had even though S.447 is compoundable and S.506 (ii) is not cognizable. Such an interpretation will lead to the conclusion that for the applicability of S.249 a single offence or all the offences must be both compoundable and non-cognizable and where there is at least one offence which is either not compoundable or cognizable a discharge under S.249 cannot be had. S.249 is not capable of such an interpretation and I do not think that 1967 KLT 800 has laid down such a proposition. What the Section says is "the offence may be lawfully compounded or is not a cognizable offence" and not "the offence may be lawfully compounded and is not a cognizable offence". The wording of the Section is so clear that the existence of either of the conditions is sufficient for its applicability even though the other condition is absent. In the case in hand though the offence under S.447 is cognizable it is compoundable by the person in possession of the property. So also the offence under S.506 (ii) is non-cognizable though it is not compoundable. Mr. S. Eswara Iyer said that since S.447 is compoundable and 506 (ii) is non-cognizable the specification of S.249 is satisfied even though S.447 is cognizable and S.506 (ii) not compoundable. I think his contention is correct. 5. 1967 KLT 800 arose out of C.C. 675 of 1965 on the file of the Sub-Magistrate, Thiruvalla. It was a complaint for offences punishable under S.279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code out of which the offence under S.279 is both cognizable and non-compoundable. When there is at least one offence which is both cognizable and not compoundable the requirements of S.249 are not satisfied. Soni Lal v. Pranab Kumar A I.R. 1958 Tripura 22 referred to in that decision was for offences punishable under S.117, 224 and 353 of the 1ndian Penal Code. All the offences were non-compoundable and those under S.224 and 353 were cognizable and hence the offence under S.117 was also cognizable. Thus all the offences were non-compoundable and cognizable. Soni Lal v. Pranab Kumar A I.R. 1958 Tripura 22 referred to in that decision was for offences punishable under S.117, 224 and 353 of the 1ndian Penal Code. All the offences were non-compoundable and those under S.224 and 353 were cognizable and hence the offence under S.117 was also cognizable. Thus all the offences were non-compoundable and cognizable. The argument that appears to have been rejected in that case is that even if one of the offences is non-compoundable and cognizable, so long as the other offences are non-cognizable, or compoundable the Magistrate was competent to discharge the accused under S.249. The confusion arose only because instead of "non-compoundable and cognizable" the words used were "non-compoundable or cognizable". I do not understand that decision as laying down that in a case in which the accused are tried for several offences even if one offence is non-compoundable or cognizable S.249 is not attracted. Applicability of the section is excluded only in cases where at least anyone of the offences is both cognizable and non-compoundable. S.256 applies to all offences triable as summons cases on complaint while S.249 applies to complaints for offences triable as warrant cases as are either compoundable or non-cognizable. Para 3 of 1967 KLT 800 which reads thus: "The terms of the Section are clear that in a case where the complainant alleges the commission of an offence which is cognizable or non-compoundable, the Magistrate cannot discharge the accused under the Section for the absence of the complainant. Therefore, I set aside the orders of Court below and direct the Magistrate to take the case to his file and proceed in accordance with law". is not capable of a different interpretation in the facts and circumstances of that case, even though at first blush a different interpretation is likely because of the words "cognizable or non-compoundable". In the context it will have to be understood and read as "cognizable and non-compoundable" because a different contingency has not arisen for consideration in that case. I do not mean that the decision has laid down that discharge under S.249 could be had only if all the offences are both compoundable and non-cognizable or that when at least one of the offences is cognizable or not compoundable the section is not attracted. 6. In Ganesh Narayan Dangre v. Eknath Hari Jhampe and others (1978 Crl. I do not mean that the decision has laid down that discharge under S.249 could be had only if all the offences are both compoundable and non-cognizable or that when at least one of the offences is cognizable or not compoundable the section is not attracted. 6. In Ganesh Narayan Dangre v. Eknath Hari Jhampe and others (1978 Crl. Q. 1009) it was held: "It cannot be contended that both the conditions must exist, namely, that the offence could be lawfully compounded, and is not a cognizable offence before the provisions in S.249 can be resorted to. If either of the two conditions exists the provisions in S.249 would apply". In Kanhei v. Basanti (1981 Crl. Q 266) the principle laid down was: "A Magistrate has the power to discharge an accused of an offence which is either compoundable or is a non-cognizable one. The clauses 'and the offence may be lawfully compounded' and 'is not a cognizable offence' are separated by a disjunctive conjunction 'or' which indicates that they are alternative and not cumulative. Thus S.249 applies not only to cases where the offence is a compoundable one but also where though it is not compoundable, it is non-cognizable. The power under the Section can be exercised in respect of all compoundable offences, whether cognizable or not, and all non-cognizable offences, whether compoundable or not". The Magistrate had the jurisdiction to discharge the accused under S 249. The view expressed by the Sessions Judge appears to be not correct. The Criminal Revision Petition is allowed, the order of the Sessions Judge set aside and that of the Magistrate restored.