A. P. RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) THE petition is directed against the order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Pardi below Exh. 29 in Regular Civil Suit No. 97 of 1983 filed by the respondent No. 2. alleged tenant against respondent No. 1 the landlord. By the aforesaid order the petitioner who was not a party to the suit has been deprived of his possession of the suit premises which are situated at City Survey No. 327 of Vapi town and which consist of two rooms on the ground floor and two rooms on the first floor The detailed description with regard to area of the property in dispute is given in the plaint a copy of which has been produced on record by the counsel for the petitioner. The description reads as follows: ( 2 ) THE petitioner occupied the property since the year 1968. By sale document dated 22/06/1979 the respondent No. 1 herein (hereinafter referred to as the landlord) purchased the property from one Kansa Dadabhai forcible possession from the petitioner. Hence on ar about 12/03/1980. the petitioner filed complaint before the Police under the provisions of sec. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code and asked for protection. The Police made report to the Executive Magistrate concerned who initiated the proceedings under the provisions of sec. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code and attached the property and sealed the same and called upon the parties concerned to show cause as to who was in lawful possession of the property. After recording evidence and after hearing the parties The learned Magistrate decided the case in favour of the landlord and held that the landlord was in possession of the property on the date of dispute. This order was passed on 15/08/1981 On the same day the landlord is alleged to have executed a lease in favour of respondent No. 2 herein (hereinafter referred to as the alleged tenant) and as per the this lease deed the landlord handed over the possession of the disputed property to the alleged tenant. ( 3 ) THE petitioner challenged the legality and validity of the orders passed by the learned Executive Magistrate by filing Criminal Revision Application in Sessions Court of Valsad at Navsari. The revision application was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge who confirmed the order passed by the learned Magistrate. ( 3 ) THE petitioner challenged the legality and validity of the orders passed by the learned Executive Magistrate by filing Criminal Revision Application in Sessions Court of Valsad at Navsari. The revision application was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge who confirmed the order passed by the learned Magistrate. The petitioner preferred Special Criminal Application No. 171 of 1982 in the High Court. This High Court after hearing the parties quashed and set aside the orders passed by the lower courts and held that the petitioner was in lawful possession of the property on the date of dispute (which would be 12/03/1980 or Marc 15/03/1980 This Court further directed that the learned Executive Magistrate should restore the possession of the disputed property to the petitioner within a period of date of receipt of the writ of this Court. ( 4 ) AFTER the aforesaid judgment was delivered by this High Court the alleged tenant i. e. respondent No. 2 herein filed Civil Suit No. 97 of 1983 in the Court of Civil Judge (JD) Pardi against the landlord (respondent No. 1 ). The alleged tenant prayed in the Suit that the landlord be restrained from interfering with his possession of the property without obtaining a decree from a competent court. Thus the suit was filed for permanent injunction restraining the landlord from taking possession from the alleged tenant. The trial court granted the injunction as prayed for on 23/09/1983 and restrained the landlord from interfering with the possession of the alleged tenant the plaintiff This injunction order was subsequently extended up to 6/10/1983 The alleged tenant also submitted an application before the learned Executive Magistrate on 10/10/1983 and stated that the Civil Court had granted injunction against the landlord and that he was in possession of the property in dispute and his possession should not be disturbed. ( 5 ) THE petitioner approached the learned Executive Magistrate Pardi and prayed that as per the order of the High Court he should be put in possession of the property. The learned Executive Magistrate ordered that the petitioner be put in possession of the property and accordingly he was put in possession of the property. ( 6 ) IT may be noted that on 29/09/1983 the petitioner submitted an application before the learned Judge praying that he be joined as a party to the proceedings. The learned Executive Magistrate ordered that the petitioner be put in possession of the property and accordingly he was put in possession of the property. ( 6 ) IT may be noted that on 29/09/1983 the petitioner submitted an application before the learned Judge praying that he be joined as a party to the proceedings. In the application the petitioner narrated the history of the litigation and pointed out that the suit was filed by the alleged tenant against the landlord in collusion with each other. He further submitted that his lawful right of getting the possession of the property as per the order of the High Court was being denied to him and that he was being deprived of the order passed by the High Court. He also submitted that he was a necessary party to the proceedings and therefore he should be joined in the suit. However the learned Judge did not pass any order below the application and the same remained pending. ( 7 ) ON 24/10/1983 the alleged tenant submitted an application before the learned Judge and prayed that his possession of the property was disturbed by the petitioner who had submitted an application for being joined as party in the proceedings that he was in lawful possession of the property since 15/08/1981 and his possession of the property was disturbed by the petitioner otherwise than in due course of law and he should be put in possession of the property in dispute. The alleged tenant in the application submitted that inherent powers under sec. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code be exercised by the court. The trial court on the same day allowed the application of the alleged tenant. The trial court inter alia observed that in absence of the alleged tenant and pending the suit the possession was taken by the petitioner whose application for being joined as a party was pending and was yet to be heard. The trial court found that prima facie the possession of the alleged tenant was as tenant and his possession was disturbed and therefore it was necessary to exercise powers under sec. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code and the alleged tenant the plaintiff should be placed in possession of the disputed property by removing all the obstructions. The trial court found that prima facie the possession of the alleged tenant was as tenant and his possession was disturbed and therefore it was necessary to exercise powers under sec. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code and the alleged tenant the plaintiff should be placed in possession of the disputed property by removing all the obstructions. As per the order passed by the trial court the alleged tenant the original plaintiff of Civil Suit No. 97 of 1983 has been put in possession of the disputed property. ( 8 ) IT is the aforesaid order passed by the trial court which has bee challenged in this High Court by invoking the provisions of Article 227 of the (Constitution of India. Before dealing with the contentions on merits raised by the counsel for the petitioner it would be proper to dispose of the preliminary objections raised by the counsel for the respondents ( 9 ) IT is contended that the petitioner had challenged the legality and validity of the impugned order but filing an appeal before the District Court of Valsad and therefore the petition should not be entertained and the same should be rejected. Counsel for the petitioner has stated that the appeal has already been withdrawn and the appeal was field on erroneous advice because an order passed under sec. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code is not an appealable order. In view of the fact that the appeal has already been with- drawn by the petitioner the contention that the petitioner has availed of an alternative remedy and therefore the petition should not be decided on merits does not survive. ( 10 ) COUNSEL for the respondents No. 2-alleged tenant has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd Yunus V. Mohd. Mustaquim reported in AIR 1984 SC 38 . Reliance is placed on the following observations in para 6 of the judgment:"even if no appeal lay against the impugned orders of the learned Subordinate Judge the petitioner had the remedy of filing a revision before the High Court under Sea 115 of the Code. Upon any view of the matter the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned orders passed by the learned Subordinate Judge under Art. 227 of the Constitution. Upon any view of the matter the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned orders passed by the learned Subordinate Judge under Art. 227 of the Constitution. A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227". ( 11 ) IT may be noted that only the last sentence in the aforesaid observations made by the Supreme Court applies to the facts and circumstances of the case. The principle laid down by the Supreme Court is only to the effect that a mere wrong decision without anything more is not sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. Therefore what is required to be soon in this case it is a case of mere wrong decision without anything more or is there a case of overstepping the limits of its authority by the trial court ? or that there is failure on the part of the lower court to exercise jurisdiction and that there is disregard of principles of natural justice ? The aforesaid factors are required to be taken into consideration in view of the observations made by the Supreme Court in Para 7 of the aforesaid judgment. The Supreme Court has observed;"the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record much less an error of law. . . . . . . . . . "the Supreme Court has further observed"there was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principle of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure establish by law". . . . . . . . . . "the Supreme Court has further observed"there was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principle of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure establish by law". ( 12 ) AS per the settled legal position and as per the aforesaid decision of the Superhuman Court it is clear that it is not open to the High Court to act as an appellate court or Tribunal and this high Court cannot review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior court or Tribunal is Even this High Court cannot correct errors of law in the decision of the court in exercise of its power under Article 227 of the Constitution. ( 13 ) IN the instant case it clearly appears that the trial court has over- stepped its limits and has acted without jurisdiction and that too in clear disregard of the principles of natural justice. This is so because the order has been passed against a person who was not party to the proceedings. The petitioner had submitted an application for being joined as party but his application was kept pending. Behind the back of the petitioner an order is passed depriving him of his possess on I confess my ignorance of any provision of law which empowers a court to direct a person who is not a party before it to handover the possession of the disputed property. Counsel for the respondents were asked a pointed question to show me any provision of law which empowers a lower court (or for that matter any superior court) to issue orders against any person who is not party to the proceedings directing him to handover possession of the property in dispute to someone else. A counsel for the respoents submitted that such powers would be there with the court under the provisions of sec. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. He particularly relied on the phrase shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the court are not limited in any way and the court has ample power to pass orders which may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of court. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. He particularly relied on the phrase shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the court are not limited in any way and the court has ample power to pass orders which may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of court. True the court has these powers. But the question is would the inherent powers of the court take within sweep the powers to direct a person who is not party before the court to handover possession of disputed property. I am unware of any such provision in law and the counsels appearing for the parties are also unable to show me any such provision by which a court of law is empowered to pass any such orders. In this view of the matter on the face of it the order passed by the trial court against the petitioner who was not a party to the proceedings directing him to handover the possession of this property in dispute is without jurisdiction. By passing this order the trial court has overstepped its authority and has acted in an illegal manner. ( 14 ) SIMILARLY the order has been passed without affording an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. In fact it was shown in the application Exh. 20 that the petitioner was in possession of property and he had taken possession of the property pursuant to the order of the High Court through the agency of Executive Magistrate. Even so the learned Magistrate passed order against the petitioner and directed that the possession of the disputed property be given to the alleged tenant i. e. plaintiff in the Civil Suit No. 97 of 1983. This order was certainly against the in crest of the petitioner and could not have been passed so as to affect his rights and interest in the property with- out affording an opportunity of being heard to him. Thus the order being in contravention of the principles of natural justice is a nullity and therefore also in the instant case this Court can exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution. Thus the order being in contravention of the principles of natural justice is a nullity and therefore also in the instant case this Court can exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution. ( 15 ) IN above view of the matter the preliminary objection raised by the counsel for the respondent No. 2 that the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable has got to be rejected. ( 16 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 (alleged tenant) submitted that the impugned order is under the provisions of Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 and not under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code therefore in hi submission the petitioner must file civil misc. appeal in the court of District Judge. It is further submitted that the petitioner should have gone to the learned Judge himself and should have requested him for modifying the order passed behind his back. Counsel further submitted that even if the order is considered to be one under sec. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code the petitioner should be directed to file civil revision application under Section 115 the Civil Procedure Code and his petition under Article 227 of the Constitution should not be entertained. ( 17 ) THE application ex-29 is itself under sec. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code and the order passed by the learned Judge is also under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. The bare reading of the application and the order passed below it shows Chat the application is filed under Section 151 and the order is also passed under sec. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. More- over the provisions of Order 39 Rules 1 and 9 would be applicable only when an order is passed against the party to the suit. Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 makes provision for issuing temporary injunction against a person who is party to the suit. This provision does not empower the court to pass any injunction order against one who is not a party to the suit. Therefore on this ground alone it can be said that the order is not under the provisions of Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. This provision does not empower the court to pass any injunction order against one who is not a party to the suit. Therefore on this ground alone it can be said that the order is not under the provisions of Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. It appears that the learned Judge was conscious of this fact and therefore he has expressly stated in the order that he was passing the order under the provisions of Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. In this view of the matter. the contention that the petitioner should be directed to pursue the appeal filed by him or that the petition should rejected and he should be directed to file fresh appeal and/or revision in the court of proper forum has no merits. ( 18 ) THE contention that the petitioner should be directed to approach the learned Judge himself with a prayer that the impugned order be modified has also no merits. If one looks at the order it is clear that a mandatory order has been passed which is final in its nature. The order does not speak of any interim stage. The order is passed finally. Moreover when the order is in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice and when it is evident that the lower court has acted beyond the scope of its authority this Court will be failing in its duty if powers under Article 227 of the Constitution are not exercised and the lower court it not kept within the bounds of its authority. The argument that the remedy is by way of civil revision application under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code has also no merits. As stated hereinabove when the lower authority acts beyond the limits of its jurisdiction and acts in contravention of the principles of natural justice the powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be invoked. More- over the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution has already been admitted as far back as on 13/01/1984 (prior to that date notice was issued and the parties were heard before admitting the matter.) Therefore now it would serve no purpose to convert this proceedings into civil revision application. More- over the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution has already been admitted as far back as on 13/01/1984 (prior to that date notice was issued and the parties were heard before admitting the matter.) Therefore now it would serve no purpose to convert this proceedings into civil revision application. Even if the petition is treated as civil revision application under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code the same result would follow. Therefore it would only be an academic exercise without any difference in sub stance. Hence this contention has also no merits and has not to be rejected ( 19 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent No. 2-alleged tenant submitted that the order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate on 12/10/1983 directing the respondent No. 2 to hand over the possession of the disputed property to the petitioner was nullity. According to him the High Court in its order delivered on 7/09/1983 in Special Criminal Application No. 171 of 1982 granted two months time for restoration of the possession of the disputed property with the possession has been taken over on 12/10/1983 i. e. within two months from the date of order passed by the High Court the contention is not based on correct factual position. The High Court passed the following direction:"it is further directed that the Executive Magistrate Valsad shall restore the possession of the disputed property to the petitioner within two months from the date of receipt of the writ of this Court". The High Court did not say that for two months the respondent-landlord should be allowed to remain in possession. The maximum time limit within which the learned Executive Magistrate should exercise the order was indicated in the direction given by the High Court. Therefore it cannot be said that there was stay order from the High Court. On this basis it cannot be said that the order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate directing the respondent-landlord to hand over the possession of the disputed property on 12/10/1983 was a nullity. Therefore it cannot be said that there was stay order from the High Court. On this basis it cannot be said that the order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate directing the respondent-landlord to hand over the possession of the disputed property on 12/10/1983 was a nullity. ( 20 ) COUNSEL for the respondent No. 2-alleged tenant submitted that when the learned Executive Magistrate issued order directing to hand over this possession of the disputed property on October 12 1983 third party (i. e. alleged tenant who was not party to the proceedings before the Executive Magistrate) was in possession of the property and the learned Magistrate could to be passed such order against third party. The contention does not seem to be factually correct. In the entire proceedings before the High Court no- where it was stated by the respondent-landlord that he parted with the possession of the disputed property on 15/08/1981 and that respondent No. 2-alleged tenant was stated in possession since then. The respondent-landlord filed an application before the High Court on 14/10/1983 By that application pondent-landlord prayed for stay of the execution of the order passed by the High Court. In that application also nothing was stated by the respondent-landlord regarding the possession of third party meaning thereby the possession of respondent No. 2-alleged tenant. Therefore it appears that the story of third party (respondent no. 7-alleged tenant) being in possession appears to have been concocted. There appears to be much substance in the allegation made by the petitioner that the suit is filed by the respondent No. 2 tenant against respondent No. 1-landlord in collusion with each other. Apart from his factual position it may be assumed that when the learned Executive Magistrate passed order on 12/10/1983 the respondent No. 2 tenant was in possession of the property. Then also the learned Executive Magistrate was bound to carry out the directions given by the High Court. When the High Court decided Special Criminal Application No. 171 of 198 2/09/1983 the High Court decided the question regarding possession of the disputed property on the date of dispute. Be it noted that the proceedings under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code were initiated on 15/03/1980 On that day the learned Executive Magistrate passed an order under sec. 146 of the the Criminal Procedure Code and attached and seated the disputed property. Be it noted that the proceedings under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code were initiated on 15/03/1980 On that day the learned Executive Magistrate passed an order under sec. 146 of the the Criminal Procedure Code and attached and seated the disputed property. At this stage it would be profitable to look at the provisions of sec. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. As per sec. 145 (4) of in Criminal Procedure Code the Executive Magistrate is required to decide whether any and which of the parties was on the date of the order made by him under sub-section (i) in possession of the subject of dispute. The proceedings before the High Court arose out of the order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore when the High Court decided Special Criminal Application No. 171 of 1982 on September 7/8 19 and quashed and set aside the order passed by the lower courts the High Court decided the question as to which of the parties was in possession of the disputed property on the date of dispute meaning thereby 15/03/1980 The High Court accordingly directed that the party who was found to be in possession of the property on the date of dispute i. e. the petitioner herein should be put into possession of the property within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the order. Therefore when the respondent No. 1-landlord inducted the respondent No. 2-alleged tenant into possession on 15/08/1931 this cannot affect the rights and interests of the petitioner who according to the High Court was unlawfully and wrongly dispossessed of the disputed property on or about 15/03/1980 . ( 21 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent No. 2-alleged tenant submitted that by an application dated 10/10/1983 the learned Executive Magistrate was informed about the injunction granted by the trial court by which the respondent-landlord was restrained from interfering with the possession of respondent No. 2-alleged tenant. Despite this fact having been brought to the notice of the learned Executive Magistrate he passed an order directing the respondent No. 1-landlord to handover the possession of the disputed property. Therefore according to the counsel the order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate was unlawful and illegal because it was against the injection order passed by the trial court. The submission cannot be accepted. Therefore according to the counsel the order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate was unlawful and illegal because it was against the injection order passed by the trial court. The submission cannot be accepted. The learned Magistrate has followed the direction given by the High Court. It is not understood for what reason the trial court thought it fit to by pass and/or ignore the order passed by the High Court in Special Criminal Application No. 171 or 1982 decided on 7/09/1983 The learned Judge ought not to have granted any injunction whatsoever in favour of the respondent No. 2-alleged tenant. Even if he had granted the injunction it was not an injunction against the learned Executive Magistrate. The learned Executive Magistrate was within his rights when he directed the respondent No. 1-landlord to hand over the possession of the disputed property to the petitioner. In fact had the learned Executive Magistrate not passed such order he would have been guilty of flouting the directions given by the High Court ( 22 ) COUNSEL for the respondent No. 2 alleged tenant further submitted that the High Court had given direction for handing over the possession to learned Executive Magistrate Valsad and not to the learned Executive Magistrate Pardi. Even so in this case the learned Executive Magistrate Pard had issued the orders directing the landlord to handover the possession of the property in dispute. Therefore according to the counsel for the respondent No. 2-alleged tenant the order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate Pardi was without jurisdiction. The submission cannot be accepted for the simple reason that when the High Court even direction to the learned Executive Magistrate Valsad did not mean that even if the property is situated within the jurisdiction of the Executive Magistrate Pardi the jurisdiction should be exercised by the executive Magistrate Valsad. There is no dispute with regard to the fact that the disputed property is situated within the jurisdiction Executive Magistrate Pardi. In this view of the matter it cannot be said that simply because in the operative portion of the order passed by the High Court. the direction is given to the Executive Magistrate Valsad the Executive Magistrates Pardi in whose jurisdiction the disputed property is situated could not and should not have issued the directions for handing over the possession of the disputed property. the direction is given to the Executive Magistrate Valsad the Executive Magistrates Pardi in whose jurisdiction the disputed property is situated could not and should not have issued the directions for handing over the possession of the disputed property. It may also be noted that the initial order attaching the property was passed by the learned Executive Magistrate Pardi. Later on the proceedings were transferred to the Executive Magistrate Valsad. Therefore for the purpose of carrying out the directions given by the High Court if the party has approached the learned Executive Magistrate Pardi in whose jurisdiction the property is situated is cannot be said that any irregularity or illegality has been committed. ( 23 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent No. 2-alleged tenant submitted that on equitable considerations also this High Court should not exercise its powers under Article 227 of Constitution of India. According to him the respondent has paid Rs. 10 0 to the respondent No. landlord. and he is paying Rs. 500. 00 per month as and by way of rent to the respondent No. 1-landlord. The argument based on equitable consideration if examined property come to this: Dont look at the manner in which I have come into possession. Since I am in possession of the property for the last about 2-3 years allow me to retain the possession. Such an argument cannot be accepted much more so. when on face of it is appears that there is collusion between the respondent No. 1-landlord and respondent No. 2 tenant. Moreover apart from this collusion the respondent No. 1 7 tenant cannot claim any legal right whatsoever in the disputed proparty when he has been inducted in the property on 15/08/1981 i. e. after the initiation of the proceedings under Section 145 of the Criminal procedure Code (The proceedings under sec. 145 of Criminal Procedure were initiated and the property was attached on 15/03/1980 the High Court decided the question as to the lawful possession of the parties on 7/09/1983 and held that on the date of dispute i. e. on 15/03/1980 the petitioner was in lawful possession of the property. Thus it is clear that the respondents have been and to keep the petitioner out of possession of the disputed property from 15/03/1980 onwards except for a brief period of a fortnight or so in the month of October 1983. Thus it is clear that the respondents have been and to keep the petitioner out of possession of the disputed property from 15/03/1980 onwards except for a brief period of a fortnight or so in the month of October 1983. Without there being any fault whatsoever on the part of the petitioner and even though the petitioner succeeded in High Court in getting the order in his favour the petitioner has been kept out of possession of the disputed property because the learned Civil Judge was not aware of the legal position and did not look at the order passed by the High Court and did not understand the implications of the order passed by him. Thus even on the grounds of equitable considerations the petitioner should be ordered to be put into possession of the disputed property immediately and his continued dispossession on the basis of wholly illegal and erroneous order should not be permitted even for a day more. ( 24 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent No. 1-landlord submitted that the High Court decided Special Criminal Application No. 171 of 1982 on 7/09/1983 and granted stay for a period of two months and therefore according to him up to 7/11/1983 possession of the disputed property should no. have been ordered to be handed over to the petitioner This Contention his already been dealt with by me while dealing with the argument advanced by the respondent No. 2-alleged tenant. Therefore it does not require to be repeated there. ( 25 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent-landlord was asked to ex-plain as to why the landlord did not bring to the notice of the High Court that he had already paled with the possession of the property as far back as 15/08/1981 and the respondent No. 2-alleged tenant was in possession of the property in dispute. His attention was drawn to the pursis (page 36 of the compilation) filed by him before the learned Executive Magistrate on 12/10/1983 and application dated 14-10-1983 (Page 42 of the compilation) submitted by him in this High Court being Misc. Criminal Application No. 1805 of 1933. His attention was drawn to the pursis (page 36 of the compilation) filed by him before the learned Executive Magistrate on 12/10/1983 and application dated 14-10-1983 (Page 42 of the compilation) submitted by him in this High Court being Misc. Criminal Application No. 1805 of 1933. In the pursis filed before the learned Execution Magistrates he has not stated that the possession of the disputed property by was handed over by him to the respondent No. 2-alleged tenant on 15/08/1981 Similarly in the application before this Court submitted on 14/10/1983 he has not stated that respondent No. 2-alleged tenant was in possession of the disputed property. Even on that day the application has been submitted on the basis that he was in possession of the disputed property and the same. was likely to be disturbed. He had come before this Court for stay of the execution and implementation of the order passed by the court. In above view of the matter tie counsel for the landlord was asked to explain as to why he suppressed these material facts from the High Court and why he did not disclose that he (the landlord) had parted with the possession of the property as far back as 15/08/1981 He was not in a position to explain this conduct of the respondent-landlord. No explanation whatsoever has been rendered by him for suppressing these material facts from the High Court. This is a very strong circumstance indicating that the entire story of respondent No. 2 tenant having been inducted into the property as tenant as far back as 15/08/1981 is a bogus and connected story created subsequently with a view to deprive the petitioner of the fruits of the order passed by this High Court in Special Criminal Application No. 171 of 198 2/09/1983 ( 26 ) THE impugned order is admittedly passed without affording an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. The petitioners application for being joined as party which was submitted on 29/09/1983 was kept pending and no decision was given by the learned Civil Judge either allowing the application or rejecting the same. Thus on the date of the order passed below Exh. 29 i. e. on 24/10/1983 the petitioner was not a party to the proceedings. The petitioners application for being joined as party which was submitted on 29/09/1983 was kept pending and no decision was given by the learned Civil Judge either allowing the application or rejecting the same. Thus on the date of the order passed below Exh. 29 i. e. on 24/10/1983 the petitioner was not a party to the proceedings. Therefore it is very clear that the order has been passed affecting the interest of the person who was not a party of the proceedings. Such an order cannot be passed by the trial court even under the provisions of Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. No Court much less the court of Civil Judge (JD) possesses any inherent power to pass orders against a person who is not a party to the proceedings. As stated hereinabove in the beginning of this judgment the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2-alleged tenant was requested to point out any provision of law which confers jurisdiction on the trial court or for that matter on any court whatsoever to pass orders affecting the possession of the property of a person who is not a party to the proceedings. The learned counsel for the respondent-alleged tenant was not in a position to show any such provision of law. Moreover the learned Judge has also acted against the settled legal position. In the case of Mesa Ahir v. Shamla Surat reported in 14 GLR 812 decided by this High Court it is clearly held that in inquiry under Section 145 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code the Court decides the question as to possession on the date of the dispute between the parties. The Court has further observed:"as the Magistrate does not enter into an enquiry as to the title or right to such possession the protection of that possession would be by virtue of an order made under sub-sec. (6) of sec. 145 irrespective of the question of title or right to such possession. This provision in my opinion confers a statutory right on a person found and declared to be in actual possession on the date of the order under sec. 145 (1) to continue that possession till he is evicted in due course of law. (6) of sec. 145 irrespective of the question of title or right to such possession. This provision in my opinion confers a statutory right on a person found and declared to be in actual possession on the date of the order under sec. 145 (1) to continue that possession till he is evicted in due course of law. Both the courts below have ignored this statutory right of the defendant That right comes to an end only on passing of a decree or order for eviction in due course of law. So long as that right exists no injunction could issue against the successful party". True in that case the party who lost in the proceedings under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code had instituted civil suit and tried to obtain injunction from the trial court and had tried to disturb the possession of the party who succeeded in the proceedings under Section 145 of Cr. Pro. Code. Here the only difference is that the landlord has set up another person the alleged tenant No. 2 He has filed the suit and by obtaining order from trial court has tried to disturb the possession of the petitioner who has succeeded in the proceedings under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The principle laid down in the aforesaid case of Mesa Ahir (Supra) would be equally applicable to the facts and circumstances of present case. In this view of the matter it is clear that the learned Civil Judge (JD) has acted in clear disregard of the principles laid down by this High Court. Moreover tie learned Civil Judge failed to take into consideration that the High Court had decided the question of possession of the parties. This possession could not have been disturbed finally by him without following the due process of law meaning thereby without final adjudication of the rival claims of the parties. In the instant case the learned Civil Judge even refused the petitioner to enter the fray and put up his claim. Even before he is allowed to enter into the fray he has been deprived of his right to continue in possession of the disputed property. ( 27 ) IN above view of the matter the petition is required to be allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Pardi below Exh. Even before he is allowed to enter into the fray he has been deprived of his right to continue in possession of the disputed property. ( 27 ) IN above view of the matter the petition is required to be allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Pardi below Exh. 29 in Civil Suit No. 97 of 1983 is quashed and set aside The petitioner is directed to be put in possession of the dispute property forthwith. Rub made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. Office is directed to send the writ of the order immediately to the appropriate authorities. (ATP) petition allowed. .