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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

1985 DIGILAW 311 (MP)

UNION OF INDIA v. INDERSHWAR MISHRA

1985-07-09

K.M.AGARWAL

body1985
JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS second appeal by the defendant was admitted on 8-7-1981 on the following substantial questions of law :- (1) Whether the Courts could quash the legal order passed by the government under the admitted rules by imputing mala fides ? (2) In the absence of mala fides being proved as a defence or exception in the Rules whether the Courts were competent to quash the order by adding something in the Statutory Rules which is not there ? (3) Whether there was any scope of interference in the unanimous order passed at the instance of Review Committee consisting of 5 members and that too appointed by the Comptroller and Auditor General of india ? (4) Whether the finding of mala fide was justified and was sufficient to reverse the finding of the Review Committee ? (5) Whether the suit of the plaintiff was maintainable in absence of the prayer for reinstatement with back wages ? (6) Whether the suit only for declaration without consequential relief was maintainable ? ( 2. ) THE learned Counsel for the parties agreed that the appeal did not involve the last two questions of law and that the remaining 4 questions of law would be covered by the following question of law, which was suggested to them by the Court :- "whether the respondents pre-mature retirement was in the public interest or was tainted with mala fides?. " ( 3. ) THE questions of law framed on 8-7-1981 are accordingly reframed and this second appeal shall now be considered only on the reframed substantial question of law. ( 4. ) THE respondent was a Selection Grade Officer in the Office of the accountant General, Madhya Pradesh. He was served with the notice, dated 23-8-1974 (Ex. P-1) for his compulsory retirement in accordance with proviso (b) to rule 48 (1) (b) of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, (hereafter called the "pension Rules" ). This notice, containing the appellants decision to give him pre-mature retirement, was challenged by filing a suit on 31-10-1974. According to the respondent, the order of pre-mature retirement was not in public interest. It was arbitrary and unjust as well as tainted with mala fides. ( 5. ) THE appellant denied the plaint allegations and submitted that the order was proper and in public interest. According to the respondent, the order of pre-mature retirement was not in public interest. It was arbitrary and unjust as well as tainted with mala fides. ( 5. ) THE appellant denied the plaint allegations and submitted that the order was proper and in public interest. It was stated that the decision for pre-mature retirement of the respondent was based on his past service record and on the unanimous recommendation of the Departmental Promotion Committee, (hereafter called the "d. P. C. " or the "review Committee"), consisting of five members, which was constituted by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the purpose of periodical review of the cases of all employees, who had completed more than 30 years of service. ( 6. ) THE respondents suit was decreed by the Court below, which was affirmed by the impugned judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court. ( 7. ) THE learned counsel for the appellant attacked the findings of the Courts below by submitting that they were perverse both in law and on facts. According to him, the power to retire a Government servant compulsorily, in terms of a service rule, was absolute provided the authority concerned formed an opinion bona fide that it was necessary to pass such an order in public interest. Such a bona fide opinion Was formed in the present case after taking into consideration the overall picture of the respondent during the long years of his service and the recommendation of the Review committee. It was submitted that the alleged bias of Shri Manjure-e-Mustafa Siddiqui, (hereafter referred to as "shri Siddiqui"), had nothing to do with the decision of the government to retire the respondent compulsorily. It was further urged that the courts below ought not to have drawn adverse inference against the appellant for non-production of the respondents service book and the recommendation of the Review committee, because they were actually produced before the Court and were offered for the purpose of inspection by the Court. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel placed reliance on the provisions of rule 48 (l) (b) of the Pension Rules and on air 1980 SC 563 Union of India vs. M. E Reddy and 1981 JLJ 442 S. N. Jog vs. State of m. P. ( 8. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel placed reliance on the provisions of rule 48 (l) (b) of the Pension Rules and on air 1980 SC 563 Union of India vs. M. E Reddy and 1981 JLJ 442 S. N. Jog vs. State of m. P. ( 8. ) THE learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the findings given by the Courts below were findings of fact, which were not liable to be disturbed in second appeal. It was urged that the appellant failed to prove that the respondents pre-mature retirement was in public interest or not tainted with mala fides. On the contrary, as discussed in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the impugned judgment of the lower appellate court, mala fides were proved. It was submitted that in the year 1972, the respondent was recommended for the Departmental Examination qualifiying for appointment to the Subordinate Accounts Service {hereafter called "s. A. S. ") only after satisfaction of the essential conditions laid down in regulations 199 and 207 of the Standing Orders and, therefore, any adverse report in respect of an earlier period unless it had some connection with any event which took place subsequently cannot reasonably form a basis for forming an opinion about the work of the respondent. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel placed reliance on 1980 (3) SLR 583 AIR 1981 SC 594 b. B. L. Agarwal vs. High Court of M. P. and 1984 (1) SLR 342 AIR 1984 SC 630 J. D. Shrivastava vs. State of M. P. ( 9. ) RULES considered in the cases relied on by the learned counsel for the parties were similar to rule 48 (1) (b) and its proviso (b) of the Pension Rules, which provides as follows :- " "48 (1 ). At any time after a Government servant has completed thirty years qualifying service: - (a) he may retire from service, or (b) he may be required by the appointing authority to retire in the public interest, and in the case of such retirement the Government servant shall be entitled to a retiring pension : provided that.- (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b) the appointing authority may also give a notice in writing to a government servant at least three months before the date on which he is required to retire in the public interest or three months pay and allowances in liew of such notice :" ( 10. ) IN the light of the various decisions of the Supreme Court it must, therefore, be held that "the power to retire a Government servant compulsorily in public interest in terms of a service rule is absolute provided the authority concerned forms an opinion bona fide that it is necessary to pass such an order in public interest. " (See 1984 SC 630 ). Before passing an order under rule 48 (l) (b) of the Pension Rules, "it is not an entry here or an entry there which has to be taken into consideration by the government but the overall picture of the officer during the long years of his service that he puts in has to be considered from the point of view of achieving higher standard of efficiency and dedication so as to be retained even after the officer has put in the requisite number of years of service. " (See AIR 1980 SC 563 ). However, if the decision to retire a Government servant compulsorily is based on collateral grounds or if it is arbitrary, it is liable to be interfered with by Courts. I will, therefore, examine the case in the light of these settled principles of law. ( 11. ) THE respondents service book and the recommendation of the D. P. C. for giving pre-mature retirement to the respondent were not filed or exhibited in the court on the ground that they were confidential documents. However, they were placed before the Court for the purpose of inspection as would be evident from paragraphs 4 and 5 of the deposition of Shri R. T. Chaubal (D. W. 1) and from paragraph 14 of the impugned judgment of the lower appellate Court. It appears that the trial Court or the lower appellate Court did not consider or look into the said documents on the ground that they were not exhibited and at the same time, drew an adverse inference against the appellant for non-production of the documents. It appears that the trial Court or the lower appellate Court did not consider or look into the said documents on the ground that they were not exhibited and at the same time, drew an adverse inference against the appellant for non-production of the documents. I am of the view that instead of drawing an adverse inference against the appellant, the Courts below ought to have looked into the said documents before coming to any conclusion that the impugned order of compulsory retirement was or was not in the public interest. The said documents were also produced before this Court and on perusal of the service book entries I found that the respondent was, during the most of the period of his service considered an average worker and not fit for further promotion. In his confidential report for the year 1960-61, it was written that "being an average worker, the question for further promotion should not arise. " During 1961-62, his grading was "poor". About trust-worthiness, it was written that "all his work requires supervision as his accuracy is limited (average)". Against column business habits, it was written his method of working is not systematic and hence he is required to be directed off and on to complete his work. " These adverse remarks were also communicated to the respondent. During the period 1-4-1964 to 26-12-1964, against the column for "fitness. for further advancement", it was written, "question does not arise. " During the years 1965-66 and 1966-67 as well, the respondent was described as "an average worker". By his letter dated 8-9-1972, the Senior Deputy Accountant General (Adm.) observed that the respondent "was not reported to be good. He was asked to show improvement in his work before he could be allowed to cross the efficiency bar. " As per the remarks of the Reviewing Officer for the period 13-6-1971 to 30-11-1971, "the subordinate is not fit for further advancement and is an average worker. " Besides the adverse entries, there were materials to show that by order dated 4-6-1970 of the Accountant General, penalty of withholding next increments "for a period of two years with cumulative effect of postponing the future increments, was imposed on the respondent. The appellate authority reduced this penalty to withholding of increments "for tow years without cumulative effect". By letter dated 20-11-1973, the Accountant General had warned the respondent about his careless work. The appellate authority reduced this penalty to withholding of increments "for tow years without cumulative effect". By letter dated 20-11-1973, the Accountant General had warned the respondent about his careless work. By order dated 27-7-1974 of the accountant General, the respondent was further subjected to penalty of reduction to the lower stage of Rs. 550/- for a period of two years and was further directed that he would not earn incremants of pay during the period of his reduction. His gross indiscipline and utter irresponsibility in taking part in an illegal strike dated 19-9-1968 was also deprecated. ( 12. ) IN the light of the aforesaid facts, it cannot be said that the decision of the government to retire him compulsorily was passed on collateral ground or that it was arbitrary or unjust. ( 13. ) IN support of his allegations about mala fides, the respondent relied on the following facts:- (i) The impugned notice for compulsory retirement was issued by Shri manjure-e-Mustafa Siddiqui, who was biased against him. According to the respondent, Shri Siddiqui was Senior Deputy Accountant General during 1957-58 and had served him with a charge-sheet dated 7-1-1958. As charges were vague, he had made an application for necessary particulars of the charges to the annoyance of Shri Siddiqui. (ii) Before the impugned order of compulsory retirement, the respondent had served the appellant with two notices under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In one of the notices, he had made a demand for removing the efficiency bar, for payment of arrears of salary and for promotion in accordance with his seniority; and, in the second notice he had made a demand for payment of house rent allowance to him as per rules. According to him, these two notices further gave a cause for annoyance to Shri Siddiqui. (iii) No action was taken by the appellant for compulsorily retiring several other employees of the Government who had also completed more than 30 years service. The respondent alone was selected for the purpose and the impugned order was passed against him as a measure of punishment. According to him it was violative of his fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. ( 14. ) IT is pertinent to note that the decision of the Government to retire the respondent compulsorily was not based on any recommendation of Shri Siddiqui. According to him it was violative of his fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. ( 14. ) IT is pertinent to note that the decision of the Government to retire the respondent compulsorily was not based on any recommendation of Shri Siddiqui. It was based on the recommendation of the Review Committee consisting of five members and Shri Siddiqui was only one of them. The allegations of the respondent against Shri Siddiqui are far-fetched and illusory in nature. The type of allegation made against a higher officer by the respondent itself demonstrates his insubordination, and supports the adverse entries made against him in his service book. It may further be noted that none of the confidential reports of the respondent between 1961 to 1974 when the impugned notice (Ex. P/1) was issued against him, was written by Shri Siddiqui, so as to justify the alleged bias of Shri Siddiqui against the respondent. Similarly it cannot be imagined that any officer would be displeased with any of his subordinates, who pressess his reasonable demand by service of notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the Government. Such notices are not personal in nature and, therefore, they cannot afford any ground for any officer to have any grudge against any of his subordinates. ( 15. ) THE respondents allegations about violation of his fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and about punitive nature of the impugned order of the appellant are also baseless and liable to be rejected without calling for any detailed discussion on the point. Suffice it to say that the impugned notice (Ex. P/1) does not show that the decision to give pre-mature retirement to the respondent was taken as a measure of punishment ( 16. ) SO far as the selection of the respondent for S. A. S. is concerned, it was on the basis of eligibility conditions laid down in the regulations 199 and 207 of the standing Orders. Such a selection cannot be equated with any promotion and, therefore it cannot be said that merely because he was selected for S. A. S. , any adverse report in respect of an earlier period unless it had some connection with any event which took place subsequently cannot reasonably form a basis for forming an opinion about the work of the respondent. ( 17. ( 17. ) THE findings arrived at by the Courts below were on extraneous considerations and, therefore, they cannot be said to be findings of fact, not liable for interference in second appeal. ( 18. ) IN the light of my aforesaid discussion, I am of the view that the impugned judgments and decrees of the Courts below are liable to be set aside. ( 19. ) IN the result this appeal succeeds and it is hereby allowed. The impugned judgments and decrees of the Courts below are set aside, and the suit of the respondent shall accordingly stand dismissed. However, the parties are directed to bear their costs throughout as incurred. Appeal allowed.