Judgment Lalit Mohan Sharma, J. The decision of this case is dependant on the meaning of the expression 'moral turpitude'. Can a particular offence be said to involve moral turpitude in all circumstances irrespective of the background in which the offence is committed? And can a convict ion of a person under section 324 or under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code necessarily leads to the conclusion that the person has committed an offence involving moral turpitude? Further, whether the expression 'gross moral turpitude' has to be interpreted differently from 'moral turpitude'? These are the questions involved in the case. 2. The petitioner was in the service of the Reserve Bank of India and was suspended after a criminal case was instituted against him. He was later put on trial and convicted by the trial Court on the 26th September, 1972 under Sections 148, 323 and 326 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years. A notice was thereafter served on him in February, 1973 asking him to show cause as to why he should not be dismissed from Bank service under the provisions of Regulation 46(3) of the Reserve Bank of India Staff Regulation, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Regulation'). The petitioner in his show cause pleaded the pendency of the appeal but the Manager, Reserve Bank, dismissed him by the order as contained in Annexure 3 dated 26.2.73. The petitioner was accordingly informed by the letter Annexure 4 which stated that if his conviction was set aside in appeal, he could approach the authority later in this matter. The criminal appeal was ultimately dismissed with certain alteration in the conviction by the High Court in July, 1974 and the petitioner moved the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court converted the petitioner's conviction under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code into one under Section 324 and reduced the sentence to one of fine. The Judgment was delivered on 25.4.1979. The petitioner thereafter filed a representation, a copy whereof is Annexure 5 to the application, before the competent authority of the Bank for his reinstatement. The same was dismissed by the order in Annexure 6. By the present Writ Application, the petitioner has challenged the orders in Annexures 3 and 6. 3. The Judgment was delivered on 25.4.1979. The petitioner thereafter filed a representation, a copy whereof is Annexure 5 to the application, before the competent authority of the Bank for his reinstatement. The same was dismissed by the order in Annexure 6. By the present Writ Application, the petitioner has challenged the orders in Annexures 3 and 6. 3. The Reserve Bank of Indian Staff Regulation, 1948 deals with the terms and conditions of service of the Staff of the Bank, and Regulation 46(1) lays down that an employee who is arrested for debt or on a criminal charge or is detained in pursuance of any process of law may be directed by competent authority to be considered under suspension. Thereafter, Regulation 46(3) reads as follows: "An employee shall be liable to dismissal or to any of the other penalties referred to in Regulation 47 if he is committed to prison for debt or is convicted of an offence which in the opinion of the competent authority, either involves gross moral turpitude or has a bearing on any of the affairs of the Bank or on the discharge by the employee of his duties in the Bank; the opinion in this respect of the competent authority shall be conclusive and binding on the employee. Such dismissal or other penalty may be imposed as from the date of his committal to prison or conviction and nothing in Regulation 47 shall apply to such imposition." (emphasis added). The sub-regulation (4) states that in case the conviction is set aside by higher court, the employee will he reinstated in service. The petitioner has also explained the delay in approaching this Court in filing this Writ Application In November, 1979 for quashing Annexure 3 by stating that he was awaiting for the final outcome of the appeal before the Supreme Court. The Writ Application was admitted in December, 1979 by a Division Bench of this Court and I do not think that the relief for quashing Annexure 3 in the facts and circumstances of the case can he legitimately refused on the ground of delay. 4. Mr. The Writ Application was admitted in December, 1979 by a Division Bench of this Court and I do not think that the relief for quashing Annexure 3 in the facts and circumstances of the case can he legitimately refused on the ground of delay. 4. Mr. T.K. Jha opposed the application on two grounds, namely, (i) that the conviction of the petitioner as maintained by the Supreme Court under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code involves gross moral turpitude and the decision to dismiss him is legal and valid and (ii) the regulations are not statutory in nature and the impugned orders passed thereunder, therefore, cannot be interfered with under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. In support of the second point; Mr. T.K. Jha relied on the observations in V.T. Khanzode and others vs. Reserve Bank of India and Another, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 917. The facts there were different and the case does not help the Respondent except showing that the regulations an: not statutory. The case which appears to be relevant is B.S. Minims vs. Indian Statistical Institute, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 363. 5. In B.S. Minhas's case, the Respondent No. 4 before the Supreme Court was appointed as a Director of the Respondent Statistical Institute, and the petitioner challenged the same under Articles 32 of the Constitution on the ground of violation of bye-law No.2 of the Bye-laws. The Respondent while resisting the application contended that the bye-law being not statutory, the application could not succeed on the ground of its noncompliance. The objection was over-ruled holding that it was obligatory on the part of the Respondent No.1 which was an authority' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution follow the bye-laws, as the same had been framed for the conduct of its affairs to avoid arbitrariness. The position is identical. In support of its view, the Supreme Court referred to the rule enunciated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Vitarelli vs. Seaton, (1959) 3 Law Ed 2nd, 1012, in the following terms: “An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged. Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed. Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed. This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with that sword." The above observations were followed earlier also by the Supreme Court on several occasions. In Ramana Davaram Shetty vs. International Airport Authority of India, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1028, the Supreme Court held that it is a well settled rule of administrative law that an executive authority must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged and it must scrupulously observe those standards on pain of invalidation of an act in violation of them. I, therefore, overrule the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the Respondent. 6. The main point on which Mr. T.K. Jha elaborated his argument relates to the question as to what is the meaning of 'moral turpitude'. The expression has not been defined in the Regulations nor in the numerous other similar provisions, statutory or otherwise, which were examined during the hearing of this case. The learned counsel for the parties, therefore, placed before me several dictionaries for the purpose of interpreting it. Black's Law Dictionary orders to an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men as involving moral turpitude. In Law Lexicon by Ramnath Iyyer also the dement of baseness, vileness or depravity has been mentioned. In Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition published by West Publishing Company, the same aspect has been emphasised. The ordinary dictionaries of English language suggest that the expression has been used in the sense of unethical. The word 'ethical' means pertaining to or dealing with the moral or the principle of morality, that is, pertaining to right and wrong in conduct. Several decisions of different High Courts which were relied on by the learned counsel for the parties have also construed the term accordingly and I do not think there is any reason to interpret the expression differently with reference to the Regulations. 7. A precise definition of right and wrong having an universal application to all societies at all points of time is not feasible. 7. A precise definition of right and wrong having an universal application to all societies at all points of time is not feasible. The concept is varying in accordance with the beliefs of the people. An act which may be considered unethical and base by certain people may not be so looked down upon in another country and may be considered with approbation in still another society. It is also dependant on the time factor. Whenever a question arises for deciding whether a particular act involves moral turpitude or not, it will have to be examined in the background of the moral character of the relevant society and no absolute standard can be laid down. Mr. T.K. Jha strenuously contended that since the Petitioner had taken part in a not and caused injury to a person, his act must, therefore, be treated to be directed against the society. The learned counsel wants to condemn all such acts as involving moral turpitude. I am afraid, the broad proposition as pressed cannot be accepted. In the larger sense, every criminal act is directed against the society and applying t he test suggested on behalf of the respondent Bank, it shall involve moral turpitude in every case of conviction. This could not have been the intention of the author of the Regulation or similar other provisions because had it been so, the condition about involving moral turpitude would not have been mentioned. 8. Mr. T.K. Jha strongly relied on the decision of the Madras High Court in Management of Tractors & Farms Equipment Ltd. vs. First Additional Labour Court, Madras, 1982 (II) L.L.J. 403 . This decision, to my mind, docs not help him. The learned Judge in that case considered several other decisions and agreed with the view of the Allahabad High Court in Mangali vs. Chakki Lal, A.I.R. 1963 Allahabad, 527 that for deciding the question whether an act involves moral turpitude or not should be examined by tests; whether it shocks the moral conscience of society in general, whether the motive leading to it was a base one and whether the perpetrator can be considered to be of a depraved character on account of the act. Merely a violation of a particular statute cannot amount to such an act. Merely a violation of a particular statute cannot amount to such an act. In the Madras case, the person concerned was convicted for an offence for consumption of liquor under the Prohibition Act, but is was held that the offence did not involve moral turpitude. In the Allahabad case also, similar conclusion was reached for violation of the Excise Act. In Thakorbhai Rhagabhai vs. D.D.O. Surat, 1980 (3) S.L.R. 535, the Gujarat High Court was considering a case where the person concerned was convicted under sections 324, 147, 149 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code and observed that the said conviction did not involve moral turpitude as it could not be termed as unethical or immoral. 9. The judgment of the trial court convicting the Petitioner under section 326 was placed before me on behalf of the Respondents and it shows that the Petitioner was charged under section 326 of the Indian Penal Code for causing grievous hurt to one Bishwanath Prasad by means of a bhala. The statement in para 6 of the judgment indicates that there was a quarrel between the prosecution party and the accused, five in number, including the petitioner, with respect to certain claims and counter claims to a piece of land. A wall was being constructed by the prosecution party to which the accused party had objection. This led to the occurrence in which the petitioner was convicted. A man was killed for which another accused was convicted. So far' as the petitioner was concerned, it was held that he did not share the common object of killing the deceased. As stated earlier, ultimately, the conviction was converted by the Supreme Court into one under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code and the sentence was reduced to fine. Judged in this light, I hold that the petitioner was not guilty of an offence involving moral turpitude. 10. Even if it be assumed that the assault by the petitioner for which he has been convicted involved moral turpitude, he cannot be held liable to dismissal under Regulation 46(3), quoted in paragraph 3 above, as the provision mentions "gross moral turpitude". Admittedly, the other condition mentioned in Regulation 46(3), namely, the offence having a bearing on any of the affairs of the Bank or on the discharge by the petitioner of his duties in the Bank, is not attracted. Admittedly, the other condition mentioned in Regulation 46(3), namely, the offence having a bearing on any of the affairs of the Bank or on the discharge by the petitioner of his duties in the Bank, is not attracted. Can it be suggested that the position remains unaltered even after addition of the word 'gross' before 'moral turpitude'? It is an established rule of interpretation of a document that its author cannot be presumed to have used an unnecessary word, unless for some reason, it is shown otherwise. The use of the word 'gross' in the present case appears to be deliberate for restricting the application of the sub-regulation to acts which arc more serious in their nature of being unethical, immoral or base. The circumstances of the criminal case cannot lead to such an inference. 11. I, therefore, hold that the orders in Annexure 3 and Annexure 6 were wrongly passed and they are, therefore, quashed. The appropriate authority of the Reserve Bank shall now pass orders restoring the petitioner in service along with such benefits as may be permissible to him. The Writ Application is, accordingly, allowed, but in the circumstances, without costs.