Judgment :- 1. All these three Second Appeals arise out of suits instituted by the respondent to evict the appellants from three rooms in a bigger building having 33 rooms in all. These appeals have come before us in pursuance to an order of reference passed by Khalid, J. (as he then was). The said order reads as follows: "This second appeal raises an interesting question. The suit, out of which this second appeal arises, was one in ejectment of the defendant from a room in a building. According to the plaintiff, the defendant is occupying a room in a lodging house; and that a lodging house is the same as a hotel The defendant contends that the building is a room in a lodge, which falls within the Rent Control Act and that only a room in a hotel or a boarding house is exempted. In the Kerala Act, the exemption relates to 'a room in a hotel or a boarding house'. In certain cognate enactments in other States, the expression used is 'lodging house'. The appellant's case is that for a building to be either a hotel or a boarding house, in addition to stay, food should also be supplied. The Courts below concurrently found that the building was exempted from the operation of the Rent Control Act. 2. Reliance is placed by both on the decision reported in Associated Hotels of India v, R. N. Kapoor. (1). This judgment has been referred to by Nambiyar J, as he then was in the decision reported in Vidyadharan v. Narayana Pillai (2). 1n that case, the plaintiff had by a replication contended that the building in question was a hotel. Such a plea is absent in this case. However, some observations in the above judgment are capable of being understood to hold that a lodging house is the same thing as a hotel. This needs clarification. I therefore adjourn the case to be heard by a Division Bench." The questions that arise for our consideration are: 1. Whether the appellants are occupying the rooms from which they are sought to be evicted as lessees or only as licensees? 2.Whether the room occupied by the appellant is a room in a hotel? 2. OS. This needs clarification. I therefore adjourn the case to be heard by a Division Bench." The questions that arise for our consideration are: 1. Whether the appellants are occupying the rooms from which they are sought to be evicted as lessees or only as licensees? 2.Whether the room occupied by the appellant is a room in a hotel? 2. OS. No. 986/77 on the file of the Munsiff's Court, Trichur was instituted by the respondent in S.A. No. 1094/ 77 for evicting the appellant in that appeal from room No. 7 of the building. The rent of the room was Rs. 30/- per month. The Trial Court decreed the suit. Appeal AS. No. 201/79 filed by the appellant in this appeal before the District Court, Trichur happened to be dismissed. Hence these appeal. SA. 130/80 arises out of the decree in OS. No. 1124/77 as confirmed in AS. No. 203/79. It relates to room No. 19. The rent of that room is Rs. 60/- per month. S.A. No. 327/82 is against the decree in OS. No. 987/77 as confirmed in AS. No. 145/80. The decree related to room No. 27 occupied by the appellants on a monthly rental of Rs. 55/-. 3. The facts necessary for the disposal of these appeals can be stated in a nut-shell as follows: The plaint schedule room form part of a bigger building purchased by the plaintiff as per document Nos. 2119 and 2120 of 1976 of the Sub Registry Office, Trichur. The previous owner has let out the rooms to various persons including the appellants. The building was known by the name'Venku Memorial Home'. After the purchase the plaintiff changed its name as 'Priya Lodge'. The appellants are licensees staying in the rooms on payment of rent. The condition of the building is such that it requires reconstruction. The septic tanks and the pipe connections in the building are is a dilapidated condition. The municipal authorities have issued notice to the respondent asking for carrying out major repairs. The appellants have defaulted in payment of rent. The permission granted to the appellants have been withdrawn by issue of notice. Hence they are liable to surrender the building. 4. The appellants disputed the right of the plaintiff to claim recovery of the building in this proceeding. The appellants have defaulted in payment of rent. The permission granted to the appellants have been withdrawn by issue of notice. Hence they are liable to surrender the building. 4. The appellants disputed the right of the plaintiff to claim recovery of the building in this proceeding. According to them, they are tenants coming within the purview of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The grounds stated for recovery of the building were disputed. According to them even if a decree for eviction is passed in these suits they can be executed only in accordance with the provisions contained in S.11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 5. The most important question that has to be considered in these appeals is whether the appellants are lessees in respect of the rooms taken by them on rent or are they only licensees having permission to stay there. It is the common case that the entire building known by the name Priya Lodge has 33 rooms. All the rooms were occupied by persons on payment of rent. Except 3 rooms involved in these three appeals all the other rooms are now lying vacant. There is no document to evidence the arrangement by which the appellants are staying in the respective rooms. The appellant in S.A. No. 1094/79 has got a case that he was using room No. 7 for taking rest and also as a godown. It is his case that he is conducting a business in an adjoining shop room and that goods are also being stored in the plaint schedule room. This case put forth by him has not been substantiated and it has now been concurrently found that he was staying in room No. 7. The other appellants admit that they are using the respective rooms only for their stay there. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants, on the basis of the lawyer's notice issued by the respondent prior to the institution of the suit, contends that the transaction between the parties was taken by the respondent as a tenancy pure and simple. According to him by the notice the respondent called upon the appellants to treat the rental arrangement terminating with the expiry of 15 days the date of notice, co-terminus with the month of the tenancy. According to him by the notice the respondent called upon the appellants to treat the rental arrangement terminating with the expiry of 15 days the date of notice, co-terminus with the month of the tenancy. This averment in the notice must be taken as a notice of termination of the tenancy under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. If the respondent had understood the arrangement as a licence, such a notice would not have been sent on her behalf. It is further submitted that the plaint has been valued under S.42 of the Court Fees Act on the annual rental of the building. This also would go to show that the respondent was treating the arrangement between the parties as a lease and lease alone. 7. Ext. Al is the true copy of the lawyer's notice sent to the appellants. Even though it states that the room is to be surrendered on the expiry of 15 days, co-terminus with the month of the tenacity it specifically provides that with effect from that date the permission given to the appellant for the stay will stand terminated. The averments in the plaint only go to show that the appellants were licensees in respect of the respective rooms occupied by them. The mere fact that a larger amount has been paid by way of Court fee under S.42 of the Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act will not make the suit one based on any tenancy arrangement. 8. The appellants have no case that they are having any interest in the building of which the rooms occupied by them forms a part. The entire building is under the control of the respondent. The evidence in the case shows that the respondent has engaged a Watchman and a Room boy for the building. The entire control and possession of the building remains with the respondent In other words, the entire control over the apartment was with the respondent. The appellants are in the position of a lodger or as inmate. The rooms occupied by the appellant form part of the building over which the respondent has the general control and the fact that the appellants have not obtained any interest in the rooms for exclusive enjoyment show that the appellants are only licensees. They had the sole privilege of stay in the respective rooms and had no interest in the building. They had the sole privilege of stay in the respective rooms and had no interest in the building. Taking into consideration the entire circumstance of the case we have no hesitation to hold that the appellants in these three second appeals are only licensees in respect of the three rooms occupied by them. At this juncture we think it worthwhile to quote the following passage from the judgment of A Lord Greene, M. R. in Backer v. Palmer (1842-2 All ER 674-677) quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in the decision Ramamurthy Subudhi v. Gopinath (AIR. 1968 SC. 919). "There is one golden rule which is of very general application, namely, that the law does not impute intention to enter into legal relationship where the circumstances and the conduct of the parties negative any intention of the kind." From the facts discussed above, it is abundantly clear that the intention of the parties was only to grant permission to the appellants to stay in the rooms which were scheduled to the plaints When the intention was only that, it will not be just to impute intention to the parties to have a landlord-tenant relationship between them. 9. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants advanced an argument that the respondent was asking rent for the rooms. The demand of rent, according to counsel, can only be the consequence of a tenancy arrangement. We are not impressed with this argument either. Reference may be made to the decision in Ramamurthy Subudhi v. Gopinath (AIR. 1968 SC 919). Their Lordship state: "In its wider sense rent meant any payment made for the use of land or buildings and thus includes the payment by a licensee in respect of the use and occupation of any land or buildings. In its narrower sense it means payment made by a tenant to landlord for property demised to him." Thus in a wider sense rent can mean payment of the licence fee also. Accordingly, the demand of rent made by the respondent will not in any way go to help the appellants to substantiate their case that they were lessees in respect of the rooms or that there was any tenancy arrangement between the parties. 10. Accordingly, the demand of rent made by the respondent will not in any way go to help the appellants to substantiate their case that they were lessees in respect of the rooms or that there was any tenancy arrangement between the parties. 10. In view of the above discussion we hold that the appellants in these three appeals are only licensees in respect of the three rooms with which we are concerned in these appeals. A suit for recovery of the premises is therefore maintainable and the decree passed by the Courts below allowing the said prayer of the respondent calls for no interference. 11. The second question with which we are concerned in this Second Appeals is whether the petition schedule rooms fall within the category of "room in a hotel". S.2(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act defines building. This Clause further provides that a building defined therein does not include a room in a hotel or a boarding house. If the petition schedule rooms fall within the category of "room in a hotel" then no provision of the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act will apply to it. 12. The entire building of which the three rooms occupied by the appellants in these appeal form part is known as Priya Lodge. Before the building was purchased by the respondent it was known as Venku Memorial Home. Altogether it has 33 rooms. All the 33 rooms were let out to different persons for their stay. No food: was being cooked in the building. The evidence before Court now goes to show that the respondent had engaged a room boy and he was getting food from other places to the inmates. Whether such a place will become a hotel is the question for our consideration. 13. In Associated Hotels of India v. R N. Kapoor (AIR. No food: was being cooked in the building. The evidence before Court now goes to show that the respondent had engaged a room boy and he was getting food from other places to the inmates. Whether such a place will become a hotel is the question for our consideration. 13. In Associated Hotels of India v. R N. Kapoor (AIR. 1959 SC 1262) S. K. Das J. observed: "It is sufficient to state that in its ordinary connotation the word 'hotel' means a house for entertaining strangers or travellers: a place where lodging is furnished to transient guests as well as one where both lodging and food or other amenities are furnished." His Lordship went on to state: "I am prepared, however, to state that a strictly literal construction may not be justified and the word 'room' in the composite expression 'room in a hotel' must take colour from the context or the collocation of words in which it has been used; in other words, its meaning should be determined noscitur a sociis. The reason why I think so may be explained by an illustration. Suppose there is a big room inside a hotel; in a physical sense it is a room in a hotel, but let us suppose that it is let out. to take an extreme example, as a timber godown. Will it still be a room in a hotel, though in a physical sense it is a room of the building which is used as a hotel? I think it would be doing violence to the context if the expression 'room in a hotel' is interpreted in a strictly literal sense. On the view which I take a room in a hotel must fulfil two conditions: (I) it must be part of a hotel in the physical sense and (2) its user must be connected with the general purpose of the hotel of which it is a part." Subba Rao J. in the above decision observed: "It is, therefore, necessary to ascertain the meaning of the word "hotel" The word "hotel" is not defined in the Act A hotel in common parlance means a place where a proprietor makes it his business to furnish food or lodging or both to travellers or other persons. (emphasis added) A building cannot be run as a hotel unless services necessary for the comfortable stay of lodgers and boarders are maintained. (emphasis added) A building cannot be run as a hotel unless services necessary for the comfortable stay of lodgers and boarders are maintained. Services so maintained vary with the standard of the hotel and the class of persons to which it caters; but the amenities roust have relation to the hotel business. Provisions for heating or lighting, supply of hot water, sanitary arrangements, sleeping facilities, and such others are some of the amenities a hotel offers to its constituents." 15. In Strouds Judicial Dictionary states: 'A hotel' is a place where lodging are let and where provisions are, to some extent supplied The modern word is introduced from the French, and rather implies a house to which people resort for lodgings, than for the sort of entertainment procured only at an inn. It also states: "I think that the word hotel always imports a bouse where travellers are taken in to lodge" 16. P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon mentions hotel as a place where the proprietor makes it his business to furnish food or lodging or both to travellers or other persons. 17. In Vidyadharan v. Narayana Pillai (1973 KLT. 203) V. P. Gopalan Nambiyar J. (as he then was) stated: "Counsel for the plaintiff also invited my attention to the decision in Madan Lal v. Dr. Brahm Sarup (1951-53 Punj. L. R.75) where, after referring to the definition of the term 'hotel' in Ramanatha Iyer's Law Lexicon, and to the provisions of the Punjab and the West Bengal Rent Control Legislations, a learned judge of the Punjab High Court held that 'hotel' is a place where food or lodging or both is, or are, made available to travellers or for other persons. My attention was called to several dictionaries and law lexicons. Some of them contain indications that both food and lodging should be served before a building can be regarded as 'hotel'. Others state that provision for either food or lodging is sufficient to constitute a hotel. Having regard to the fact that the two learned judges of the Supreme Court (Das and Subba Rao JJ.) preferred to adopt the definition of 'hotel' as given in Ramanatha Iyer's Law Lexicon, I am of the opinion that the room in question is a room in a hotel and therefore exempt from the definition of the term 'building' in S.2(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. I therefore allow Civil Revision Petition No. 1193 of 1972." We are in respectful agreement with the above observations made by the learned judge and we approve the same 18. The meaning of hotel as seen in Webstor's Dictionary of English language is: "A building or establishment which provides giving accommodation for transit visitors and sometimes long term resident and often offers other facilities such as meeting rooms, restaurants, entertainment, shops are available to its guests and to the general public." The meaning of the word 'hotel' when considered in the light of the views expressed by the Supreme Court, dictionaries and the Law Lexicon is a place where food or lodging or both is, or are made available to travellers or for other persons. The respondent was giving accommodation to various persons in the 33 rooms which form the building known as Priya Lodge. Provision was made for getting cooked food from elsewhere to the inmates. For the said purpose a room boy way employed. This shows that Priya Lodge was giving accommodation to travellers or other persons and the occupants were provided with other amenities as well. Therefore it can safely be considered as a hotel Consequently, the rooms occupied by the appellants are "rooms in a hotel". Those rooms are exempt from the provisions contained in the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The appellants are thus not tenants entitled to the protection of any of the provisions contained in that Act. The decrees passed by the Court below allowing recovery of the rooms from the appellants call for no interference. The result, therefore, in these three appeals fail and are dismissed with costs.