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1985 DIGILAW 314 (PAT)

Life Insurance Corporation Of India v. Yogesh Chandra Lodh Roy

1985-11-09

S.S.SANDHAWALIA, S.SHAMSUL HASAN

body1985
Judgment S.Shamsul Hasan, J. 1. The defendants have preferred this appeal which arises out of a suit filed by respondent No. 1 claiming the benefit on the life insurance policy, being policy No. 10210751, perhaps dated January 7, 1958, on the demise of his spouse, Smt. Manorma Lodh Roy. 2. A policy had been obtained by the said deceased lady from the Metropolitan Insurance Co., being policy No. 477407, which policy, it is not disputed, was transferred to the Life Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as "the Corporation"). Because of the plaintiffs wife being highly of overweight, that policy was accepted by the said Metropolitan Insurance Co., with lien of the 50% of the sum assured decreasing by 10% per year. Subsequently, the plaintiff and his wife, the said late Smt. Manorma Lodh Roy, took a joint policy from the Corporation (which is the subject-matter of this appeal) for a sum of Rs. 2,000 but in the instant suit, the claim was made to the extent of Rs. 1,642 only, since, as it appears, a sum of Rs. 350 was advanced as a loan on the said policy. On the death of the wife, the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 claimed the said amount but it was refused by the Corporation on the ground of giving mis-statement in answer to questions Nos. 8 and 9 in the proposal form and also for fraudulent suppression of material facts, rendering the policy null and void. By this, the nature of the previous policy, that is, policy No. 477407, and the state of health of the wife of the plantiff at the time of the purchase of that policy had been concealed. 3. 8 and 9 in the proposal form and also for fraudulent suppression of material facts, rendering the policy null and void. By this, the nature of the previous policy, that is, policy No. 477407, and the state of health of the wife of the plantiff at the time of the purchase of that policy had been concealed. 3. The trial court dismissed the suit but the appellate court decreed it mainly on the grounds : (i) that the plaintiffs wife, being an uneducated lady, the form was filled in by the agent and she could not know its implication, (ii)that the mention of the loss of weight was not material because at the time the proposal was signed, the plaintiffs wife was perfectly in sound health and the loss of weight was not due to any deceit and, therefore, the omission to mention it was not material, and (iii) that the mis-statement by the proponent in exhibit A was not material nor was it made fraudulently with the knowledge of the proponent to be false and, therefore, it did not vitiate the contract. Hence, this appeal by the defendants. 4. The points of law originally framed were as follows : " (i) Whether the court below erred in law in holding that the policy in question can be said to have been vitiated by fraud ? (ii) Whether the inaccuracies found by the court below can be said to have materially affected the policy ?" 5. The matter was referred by me to a larger Bench on the point of interpretation of Sec. 45 of the Insurance Act, 1938 , as raised by the respondent-plaintiff. Before this Bench, this point was abandoned and broadly the only submission made was that the finding of the appellate court that the concealments were not material and fraudulent should not be interfered with, particularly because the deceased lady who signed the proposal was illiterate and did not know really what she was signing and that the concealments, if any, were not fraudulent nor was any suppression made. 6. As stated above, the court below has held that the concealment was not material in view of the fact that the condition of health at the time of purchase of the policy of the lady in question was good. In my view, the findings are contrary to law and are entirely specious. 6. As stated above, the court below has held that the concealment was not material in view of the fact that the condition of health at the time of purchase of the policy of the lady in question was good. In my view, the findings are contrary to law and are entirely specious. What was required to be stated and was a material fact was that the condition appertaining in any prior policy and the state of health at the time of the issuance of the second policy would not affect the requirement to state the material fact regarding any previous policy. Even if the wife of the plaintiff had become healthy, the requirement to state material particulars and all the information required to be given were absolutely essential. The aspects relevant are three, namely, (i) the statement made in the proposal for insurance was inaccurate or false or was on a material matter or suppressed facts which it was material to disclose, (ii) it was fraudulently made by the insured, and (iii) the policyholder knew at the time of taking it that such a statement was false or suppressed facts which were material to be disclosed. It is open to the Corporation, in view of Sec. 45 of the Act, to challenge the correctness of any such statement made in the proposal form, if the above conditions are fulfilled. This is based on the, principle that a contract of life insurance is uberrima fides and it is vitiated due to the non-disclosure and misrepresentation which are fraudulent in nature. 7. Now, the facts required in the form of proposal and which were not stated by the wife of the plaintiff, were undoubtedly within the three-categories set out above and undoubtedly were affected by all the three situations spelt out above. The submission of learned counsel for the appellants, therefore, is entirely tenable and acceptable, that the findings of the appellate court are erroneous in law and the manner of entries in the proposal form amounts to fraudulent concealment. 8. The submission of learned-counsel for the plaintiff-respondent that the illiterate lady did not know what she was signing would be a good and valid submission if the document of contract was being repudiated and not when the party is claiming a benefit from that contract. 9. 8. The submission of learned-counsel for the plaintiff-respondent that the illiterate lady did not know what she was signing would be a good and valid submission if the document of contract was being repudiated and not when the party is claiming a benefit from that contract. 9. A few decisions which are relevant to the matter in issue are cited below for reference, (i) Lakskmi Insurance Co. Ltd. V/s. Bibi Padmawati [1961] 31 Comp Cas (Ins) 96 ; AIR 1961 Punj 253 and Life Insurance Corporation of India V/s. Baidyanath Singh, AIR 1978 Pat 334 ; [1979] 49 Comp Cas 653. 10. In the result, the appeal is allowed without costs and the judgment and the decree of the court of appeal are set aside and those of the trial court are restored. S.S.Sandhawalia, J. 11 I agree.