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1985 DIGILAW 316 (CAL)

Barindra Kesbori Roy v. Deb Prasanna Mukherjee

1985-08-05

SUDHIR RANJAN ROY

body1985
JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows :–– This appeal by the substituted defendants arises out of the plaintiff's suit for ejectment and khas possession being Title Suit No. 239 of 1966 of the First Court of the Munsiff at Asansol. 2. The relevant facts are as follows :–– Plaintiff is the owner of the suit premises and the original defendant Anima Roy was a tenant under him in respect thereof at a monthly rental of Rs. 65/- payable according to English Calendar month. Defendant having defaulted in payment of rent from the month of October, 1965, the plaintiff terminated the tenancy by a notice to quit dated April 4, 1966. Inspite of the notice having been duly served upon the defendant on April 11, 1966, the defendant refused and neglected to quit and vacate the suit premises, which compelled the plaintiff to file the instant suit for khas possession and for other reliefs. 3. Defendant contested by filing a written statement and defence, inter alia, was that the defendant was not a defaulter as alleged. So far the rents for October to December, 1965 are concerned, the defence case, was that inspite of the rents having been duly paid to the plaintiff, no receipt was granted for the same. Thereafter, the plaintiff's agent having refused to accept rent for the month of January, 1966, the subsequent rents were deposited with the Rent Controller. After the suit was instituted the defendant deposited rents in Court for the months of October, 1965 to December, 1965 with statutory interest thereon and from September, 1966 and onwards she had been regularly depositing the rents in Court. The defendant also denied service of the notice to quit upon her. 4. On the aforesaid facts the parties went into evidence and on a perusal of the said evidence the learned trial Court held that the defendant was a defaulter as alleged and that the notice to quit was also served upon her and on the said findings he decreed the suit in the plaintiff's favour. 5. Being aggrieved the defendant moved up in appeal and the learned lower appellate Court being of the same view that the defendant was a defaulter as alleged by the plaintiff, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. 6. 5. Being aggrieved the defendant moved up in appeal and the learned lower appellate Court being of the same view that the defendant was a defaulter as alleged by the plaintiff, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. 6. During the pendency of the appeal before the learned lower appellate court the defendant died and was substituted by her legal heirs. The said legal heirs of the original defendant have now come up in appeal before this Court being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned lower appellate court in Title Appeal No. 88 of 1967. 7. Appearing on behalf of the appellants it was contended by Mr. Chatterjee, the learned Advocate, that the learned. Courts below erred in law is not granting relief to his clients under section 17(4) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act on the ground that the defendant had made a second default of four months within a period of twelve months. 8. None appeared on behalf of the respondent when the appeal was taken up for hearing. 9. The only ground on which eviction of the defendant was sought for, was default in payment of rent from October, 1965 to December, 1965. However, during the pendency of the suit the defendant with the permission of the Court deposited the rents for the said months with statutory interest thereon. Having done so, the defendant asked for relief under sub-section (4) of section 17 of the Premises Tenancy Act, which was refused to her by the learned Courts below on the ground that she had made a second default of four months within a period of twelve months, i.e. from February, 1966 to May, 1966. 10. According to the defendant, she deposited rents for January, 1966 to August, 1966 with the Rent Controller as the plaintiff refused to accept the rent for the month of January, 1966 which was sent by postal Money Order. In support thereof the defendant produced the relevant money order receipt (Ext. C) to show that on February 7, 1966 a sum of Rs. 65/- was remitted to the plaintiff. 11. It has been found by the learned lower appellate Court that regarding payment of rents there was no contract between the parties and the agreement (Ext. 7) produced by the plaintiff was not accepted. C) to show that on February 7, 1966 a sum of Rs. 65/- was remitted to the plaintiff. 11. It has been found by the learned lower appellate Court that regarding payment of rents there was no contract between the parties and the agreement (Ext. 7) produced by the plaintiff was not accepted. Accordingly, rent for January 1966 could be paid by the defendant by February 15, 1966 and that being so, remittance of rent for January, 1966 on February 7, 1966 was quite within time. Incidentally, the plaintiff having refused to accept the Money Order, the rent for January, 1966 was deposited with the Rent Controller on March 2, 1966, though the relevant challan was passed within time on February 28, 1966. Evidence was adduced before the learned trial Court to show that the deposit with the State Bank of India could not be made prior to March 2, 1966, a fact which none of the learned Courts below disbelieved. 12. Under sub-section (1) of section 21 of the Premises Tenancy Act, where the landlord does not accept any rent tendered by the tenant within the time referred to in section 4 of the Act. The tenant may deposit such rent with the Rent Controller and that where any rent is remitted by the tenant to the landlord by postal Money Order, the date of issue of the postal Money Order she shall be deemed to be the date of tender of such rent by the tenant to the landlord. 13. Under sub-section (2) of section 4 of the Premises Tenancy Act rent shall be paid within the time fixed by contract or in the absence of such contract, by the 15th of the next following month. As already stated, the date of tender of the rent for January, 1966 was February 7, 1966, which was within the period contemplated by sub-section (2) of section 4, since there was no contract between the parties to the contrary, as found by the learned Courts below. 14. The learned lower appellate Court found that even if it be assumed that the rent for January, 1966 was tendered in time, deposit of rents for the subsequent months with the Rent Controller not having been proceeded by valid tenders, the said deposits were invalid. 14. The learned lower appellate Court found that even if it be assumed that the rent for January, 1966 was tendered in time, deposit of rents for the subsequent months with the Rent Controller not having been proceeded by valid tenders, the said deposits were invalid. Sub-section (4) of section 21, however, provides that where rent for any month or period has been deposited under section 21 on the ground that the landlord did not accept the rent when tendered, the tenant may, without further tender of the rent to the landlord continue to deposit the rent for subsequent months or periods. Thus, under the amended sub-section (4A) of section 21, tender for the initial month and refusal by the landlord to accept the same authorises the tenant to go on depositing rents with the Rent Controller unless the landlord signifies tender is necessary. 15. This amendment having come into force during the pendency of this appeal, which is a continuation of the suit, this court is bound to take note of the said amendment. 16. It is, therefore, clear that deposit of rent with the Rent Controller for the month of January, 1966 and onwards were valid deposits and under no circumstances the defendant could be said to have made a second default of four months within a period of twelve months. Moreover, under the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 17, no relief can be granted to the defaulting tenant if having obtained such relief once he has again made default in payment of rent for four months within a period of twelve months. Incidentally, the proviso to subsection (4) of section 17 was substituted by the amending Act of 1969 and was made operative from August 26, 1967 and is retrospective in operation. It is not the case of the plaintiff and nor was it found by the learned Courts below that the defendant having obtained relief once under section 17 (4), made a second default. 17. The learned Courts below were, therefore, wrong in holding that the defendant was not entitled to any relief under section 17(4) since she had made a second default for four months within a period of twelve months. 18. 17. The learned Courts below were, therefore, wrong in holding that the defendant was not entitled to any relief under section 17(4) since she had made a second default for four months within a period of twelve months. 18. Thus, being a defaulter for the first time, the defendant should have been granted relief under section 17(4) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, she having deposited the arrears from October, 1965 to December, 1965 in Court with statutory Interest. 19. Thus, the only ground of eviction made by the plaintiff against the defendant not being sustainable in law, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgments and decrees of the learned Courts below are hereby set aside and the suit be dismissed. The defendant appellant having deposited the arrears of rent in Court with statutory interest, no decree or order for delivery of possession of the suit premises is made in view of the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, the defendant having defaulted in payment of rent for the first time. 20. The plaintiff-respondent will, however, get the costs of the suit from the appellants including the costs of the appeal before the learned appellate Court. No order for costs is however, made in this appeal since there was no appearance in this appeal on behalf of the respondent. Let the records be sent down to the learned trial Court along with a copy of this judgment as early as possible.