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1985 DIGILAW 316 (DEL)

MAGNUM FILMS v. GOLCHA PROPERTIES

1985-08-23

G.R.LUTHRA

body1985
( 1 ) BY way of this judgment, Suits Nos. 580-A/85, 622-A/85 and two applications (1. A. 2047/85 in Suit No. 1154-A/83 and LA. 2829/85 in Suit No. 580-A/85) are being decided. The judgment is being recorded in the file of Suit No. 580-A/85. ( 2 ) M/s. Magnum Films (hereinafter referred to as the claimant) is a partnership firm. It is carrying on business of distribution, exhibition and exploitation of films. M/s. Golcha Properties Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the objector) is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act. It is carrying on the business of exhibition of films in a cinema known as golcha CINEMA , Delhi. ( 3 ) ON May 3, 1982, the objector and the claimant entered into an agreement by virtue of which a picture having the title "nikaah was released on and from 15th October 1982 for exhibition in Golcha Cinema, Delhi besides a number of other cinemas of Delhi, New Delhi and Uttar Pradesh. The picture did roaring business. It was exhibited in Golcha Cinema tor 40 weeks ending on 21st July 1983. Vide the aforesaid agreement, the cinema hire was agreed upon at Rs. 52,000. 00 per week. That hire was to be retained by the objector and the balance after meeting the expenditure was to be paid to the claimant. The objector made payments to the claimant in respect of the first 8 weeks but did not pay anything thereafter. On June 15, 1983, the accounts were gone into between the parties, and it was agreed that the objector shall pay a sum of Rs. 3,93,628. 14 P. in full and final settlement towards the dues of the claimant in respect of the exhibition of the picture up to 34th week. It was further agreed that Rs. 75,000. 00 would be payable forthwith and that the balance would be payable @ Rs. l0,000. 00 per week commencing from June 21,1983. In pursuance of that agreement, the claimant handed over cheque No. 131175 dated 15th June 1983 on State Bank of Patiala drawn in favour of M/s. B. R. Films, Bombay. That cheque, was, however, dishonoured on presentation and not even a single penny was paid out of the aforesaid amount of Rs. 3,93,628. 00 per week commencing from June 21,1983. In pursuance of that agreement, the claimant handed over cheque No. 131175 dated 15th June 1983 on State Bank of Patiala drawn in favour of M/s. B. R. Films, Bombay. That cheque, was, however, dishonoured on presentation and not even a single penny was paid out of the aforesaid amount of Rs. 3,93,628. 14 P. According to the claimant, the objector is liable to pay that amount besides the income for the exhibition of the picture from 35th to 40th week. ( 4 ) IN the agreement dated May 3,1982, as already mentioned, the theatre hire was Rs. 52,000. 00 per week consisting of 28 shows. The claimant urges that the said theatre hire was fixed on the basis of the capacity of the cinema hall and the value of the admission tickets, that on May 3, 1982 the value of the admission tickets was higher, that the same was reduced with effect from February 4, 1983 and that, therefore, from February 4, 1983 the theatre hire chargeable by the objector should be proportionately reduced. According to the calculations of the claimant, the theatre hire was liable to be reduced from Rs. 52,000. 00 per week to Rs. 46,549. 15 per week. The reasons given by the claimant for the aforesaid reduction are briefly as follows : The hire depended on the capacity of cinema hall and the value of the admission tickets. On or about 15th December 1980, the rates of admission were Rs. 7. 00 per ticket for the balcony and Rs. 5. 00 per ticket for the lower class. In that way, the weekly full house capacity of Golcha Cinema was Rs. 70,012. 60 P. Then the rates of admission were controlled by Delhi Administration. Delhi High Court, AIR 1979 Delhi 49 held on May 15, 1979 that the Delhi Administration had no right to control the. rates of cinema tickets. Thereafter the Central Government extended the provisions of the Punjab Cinemas Regulation Act, 1952 which were in force in the State of Haryana to the Union Territory of Delhi. By virtue of that, Delhi Administration was entitled to fix the rates of admission in the cinemas in the Union Territory of Delhi. The cinema owners filed separate writ petitions. The objector also filed such a petition challenging the authority of Delhi Administration to fix the rates of admission. By virtue of that, Delhi Administration was entitled to fix the rates of admission in the cinemas in the Union Territory of Delhi. The cinema owners filed separate writ petitions. The objector also filed such a petition challenging the authority of Delhi Administration to fix the rates of admission. Delhi High Court fixed the following rates of admission for Golcha Cinema as an interim measure during the pendency of the writ petition : ( 5 ) ON account of the aforesaid rates, the capacity of Golcha Cinema per week came to Rs. 78,211. 00. The aforesaid arrangement was subject to the ultimate decision of the writ petition. On December 20, 1982 Delhi High Court dismissed all the writ petitions of the cinema owners and directed the present respondent to re-fix its rates of admission as were prevalent before December 15, 1980. The respondent filed Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court which was dismissed on January 28, 1983. The result was that on February 4, 1983, the respondent fixed the cinema rates as were prevalent on 15th December 1980 which reduced the weekly full house capacity to Rs. 70,012. 60 P. On the basis of that reduced weekly full house capacity, the theatre hire was liable to be reduced proportionately, to Rs. 46,549. 15 P. . instead of Rs. 52,000. 00 per week. ( 6 ) BY way of calculating the theatre hire at Rs. 46,549. 15 per week with effect from February 4,1983, the claimant claims a sum of Rs. 5,91,261. 70 as due from the objector. It is stated that according to the agreement arrived at between the parties on June 15, 1983, the theatre hire was fixed at Rs. 52,000. 00 per week, but that the said agreement had ceased to be enforceable and binding on the claimant because the objector had not paid even a single penny out of the amount of Rs. 3,93,628. 14 P. which was agreed to be paid vide the aforesaid agreement. ( 7 ) AS disputes arose between the parties, the claimant brought a petition under S. 20 of the Arbitration Act which was registered as Suit No. 1154-A of 1983. By means of an order dated December 7, 1983, Motion Picture Association, Chandni Chowk, Delhi was appointed as arbitrator in accordance with the agreement. ( 7 ) AS disputes arose between the parties, the claimant brought a petition under S. 20 of the Arbitration Act which was registered as Suit No. 1154-A of 1983. By means of an order dated December 7, 1983, Motion Picture Association, Chandni Chowk, Delhi was appointed as arbitrator in accordance with the agreement. ( 8 ) THEREAFTER the claimant brought an application (I. A. 5327/83) to the effect that direction be issued that there should be appointment of arbitrators and the decision of the disputes be expedited soon. Arbitrators were thereafter appointed and as they disagreed in respect of appointment of an Umpire, by the agreement of the parties, Shri Justice S. Rangarajan, retired Judge of this Court was appointed as Umpire. Vide order dated 27th April 1984, following directions were given : "now the arbitrators will proceed with the arbitration according to law and the Umpire shall step in if there is any difference of opinion. The arbitrators shall proceed with the arbitration and decide the matter as expeditiously as possible. "before thearbitrators the claimant put in a written request dated 19th March 1984, which reads as under: "it is prayed that the Hon ble Arbitrators may please give an interim award u/s. 27 of the Arbitration Act: a) A sum of Rs. 3,93,628. 14 paisa being admitted amount be paid to us immediately. b) That the amount accruing after allowing the disputed Theatre Hire of Rs. 52,000. 00 per week which the defender in this case is demanding out of the total gross of the picture of 40 weeks run be deposited in the Association. After giving adjustment of Rs. 3,93,628. 14 which may be paid to us as per prayer above. " ( 9 ) THEREAFTER the claimant filed a claim dated 18th June 1984. In that claim, the claimant reiterated his request to the arbitrators that an interim award directing the objector to pay the amount of Rs. 3,93,628. 14 being the admitted amount be given immediately. ( 10 ) ON November 17, 1984, differences arose between the arbitrators and they referred the question of interim application for interim award to the Umpire Shri S. Rangarajan, J. for further proceedings as the arbitrators had differed on the award and had given their respective awards . 3,93,628. 14 being the admitted amount be given immediately. ( 10 ) ON November 17, 1984, differences arose between the arbitrators and they referred the question of interim application for interim award to the Umpire Shri S. Rangarajan, J. for further proceedings as the arbitrators had differed on the award and had given their respective awards . Then the matter came up before the Umpire who gave an interim award directing the objector to pay to the claimant a sum of Rs. 4,01,170. 34 with costs. The Umpire sought direction of the Court if he had to decide the remaining disputes between the parties. ( 11 ) THE Umpire filed the award in Court. The same was registered as Suit No. 580-A/85. Notice of filing of the award was sent to the claimant as well as the objector. The objector came up with an application (registered as LA. 2829/85) for setting aside the interim award and for either removing the Umpire or for granting permission for revoking his authority. The grounds on the basis of which the objector prays for setting aside of the award and removing the Umpire or granting permission for revoking his authority are being mentioned hereinafter. ( 12 ) THE claimant filed a petition under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act for making the award a rule of the Court. That petition was registered as Suit No. 622-A/85. ( 13 ) THE claimant also made an application (LA. 2047/85) to the effect that the Umpire be directed to decide all the disputes between the parties. ( 14 ) THE objections of the objector are contested by the claimant. The objector contests the making of the award a rule of the Court and also contested the Suit No. 622a/85 as well as I. A. 2047/85 filed by the claimant. Following issues were framed on 28th May 1985 : 1. Is the award liable to be set aside on the grounds mentioned in the objection petition (I. A. 2829/85)? 2. Relief. ( 15 ) WITH the consent of the parties all the aforesaid petitions were taken up together. Arguments were also heard together and it was requested by the parties that they be decided by one and the same judgment. Accordingly, all these are being decided together. 2. Relief. ( 15 ) WITH the consent of the parties all the aforesaid petitions were taken up together. Arguments were also heard together and it was requested by the parties that they be decided by one and the same judgment. Accordingly, all these are being decided together. ( 16 ) IT is on the following grounds that the objector prays for the setting aside of the award : (A) The Umpire had misconducted the proceedings by way of exceeding the scope of reference. The difference between the arbitrators was confined only to a question of law as to whether an interim award can be legally given or not but the Umpire instead of answering that question of law in the negative or positive and then sending back the matter to the arbitrators, illegally assumed jurisdiction of making the interim award on merits. (B) The Umpire totally ignored the plea of the objector to the effect that it was in full and final settlement of the claim of the claimant that the objector had agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 3,93,628. 14 to the claimant and without deciding that plea, gave the interim award. The award is thus incomplete and without jurisdiction on the part of the Umpire and is thus liable to be set aside. (C) The claimant did not have any right to recover anything from the objector because the former had assigned his rights in this respect to B. R. Chopra vide agreement dated 15th June 1983. Without deciding the aforesaid essential question of fact, the Umpire gave an interim award holding that the claimant was entitled to a sum of Rs. 4,01,170. 34 P. In that way, the Umpire misconducted the proceedings. (D) The prayer of the claimant in respect of interim award was confined to a sum of Rs. 3,93,628. 14 while the Umpire went beyond the scope of that prayer and exceeded his jurisdiction and awarded a higher amount of Rs. 4,01,170. 34 P. ( 17 ) THE contention of the objector is that not only that the award should be set aside but that on account of the aforesaid misconducts, the Umpire has rendered himself unfit to continue as an Umpire and that either permission be given under S. 5 of the Arbitration Act to revoke his authrority or he be removed by the Court under S. 11 of the said Act. ( 18 ) IT may be mentioned that the objections of the objector for setting aside the award and his application for permission for revoking the authority of the Umpire or removing the Umpire are quite lengthy ones. However, only the sum and substance of th6se have been stated above. ( 19 ) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. I am taking up separately the different grounds for (illegible ). ( 20 ) IT is factually wrong that the differences between the arbitrators were confined only to a question of law as to whether an interim award can be legally given or not. However, before adverting to the facts in that respect, I am assuming for the sake of finding the legal position that the differences between the arbitrators were so confined. The question as to whether in the event of partial differences between the arbitrators, the Umpire gets jurisdiction to decide all the disputes between the parties or not can be determined by finding out as to what the Arbitration Act lays down in that respect. The law in this respect is contained in paragraphs 4 and 5 of First Schedule of the Arbitration Act which read as under: "4. If the arbitrators have allowed their time to expire without making an award or have delivered to any party to the arbitration agreement or to the umpire a notice in writing stating that they cannot agree, the umpire shall forthwith enter on the reference in lieu of the arbitrators. " "5. The umpire shall make his award within two months of entering on the reference or within such extended time as the Court may allow. "it is apparent from the above that the umpire comes into the picture in any of the following two situations : (I) The arbitrators have allowed their time to expire without making any award, or (II) arbitrators have delivered to any party to the arbitration agreement or to the umpire notice in writing stating that they cannot agree. ( 21 ) IT is, therefore, apparent that in any of the aforesaid situations, it becomes the duty of the umpire to enter on the reference in lieu of the arbitrators. The word "reference" clearly indicates that it is the entire reference 9n which an arbitrator (sic) should enter. ( 21 ) IT is, therefore, apparent that in any of the aforesaid situations, it becomes the duty of the umpire to enter on the reference in lieu of the arbitrators. The word "reference" clearly indicates that it is the entire reference 9n which an arbitrator (sic) should enter. That means that the umpire should decide all the disputes and should not merely confine himself to the area of differences between the arbitrators. That position is further confirmed from the existence of the words "in lieu of the arbitrators". The words "in lieu of mean instead of. The net effect is that the umpire is to work instead of the arbitrators, which in other words means that the umpire is to be substituted completely in place of the arbitrators with the result that it becomes the duty of the umpire to decide all the disputes between the parties as could be done by the arbitrators. Therefore, in the present case, even if we assume for the sake of arguments that the differences between the arbitrators were limited only to determination of the question of law if an interim award could be given or not, the jurisdiction of the umpire was not confined to that question of law alone but extended to the decision of the disputes between the parties as if the arbitrators went to the background and the umpire had been substituted in their place. ( 22 ) FACTUALLY also, it is wrong on the part of the objector to say that the differences between the arbitrators were confined only to the aforesaid question of law. The differences between the arbitrators came on the surface in the proceedings dated November 17, 1984. Those proceedings (after excluding the noting of the presence of the parties) read as under : "the authority letter containing resolution of the Board of Directors of Golcha Properties (P) Ltd. for Shri N. R. Sini is taken on the record. The resolution is dated 9th Nov. 1984 in addition to their earlier authority. We, the arbitrators hereby refer the question of interim application for interim award to the Umpire Shri S. Rangar. ajan, J. for further proceedings as the arbitrators have differed on the award and have given their respective awards. Both awards and the relevant arbitration files be forwarded to the umpire for his decision. For. We, the arbitrators hereby refer the question of interim application for interim award to the Umpire Shri S. Rangar. ajan, J. for further proceedings as the arbitrators have differed on the award and have given their respective awards. Both awards and the relevant arbitration files be forwarded to the umpire for his decision. For. further orders the matter is adjourned to Tuesday, 20th Nov. 1984, at 3. 00 p. m. at the office of the Association for framing of the issues. The matter was fixed for evidence of the claimant and Shri Raj Chopra on behalf of M/s. Magnum Films, Delhi states that he is ready with evidence even today. However, in view of the opinion of other arbitrator to adjourn it to 20th Nov. 1984, at 3. 00 p. m. , the matter is adjourned. M/s. Magnum Films are advised to come with their evidence on the said date. On this Shri Joginder Singh, one of the arbitrators, reserved his opinion on the points 1. Whether before framing the issues, the plaintiff can lead the evidence. 2. Whether before the. award given by the umpire on the interim application, main petition can proceed or not. He will give his opinion on the next date i. e. on 20th Nov. 1984. Mr. K. M. S. Khan, the other arbitrator is of the opinion that the terms of reference are mentioned in the order of the High Court, and they are the issues on which the arbitrators have to give their award and the parties to give evidence and plead their respective case. In case there is difference within the arbitrators on this basic issue itself, let these matters be also referred to the umpire for award. " ( 23 ) THE learned umpire was not able to make out as to what were the differences between the arbitrators and as to what they desired the umpire to decide. Therefore, he addressed letters to the arbitrators for clarification. Each of the arbitratorsreplied separately. The reply of Shri Joginder Singh, arbitrator is dated 9th March 1985 and forms part of file of arbitration. He stated that the other arbitrator and he had differed only on the question of interim award and had decided to hear the evidence of the parties on the next date fixed in the proceedings of November 17, 1984. The reply of Shri Joginder Singh, arbitrator is dated 9th March 1985 and forms part of file of arbitration. He stated that the other arbitrator and he had differed only on the question of interim award and had decided to hear the evidence of the parties on the next date fixed in the proceedings of November 17, 1984. So, according to Shri Joginder Singh, the Umpire had to decide the matter of interim award. The letter of Shri K. M. S. Khan is dated 4th March 1985 and also forms part of the arbitration file. The sum and substance of that letter is that it was clear from the proceedings that he and the other arbitrator (Shri Joginder Singh) were not proceeding smoothly, that there have been delaying tactics and that according to the former, the entire disputes are to be decided by the Umpire. The concluding words of his letter read as under: "it is, therefore, informed that according to the undersigned, one of the arbitrators in the above matter, now both the issues, i. e. the matter regarding interim award and the matter regarding award on the entire issue, have to be taken up by the umpire and this is my final opinion, judgment and decision in the matter. "it is clear from the letter of Shri K. M. S. Khan, arbitrator that the Umpire had not to confine himself to the matter of interim award and had to decide all the disputes between the parties. That itself entitled the Umpire to decide all the disputes and give an award in respect thereof. The mere fact that Shri Joginder Singh, arbitrator wanted to refer the matter of interim award only does not make any difference. When the arbitrators were not agreed as to what was the difference and as to what should be decided by the Umpire, obviously the Umpire had the jurisdiction and was entitled to decide all the disputes between the parties. ( 24 ) IT is, therefore, wrong on the part of the learned counsel for the objector that difference between the arbitrators was confined to giving of interim award only. It is further wrong on the part of the said learned counsel that the Umpire had merely to decide as to whether interim award could be given legally or not. ( 24 ) IT is, therefore, wrong on the part of the learned counsel for the objector that difference between the arbitrators was confined to giving of interim award only. It is further wrong on the part of the said learned counsel that the Umpire had merely to decide as to whether interim award could be given legally or not. Even the opinion of Shri Joginder Singh, arbitrator did not say so and he had also referred the matter of interim award which meant that it was for the arbitrator to decide as to whether interim award could be legally given or not and as to for which amount the interim award should be. ( 25 ) THE learned counsel for the objector conceded that the interim award could be legally given under Section 27 of the Arbitration Act and there is no dispute in respect of that proposition. ( 26 ) EVEN otherwise in the present case the Umpire had to decide the entire reference because the arbitrators allowed their time to expire without making any award. The file of the arbitration shows that it was on 14th March 1984 that the arbitrators entered upon the reference when they issued a notice fixing a date of hearing before them. According to paragraph 3 of First Schedule of the Arbitration Act, they should have made their award within four months from the aforesaid date. That means that the award should have been made up to July 14, 1984. Yet they carried on the proceedings and it was on November 17,1984 that they recorded their differences. Hence on that account also, they ceased to have any jurisdiction and the Umpire was entitled to enter upon the reference and decide all the disputes between the parties. ( 27 ) THE objection of the objector to the effect that the Umpire was guilty of misconduct as he totally ignored the plea of the objector that it was on full and final settlement of the claim of the claimant that the objector had agreed to pay the sum of Rs. 3,93,628. 14 P. is equally without any force. The Umpire has merely given an interim award. He has yet to decide in respect of the remaining claim of the claimant. It will be at the stage of deciding that remaining claim that this plea of the objector will have to be decided. 3,93,628. 14 P. is equally without any force. The Umpire has merely given an interim award. He has yet to decide in respect of the remaining claim of the claimant. It will be at the stage of deciding that remaining claim that this plea of the objector will have to be decided. There can be no manner of doubt that the objector has to pay this admitted amount and it will be separate question for deciding if the payment of the aforesaid amount will be in full and final settlement of the claim of the claimant or not. ( 28 ) LEARNED counsel for the objector, however, contended that had the Umpire given an interim award for the amount of Rs. 3,93,628. 14 P. , it could perhaps be said that the question as to whether that was the only amount payable to the claimant or not and the dispute whether the payment of that amount would finally settle the claim of the claimant or not was still open but the Umpire had awarded more amount of Rs. 4,01,170. 34 P. which impliedly meant that the Umpire had overruled the plea that the - amount of Rs. 3,93,628. 1a P. was in full and final settlement. ( 29 ) THE aforesaid argument of the learned counsel does not appeal to me. The amount which was awarded in excess of Rs. 3,93,628. 14 was in respect of the amount payable to the claimant relating to the exhibition of the picture nikaah from 35th to 40th week. The amount of Rs. 3,93,628. 14 represented the dues of the claimant in respect of the exhibition of picture up to 34th week. Therefore, it can still be decided by the Umpire as to whether the payment of Rs. 3,93,628. 14 was in full and final settlement with respect to the claim of the exhibition of the picture of the claimant up to 34th week. ( 30 ) IT was neither necessary nor expected nor required of the Umpire to decide if the right to recover the amount due to the claimant had been assigned to B. R. Films. That matter pertained to the domain of the Court while deciding the petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act. ( 30 ) IT was neither necessary nor expected nor required of the Umpire to decide if the right to recover the amount due to the claimant had been assigned to B. R. Films. That matter pertained to the domain of the Court while deciding the petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act. With a view to give a finding if the matter should be referred to arbitrators and the Umpire it was obligatory on the Court to decide if the claimant retained locus standi to maintain the aforesaid petition and could ask for the reference of the disputes to arbitration. If it were held that he had assigned his rights to M/s B. R. Films, obviously he could not have the aforesaid locus standi. The fact that this Court directed the reference of the disputes to the arbitration and the fact that the application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act had been accepted clearly implied that there was no assignment of his rights by the claimant in favour of M/s B. R. Films. It was for these reasons that the Umpire refused to enter into the aforesaid controversy of assignment and decide the same. ( 31 ) AS a matter of fact there was no assignment at all. For the purpose of proving that there was assignment, reliance of the objector is on a letter dated 15th June 1983. The relevant portion of that letter written by the claimant to the objector reads as under : "with reference to the discussion the undersigned had with your Shri Seth Mehtab Chand Golcha we have no objection to your making the payment to M/s B. R. Films, Bombay on our behalf of the amount of our share in respect of the picture NIKAAH being screened at your theatre. "it is clear from the above paragraph that there was no assignment, at all. Those words gave two options to the objector. The first option was that it might pay the amount due to the claimant to the latter directly. The second choice was that it might pay the amount to M/s B. R. Films. This is clear from the words "no objection" which meant the claimant recognised such payment to M/s B. R. Films as one of the modes of payment to the claimant. There is no indication of assignment either expressly or impliedly. The second choice was that it might pay the amount to M/s B. R. Films. This is clear from the words "no objection" which meant the claimant recognised such payment to M/s B. R. Films as one of the modes of payment to the claimant. There is no indication of assignment either expressly or impliedly. Rather the use of the words no objection negatives the existence of assignment inasmuch as it implies the preserving the right of the claimant to receive his dues. ( 32 ) THE prayer for making of an interim award was made in the application dated 19th March 1984, of the claimant. It is true that the prayer for interim award was in respect of Rs. 3,93,628. 14 P. However, we must not forget that the total claim of the claimant was for Rs. 5,91,261. 60 P. Therefore, the Umpire could give an interim award which was less than the total amount claimed (i. e. Rs. 5,91,261. 60 P ). It was on the amount admitted to be due to the claimant in the statement of accounts furnished by the objector in respect of exhibition of the picture from 35th to 40th week that the arbitrators allowed the amount over and above Rs. 3,93,628. 14 P. Under these circumstances, not only that no portion of the interim award is beyond the scope of reference but also the same is based on the amounts admitted by the objector due to the claimant. Hence the interim award is not defective. ( 33 ) LEARNED counsel for the objector at the time of arguments also contended that even if interim award were made a rule of the Court and this Court did not accept the prayer of the objector that the umpire should be removed or his authority be allowed to be revoked, there would be hardly any use to refer the matter again to the umpire for deciding the remaining disputes. He explained that it can be decided by the Court if an amount of Rs. 3. 93,628. 14 was payable in full and final settlement of the claim of the claimant, in respect of the exhibition of the picture up to 34th week or, not and in the event of the decision in favour of the objector, no further controversy remains. 3. 93,628. 14 was payable in full and final settlement of the claim of the claimant, in respect of the exhibition of the picture up to 34th week or, not and in the event of the decision in favour of the objector, no further controversy remains. He further explained that even if the aforesaid plea of full and final settlement were not accepted, there could not be any reduction in the weekly theatre hire on the basis of the reduction of the weekly full house capacity because terms of the agreement to pay theatre hire @ Rs. 52,000. 00 per week could not be changed under any circumstances. In this respect he relied upon the observations of Sultan Singh, J. in the judgment dated 8th April 1983 on I. A. NOS. 1255 and 1434 of 1983 in Suit No. 407- A/83. Sultan- Singh. J. held that thetheatre hire of Rs. 52,000. 00 per week agreed upon between the parties under the agreement dated 3rd May 1982 could not be reduced under any circumstances. ( 34 ) HOWEVER, it is within the jurisdiction of the Umpire to decide the aforesaid matters and this Court cannot decide the same. Learned counsel for the objector can rely upon the judgment of Sultan Singh, J. before the Umpire. ( 35 ) UNDER the above circumstances I dismiss the objection petition (I. A. 2829 of 1985) of the objector and accept I. A. 2047 of 1985 and the petition registered as Suit No. 622-A/85 and make the award registered as Suit No. 580-A/85 a rule of the Court and pass a decree for recovery of Rs. 4,01,170. 34 P. with costs in terms of the award in favour of the claimant and against the objector. The objector shall also pay the costs of the present proceedings which are in all quantified at Rs. 5,000. 00. The claimant shall also be entitled to recover interest @ 18% p. a. on Rs. 4,01,170. 34 P. from today till realisation of the decretal amount. ( 36 ) A decree sheet be framed and the interim award shall be attached and shall form part of the decree. A copy of this judgment may be sent to the Umpire for deciding the remaining disputes between the parties within a period of two months from the date of entering upon the reference. ( 37 ) I. A. Nos. A copy of this judgment may be sent to the Umpire for deciding the remaining disputes between the parties within a period of two months from the date of entering upon the reference. ( 37 ) I. A. Nos. 2829, 2047 of 1985 and Suits Nos. 622-A of 1985 and 580-A of 1985 stand disposed of.