ORDER Cr.M.P.No.5132 of 1985 is a petition filed by three petitioners who are accused of an offence punishable under section 302, Indian Penal Code. According to the prosecution, the wife of the second petitioner met with death under suspicious circumstances and petitioners 1 to 3 have been arrested in connection with the death of second petitioner's wife Porkodi. 2. Cr.M.P.No.5221 of 1985 is a petition filed by one S. Dharmar, deceased Porkodi's father's brother for impleading himself as a party to the bail application. According to the averments in the affidavit, it is he who brought her up and got her married. 3. The question that arises for decision is whether Cr.M.P.No.5221 of 1985 is sustainable. Mr. Karpagavinayagam, learned Counsel for the three accused, opposes the said petition on the ground that there is no provision of law by which interested parties can get themselves impleaded in criminal proceedings and such a procedure will give rise to endless complications in the matter of administration of criminal law. 4. On the other hand Mr. Rajamanickam, learned Counsel for the proposed party, petitioner in Cr.M.P.No.5221 of 1985, contends that as an interested party the petitioner can get himself impleaded on record and assist the prosecution and see that justice is rendered. In support of this contention, he relied upon the decision reported in Subhash Chandar v. The State (Chandigarh Administration) and others Subhash Chandar v. The State (Chandigarh Administration) and others (1980) MLJ. (Crl.) 423:(1980) L.W. (Crl.) 20 (S.C.): (1980) 2 S.C.R. 44 :(1980) 1 S.C.J. 496: (1980) 2 S.C.C. 155 :(1980) Crl.L.J. 324:(1980) S.C.C. (Crl.) 376:A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 423, wherein it has been observed as follows: “The even course of criminal justice cannot be thwarted by the executive, however high the accused, however sure Government feels a case is false, however unpalatable the continuance of the prosecution to the powers that be who wish to scuttle Court justice because of hybris, affection, or other noble or ignoble consideration.” The above observation has been made while holding that if it appears from the material before the Court that germane or relevant considerations did not prompt the motion for withdrawal of prosecution but it was the pressure of political influence, the Court will withhold its consent. 5. Mr. 5. Mr. Rajamanickam, learned Counsel for the proposed party, further relies upon the decision reported in P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam (1980) 3 S.C.C. 141 :(1980) S.C.C. (Crl.) 649:(1980) L.W. (Crl.) (S.C.) 14 (S.N.):A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 856, wherein the Supreme Court has observed as follows: “The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain appeals against judgments of acquittal by the High Court at the instance of private parties. Thus, where in a murder case, an appeal against acquittal was not filed by State, a brother of the deceased, a private citizen who is neither a complainant nor a first informant could invoke the special power under Article 136 for leave to appeal against acquittal and the same would not violate Article 21 of the Constitution.” In that case it was contended that Article 136 of the Constitution does not confer a right of appeal on a party as such. The Supreme Court has further observed as follows: “If Article 21 is telescoped into Article 136, the conclusion follows that their procedure is imprinted on the special leave that the Court may grant or refuse. When a motion is made for leave to appeal against an acquittal, the Supreme Court appreciates the gravity of the peril to personal liberty involved in that proceeding. It is fair to assume that while considering the petition under Article 136 for leave to appeal against acquittal, the Court will pay attention to the question of liberty, the person who seeks such leave from the Court, his motive and his locus standi and the weighty factors which persuade the Court to grant special leave. When this conspectus of processual circumstances and criteria play upon the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 136, it is reasonable to conclude that the desideratum of fair procedure implied in Article 21, is adequately answered. The wider the discretionary power the more sparing its exercise. Moreover, the Court may not, save in special situations, grant leave to one who is not eo nomine a party on the record. Thus, procedural limitations exist and are governed by well worn rules of guidance. It is true that the strictest vigilance over abuse of the process of the Court, especially at the expensively exalted level of the Supreme Court, should be maintained and ordinarily meddlesome by-standards should not be granted ‘visa’. Thus, procedural limitations exist and are governed by well worn rules of guidance. It is true that the strictest vigilance over abuse of the process of the Court, especially at the expensively exalted level of the Supreme Court, should be maintained and ordinarily meddlesome by-standards should not be granted ‘visa’. But the bogey of busy bodies blackmailing adversaries through frivolous invocation of Article 136 is chimerical. Access to justice to very bona fide seeker is a democratic dimension of remedial jurisprudence even as public interest litigation, class action, pro bono proceedings, are.” Relying on the above observations Mr. Rajamanickam, contends that as a person vitally interested in prosecuting the offender, the petitioner in Cr.M.P.No.5221 of 1985 has got right to get himself impleaded in the bail proceedings. 6. There is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code to implead a third party in a prosecution case. Section 301, Criminal Procedure Code, provides for instructing a pleader to prosecute by any person in any case and if the pleader is so instructed, he will have to act under the directions of the Public Prosecutor or the Assistant Public Prosecutor as the case may be and such pleader with the permission of the Court may submit a written argument after the evidence is closed in that case. Considering the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the observations made by the Supreme Court and the other courts, referred to above, the following conclusions can be reached on the question of impleading- (i) There is no provision to get the third party impleaded in a criminal proceeding; and (ii) at the same time, the third party can be permitted to assist the Public Prosecutor in the matter of prosecuting the evidence and in which case section 301 gives the third party a right to assist the prosecution and also to submit a written argument. 7. Under the circumstances, the petitioner in Crl.M.P.No.5221 of 1985 is only entitled to assist the prosecution and he cannot be impleaded as a party to the abovesaid proceedings. With these observations, Crl.M.P.No.5221 of 1985 is dismissed. 8. Crl.M.P.No.5132 of 1985: This is an application to release the petitioners, who are accused of an offence under section 302, I.P.C. on bail. 9. As already stated, Porkodi, the wife of the second petitioner, met with a suspicious death as per the first information report given by one Panneerselvam. With these observations, Crl.M.P.No.5221 of 1985 is dismissed. 8. Crl.M.P.No.5132 of 1985: This is an application to release the petitioners, who are accused of an offence under section 302, I.P.C. on bail. 9. As already stated, Porkodi, the wife of the second petitioner, met with a suspicious death as per the first information report given by one Panneerselvam. The case of the prosecution is that on further investigation it revealed that in the process of extracting dowry by the husband, viz., Asokan (second petitioner) aided by his brother, the third petitioner and his father, the first petitioner and Rajammal, the mother of petitioners 2 and 3, now on bail, have caused the death of Porkodi and that this is not a fit case where the petitioners should be released on bail at this stage since the two witnesses to the occurrence are the tenants under the petitioners and susceptible to the influence of the petitioners. 10. Mr. Karpagavinayakam, learned Counsel for the petitioners contends that the F.I.R. and the inquest report only reveal a suspicious death and as such there is no evidence appearing against the petitioners involving them in the offence and that the second petitioner was found to be working in the factory in which he was employed at the time when the occurrence is said to have been committed and as such the petitioners are entitled to bail. 11. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhagirathsingh Judeja v. State of Gujarat Bhagirathsingh Judeja v. State of Gujarat (1984) 1 S.C.C. 284 :(1984) Crl.L.J. 160:A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 372, wherein it was observed as follows- “And the trend today is towards granting bail because it is now well-settled by a catena of decisions of this court that the power to grant bail is not to be exercised as if the punishment before trial is being imposed. The only material considerations in such a situation are whether the accused would be readily available for his trial and whether he is likely to abuse the discretion granted in his favour by tampering with evidence. The order made by the High Court is conspicuous by its silence on these two relevant considerations. It is for these reasons that we consider in the interest of justice a compelling necessity to interfere with the order made by the High Court.” 12. The order made by the High Court is conspicuous by its silence on these two relevant considerations. It is for these reasons that we consider in the interest of justice a compelling necessity to interfere with the order made by the High Court.” 12. In the case reported in Gurcharan Singh v. State Gurcharan Singh v. State (1978) Crl.L.J. 129:(1978) L.W. (Crl.) (S.C.) 67 (2): (1978) 1 S.C.C. 118 :(1978) S.C.C. (Crl.) 41:(1978) 1 S.C.J. 388:(1978) MLJ. (Crl.) 261:A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 179, the Bench of the Supreme Court has observed as follows: “The two paramount considerations, viz., likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice and his tampering with prosecution evidence relates to ensuring a fair trial of the case in a Court of justice. It is essential that due and proper weight should be bestowed on these two factors apart from others.” 13. In the case reported in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand State of Rajasthan v. Balchand (1977) 4 S.C.C. 308 :(1977) S.C.C. (Crl.) 594:(1978) Crl.L.J. 195:A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2447, the Bench of the Supreme Court has observed as follows: “The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court, we do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of bail. So also the heinousness of the crime.” 14. In G. Narasimhalu v. Public Prosecutor, A.P. G. Narasimhalu v. Public Prosecutor, A.P. (1978) 1 S.C.C. 240 :(1978) Crl.L.J. 502:A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 429, Krishna Iyer, J., has observed as follows: “Bail or jail’ at the pre-trial or post conviction stage belongs to the blurred area of the criminal justice system and largely hinges on the hunch of the beach, otherwise called judicial discretion. Personal liberty, deprived when bail is refused, is too precious a value of our constitutional system recognised under Article 21 of the Constitution that the crucial power to negate it is a great trust exercisable, not casually but judicially, with lively concern for the cost to the individual and the community.” 15. Personal liberty, deprived when bail is refused, is too precious a value of our constitutional system recognised under Article 21 of the Constitution that the crucial power to negate it is a great trust exercisable, not casually but judicially, with lively concern for the cost to the individual and the community.” 15. In Babu Singh v. State of U.P. Babu Singh v. State of U.P. (1978) Crl.L.J. 651:(1978) L.W. (Crl.) (S.C.) 85:(1978) 2 S.C.J. 135:(1978) MLJ. (Crl.) 465:A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 527, the same learned Judge has observed as follows: “Personal liberty deprived when bail is refused is too precious a value of our constitutional system recognised under Article 21 that the crucial power to negate it is a great trust exercisable, not casually but judicially, with lively concern for the cost to the individual and the community. To glamorise impressionistic orders as discretionary may, on occasions, make a litigative gamble decisive of a fundamental right. After all, personal liberty of an accused or convict is fundamental, suffering lawful eclipse only in terms of ‘procedure established by law’. No deprivation of personal freedom, ephemoral or enduring, must be founded on the most serious considerations relevant to the welfare objectives of society, specified in the Constitution.” 16. In Harsh Sawhney v. Union Territory, Chandigarh Harsh Sawhney v. Union Territory, Chandigarh (1978) 2 S.C.C. 365 :(1978) Crl.L.J. 774:(1978) L.W. (Crl.) (S.C.) 84:A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1016, the same learned Judge has observed as follows: “The principles bearing on grant or refusal of bail have already been explained by this Court in Gurcharan Singh v. State, (Delhi Administration) Gurcharan Singh v. State, (Delhi Administration) (1978) Crl.L.J. 129:(1978) L.W. (Crl.) (S.C.) 67(2): (1978) 1 S.C.C. 118 :A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 179. On the basis of that decision this is clearly a case where the appellant is entitled to bail. Two grounds have been mentioned on behalf of the State, namely, the appellant's presence is necessary for making a search and recovery of certain documents. We do not think that the appellant has to be taken into custody for making a search of premises in her presence. This can be done without her being taken into custody. The other ground that is put forward is the appellant's presence is required by the police for interrogation in connection with investigation. We do not think that the appellant has to be taken into custody for making a search of premises in her presence. This can be done without her being taken into custody. The other ground that is put forward is the appellant's presence is required by the police for interrogation in connection with investigation. We make it clear that the appellant shall appear for interrogation by the police whenever reasonably required, subject to her right under Article 20(3) of the Constitution.” 17. In Mohan Singh v. Union Territory, Chandigarh Mohan Singh v. Union Territory, Chandigarh (1978) Crl.L.J. 844: (1978) 2 S.C.C. 366 :(1978) S.C.C. (Crl.) 190:A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1095, the learned Judge has observed as follows: “Counsel for the State pressed before us that the corruption of which the appellant was guilty prima facie (according to the results of the investigation) was substantial. Let us assume so. Even then refusal of bail is an indirect process of punishing an accused person before he is convicted. This is a confusion regarding the rationale of bail. This Court has explained the real basis of bail law in Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) (1978) Crl.L.J. 129:A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 179. We do not think there is as yet any allegation against the appellant of interference with the course of justice or other well-established grounds for refusal of bail.” 18. In the case reported in Hussaina Khatoon v. State of Bihar Hussaina Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979) Crl.L.J. 1036:(1980) S.C.C. (Crl.) 23: (1980) 1 S.C.C. 81 :A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1360, the Supreme Court laid down certain guidelines for releasing the persons accused of non-bailable offence on bail- “Even under the law as it stands today the Courts must abandon the antiquated concept under which pretrial release is ordered only against bail with sureties. The new insight into the subject of pretrial release which has been developed in socially advanced countries and particularly the United States should now inform the decisions of our Courts in regard to pretrial release. If the Court is satisfied, after taking into account, on the basis of information placed before it that the accused has his roots in the community and is not likely to abscond it can safely release the accused on his personal bond. If the Court is satisfied, after taking into account, on the basis of information placed before it that the accused has his roots in the community and is not likely to abscond it can safely release the accused on his personal bond. To determine whether the accused has his roots in the community which would deter him from fleeing, the Court should take into account the following factors concerning the accused: 1. The length of his residence in the country. 2. his employment status, history and his financial condition, 3. his family ties and relationship. 4. his reputation, character and monetary conditions. 5. his prior criminal record including any record or prior release or recognisance or on bail. 6. the identity of responsible members of the community who would vouch for his reliability. 7. the nature of the offence charged and the apparent probability of conviction and the likely sentence in so far as those factors relevant to the risk of non-appearance, and 8. any other factors indicating the ties of the accused to the community or bearing on the risk of wilful failure to appear.” 19. Now, we have to consider the question of releasing the petitioners on bail by following the several guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court. The first thing to be considered is the gravity of the offence. According to the prosecution, it is a dowry death and the guilt is attributed to petitioners 1 to 3 and Rajammal. Apart from the gravity of the offence, social element concerning the rights and liberties of the women are also involved, and hence one cannot be lenient in the matter of granting bail in such cases. The second factor to be taken into consideration is whether releasing the petitioner on bail will hamper the further investigation. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, there is evidence regarding the commission of the offence available against the petitioner and the said Rajammal and that the tenants in occupation of the premises of the petitioner are the witnesses to speak to the perpetration of crime and that if the petitioners are released on bail they are likely to tamper with the witnesses. There is much force in the contention that the tenants may be amenable to the influence of the landlords and in this aspect I agree with the prosecution that releasing the petitioner on bail at this stage will come in the way of prosecution letting is available evidence. 20. The next contention is based upon the First Information Report in which the names of the accused do not find a place. The argument of M. Karpagavinayakam, learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when their names do not appear in the First Information Report and no witnesses examined during the inquest to implicate them, they are entitled to be released on bail. In case of suspicious death, one cannot expect the First Information Report to contain the entire details leading to the death. In such a case, it is the subsequent investigation that brings to light the complicity of the persons in causing the death of the deceased. Under the circumstances, in a case like the present one, no inference can be drawn from the First Information Report which is bound to be only an intimation regarding the death. On the other hand, it is stated on behalf of the prosecution that the further investigation revealed the complicity of the petitioner in the involvement of the offence. Under the above circumstances, this contention will have to be negatived. 21. The next point urged on behalf of the petitioners is that the petitioners are local residents, that the first and second petitioners are employed in Ashok Leyland and the third petitioner is an employee of Tiruvottiyur Municipality and that their status and standing in society will have to be taken into consideration in considering the bail application. But this is a double edged weapon so far as the bail applications are concerned. It can as well be argued that with the status and influence in their command they are likely to influence the witnesses in their favour. 22. Mr. Karpagavinayakam, further contends that even in the inquest report it is stated that at the time of the occurrence-the petitioners were not in the house and that Rajammal might have caused the death. It can as well be argued that with the status and influence in their command they are likely to influence the witnesses in their favour. 22. Mr. Karpagavinayakam, further contends that even in the inquest report it is stated that at the time of the occurrence-the petitioners were not in the house and that Rajammal might have caused the death. But at this stage, we are concerned only with the fact that the death had happened in the house of the petitioners and in the normal course of events the petitioners are bound to explain as to how the death had taken place. Considering the entire circumstances, even by applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, this is not a fit case where the petitioners can be released on bail at this stage. Accordingly, the petition (Crl.M.P.No.5132 of 1985) is dismissed. The petitioners are at liberty to renew the application after sufficient progress is made in the investigation. B.S. ----- Petitions dismissed.