ORDER J. S. Verma. J. 1. The petitioner Mahadeo Prasad Gautam was appointed Assistant Grade III in the Food Corporation of India at Balaghat. A charge sheet (Annexure P-6) dated 14-7-1977 was given to him by the Regional Manager, Food Corporation of India, Bhopal (respondent No.1) and a departmental enquiry was held into the charges mentioned therein. The petitioner was also placed under suspension. The charges levelled were that between February 1975 and January 1976, the petitioner had committed the fraud of two demand drafts, which were collected from the fair price shop-keepers for sale of rice; and he had also fraudulently and dishonestly misappropriated some amount by maintaining false accounts of payments towards railway freight and other contingencies. In his reply (Annexure P-7) dated 24-7-1977, the petitioner admitted the charges levelled against him, while mentioning the circumstances in which he had committed the lapse. The petitioner prayed for a lenient view in the circumstances stated by him. By order (Annexurep-8) dated 26-11-1977, the Regional Manager, Food Corporation of India, Bhopal. (respondent No.1) imposed the penalty of 'withholding one increment of pay with cumulative effect' revoked the suspension and further directed that the period of suspension of the petitioner will not be treated as on duty and the payment of emoluments for that period would be restricted to the subsistence allowance already paid to the petitioner. This penalty was imposed obviously on the admission made by the petitioner on account of which no further enquiry into the correctness of the allegations was necessary. 2. The petitioner was reinstated in service and he served cut the above penalty imposed on him by the Regional Manager (respondent No.1) in the meantime; by order (Annexure P-11) dated 30-10-1978, the Zonal Manager, Food Corporation of India, Bombay (respondent No.2), promoted the petitioner to the Post of Assistant Grade II and the petitioner continued to work on this higher post thereafter, having suffered the penalty imposed by the Regional Manager by his order (Annexure P 8) dated 26-11-1677, for his aforesaid misconduct. Thereafter, by order (Annexure P-12), dated 27-4-1981, about 3 years after imposition of the above penalty by the Regional Manager, the Zonal Manager (respondent No.2) who has promoted the petitioner about 2.1/2 year earlier, decided to exercise the rower of review under Regulation 74 of the Food Corporation of India (staff) Regulations 1971, and gave notice to the petitioner to show cause why the above penalty of 'withholding of one increment with cumulative effect should not be enhanced to dismissal from service. Annexure P-13, dated 19-6 1981, was the reply given by the petitioner. The Zonal Manager (respondent No-2) then, by his order (Annexure P-14) dated 19-10-81, reviewed the penalty which had been imposed by the Regional Manager and served out by the petitioner and enhanced the penalty to removal from service. The petitioner, therefore stood removed from service of the Food Corporation of India. The petitioner's appeal was also dismissed by the Managing Director F.C.I (respondent No.3), as communicated by order (Annexure P.17) dated 2-6-1982. Hence this is petition for quashing the order enhancing the penalty to removal from service and dismissed of the appeal against that order. 3. The only contentions urged in support of the petition, by Shri J. P. Dube, learned counsel for the petitioner are three, namely :- (1) The order of review resulting in enhancement of the penalty contravenes the proviso to Regulation No. 74(1)(b) of the Food Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1971, inasmuch as no enquiry was held before making the review, (2) no review could be made after the expiry of period of limitation for appeals prescribed by regulation No.7; and (3) even if there is no limitation prescribed for such review, the same cannot be made after the expiry of a reasonable period, which could not extend beyond the date on which the penalty imposed had been suffered. In reply shri Dilip Naik, learned counsel for the respondents contended that the review can been made 'at any time' as provided in Regulation No. 74 (1) itself and no period of limitation is prescribed for the same. 4. Regulation No. 74, providing for review, is as under:- 74. In reply shri Dilip Naik, learned counsel for the respondents contended that the review can been made 'at any time' as provided in Regulation No. 74 (1) itself and no period of limitation is prescribed for the same. 4. Regulation No. 74, providing for review, is as under:- 74. Review: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these regulations, the Board may, at any time either on its own motion or otherwise, call for the records of any inquiry and review any order made under these regulations, and (a) confirm, modify or set aside the order, or (b) confirm, reduce, enhance or set aside the penalty imposed by the order, or impose any penalty where no penalty has been imposed, or (c) remit the case to the authority which made the order or to any other authority directing such authority to make such further inquiry as it may consider proper in the circumstances of the case, or (d) pass such other orders as it may deem fit: Provided that no order imposing or enhancing any penalty shall be made by the reviewing authority unless the employee concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation against the penalty proposed and where it is to impose any of the penalties specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of Regulation 54 or to enhance the penalty imposed by the order sought to be reviewed to any of the penalties specified in those clauses; no such penalty shall be Imposed except after an inquiry in the manner laid down in regulation 58. (2) No proceeding for review shall be commenced until after; (i) the expiry of the period of limitation for an appeal, or (ii) the disposal of the appeal, where any such appeal has been preferred. (3) An application for review shall be dealt with in the same manner as if it were an appeal under these regulations. (4) power similar to those specified in clause- (i) above may be exercised by the Chairman. Managing Director, Zonal Manager and Regional Manager (Additional/Joint Manager in respect of orders passed by authorities subordinate to them. 5. The first contention in support of this petition has no merit and must be rejected. (4) power similar to those specified in clause- (i) above may be exercised by the Chairman. Managing Director, Zonal Manager and Regional Manager (Additional/Joint Manager in respect of orders passed by authorities subordinate to them. 5. The first contention in support of this petition has no merit and must be rejected. The proviso to regulation 74 (1) (d) says that (1) no order imposing any penalty shall be made by the reviewing authority, unless the employee concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation against the proposed penalty; and (2) where the proposal is to impose any of the penalties specified in clauses (v) to (xi) of regulation No. 54; or to enhance the penalty imposed by the order sought to be reviewed to any of the penalties specified in those clauses, no such penalty shall be imposed except after an inquiry in the manner laid down in regulation 58. The first part of the proviso merely requires giving a reasonable opportunity of making a representation before imposition or enhancement of the reviewing authority. This was admittedly done in the present case. It is the second part of the provision on which reliance is placed by Shri Dubey, learned counsel for the petitioner. Regulation 54 deals with penalties and specifies the minor penalties in clauses (i) to (iv) and the major penalties in clauses (v) to (ix). Regulation 58 lays down the procedure for imposing major penalties specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of regulation 54 and it says that none of these major penalties shall be imposed except after an inquiry held in the manner specified therein. The second part of the proviso, therefore, deals with cases of imposition of one of these major penalties and it says that where any such penalty is to be imposed, the same shall not be imposed except after an enquiry as contemplated by regulation 58. In the present case, an enquiry as required by Regulation 58 was contemplated since the penalty was enhanced to a major penalty from a minor penalty, as classified in regulation 54. However, the misconduct had been admitted by the petitioner and, therefore, no enquiry was required to be made into those admitted facts. Regulation 58 (5) (a) itself contemplates an enquiry only about matters which are not admitted and indicates, for obvious reason, that admitted facts require no enquiry to be made. However, the misconduct had been admitted by the petitioner and, therefore, no enquiry was required to be made into those admitted facts. Regulation 58 (5) (a) itself contemplates an enquiry only about matters which are not admitted and indicates, for obvious reason, that admitted facts require no enquiry to be made. In such a situation, the only requirement before enhancing the penalty was to give the petitioner are son able opportunity of making a representation against the penalty prop sell and this was admittedly done The final order enhancing the penalty to removal from service was made, taking into account the reply of the petitioner to the notice given to him for showing cause why the penalty should not be enhanced to that of dismissal from service. Enhancement of penalty cannot, therefore, be held invalid for this reason. 6. The second contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the review was time barred having been made beyond the prescribed period of limitation has also no merit. The argument is that according to clause (3) of regulation 74, a review application is to be dealt with in the same manner as an appeal under the regulations and, therefore, the period of limitation for appeals prescribed in regulation 70, of forty-five days must be read as the limitation prescribed for review as well In the first place, clause (3) of regulation 74 merely says that the procedure for dealing with a review application shall be the same as that for an appeal under the regulation. The procedure for consideration of appeals is laid down separately, while regulation 70 prescribes only the period of limitation for appeals. That apart, clause (1) of regulation 74, in its opening words, says, 'notwithstanding anything contained in these regulations, the Board may, at any time review any order made under regulations', Clause (2) of regulation 74. clearly provides that review proceedings shall not be commenced until after the expiry of the period of limitation for an appeal or disposal of the appeal, if it is filed. This express prohibition is a complete answer to the contention that review proceedings must be commenced within the period prescribed for an appeal. I is, therefore, clear that the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal under regulation 70 cannot be read as the period of limitation for review under regulation No. 74. 7. This express prohibition is a complete answer to the contention that review proceedings must be commenced within the period prescribed for an appeal. I is, therefore, clear that the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal under regulation 70 cannot be read as the period of limitation for review under regulation No. 74. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on rule 29 (1) (v) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, dealing with review, which lays down that the appellate authority can initiate proceedings for review only 'within six months of the order proposed to be reviewed'. He argues that this period of limitation applicable to the appellate authority, which is the reviewing authority in the present case, govorns the limitation for review under the aforesaid regulation 74. Inspite of time being given for this purpose, learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to show us that the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) rules, applicable to the Central Government employees, are also applicable to the employee-of the Food Corporation of India, notwithstanding the aforesaid regulations which admittedly apply to them. There is thus no basis for us to import and apply in the present case the provisions relating to limitation for review by the appellate authority contained in rule 29(1) (v) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the review was time berred, by virtue of any express provision prescribing the period of limitation for its commencement is, therefore, rejected. 8. The last contention does raise a point of significance and it was stated at the Bar that the same is not covered by any authority. The question is whether, in absence of any specific limitation prescribed for review, the equitable principal of restricting the power of review upto a reasonable period only should be extended? If it is so, the facts of this case would justify application of that rule. The question is whether, in absence of any specific limitation prescribed for review, the equitable principal of restricting the power of review upto a reasonable period only should be extended? If it is so, the facts of this case would justify application of that rule. In the present case, the penalty of 'withholding of one increment with cumulative effect' was imposed by order dated 26-11-1977, the petitioner was promoted by order dated 30-10-1978, and it was about 2.1/2 years even thereafter that the power of review under regulation 74 was invoked by the very same authority which had earlier promoted the petitioner on his serving out the penalty imposed for the misconduct, 9. In State of Gujarat v. P. Raghav. AIR 1969 SC 1297 a similar question arose since there was no limitation prescribed for exercise of the power of revision given to the Commissioner under section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. No doubt. the Supreme Court took into account the fact that the other provisions of the enactment gave rise to certain rights in the person concerned after lapse of a particular period but it held that sue motu power of revision, though untrammelled, as it did not prescribe any limitation, has to be exercised within a reasonable time, which was a question of fact in each case. The general principle enunciated for application in such a situation was indicated as under:- “The question arises whether the Commissioner can revise an order made under section 65 at time. It is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed under section 211 but it seems to us plain that this power must be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised." (Para 11) A similar principle was indicated by their Lordships of the Privy Council in I.T. Commissioner v. Khemchand Ramdas, AIR 1938 PC 175 while construing section 33 of the Income Tax Act, 1922 which gave power of suo motu revision to the Commissioner of Income Tax without prescribing any time limit. It was held that exercise of this untrammelled power of revision could not extend beyond the date on which the assessment is completed as it could not permit reopening of a concluded event. It was held that exercise of this untrammelled power of revision could not extend beyond the date on which the assessment is completed as it could not permit reopening of a concluded event. Other provisions of the Act were also referred to indicate that assessment could be reopened only in accordance with those provisions and this too indicated that the power of revision could not extend beyond the time when assessment was completed. However, this was another reason to support the conclusion that the power had to be exercised within a reasonable time where no limitation is prescribed and this factor indicated the period which was reasonable time for that purpose. 10. The principle discernible from these decisions is that even where there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercise of the power, the same must be exercised within a reasonable time, which is a question of fact in each case, depending on the facts of the case and nature of order. This principle by now is even more deeply entrenched in our legal system. A contrary view would confer arbitrary power which can be exercised at the whim and caprice of the authority, unbriddled and untrammclled by any consideration of reasonableness of its exercise even long after the transaction and its incidents are copc1uded events. Arbitrariness is the negation of rule of law and offends Article 14 of the Constitution. The Contrary view would also, therefore, violate Article 14. This is an additional reason for us to extend the above principle and to apply it for the purpose of taking the view that the power of review conferred by regulation 74, though untrammelled, can be exercised within a reasonable time and not after the expiry thereof. What is reasonable time is a question of fact in each case. 11. The question now is whether the exercise of the power of review in the present case was after expiry of reasonable time so that it was no longer available? What is reasonable time is a question of fact in each case. 11. The question now is whether the exercise of the power of review in the present case was after expiry of reasonable time so that it was no longer available? The undisputed facts are that Regional Manager (respondent No.1) imposed the penalty of 'withholding one increment with cumulative effect" by order dated 26-11-1977 and the petitioner was simultaneously reinstated; that the petitioner was considered fit for promotion after he had been given the next increment and the Zonal Manager (respondent No.2) by order dated 30-10-1978 gave promotion to the petitioner; that after the petitioner had enjoyed the promotion for a bout 2-1/2 years and been working on a higher post, the Zonal Manager (respondent No.2) decided to initiate review proceedings by order dated 27-4-1981 and the penalty has enhanced by order dated 19-10-1981, almost four years after imposition of penalty by the Regional Manager. In other words the proceedings for review were initiated 3.1/2 years after the order which was to be reviewed and the review by enhancement of the penalty was made four years after that order; and that too almost three years after the penalty initially imposed had been served out and promotion was given to the petitioner on the basis of his subsequent performance. In our opinion, a reasonable time for review, in the present case could not extend beyond the date on which the penalty was to be served out, or at any rate, after the date on which he was considered and found fit for promotion by the reviewing authority itself on the basis of his entire record and subsequent performance. It is obvious that the reviewing authority decided to give the promotion after taking into account the petitioner's past misconduct and the penalty imposed which had been served out. If at that stage the authority thought it fit to promote him, instead of initiating review proceedings for enhancement of the penalty, there is no occasion to hold that he could review the penalty later on the same facts. We would, therefore, accept the last contention of learned counsel for the petitioner and hold that the impugned power of review by which the penalty was enhanced to removal from service being exercised after the expiry of a reasonable time, was arbitrary and must be set aside. 12. Consequently the petition is allowed. We would, therefore, accept the last contention of learned counsel for the petitioner and hold that the impugned power of review by which the penalty was enhanced to removal from service being exercised after the expiry of a reasonable time, was arbitrary and must be set aside. 12. Consequently the petition is allowed. Tile impugned order of review (Annexure P 14) dated 19-10-81, passed by the Zonal-Manager (respondent No.2) and the appellate order (Annexure P.17) dated 6-12-1982, passed by the Managing Director (respondent No.3) are quashed. There will be no order as to costs. The security amount shall be refunded to the petitioner.