JUDGMENT 1. - This is a civil second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 28th July, 1982, passed by the learned Addl District Judge No. 5. Jaipur City, Jaipur in Civil First Appeal No 7 of 1982, affirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsiff & Judicial Magistrate, No. 1, Jaipur City, Jaipur dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiff-appellant. 2. The plaintiff-appellant was appointed vide order No. 208 dated 28th June, 1978 (Annex-Al), on daily wages at the rate of Rs. 12/- per day. Initially, he was appointed for three months on the newly created post. However, he was continued upto 21st January, 1981 and his services were terminated vide order No. 7110 dated 21st January, 1980 passed by the Manager, Vidhayak Niwas (Government Hostel), Jaipur. The plaintiff challenged the termination order on various grounds before the trial court. On behalf of the respondent, in their written statement filed before the trial Court, it was admitted that the plaintiff was appointed on daily wages vide order Annex-Al and he joined his duty on 1st July, 1978 it was also admitted that the services of the plaintiff were terminated on 21st January, 1980. Thus. it is an admitted position that the plaintiff continued in service from 1st July 1978 to 21st January, 1980. In para 2 of the plaint it was submitted that the plaintiff' did not appear on 24th February, 1979 and as such, the salary for this day was not paid to him. It was also admitted that the plaintiff was paid the salary for 25th February, 1979. It was also submitted that the plaintiff was not in regular service but he was on daily wages. As such, he was not entitled to any leave and other benefits of the service. 3. As regards the submissions made by the plaintiff in para 7 of the plaint are concerned. it was submitted that the question of seniority does not arise in the instant case as Shankar Lal and the appellant were appointed on the same date. It was also submitted that the question of seniority does not arise in the instant case as none of them was appointed on the basis of regular cadre. 4. it was submitted that the question of seniority does not arise in the instant case as Shankar Lal and the appellant were appointed on the same date. It was also submitted that the question of seniority does not arise in the instant case as none of them was appointed on the basis of regular cadre. 4. So far as the facts are concerned, they ate admitted one that the plaintiff was elder than Shanker Lal and his name has been mentioned at No. 1 in the appointment letter whereas the name of Shanker Lal has been mentioned at No. 2. Ordinarily, if some persons are appointed on the same day by the same order, the person who is elder in age is given seniority unless his name has been mentioned in the appointment order. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that the Danie of the appellant appears at the top of the appointment order and he was also elder in age. It was also admitted that the plaintiff was appointed against a temporary post which was created by the State Government in the year 1978 and that post still continues. The learned Munsif after considering the evidence produced by both the parties dismissed the suit of the plaintiff on the ground that the plaintiff was a temporary employee and that he was appointed on daily wages, and as such, the question of seniority does not arise. The principle of last come first go does not apply. It was held by the Court below that the plaintiff has failed to prove that there was any mala fide action. 5. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsif, an appeal was preferred before the learned District Judge. The learned District Judge vide his judgment and decree dated 28th July, 1982, dismissed the appeal. The learned District Judge held that the daily rated employees cannot be given the protection under Article 16 of the Constitution of India as they are not entitled to increment, leave, gratuity and other benefits of the service. 6. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, this second appeal has been preferred before this Court. 7. The following substantial questions are involved in the instant case: 1. 6. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, this second appeal has been preferred before this Court. 7. The following substantial questions are involved in the instant case: 1. Whether the protection of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution is available to the daily rated employees of the State or not? 2. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the services of the appellant have been terminated in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India ? 3. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case can it be said that Shanker Lal Saini was a junior person ? 4. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the termination of the service of the plaintiff-appellant was without an reason and is in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India on the ground that Shanker Lal Saini was retained in the service. 8. So far as the decision of this appeal is concerned, issue No. 1 is only relevant for the purpose. Mr. Singhvi, counsel for the appellant has submitted that Art 16 of the Constitution of India should be interpreted for the benefit of all the citizens in the matter of employment or appointment to any office under the State. He further submits that Article 16 of the Constitution does not provide that the benefit of this article should only be extended to the monthly paid employees who have been appointed on regular basis. He submits that if a person has been appointed on a regular post even on daily wags, even then the protection of Article 16 of the Constitution is available to such employees. He further submits that apart from that Article 14 of the Constitution is still wide enough and which prohibits the State not to deny equality before law or the equal protection of law within the territory of India. He submits that daily rated employees can also get the protection under Article 14 of the Constitution the further submits that the doctrine of 'last come first go' should be made applicable unless there are special reasons for not applying the same. He submits that daily rated employees can also get the protection under Article 14 of the Constitution the further submits that the doctrine of 'last come first go' should be made applicable unless there are special reasons for not applying the same. He has pointed out that in the written statement filed by the respondents before the trial Court, in para 8(c), it has been specifically mentioned that the services of the plaintiff-appellant have not be terminated by way of punishment. No reasons have been assigned in the written statement why the services were terminated and no issue has also been framed on this point. 9. On the other hand, M. Pareek submits that the protection of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India is not available to the daily rated workers, though they might be holding a regular post. Mr. Pareek submits that in the written statement it has been admitted that the appellant was appointed on a temporary basis which still continues. 10. I have heard the rival contentions of both the parties and perused the record of the case. 11. Before coming to the merits of the case, I consider it proper to examine the provisions of Article 16 (1) of the Constitution, which is reproduced as under : "(I) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State." The point which needs consideration is that in Clause (1) of Article 16 the words - "employment or appointment to any office under the State" have been used. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff was holding the post under the State of Rajasthan. It is also not disputed that the appellant was appointed vide Annex. Al and from time to time his services were extended and the plaintiff-appellant continued in the employment upto 21st January, 1980 i.e. the date on which his services were terminated. It is also an admitted position that no grounds have been given in the termination order of the appellant as well as in the reply filed by the State. DW11 Himmat Singh has stated that the plaintiff was working as a Lower Division Clerk on daily wages and he continued upto the date of his termination. It is also an admitted position that no grounds have been given in the termination order of the appellant as well as in the reply filed by the State. DW11 Himmat Singh has stated that the plaintiff was working as a Lower Division Clerk on daily wages and he continued upto the date of his termination. However, one only salary for 24th February, 1979 was not paid to him as the plaintiff-appellant was not present on that day. Ram Chandra plaintiff appellant has also admitted that he joined the service on 1st July, 1978 and his services were terminated on 21st January, 1980. He has stated that Shankar Lal Saini was junior to him and he was retained in the service. He has further stated that on the post which he was holding one Shri Giving Singh has been appointed vide appointment order Ex 2, dated 30th August. 1980. He further submits that his work was satisfactory and no reason has been assigned for his removal from service. In the case of State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, ( AIR 1976 SC 490 ) , their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that : "The principle of equality is applicable to employment at all stages and in all respects, namely, initial recruitment, promotion, retirement, payment of pension and gratuity." 12. The basic concept of equality is equality of opportunity for appointment, retention in service, promotion and other allied matters. 13. In the case of E. P. Rameppa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974 (1) SLR 497) their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the scope of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Their Lordships have held that ; "The ambit and reach of Articles 14 and 16 are not limited to cases where the public servant affected has a right to post. Even if a public servant is in an officiating position, he can complain of violation of Articles 14 and 16 if he has been arbitrarily or unfairly treated or subjected to mala fide exercise of power by the State machine." 14. Even if a public servant is in an officiating position, he can complain of violation of Articles 14 and 16 if he has been arbitrarily or unfairly treated or subjected to mala fide exercise of power by the State machine." 14. Article 16 embodies the fundamental guarantee that there shall be an equality of opportunity for all citizens and the matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State, though enacted as an independent fundamental right because of great importance as a principle enshrined equality of opportunity in public employment which is so vital to the building of democratic set-up in the Constitution. In a democratic set-up there may be a rule of one party today and the rule of other party tomorrow. The services will have to execute the policy of the ruling party under the guidelines given by the Minister concerned. Independence of the services is necessary for the preservation of democratic set-up and they will have to execute the policies as per the directions given by the Minister. For this reason also, the protection has been given to the service. It is, therefore, necessary that the services are not flooded on the political ideology to the prejudice of a particular party as the prime function of the services are not flooded on the political ideology to the prejudice of a particular party as the prime function of the services is to execute the policies of the State laid down by the Council of Ministers. It is the quality of the officers in the matter of execution which counts much and the touch-stone in the matter of execution of the State policy. In Govt. Branch Press v. D.B. Belliapa ( AIR 1979 SC 429 ) their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as under : If the services of a temporary Government servant are terminated in accordance with the conditions of his service on the ground of unsatisfactory, conduct or his unsuitability for the job and/or for his work being unsatisfactory. or for a like reason which marks him off a class apart from other temporary servants who have been retained in service, there is no question of the applicability of Article 16. or for a like reason which marks him off a class apart from other temporary servants who have been retained in service, there is no question of the applicability of Article 16. Conversely, if the services of a temporary Government servant are terminated arbitrarily and not on the ground of his equitability, unsatisfactory conduct or the like which would put him in a class apart from his juniors in the same service, a question of unfair discrimination may arise notwithstanding the fact that in terminating his service, the appointing authority was purporting to act in accordance with the terms of the employment, where a charge of unfair discrimination is levelled with specificity, or improper motives are imputed to the authority making the impugned order of termination of the service, it is the duty of the authority to dispel that charge by disclosing to the Court the reason or motive which impelled it to take the impugned action. Excepting, perhaps, in cases analogous to those covered by Article 311 (2), proviso (a). the authority cannot withhold such information from the Court of the last excuse, that the impugned order is purely administrative and not judicial, having been passed in exercise of its administrative discretion under the rules governing the conditions of the service." 15. Their Lordships were considering the termination of services of an employee who was earlier served with a show cause notice questioning his integrity and fidelity and the employee was terminated from service. Thus, it is a settled law that the protection under Article 16 of the Constitution is also available to temporary Government Servant. 16. Mr Singhvi has also cited before me the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sughar Singh (1974(1) SLR 435) in which their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering reversion of one ASI to post of Head Constable. In the case Sughar Singh alone was reverted to the substantive post of Head Constable. No suggestion was made at any time on behalf of the appellant, State of Uttar Pradesh, that the post has been abolished or the respondent was required to go back to his substantive post of' Head Constable. This circumstance was considered together with the fact the learned Standing Counsel for the State admitted here the Court that order of revision was a result of the adverse entry made in the appellant's confidential muster rolls. This circumstance was considered together with the fact the learned Standing Counsel for the State admitted here the Court that order of revision was a result of the adverse entry made in the appellant's confidential muster rolls. Their Lordships considered that it was penal in nature and dismissed the appeal filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh. 17. Mr. Singhvi has also cited before me the case of Supdt. Post Offices v. P.K. Rajamma, ( AIR 1977 SC 1677 ) in which it was held as under : "A post, it was explained, exists apart from the holder of the post. A post may be created before the appointment or simultaneously with it. A post is an employment. but every employment is not a post. A casual Labourer is not the holder of a post. A post under the State means a post under the Administrative control of the State. The State may create or abolish the post and may regulate the conditions of persons appointed to the post." "It is apparent from the rules that the employment of an extra depart- mental agent is in a post which exists "apart from" the person who happens to fill it at any particular time. The post of extra-departmental agent was outside the regular service." 18. But, their Lordships held that there is no doubt that it is a post under the State. A servant acts under the direct control and supervision of his master and is bound to conform to all reasonable orders given to him in the course of his work. 19. There is a well established distinction between the contract for service and contract of service. In one case the master can order or require what is to be done while in the other case, he cannot only order or require what is to be done but how it shall be done. In the instant case, appellant was under a contract of service and the State had the power to order or require what is to be done as well as how it shall be done. 20. Mr Singhvi has also cited before me the case of Board of Trustees, Port of Bombay v. Dilip Singh ( AIR 1983 SC 109 ) in which their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that reasonable opportunity should be given to the parties concerned. 20. Mr Singhvi has also cited before me the case of Board of Trustees, Port of Bombay v. Dilip Singh ( AIR 1983 SC 109 ) in which their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that reasonable opportunity should be given to the parties concerned. The question of principle of natural justice does not arise. At this stage, we are mere concerned with the applicability of Articles 14 and 16, of the Constitution. Mr. Singhvi has also cited before me the case of Sanjit Roy v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1983 SC 328 ) . In the said case, their Lordship, were considering the provisions of Article 23 of the Constitution of India. The case cited by Shri Singhvi does not apply in the facts and circumstances of the case. 21. From a perusal of the citations submitted by Mr. Singhvi it is clear that the scope of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution are wide enough. It is also a well settled rule of administrative law that an executive authority must be rigorously held to the standards by which it purports its action to be adjudged and it must scrupulously observe just standards of ban on investigation of an Act in violation of' that. This judicially evolved administrative law is now formally established. 22. The provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution are applicable in the matters relating to employment or appointment in any office under the State. It is also a well settled law that the casual labour cannot get the benefit of Article 16 of the Constitution in the matter relating to employment or appointment. It must be a regular one under the State. Regular appointment cannot be equated with a permanent post, but a temporary post also fall, within the purview of regular post. The word "casual" means occasional, coming at certain time without regularity in distinction from states or regular as a casual worker is one without a regular employment. Generally, the casual posts are unforeseen posts and come into existence by chance looking to the nature of the temporary need. Regular posts are those posts which are not casual and finds place generally every year. It may be said that these posts are generally anticipated posts and are continued every year or for a pretty long time. Generally, the casual posts are unforeseen posts and come into existence by chance looking to the nature of the temporary need. Regular posts are those posts which are not casual and finds place generally every year. It may be said that these posts are generally anticipated posts and are continued every year or for a pretty long time. I am of the view that Article 16 will apply to the regular permanent posts or are regular temporary post, but will not apply to casual post. Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution have nothing to do with the mode of payment of salary of the person so employed. The payment can be made on monthly basis, yearly basis or even on daily rated basis. There is nothing in Article 16 to suggest that the persons who are daily rated wage workers would get the benefit of Article 16 of Constitution. A person who is holding a permanent or temporary regular post, even if he is paid daily rated wages he is entitled for protection of Article 16. only the persons who are casual employees cannot get the benefit of Article 16 of the Constitution. Casual work is a work of a particular type for a particular period having relations with the particular work itself. For example, a road is tinder repair and the labour is appointed for the purpose of repair of the road. The wages of the employees is charged against a work which is carried by the state i.e. against the budget for maintenance of road. The persons who are deputed against a particular work of a casual nature fall within the purview of a casual labour and other persons who do not fall within the purview of casual labour fall within the purview of permanent or temporary employees of the State. It will not be out of place to mention that in the instant case, the appellant was appointed vide order No. 208 dated 28th June, 1978 (Annx. A1) on daily wages of Rs. 12/- per day. He continued to serve the state upto 21st January, 1980, and his services were terminated vide order dated 21st January, 1980 (No. 711). It is also an admitted position that the post which the appellant was holding continued even at the time of examination of the witnesses produced by the parties in the court. 12/- per day. He continued to serve the state upto 21st January, 1980, and his services were terminated vide order dated 21st January, 1980 (No. 711). It is also an admitted position that the post which the appellant was holding continued even at the time of examination of the witnesses produced by the parties in the court. It cannot be said whether the post is continuing even today or not but the contention of the appellant is that the post still continues. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the petitioner was a casual employee of the State for years together. Another person has been appointed even after the termination of the appellant, and the post is continued which goes to show that the post is a temporary post, if not a permanent post. Temporary post may be for an indefinite period till it is declared as a permanent post. But it cannot be said that casual post will continue for years and that too for a ministerial staff. 23. For the reasons stated above, I am of the view that the persons who are daily rated employees can also get the benefit of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution if they are holding a permanent or a temporary regular post. In the instant case, I have already held that the appellant too was holding temporary post and was not holding a casual post. As such, the appellant is entitled for the benefit of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 24. For the reasons stated above, I accept the appeal of the appellant and set aside the judgment of the appellate Court and further direct the appellate court to consider the appeal of the appellant on merits taking into consideration (sic-line missing) are available to the appellant, the parties are left to bear their own costs.Appeal Accepted. *******