Judgement JAHAGIRDAR, J.:- This petition seeks to challenge an order of detention passed against the husband of the petitioner, hereinafter referred to as the "detenu", by the Government of Maharashtra under S. 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, hereinafter referred to as the "COFEPOSA Act". The order of detention is dt. 21st of Nov. 1984. The grounds of detention contemporaneously formulated were served upon the detenu along with the order of detention. The detention order arose out of an incident which took place on the night of 21st and 22nd of Oct. 1984 in which a truck with contraband was involved within the precincts of the Raj Bhavan at Bombay the detenu who was the security officer attached to Raj Bhavan is said to have asked the guard to allow the truck to go into the compound of the Raj Bhavan and also to allow it to go out. However while the truck was making its exit, it was intercepted and on a search being made it was found that the truck contained smuggled goods. These and other facts have been mentioned in the grounds of detention. 2. The Additional Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, made a declaration that the detenu is likely to abet the smuggling of goods into Bombay which is an area highly vulnerable to smuggling as defined in Explanation 1 to S. 9(1) of the COFEPOSA Act. While making the said declaration, the Additional Secretary, hereinafter referred to as the "competent authority", has mentioned that he has carefully considered "the material bearing on the matter in my possession".The effect of a declaration having been made under S. 9(1) of the COFEPOSA Act is that the maximum period during which a detenu can be detained without obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board is extended. Similarly the maximum period of detention is extended from one year to two years. Another consequence is that the reference to the Advisory Board can be made by the detaining authority within an extended time. The importance of the declaration under S. 9(1) of the COFEPOSA Act cannot, therefore, be underestimated. 3. In this petition challenge has been made to the order of detention as well as to the continued detention on various grounds. Another consequence is that the reference to the Advisory Board can be made by the detaining authority within an extended time. The importance of the declaration under S. 9(1) of the COFEPOSA Act cannot, therefore, be underestimated. 3. In this petition challenge has been made to the order of detention as well as to the continued detention on various grounds. It is not necessary for us to consider all the grounds urged in support of petition because we are of the opinion that there is full justification for the contention urged by Mr. Kotwal appearing in support of the petition that the respondents have been unable to prove that the subjective satisfaction before issuing the declaration under S. 9(1) of the COFEPOSA Act has been arrived at by the competent authority on relevant material. If one reads the affidavit in reply filed in the instant case, says Mr. Kotwal, it has not been satisfactorily shown that the competent authority considered any particular material and that particular material was relevant to the formation of the subjective satisfaction which is a pre-condition before issuing the declaration under S. 9(1) of the COFEPOSA Act. 4. Often we are confronted with a question as to whether an affidavit is always necessary in reply to a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. When an order of detention is challenged by a detenu, to whom the order of detention and the grounds of detention on which that order is based are supplied, it is open to the detaining authority to come before the Court and contend that the subjective satisfaction which is formulated in the form of a conclusion towards the end of the grounds of detention is supportable by the material contained in the grounds of detention itself. He may, indeed, with justification contend that the said subjective satisfaction will stand or fall on its being referable to the grounds mentioned therein. In such a case an affidavit in reply may not be necessary and the burden of demonstrating that the subjective satisfaction incorporated at the end of the grounds of detention could not have been arrived at by any rational person is naturally upon the petitioner. Often, the petitioner makes a vague allegation that the order of detention is mala fide without bothering to give any particulars. Often, the petitioner makes a vague allegation that the order of detention is mala fide without bothering to give any particulars. Such a general allegation can only naturally be denied and if the respondents do so they cannot be blamed. 5. We are coming across several petitions which are filed in this Court with vague general allegations, prolix arguments based upon facts not always verified, and averments on facts mixed with legal submissions, which must be causing a lot of headache to the respondents while filing affidavits in reply. The practice of making vague and unfounded allegations has been frowned upon by several Courts and in particular by the Supreme Court. One may refer to A. K. K. Nambiar v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 652 . The appellant before the Supreme Court made allegations against the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh and other persons and had filed an affidavit in support of the petition. Neither the petition nor the affidavit was verified. The Supreme Court stated as follows : "The reasons for verification of affidavits are to enable the Court to find out which facts can be said to be proved on the affidavit evidence of rival parties. Allegations may be true to knowledge or allegations may be true to information received from persons of allegations may be based on records. The importance of verification is to test the genuineness and authenticity of allegations and also to make the deponent responsible for allegations. In essence verification is required to enable the Court to find out as to whether it will be safe to act on such affidavit evidence." In view of the fact that the appellant before the Supreme Court had not filed a proper affidavit and had made allegations only generally, he failed. 6. Similarly, in Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar v. State of Punjab, (1982) 1 SCC 31 : ( AIR 1982 SC 65 ) it was held that the court would be justified in refusing to carry out investigation into allegations of mala fides, if necessary particulars of the charge making out a prima facie case are not given in the petition. The petitioners who seek to invalidate the orders of the Government must establish the charge of bad faith or bias or misuse by the Government of its powers. The petitioners who seek to invalidate the orders of the Government must establish the charge of bad faith or bias or misuse by the Government of its powers. In this case it was noticed that one of the petitioners had filed an affidavit asserting that the allegations made in the petition were correct to the best of his knowledge. The Supreme Court said : "This is no affidavit at all. Order 19, R. 3, C.P.C. 1908 requires the deponent to disclose the nature and source of his knowledge with sufficient particularity. The allegations in the petition are, therefore, not supported by an affidavit as required by law. That being so, the State Government was justified in denying those allegations." It is not, therefore, as if the affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents alone are to be precise as is often made out. It is necessary to re-state that in a given case an order of detention or, for example, the declaration made under S. 9(1) of the COFEPOSA Act, can be supported by the concerned authority by relying solely upon the grounds of detention or the material disclosed in the declaration itself. It is only when an allegation supported by proper material and verified in the proper manner is made by the petitioner requiring a return disclosing the material other than the grounds of detention that the question of a proper affidavit by the respondents should arise. 7. Let us now consider the nature of the executive action taken under S. 9 of the COFEPOSA Act. Before making the declaration under S. 9, certain pre-conditions must exist. In the first place, an order of detention should have been made before 31st of July 1987 against a person with a view to preventing him from smuggling goods or abetting the smuggling of goods or engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods. Under S. 3 of the COFEPOSA Act, the order of detention could be passed with a view to preventing a person from dealing in smuggled goods and also preventing him from harbouring persons engaged in the smuggling of goods. If orders under these heads are passed they are obviously not covered by the provisions of S. 9. Under S. 3 of the COFEPOSA Act, the order of detention could be passed with a view to preventing a person from dealing in smuggled goods and also preventing him from harbouring persons engaged in the smuggling of goods. If orders under these heads are passed they are obviously not covered by the provisions of S. 9. It is only when an order of detention is made with a view to prevent a particular person from indulging in acts mentioned in S. 9, not any of the acts mentioned in S. 3, that the question of invoking the power of making the declaration under S. 9 arises. The declaration is to be made by the competent authority if that authority is satisfied that the person smuggles or is likely to smuggle goods or if he abets or is likely to abet the smuggling of goods, or engages or is likely to engage in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods in any area highly vulnerable to smuggling. The satisfaction that such a person is likely to indulge in any one or the other of the activities mentioned in sub-sec. (1) of S. 9 naturally is a subjective satisfaction to be arrived at by the competent authority after considering all the relevant materials. It is already noticed that this declaration cannot be made unless there is already an order of detention. Naturally the order of detention will be before the competent authority. The grounds of detention would also be in all probability before the competent authority. The competent authority will naturally be considering as to whether the detenu is likely to indulge in any one or the other of the prohibited acts mentioned in Cls. (a), (b) and (c) of sub-s. (1) of S. 9 in any vulnerable area. The "area highly vulnerable to smuggling" has been defined in Explanation 1 to sub-sec. (1) of S. 9 of the COFEPOSA Act. That is a matter of pure objective determination. 8. When a declaration is made under S. 9(1) and if in that declaration the order of detention which is covered by S. 9 and the grounds of detention supporting that order of detention are mentioned as the material on the basis of which the subjective satisfaction is arrived at, then the necessary material can be said to have been disclosed. When a declaration is made under S. 9(1) and if in that declaration the order of detention which is covered by S. 9 and the grounds of detention supporting that order of detention are mentioned as the material on the basis of which the subjective satisfaction is arrived at, then the necessary material can be said to have been disclosed. As already mentioned above, what is a highly vulnerable area is easy to find out in view of the definition to be found in Explanation 1 to S. 9(1) of the Act. In such a case if the declaration under Sec. 9(1) is challenged merely on the ground that it lacks the subjective satisfaction, it is open to the competent authority to contend that the material on which the order of detention has been passed was sufficient to support the subjective satisfaction arrived at by him before he made the necessary declaration. We do not see why an affidavit in reply is necessary in such a case. As we have already mentioned earlier, the detaining authority can support the subjective satisfaction by referring to the grounds of detention. Similarly, the authority making the declaration under S. 9(1) can contend that the material on the basis of which the subjective satisfaction has been arrived at is already mentioned in the declaration and the Court may examine whether the said satisfaction is supportable by the material so mentioned. In the absence of challenge on other grounds which challenge must be properly affirmed and verified, we do not see why an affidavit in reply is necessary. 9. The detenu cannot throw the ball in the other Court merely by asserting that the action is mala fide or that the authority is influenced by other material, without laying foundation for such assertions as mentioned by the Supreme Court in A. K. K. Nambiar's ( AIR 1970 SC 652 ) and Sukhwinder Pal's cases ( AIR 1982 SC 65 ) (supra). 10. However, the picture becomes different when the declaration itself does not disclose the material forming the basis of the subjective satisfaction. When a detenu comes before the Court challenging such a declaration, the competent authority cannot contend that the subjective satisfaction is proper because in the declaration itself the material on the basis of which the subjective satisfaction was arrived at is not mentioned. This is exactly the case before us. When a detenu comes before the Court challenging such a declaration, the competent authority cannot contend that the subjective satisfaction is proper because in the declaration itself the material on the basis of which the subjective satisfaction was arrived at is not mentioned. This is exactly the case before us. The competent authority in the instant case has stated in the declaration as follows : "And whereas I, the undersigned, specially empowered in this behalf by the Central Government, have carefully considered the material bearing on the matter in my possession;" What that material is has not been stated. It has not been stated, for example, that the grounds of detention supplied to the detenu were before the competent authority; nor has it been stated whether any other material was considered by the competent authority. What exactly the competent authority means by "the material bearing on the matter in my possession"? Normally it is the Courts which have to decide whether the material considered by the competent authority was relevant to the formation of the subjective satisfaction. It is, therefore, necessary that the authorities concerned must disclose what material was there before that authority. 11. The next question is, if an affidavit is necessary to disclose what material was considered by the authority, who should file such an affidavit? The answer must necessarily be that the affidavit must be filed by the authority who has considered the material and arrived at the subjective satisfaction. In certain circumstances, the competent authority may not be able to file the affidavit for various reasons. In such a case the Courts have allowed certain latitude to the authorities. As early as in State of Bombay v. Purushottam Jog, AIR 1952 SC 317 : (1952 Cri LJ 1269) the Supreme Court has pointed out as follows:- "As a matter of abstract law, the state of man's mind can be proved by evidence other than that of the man himself, and if the Home Secretary has the requisite means of knowledge, for example, if the Minister had told him that he was satisfied or he had indicated satisfaction by his conduct and acts, and the Home Secretary's affidavit was regarded as sufficient in the particular case, then that would constitute legally sufficient proof of the satisfaction of the Home Minister. But whether that would be enough in any given case, or whether the "best evidence rule" should be applied in strictness in that particular case, must necessarily depend upon its facts." In another part of the same judgment the Supreme Court has stated that it is not necessary in every case to call the Minister in charge. If the Secretary, or any other person, has the requisite means of knowledge and his affidavit is believed, that will be enough to prove that the order was validly made by the Government. It may also be stated that the Supreme Court emphasised the importance of verification of an affidavit especially by a Government Officer. The verification of an affidavit filed by a Government Officer to prove that certain order was validly made by the State Government should invariably be modelled on the lines of O. 19, R. 3 of the Civil P. C., whether the Code applies in terms or not. To say that what is stated is true to the best of information and belief is to verify in a very slipshod manner. When the matter deposed to is not based upon personal knowledge, the source of information should be clearly disclosed. 12. It will be in the fitness of things to refer to some more decisions on this aspect delivered by the Supreme Court. In Shaikh Hanif v. State of W. B., AIR 1974 SC 679 : (1974 Cri LJ 606), it has been pointed out that if for sufficient reason shown to the satisfaction of the Court, the affidavit of the person who passed the order of detention under S. 3 cannot be furnished, the counter-affidavit should be sworn by some responsible officer who personally dealt with or processed the case in the Government secretariat or submitted it to the Minister or other Officer duly authorised under the rules of business. Though the failure to furnish a counter-affidavit is an impropriety which may not be of much consequence in most cases, in a given case, in conjunction with other circumstances, it may take the shape of a serious infirmity leading the Court to declare the detention illegal. 13. To the same effect are the observations of the Supreme Court in Jagdish Prasad v. State of Bihar. 13. To the same effect are the observations of the Supreme Court in Jagdish Prasad v. State of Bihar. AIR 1974 SC 911 : (1974 Cri LJ 764) "It is difficult to appreciate why in return to a rule nisi in a habeas corpus motion, it is not thought serious enough even where liberty of a citizen is choked off, to get the District Magistrate to explain his subjective satisfaction and the grounds therefor. Not even why it is not available nor the next best, the oath of a senior officer in the Secretariat who had been associated with the handling of the case at Government level. Mechanical affidavits, Miniaturising the files into a few paragraphs, by some one handy in the Secretariat cannot be regarded as satisfactory. This is not a mere punctilio of procedure but a probative requirement of substance.........." 14. Sarkaria J. in Mohd. Alarri v. State of W. B., AIR 1974 SC 917 : (1974 Cri LJ 770) was dealing with a contention that the District Magistrate who had passed the detention order had not furnished his affidavit nor has any satisfactory explanation been given as to why he had not done so. In this connection, Sarkaria, J. recalled the observations made by the Supreme Court in Shaikh Hanif s case AIR 1974 SC 679 : (1974 Cri LJ 606) and stated that "the proper person to file the counter-affidavit is the District Magistrate who had passed the order of detention and if for some good reason, the Magistrate is not available, the next best thing would be to furnish the affidavit of a Senior Officer who personally dealt with the case of the detenu in the Government Secretariat, or had put it to the Minister for orders." 15. The following extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bhut Nath v. State of W. B., AIR 1974 SC 806 : (1974 Cri LJ 690) brings out the necessity of an affidavit being filed by the person concerned himself and the risk involved in following any other procedure:- "Why is an affidavit then needed at all? The following extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bhut Nath v. State of W. B., AIR 1974 SC 806 : (1974 Cri LJ 690) brings out the necessity of an affidavit being filed by the person concerned himself and the risk involved in following any other procedure:- "Why is an affidavit then needed at all? The fact of subjective satisfaction, solemnly reached, considering relevant and excluding irrelevant facts, sufficient in degree of danger and certainty to warrant pre-emptive casting into prison, is best made out by the detaining District Magistrate not one who professionally reads records and makes out a precis in the form of an affidavit. The purpose is missed, going by the seriousness of the matter, the proof is deficient, going by ordinary rules of evidence, and the Court is denied the benefit of the word of one who takes responsibility for the action, if action has to be taken against the detainer later for misuse. We are aware that in the exigencies of administration, an officer may be held up far away, engrossed in other important work, thus being unavailable to swear an affidavit. The next best would then be the oath of one in the Secretariat who officially is cognisant of or has participated in the process of approval by Government - not one who, long later, reads old files and gives its gist to the Court. Mechanical means are easy but not legitimate. We emphasize this infirmity because routine summaries of files, marked as affidavits, appear in the returns to rules nisi, showing scant courtesy to the constitutional gravity of deprivation of civil liberty. In some cases, where a valid reason for the District Magistrate's inability to swear affidavits directly has been furnished, this Court has accepted the concerned Deputy Secretary's affidavit. This should, however, be the exception, not the rule." 16. As has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in Dulal Chandra v. State of W. B., AIR 1974 SC 2361 : (1975 Cri LJ 19) ordinarily, when an averment is made by a high officer like the District Magistrate in an affidavit which is made on oath, the Court is inclined to accept the averment as correct and the burden lies heavily on the party who alleges to the contrary. In Dulal Chandra's case the original affidavit contained a mistake and it was sought to be corrected by means of an affidavit filed by another person upon which the Supreme court naturally frowned. If the District Magistrate himself had made a subsequent affidavit stating on oath that he had made a mistake in the earlier affidavit in reply and explained the circumstances under which he came to commit the said mistake it would have carried some weight with the Court. 17. It is not necessary to multiply the authorities except to mention one recent judgment of the Supreme Court to which our attention has been rightly invited by Mr. Govilkar appearing for the Union of India and that is State of Punjab v. Jagdev Singh, AIR 1984 SC 444 : (1984 Cri LJ 177). In this judgment the Supreme Court has referred to its earlier judgments on the question as to who should file the affidavit in reply, especially in reply to petitions for the issuance of writ of habeas corpus, and has summed up its views in the following terms :- "We cannot, however, leave this subject without emphasising once again the importance of the detaining authority filing his own affidavit in cases of the present nature. There are degrees of impropriety and the line which divides grave impropriety from illegality is too thin to draw and even more so to judge. Conceivably, there can be cases in which such impropriety arising out of the failure of the detaining authority in filing his own affidavit may vitiate the order of detention." Mr. Govilkar has relied on the above judgment for the purpose of canvassing for our acceptance a view that though the affidavit in reply has been filed in the instant case by a person other than the one who made the declaration, on the facts of the present case, there is no impropriety vitiating the order of detention. 18. Now, therefore, we must examine the manner in which the challenge to the declaration under S. 9(1) of the COFEPOSA Act has been sought to be met by the competent authority. We have already stated earlier that in the declaration itself no indication is available as to the material on the basis of which the competent authority was subjectively satisfied of the need to make a declaration in respect of the present detenu. We have already stated earlier that in the declaration itself no indication is available as to the material on the basis of which the competent authority was subjectively satisfied of the need to make a declaration in respect of the present detenu. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the competent authority to satisfy the Court that the impugned declaration has been made after considering the material which is relevant to the subjective satisfaction. The affidavit in this regard has been filed by one Mr. A. K. Agnihotri who is said to be working as the Under Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of Finance. In the affidavit he only describes his position in the Ministry concerned and thereafter he says that he has gone through the copy of the petition and the relevant records as maintained in his office. After going through the same, he proceeds to say that, he makes the affidavit on behalf of the Additional Secretary who made the declaration under S. 9(1). In the entire affidavit no clue is available as to how he is able to state on oath that a particular material was considered by the competent authority and on the basis of that material the competent authority was subjectively satisfied. The Affidavit is also somewhat argumentative trying to tell this Court as to what the law of the Supreme Court is, but we will ignore that part of the affidavit. Towards the end of the affidavit, he says as follows : - "I say and submit that the material relied upon for making of the declaration was the same as was supplied to the detenu along with the grounds of detention dt. 21-11-1984. It is submitted that no fresh material was relied upon to make the declaration under S. 9(1)." In the light of the total absence of any information relating to the competence of Mr. Agnihotri to depose to on the relevant material, we refuse to accept the bald statement made by him in para 4 of his affidavit. 19. In a case of this type it is absolutely essential that either the competent authority himself should file an affidavit, or, as has been pointed out in some of the judgments to which we have already made reference, it should be filed by someone who by the nature of his duties was associated with the competent authority making the declaration. In a case of this type it is absolutely essential that either the competent authority himself should file an affidavit, or, as has been pointed out in some of the judgments to which we have already made reference, it should be filed by someone who by the nature of his duties was associated with the competent authority making the declaration. Mr. Agnihotri, of course, does not pretend that he was in any way even associated with that section of the department of Revenue which deals with the exercise of the power under S. 9(1) of the COFEPOSA Act. The mere fact that a person is working in the same department will not make that person legally competent to depose to questions such as the one which has arisen before us. In the instant case it is not merely the impropriety of Mr. Agnihotri filing the affidavit in reply, but the impropriety is so grave as to render the whole affidavit totally devoid of any meaning. No explanation has been given as to why Mr. Rao has not been able to file an affidavit to meet the challenge which has been rightly posed in this case because of the non-mention of the material in the declaration itself. The question is not whether, as Mr. Govilkar contends, non-filing of an affidavit by Mr. Rao is fatal; the question is also not whether the filing of the affidavit by Mr. Agnihotri instead of by the competent authority is proper or illegal. The question is whether the respondents have been able to show that the declaration made under S. 9(1) of the COFEPOSA Act is legal or is in accordance with law. This question has not been answered in the affirmative by the material that has been placed before this Court. If this is so, naturally, one must proceed on the basis that there is no valid or legal declaration under S. 9(1) of the COFEPOSA Act and, therefore, the consequences of the extended period for the reference to the Advisory Board and of the extended period of detention cannot follow. The continued detention of the detenu, therefore, beyond the period of 90 days, which is the outer limit within which the Advisory Board has to confirm the order of detention is thus rendered illegal. 20. In the result, this petition must succeed. The petition is accordingly allowed. The continued detention of the detenu, therefore, beyond the period of 90 days, which is the outer limit within which the Advisory Board has to confirm the order of detention is thus rendered illegal. 20. In the result, this petition must succeed. The petition is accordingly allowed. The continued detention of the detenu, namely Kusumkar Anant Sabnis pursuant to the order dt. 21st Nov., 1984 passed by the Government of Maharashtra under S. 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act is declared illegal. The said detenu shall be set at liberty forthwith. Petition allowed