Judgment :- 1. This second appeal is against a final decree passed in a suit for redemption of mortgage. Defendants 3 and 5 to 7 who are the legal representatives of the 1st defendant are the appellants. 2. A preliminary decree has been passed for redemption of the mortgage of the C-schedule property on 6-9-1967. The final decree was passed on an application filed on 1-3-1975. The appellants had raised the question of tenancy in the final decree proceedings and that was negatived by the trial court which was confirmed by the first appellate court. The substantial questions of law as formulated by the appellants have been enumerated into five items in the memorandum of appeal on which notice had been issued to the respondents. But the learned counsel for the appellants has urged only two of such questions and hence I proceed to consider only those two which can be recast as under: "Should the trial court have referred the question of tenancy to the Land Tribunal as per S.125 (3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act as the final decree application was filed only after the commencement of Act 35 of 1969? and (2) whether an earlier leasehold right created prior to the mortgage would revive on the extinguishment of the mortgage". 3. Some more facts are necessary to appreciate the respective contentions raised on the questions of law formulated above. After the passing of the preliminary decree for redemption, the appellants have filed an earlier application for the passing of a final decree which was dismissed on 7-12-1971. The present application for passing the final decree was filed on 1-3-1975 which was also dismissed first by the trial court holding that the same was barred by limitation. Against that order the plaintiffs had preferred an appeal as A.S. No. 150 of 1976 before the District Court, and allowing that appeal the matter was remitted back to the trial court for fresh disposal in accordance with law. When it came back to the trial court the appellants have filed their objections on 13-6-1978 raising a claim of tenancy. The trial court then took note of the fact that the question of tenancy was already raised and considered during the preliminary decree stage and was negatived by the court. When it came back to the trial court the appellants have filed their objections on 13-6-1978 raising a claim of tenancy. The trial court then took note of the fact that the question of tenancy was already raised and considered during the preliminary decree stage and was negatived by the court. Even, that apart, according to the trial court, there is no evidence in this case to show that defendants 2 to 5 are entitled to claim tenancy right under any other provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act and on these reasonings the trial court has found against the claim of tenancy raised by the appellants. Hence the final decree was passed. When the matter was taken in appeal before the first appellate court, the said finding was confirmed and the plea for a further opportunity to adduce further evidence was rejected by the first appellate court. 4. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, the question of tenancy raised by the appellants should have been referred to the Land Tribunal as the proceedings for final decree have been initiated only on 1-3-1975 pursuant to the application filed by the plaintiffs for the passing of the final decree. The argument of the learned counsel is based on the proviso to S.125 (1) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. That sub-section is quoted here: "125. Bar of jurisdiction of civil courts (1) No civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question or to determine any matter which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with or to be determined by the Land Tribunal or the appellate authority or the Land Board or the Taluk Land Board or the Government or an officer of the Government: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to proceedings pending in any court at the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969". 5. He contended that when the jurisdiction of the civil court has been completely ousted by the legislature as per S.125(1) of the Act, the civil court should not have proceeded to decide the question of tenancy because the proviso which deals with the jurisdiction of the civil court applies only to "proceedings pending in any court at the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969". There is no dispute about the fact that the suit was filed long prior to the commencement of the said Act. But the preliminary decree in the suit was passed prior to the commencement of the said Act. Therefore, the learned counsel contends that the final decree proceedings have been commenced only on 1-3-1975 and hence it should be treated as proceedings not pending in the court at the commencement of the said Act. 6. I am not persuaded to find force in the said contention raised by the learned counsel. A suit cannot be vivisected into two such parts for the purpose of treating them as preliminary decree proceedings and final decree proceedings for the purpose of holding that the latter proceedings were not pending at the commencement of the said Act. The word "proceedings" used in the proviso is not to be given such a narrow construction. The word "proceedings" is the genus of which suit is a species. In the ambit of the word "proceedings" suits, execution proceedings, proceedings under different special enactments etc. would fall. Hence the word proceedings in the proviso to S.125 (1) is not employed to distinguish it from suits, or appeals or revision, but as one to embrace all those categories of legal proceedings. The mere passing of a preliminary decree in a suit would not terminate the proceedings in the suit. In fact no authority is necessary for that proposition as it is well-nigh settled. Even if any authority is required I shall refer to two decisions cited at the bar, Angammal v. Muhammad Sulaiman (A.I.R.1946 Mad.38) and Kunhalan Kutty v. Pathumma & others (1970 K.L.J. 903). In the former decision a contention was raised that in a suit for redemption of a mortgage, a usufructuary mortgagee has no right to apply for a final decree in order to force the action on the part of the mortgagor. That contention was repelled with the following observations: "This again does not appear to be right. A preliminary decree does not put an end to a suit whether the preliminary decree is one for partition as in Lachmi Narain v. Balmukund (4 Pat 61) or for accounts or for sale or foreclosure or for redemption. The suit is considered to be pending until it is terminated. A preliminary decree does not put an end to a suit whether the preliminary decree is one for partition as in Lachmi Narain v. Balmukund (4 Pat 61) or for accounts or for sale or foreclosure or for redemption. The suit is considered to be pending until it is terminated. In cases where a final decree is possible, the suit terminates where a final decree it passed" (emphasis supplied). In the second decision cited supra Krishnamoorthy Iyer, J. has observed thus: "The passing of a preliminary decree does not finally dispose of the suit and the suit must be deemed to be pending until the final decree is passed. The filling of an application for passing a final decree in a suit where a preliminary decree has been passed under Order XX R.18 C.P.C. is intended merely as a reminder to the court where the suit is pending to post the case for taking further steps necessary for the passing of a final decree." On this point, that the application for final decree is only a reminder to the court to take steps for passing the final decree, no exception can be taken and the learned counsel for the appellants did not cite any decision which holds a different view. Therefore, it can be taken as well settled that a suit must be deemed to be pending even though a preliminary decree has been passed in it. The pendency of the suit continues until the final decree is passed. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants had tried to find support from the analogy that the courts have treated execution proceedings as different from the suit. He cited the Full Bench decision reported in George v. Vareed (1978 K.L.T. 691) in which the execution proceedings were treated as proceedings different from a suit for the purpose of S.125 (1) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. In that case the counsel has contended that execution proceedings are continuation of the suit and as a suit had been instituted and disposed of prior to the commencement of Act 35 of 1969 the execution proceedings started and continued thereafter must be deemed to be a mere continuation of the suit itself and therefore the execution proceedings should not be construed as a proceedings pending at the commencement of the Act. Gopalan Nambiar, C.J., speaking for the Full Bench has observed thus on the said contention: "We find that the Act refers to different types of proceedings, such for instance, as, suits, appeals, revisions, review, proceedings in execution of a decree, etc We think in the circumstances that the pendency of the proceedings must be judged with special reference to the proceedings in relation to which the applicability of S.125 arises" It was held on the strength of the aforesaid reasoning that the execution proceedings instituted after the commencement of Act 35 of 1969 were not proceedings pending at the commencement of the Act. It is true that the Full Bench of this Court in the said decision cited has treated execution proceedings as different one altogether for the purpose of proviso to S.125 (1) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. But I do not think that the said decision is of any use to support the argument built up by the learned counsel for the appellants. The distinction between proceedings in the suit and the execution proceedings is apparently discernible. Pendency of a suit in the normal course is from the stage of its institution until the date of its disposal by the passing of a decree in it. But the person who secures the decree in a suit may or may not initiate proceedings to execute the decree. Sometimes a decree holder may not have the need to execute it, and in some other times a decree would be satisfied without initiating execution proceedings. Therefore the argument of the learned counsel on the strength of the Full Bench decision does not help him to advance his case. 8. The learned counsel for the appellants has next referred to S.108 (3) of Act 35 of 1969, which reads as follows: "(3) If in any suit, application, appeal, revision, review, proceedings in execution of a decree or other proceedings pending at the commencement of this section before any court, tribunal, officer or other authority, any person claims any benefit, right or remedy conferred by any of the provisions of the principal Act or the principal Act as amended by this Act. Such suit, application, appeal, revision, review, proceedings in execution or other proceedings shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Act." He has contended that as the scheme of the said Act itself is suggestive of different stages in a suit such as appeals, revisions, applications etc., the final decree proceedings must also be taken as proceedings different from the preliminary decree proceedings and hence the final decree proceedings initiated after the commencement of the Act must be treated as unprotected by the proviso to S.125 (1) of the Act. There is no difficulty to understand the scheme of the Act as indicated in S.108 (3) of Act 35 of 1969 because appeals and revisions and reviews and proceedings in execution of the decrees are all treated as different proceedings. But the words "applications" or "other proceedings" used in the said sub-section do not relate to separate applications filed in the same suit, as separate proceedings initiated within the same suit. If every application filed in the same suit is to be treated as a separate and distinct proceedings in the same suit, it would lead to absurd consequences because the practice of filing of the large number of interlocutory applications in the same suit is a common feature in legal proceedings. Each of such interlocutory applications cannot be treated as separate or different proceedings unconnected with the suit for the purpose of S.125 (1) of the Act. 9. Therefore the contentions raised by the learned counsel that the civil court had no jurisdiction to consider the question of tenancy when the same was raised in the final decree proceedings cannot be accepted. 10. The next question raised by the counsel is that the tenancy right would revive on the extinguishment of the mortgage (admittedly there was an earlier lease of the year 1109 M.E. and the mortgage was created in the year 1140 M.E.). The appellants cannot be heard to raise this point now because even in the preliminary judgment dated 6-9-1967 the said contention was negatived and that was not challenged by the appellants. That finding has become final and cannot be reopened. Hence I decline to reconsider that question now. For the aforesaid reasons, this second Appeal is dismissed. No costs. Dismissed.