JUDGMENT Jahagirdar, J.-An order of detention dated 30th July, 19S5 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Bombay, under section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers and Drug-offenders Act, 1981, hereinafter referred to as the "said Act", against one Vijay Tukaram Salunkhe, hereinafter referred to as the "detenu", is challenged by his wife In this petition under Article 220 of the Constitution of India. The order of detention states that the Commissioner of Police, who is the detaining authority under the said Act, after being satisfied that it was necessary to do so, passed the order detaining the detenu with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order under the said Act. Along with the order of detention, the grounds of detention of the same date were also supplied to the detenu. 2. Before dealing with the challenge made by Mr. Parekh, the learned Advocate appearing in support of the petition, it would naturally be advantageous to briefly notice the grounds of detention. The detaining authority has been the grounds of detention by mentioning that the detenu "is hereby informed that the grounds on which a detention order has been made are as follows". Thereafter six paragraphs from I to VI detail the various activities which show that the detenu is a slumlord. In paragraph V it has been stated that the various tenants who have been inducted by the detenu in houses illegally constructed by him on public property have stated that whenever there was a delay on their part in paying the rent the detenu used to visit their rooms and threaten them. Paragraph IV divided into several sub-paragraphs in each of which an act of the detenu on different dates has been mentioned. The detaining authority thought, and we will show presently rightly, that these various acts constituted a chain of action or conduct which had the effect of disturbing the even tempo of life of a section of the community living in slum area. 3. Mr. Parekh, however, contends that the activities indulged in by the detenu and which have been enumerated in paragraph VI of the grounds of detention are directed against individuals only and they are not such as to cause prejudice to the maintenance of public order in which case alone the detaining authority can pass the order of detention. 3. Mr. Parekh, however, contends that the activities indulged in by the detenu and which have been enumerated in paragraph VI of the grounds of detention are directed against individuals only and they are not such as to cause prejudice to the maintenance of public order in which case alone the detaining authority can pass the order of detention. He has invited our attention to each of the acts mentioned in paragraph VI for the purpose of demonstrating to us that those acts are directed against separate individuals and are not of such a nature as to cause alarm or right in the minds of the public residing in the neighbourhood. Not unpredictably he has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ajay Dixit v. State of U.P.1, and has contended that unless the acts are of such magnitude and of such frequency as to cause alarm in the mind of the public at large, and not merely in the minds of certain individuals, an order of detention to prevent a person from acting in a manner prejudicial to the public order cannot be passed. We have with the assistance of Mr. Parekh gone through all these incidents which have been mentioned in paragraph VI of the grounds of detention. Reading the same and noticing the fact that all these acts, which he has indulged in from March 1984 onwards, have been indulged in by him because the tenants whom be bad inducted in the un-authorised structures constructed by him have delayed or refused to pay the rent. The threats to different tenants, as mentioned in these incidents, were given by him in the character of a slumlord who was naturally annoyed by the fact that the tenants having discovered that he had no title to the land on which he had erected the structures refused to pay the rent. If the detenu as an individual had indulged in these acts against different members of the community without having a particular character such as the slumlord, probably the ratio of the Supreme Court judgment in Ajay Dixit's case could have helped the detenu. In the instant case, the tenants whom he has inducted in the illegal structures form a section of the community and for a reason which is entirely connected with his character as a slumlord he has been giving threats to the tenants. In the instant case, the tenants whom he has inducted in the illegal structures form a section of the community and for a reason which is entirely connected with his character as a slumlord he has been giving threats to the tenants. We do not see how it can be said that there is no nexus in the conduct of the detenu as disclosed in this chain of circumstances as a slumlord and the threat to the maintenance of public order as required under the aforesaid Act. 4. On the facts of this case we are satisfied that looking to the frequency of the acts of the detenu, the circumstances in which the threats have been given and the thread running through all these incidents, namely his character as a slumlord, they have got the effect of creating an alarm in the minds of persons who are his tenants. It should also not be forgotten that the threats which he has given to the tenants who have refused to yield to his illegal demands will necessarily have a frightening effect upon the other persons living in the slum area. If this is the conclusion which has been drawn by the detaining authority on the facts of this case, we are unable to say that conclusion is one which no rational person can draw. It is impermissible for us to sit in judgment over a conclusion reached by a detaining authority if that conclusion is reasonably possible from the material which was considered by him. 5. Mr. Parekh has further urged that the detaining authority has, in paragraphs I to IV, described the various activities which have been allegedly indulged in by the detenu. In paragraph 1, for example, it has been mentioned by the detaining authority that the detenu has un-authorised constructed rooms which he let out to different persons on taking deposit and charging monthly rent. Similarly in paragraph II it has been mentioned that he has constructed two more rooms and accepted Rs. 25,000 from two persons and gave them those rooms. In paragraph III similar act of construction of rooms and inducting tenants therein has been mentioned. Similarly in paragraph II it has been mentioned that he has constructed two more rooms and accepted Rs. 25,000 from two persons and gave them those rooms. In paragraph III similar act of construction of rooms and inducting tenants therein has been mentioned. Paragraph IV itself mentions that the detenu has been charging rent and the tenants inducted in the illegal structures have been paying rent on a promise given by the detenu that he would be providing for necessary amenities such as light, water etc. Mr. Parekh says that these grounds do not mention any prejudicial activities on the part of the detenu and if they have been relied upon by the detaining authority then the subjective satisfaction in necessarily vitiated. 6. We are sorry to say that there is a basic fallacy in this argument of Mr. Parekh. In these paragraphs which have been used as a preamble or an introductory part to the order of detention which ultimately has been passed, the detaining authority has placed material which would show that he was satisfied that the detenu is a slumlord as defined in section 2(f) of the said Act. It has not been shown to us, as indeed it could not be, that if we consider the material in the aforesaid paragraphs the detenu cannot answer the description of a slumlord as defined under the said Act. Mr. Parekh is, therefore, demonstrably on untenable ground when he argues that these are the grounds on which reliance was placed by the detaining authority for the purpose of satisfying himself that it was necessary to detain the detenu in order to prevent him from acting prejudicially to the maintenance of public order. It is only after establishing his character as a slumlord as defined under the said Act that the detaining authority has proceeded to consider the various acts indulged in by the detenu which, as we have already held above, constituted a chain of action permitting an inference that his conduct was prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 7. The argument advanced by Mr. Parekh that there is a non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority is again based upon the mistaken understanding of paragraphs I to IV which we have already examined above and it is not necessary to probe into it further. Another argument is also advanced by Mr. 7. The argument advanced by Mr. Parekh that there is a non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority is again based upon the mistaken understanding of paragraphs I to IV which we have already examined above and it is not necessary to probe into it further. Another argument is also advanced by Mr. Parekh based upon a similar misconception of paragraphs I to IV and that is that some of the grounds on which the detaining authority has placed reliance are so stale as to lose a nexus between the order of detention and the grounds of detention. Here, Mr. Parekh again referred us to paragraphs I in which the detaining authority has mentioned that the detenu has encroached upon Government land in 1979. To repeat, this is not a ground on the basis of which the detaining authority thought it fit to detain the detenu with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. This has been stated for the purpose of showing that the detenu is a slumlord as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the said Act. 8. An interesting argument was also advanced by Mr. Parekh saying that the petitioner is not a slumlord at all even if everything that is mentioned in paragraphs I to IV is accepted. He wanted us to read the preamble to the said Act wherein it has been mentioned as follows: " AND WHEREAS, having regard to the resources and influence of the persons by whom, the large scale on which, and the manner in which, the dangerous activities were being clandestinely organised arid carried on in violation of law by them." Mr. Parekh thought that if the detenu is shown to have been indulging in the activities so brazen-facedly and openly, how can it be said that he is a slumlord because the law contemplates that such persons must have been acting clandestinely. The whole argument is hopelessly misconceived. It is impermissible that a word which has been precisely defined in the Act itself is controlled by what is stated in the preamble. No rule of interpretation has shown to us by Mr. Parekh where such an extra-ordinary procedure of referring to the preamble to understand the meaning of a word, which has been clearly defined in the Act itself, has been prescribed. No rule of interpretation has shown to us by Mr. Parekh where such an extra-ordinary procedure of referring to the preamble to understand the meaning of a word, which has been clearly defined in the Act itself, has been prescribed. The word "slumlord" has been defined, as already mentioned above, in clause (f) of section 2 of the said Act. It has not been demonstrated to us that what has been mentioned in paragraphs I to IV do not imprint upon the detenu the character of a slumlord as defined in the said section. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the contention that the detenu is not a slumlord at all. 9. It was also urged that there is no material before the detaining authority in support of a statement made by him in the grounds of detention that three rooms which had been constructed by the detenu were demolished under the orders of the Municipality. This has been denied by the detaining authority in his affidavit and Mrs. Desai who appears for the State offered to show us the file containing the material in that regard. We have, however, not thought it necessary to see the same because, in our opinion, if the first four paragraphs are by way of preamble or introduction to show that the detenu is a slumlord, then the absence, if at all, of material in relation to such an insignificant fact would not vitiate the conclusion which has been arrived at in the instant case. We are satisfied that the order of detention does not suffer from any vice and deserves to be upheld. 10. In the result, this petition must fall. Rule is accordingly discharged. Petition dismissed. 1. A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 18.