JUDGEMENT This Rule is at the instance of Five employees of the United Industrial Bank Ltd., who have challenged the criminal proceeding initiated by respondent 2, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on the basis of a complaint filed by respondent 9 Chief Officer (Administration and Vigilance) at the head office of the said Bank on the grounds inter alia, that the said complaint does not prima facie disclose any cognizable offence to be investigated upon and there was unusual delay in submitting a final report/charge-sheet as envisaged in S. 173 Cr. P. C. by the Investigating Officer for about a period of three years. 2. The facts in brief are as follows Petitioners 1 to 5 are employed in the said bank as clerks and were entrusted to discharge duties attached to the post of Teller, Special Assistants, ledger keeper, etc., in the bank. It has been stated that petitioner 2 was elected as the general secretary of the United Industrial Bank Sports Club sometime in March, 1978 and since then he was relieved by the management of the normal duties in the bank as he was entrusted with the duty of looking after the sports organisation of the bank, and on some occasions he had to do duties of a clerk in the cash department. 3. It has been further stated that all these petitioners, i.e. 1, 3, 4 and 5 used to work under the control of respondent 9, and in accordance with the rules, every cheque above a sum of Rs. 5000/- before encashment has to e verified, signed and passed by the branch manager before any payment on such cheque is made. It has been stated that on 5th February, 1982 notices to show cause were issued to the petitioners alleging that they were involved in activities siphoning out bank money in connection with an alleged fictitious account opened in the name of a concern, M. M. Cloth Stores. It has been stated that on receiving the said show cause notices, the petitioners 2, 4 and 5 replied on 10th March, 1982 and 12-2-1982 denying the allegations made against them and also asked for inspection of some of the documents. It has been stated that the procedure for enquiry in connection with a disciplinary proceeding as provided in the bipartite settlement, more particularly, in paras 19.12 has not been properly observed or followed by the management. It has been stated that the procedure for enquiry in connection with a disciplinary proceeding as provided in the bipartite settlement, more particularly, in paras 19.12 has not been properly observed or followed by the management. It has been alleged that the disciplinary proceeding was purported to be abandoned as the same was not proceeded with and the criminal proceedings were started against the petitioners. It has been further alleged that on the basis of the purported FIR warrant of arrest against the manager of the said bank was issued and he was subsequently enlarged on bail. The petitioners also were arrested and were enlarged on bail on various dates dating from 8th May 1982 to 17th May 1982. After their enlargement on bail the petitioners tried to resume their duties in the office of the bank where the manager verbally asked them not to resume their duties as they have been suspended. On 10th May, 1982 the petitioners were placed under suspension. The petitioners thereafter moved the instant writ application before this Court on 15th October, 1982 wherein Basak, J. passed an interim order to the effect that investigation should continue in accordance with law and directed the police authorities to submit report stating the time they require for the purpose of completing the investigation and submitting charge-sheet. On November 29, 1982 the learned Judge passed another order directing this matter to appear after six weeks as a listed motion and the officer-in-charge of the Police Station was directed to submit his report on the said date. On 7th February, 1983 this matter again appeared before G. N. Ray, J. who was pleased to issue a Rule and pass an interim order to this extent that the investigation in the criminal case against the petitioners will proceed subject to the result of the Rule. It was also recorded in the said order that it was reasonably accepted that the police authorities would complete investigation as early as possible, preferably within a period of four months from that date. The petitioners were further directed to serve copies of the writ petition on the respondents and to file an affidavit of service. Thereafter this matter has come up for hearing before this Court. 4. Mr. The petitioners were further directed to serve copies of the writ petition on the respondents and to file an affidavit of service. Thereafter this matter has come up for hearing before this Court. 4. Mr. R. N. Mitra, learned Advocate appearing in support of the petitioners has submitted firstly that there was a blatant violation of the directions contained in the order made by G. N. Ray, J. on 7th February, 1983 by not submitting the final report within the period of four months. It has also been submitted that time was also granted by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate that no further time would be granted. Still then the O. C. Burrabazar Police Station did not submit the final report or charge-sheet. It has also been submitted by Mr. Mukherjee that by order dated 6th April, 1984 the learned Magistrate further directed to submit the report within one month there from. That was not conformed to. Again on 9th May, 1984 another month's time was granted. Even that was not complied with. It has, therefore, been submitted by Mr. Mitra that the police officer could not find out any prima facie offence of cheating against the petitioners and for that reason in spite of several directions made by this Court as well as by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, the final report or the charge-sheet was not submitted. Mr. Mitra, therefore, submitted that these proceedings should be quashed and set aside, otherwise, the petitioners would be unduly harassed even though no prima facie offence has been established and/or disclosed in the petition of complaint made against them. In support of this submission several decisions of the Supreme Court and of other Courts have been cited at the bar. 5. The next branch of Mitra's argument is this that the petitioners were placed under suspension on 10th May, 1982 purportedly on the basis of the terms of the bipartite settlement arrived at between the bank's association and the employees' association, more particularly, taking recourse to the terms of settlement embodied in Chapter IX paras 19.3(a) and 19.3(b) by initiating the instant criminal roceeding and suspending the petitioners. For these long three years more or less neither any final report, nor any charge-sheet has been submitted by the police officer investigating into the allegations contained in the FIR. Mr. For these long three years more or less neither any final report, nor any charge-sheet has been submitted by the police officer investigating into the allegations contained in the FIR. Mr. Mitra submitted further that it is unjust and inequitable to keep the petitioners under suspension for an unlimited period. It has, therefore, been submitted that this order of suspension should also be quashed or set aside. Mr. Mitra also cited the provisions of para 19.4 of the bipartite settlement. Some decisions were also cited at the bar on this score. 6. Mr. Roy, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the bank has, on the other hand, contended before this Court by referring to some decisions that the duties of the police officers to investigate and collect evidence in case of cognizable offences disclosed in FIR for trial of the offences is clearly enjoined in the provisions of Ss. 154 to 157, Cr. P. C. and it is not for the Court to intrude upon the said duties of the police officers in the matter of investigation of cognizable offences on the basis of the charge-sheet as well as other materials collected and produced whether to frame charges and whether to proceed with the said case. It has been stated that in the instant case already on 10th July, 1984 a charge-sheet has been submitted, and as such, the submission that no charge-sheet has been submitted, as has been made on behalf of the petitioners is not correct. The decisions that have been cited cannot have any application to this case. 7. It has been next submitted by Mr. Roy that this bank is a private bank. It is not a nationalised bank, and as such, the terms and conditions of its employees are strictly governed by the contract entered into between the parties supplemented by the terms of the bipartite settlement. For breach of these terms a writ application is not competent. 8. After hearing the learned Advocates for the parties and on a consideration of the averments made in the writ application as well as in the affidavit in opposition concerned on behalf of the bank, I am inclined to hold this Rule is bound to fail for the reasons stated hereinbelow. 9. 8. After hearing the learned Advocates for the parties and on a consideration of the averments made in the writ application as well as in the affidavit in opposition concerned on behalf of the bank, I am inclined to hold this Rule is bound to fail for the reasons stated hereinbelow. 9. The FIR undoubtedly was lodged sometime on 4th May, 1982 by respondent 9 and it is also clear and evident from the order dated 7th February, 1983 that police was directed to complete investigation within four months. These directions, however, have not been complied with by the investigating officer as the final report was filed about one year and five months after the said order was made on 10th July, 1984. Nevertheless, it appears from the final report or the charge-sheet that specific offences alleged to have been committed by the petitioners have been disclosed, and after investigation, the investigating officer has stated that a prima facie case against the accused persons has been established and so prayed for their trial under Ss. 120B, 408, 467, 468, 471 and 477A Penal Code. In such circumstances it is difficult for this Court to say that merely because there was delay in submitting the final report, this Court will interfere and will quash the proceedings even though the final report disclosed cognizable offences alleged to have been committed by these petitioners. It is pertinent to refer to the latest decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1982 SC 949 : (1982 Cri LJ 819). State of West Bengal v. Sanchaita Investment. It has been observed that if an offence is disclosed, the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution will not normally interfere with the investigation and will permit investigation into the offence alleged to be completed; if, however, the materials did not disclose an offence, no investigation should normally be permitted. Justice requires that a person who commits an offence has to be brought to book and must be punished for the same. If the Court interferes with the proper investigation in a case where an offence has been disclosed the offence will go unpunished to the serious detriment of the welfare of the society and the cause of justice suffers. 10. If the Court interferes with the proper investigation in a case where an offence has been disclosed the offence will go unpunished to the serious detriment of the welfare of the society and the cause of justice suffers. 10. Judged by the above test laid down by the Supreme Court in the instant case, a charge-sheet has already been submitted by the investigating officer, that is, as I have said already hereinbefore, cognizable offences are alleged to have been committed by these petitioners. As regards the last contention of Mr. Mitra, I am constrained to hold that I am unable to consider this part of the submission inasmuch as firstly the validity of the suspension proceedings is not the subject-matter of challenge in this Rule, as will be evident from he prayers made in the writ petition. Furthermore the employer, the United Industrial Bank is not a Nationalised Bank and the terms and conditions of service between the employer and the employees, that is, the petitioner are governed by the contract of service entered into between the parties and also by the bipartite agreement between the parties in accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, and as such, it cannot be said that it has got any statutory force, and violation of any of the provisions of the bipartite settlement will entitle an aggrieved person to come to the writ Court for his redress. Therefore, considering this aspect of the matter also, I am unable to interfere and/or consider this part of the submission advanced by Mr. Mitra. 11. In view of my above observations, the decision cited at the bar that is reported in 1983 Lab IC 1743 (Mad) and also an unreported decision made in F.M.A. 633 of 1984 decided on 21st November, 1984 by their Lordships M. M. Dutt and Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, JJ. have got no application to this case. 12. For the reasons aforesaid, the Rule is therefore discharged. 13. There will be no order as to costs. 14. It is expected that since the matter is pending for a long time, the Metropolitan Magistrate will take expeditious steps for the disposal of the criminal proceedings as early as possible, preferably within a period of eight months from this date. Rule discharged.