JUDGMENT B.N. Sapru, J. - Ram Adhar Kushwaha is the petitioner in the instant case. He applied for the post of Train Lighting/Head Light Fitter which was advertised by the Divisional Railway Manager, Allahabad. The petitioner along with others appeared at a written and oral test. There were 20 posts available and a panel of 20 persons who were successful at the examination, was drawn up. The name of the petitioner was at serial number 15. A panel prepared is valid for two years from the date of its approval by the competent authority or the whole of Panel is exhausted whichever is earlier as provided in paragraph 217 (a) of the Indian Railway Establishment Code Volume I. The petitioner was asked to appear at a medical test on 20-7-1977. According to the petitioner, he was not examined on that date but he was informed that he would be asked to present himself again for the test. Tire case of the respondent is that the petitioner was not medically examined on 20-7-1977 but he was not told that he would be called again. The Petitioner did not receive any call for appearing at the medical test and he made various representations to the authorities but to no avail. The petitioner finally made a representation on 10-12-1978 to the General Manager, Northern Railway through Sri Janeshwar Misra, a Member of Parliament, upon which a D.O. letter was sent to the Divisional Railway Manager from the Railway Headquarters asking him why the petitioner had not been given an appointment. In response, according to the petitioner, the Divisional Railway Manager, Allahabad, informed the Railway Headquarters that on account of a telephonic message received from the General Manager, Northern Railway, only those candidates had been given appointment who had been medically examined till 14-7-1977 and the candidates coming after 14-7-1977 for the medical test could not be given the appointment. 2. Admittedly, the candidates placed at serial numbers 4, 6 and 7 of the panel were given appointment as they had appeared for medical test uptil 14-7-1977 and had been found fit in the medical test. 3. A counter affidavit has been filed by Sri Randhir Prasad who was the Assistant Personnel Officer, Northern Railway, Divisional Railway Manager's Office, Allahabad. In the counter affidavit, it is stated that the petitioner had been placed in the panel of successful candidates. 3. A counter affidavit has been filed by Sri Randhir Prasad who was the Assistant Personnel Officer, Northern Railway, Divisional Railway Manager's Office, Allahabad. In the counter affidavit, it is stated that the petitioner had been placed in the panel of successful candidates. The petitioner had been placed at serial number 15. An offer of appointment was sent to successful candidates on 8-7-1977 which contained a stipulation stating that "on successful completion of your training of 6 months if vacancy exists you will be appointed against regular post of T.L./H.L. Fitter Gr. 260-400 (Rs) plus other allowances as admitted under the rules but no guarantee for it." It was further stated that the appointment was also subject to medical test. It is then stated that several representations were made to the General Manager against the direct recruitment of candidates to the post in question as it affected the people already in employment of the Railways whose prospects of promotion were affected by direct recruitment. It is further stated that a telephonic message had been received from the Headquarters' Office, New Delhi, on 15-7-1977 to the effect that no further appointment on the post in question should be made. Consequently, the persons who came after the aforesaid telephonic massage, were not medically examined. Annexure A to the counter affidavit discloses that a meeting between several representatives of the Railways and the Labour Union was held on 2-7-1977 and 2-8-1977 and in that meeting it was decided as follows: - "Selection for direct recruitment of 20 TLFs had since been finalised and call letters also issued to some of the candidates. In fact 3 candidates had already joined in Allahabad Division for training by 14-7-1977. It was, therefore, decided to train these 3 TLFs in the trade of Oil Engine Fitters. It was also decided not to recruit any more TLFs from this selection." 4. In paragraph 19 of the counter affidavit, it is stated that on 24-2-1977 it was decided that 25 per cent of the vacancies in the post of TLF should be filled by direct recruitment from the serving employees and 25 per cent by direct recruitment from the open market and 50 per cent from the promotees working in the Department. In paragraph 19 of the counter affidavit, it is stated that on 24-2-1977 it was decided that 25 per cent of the vacancies in the post of TLF should be filled by direct recruitment from the serving employees and 25 per cent by direct recruitment from the open market and 50 per cent from the promotees working in the Department. It was asserted that the life of the panel was two years and since it was announced on 25-2-1977, it remained valid till 24-2-1979 and was no more operative. 5. It has also been urged on behalf of the respondent, by Sri Lalji Sinha, that this writ petition presented in (his Court on 12-8-1980, was very much belated and deserves to be dismissed on the ground that it was belated. 6. The panel of selected persons in the present case consists of 20 persons and there were 20 clear vacancies. It is unlike a case where a panel is drawn up for selection of candidates against existing vacancies and future anticipated vacancies. In the instant case, the panel is more or less like the result of a competitive examination where the names of only those who have succeeded in the competitive examination, are placed in the select list. The Administration during the currency of the panel which was two years, was bound to recruit only those persons whose names find place in the panel. It cannot go outside the panel. 7. Sri A.N. Sinha appearing of the petitioner has argued with great ability that after the petitioner had successfully appeared at the test, the petitioner was offered appointment to the post subject to his being found medically fit and successfully completing his training. He submits that the petitioner had done all that he could do on his part to accept the offer. He had presented himself on 20-7-1977 for the medical test but the respondents did not examine him. He submits that a contract of employment subject to certain conditions had come into existence on 20-7-1977, when the petitioner had presented himself for the medical test and the respondents cannot unilaterally repudiate it. 8. In this connection he has relied upon a decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Vinod Kumar Hematram Dave v. Secondary Education Tribunal, 1980 (3) SLR 362 (Guj). 8. In this connection he has relied upon a decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Vinod Kumar Hematram Dave v. Secondary Education Tribunal, 1980 (3) SLR 362 (Guj). In that case the controversy centred round the question as to whether the dispute fell within the term of Section 38(1) of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act, 1972 which runs as under: - "38(1). Whether there is any dispute or difference between the Manager of a registered private secondary school and any person in service of such school as Head Master, a teacher, or a member of non-teaching staff, which is connected with the conditions of services of such person, the Manager or, as the case may be, the person may make an application to the Tribunal for the decision of the dispute." 9. The facts were that the petitioner was appointed as Head Master of a School by an appointment order dated 27-2-1979. It was mentioned in the order of appointment that the appointment would be effective from 2-4-1979. The petitioner sent his letter of acceptance within the time stipulated. Some 10 days before the appointment was to become effective, the respondent informed the petitioner that his appointment had been cancelled for certain reasons. The petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the Gujarat Secondary Education Act, 1972. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that it had no jurisdiction in the matter inasmuch as it was not competent to entertain the dispute between the parties as in the opinion of the Tribunal the petitioner could not be said to be a person in the service of the institution. 10. Mr. Justice Thakkar came to the conclusion that a contract of service came into existence as soon as the offer was made by the institution and/or accepted by the teacher irrespective of the fact that the time for performance on the part of the teacher was postponed till a specified date. The learned Judge observed as follows: "What emerges from this discussion is that a contract of service at the level of promise to employ and to be employed can come into existence as soon as the offer is made by the employer and accepted by the teacher. A breach may take place at the second level, level of performance, which contemplates exchange of remuneration for service. A breach may take place at the second level, level of performance, which contemplates exchange of remuneration for service. And that is precisely what has transpired in the present case. Now jurisdiction is conferred on the Tribunal constituted under the Act to resolve disputes or differences between the management and the person in service of such school which is connected with the conditions of the service of such person. The expression "in service of such school" can but yield to one reasonable construction. It can only be interpreted in such a manner as to apply to any such person who is under a contract of service with such school. And if this interpretation is accepted, it cannot be said that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the application made by the petitioner. The expression "a person in service" has always been interpreted in such a manner as to apply to a person who was under a contract of service. If the expression were to be interpreted literally and in a narrow manner a person in service would mean only one who is in "actual" service at the point of time of making an application. In such an event a dismissed teacher can never invoke Section 38 with the result that the scheme evolved by the Act for the benign purpose of protecting teachers from exploitation would pathetically crumble to the ground. Fortunately, however, the Courts have, preferred the meaningful twentieth century approach to the obscurantist eighteenth century approach. Section 38 has been interpreted in such a manner as to confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal to resolve disputes between a school and a teacher irrespective of whether the teacher was actually employed on the date of the making of the application or whether he had been dismissed." 11. Sri Lalji Sinha appearing for the respondents has relied very strongly on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha, AIR 1973 SC 2216 : 1973 (1) SLR 823. The facts were that an advertisement was published in the Gazette that Haryana Public Service Commission would hold an examination for recruitment of candidates for 15 vacancies in Haryana Civil Services (Judicial Branch). In response to the advertisement a number of candidates appeared and the result was declared and published. The facts were that an advertisement was published in the Gazette that Haryana Public Service Commission would hold an examination for recruitment of candidates for 15 vacancies in Haryana Civil Services (Judicial Branch). In response to the advertisement a number of candidates appeared and the result was declared and published. It contained the name of 40 candidates who obtained 45 per cent or more marks in the examination. The State Government made 7 appointments in the serial order of list according to merit. Some of those persons who ranked at serial No. 8, 9 and 13 in the merit list did not get an order of appointment though the vacancies existed. The reason for not making the appointment was that in the meanwhile the Government in consultation with the High Court had decided that in order to maintain the efficiency of service only those candidates who had secured 55 per cent or more marks should be appointed. The candidates who ranked 8, 9 and 13 filed a writ petition. The High Court allowed the writ and the matter came up in appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed as under :- One fails to see how the existence of vacancies gives a legal right to a candidate to be selected for appointment. The examination is for the purpose of showing that a particular candidate is eligible for consideration. The selection for appointment comes later. It is open then to the Government "to decide how many appointments shall be made. The mere fact that a candidate's name appears in the list will not entitle him to a mandamus that he be appointed. Indeed, if the State Government while making the selection for appointment had departed from the ranking given in the list, there would have been a legitimate grievance on the ground that the State Government had departed from the rules in this respect. The true effect of Rule 10 in Part C is that if and when the State Government propose to make appointments of subordinate Judges the State Government (i) shall not make such appointments by travelling outside list and (ii) shall make the selection for appointments strictly in the order the candidates have been placed in the list published in the Government Gazette. In the present case neither of these two requirements is infringed by the Government. In the present case neither of these two requirements is infringed by the Government. They have appointed the first seven persons in the list as subordinate Judges. Apart from these constraints on the power to make the appointments, Rule 10 does not impose any constraint. There is no constraint that the Government shall make an appointment of a subordinate Judge either because there are vacancies or because a list of candidates has been prepared and is in existence." On the basis of this decision, Sri Lalji Sinha urges that merely because the petitioner's name has been placed in the panel, lie has no right to get the appointment. All that the petitioner had established was that his name was on the panel. This case is a direct authority for the proposition that he had no enforceable right. However, this case cannot be applied to the peculiar situation of the present case. In this case an offer of appointment was made and it has been accepted by the petitioner. 12. In the circumstances the position is that a contract of employment came into existence on 20-7-1977 when the petitioner presented himself for the medical examination. The petitioner, of course, would not be entitled to receive a letter of appointment unless he qualified at the medical test and subsequently successfully completes his training. 13. Sri A.N. Sinha has further argued that in any view of the matter the doctrine of promissory estoppel applies and the respondents cannot plead as a defence to this writ petition that in view of change of policy there was no vacant post to which the petitioner could be appointed. He submits that the petitioner appeared at the examination conducted by the respondents in response to the advertisement issued by them. He was successful and he was asked to appear at a medical test. The petitioner appeared at the medical test. 14. The petitioner asserts, and there is no reason to doubt it, that he resigned from an appointment that he was holding then he came to Allahabad for medical test. The petitioner altered his condition adversely to him as a result of the action of the respondents in offering him an appointment. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is well established. (See in this connection the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. The petitioner altered his condition adversely to him as a result of the action of the respondents in offering him an appointment. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is well established. (See in this connection the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 621 as well as the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. M/s Lotus Hotels (Pvt.) Ltd., AIR 1983 SC 848 . 15. Another decision relied upon by the petitioner is in the case of Miss Shakuntala Sharma v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, 1976 AISLJ 288. In that pase a panel was drawn up for appointment of selected candidates. The petitioner was placed at serial No. 2 on the waiting list. Sri Vijay Kumar Joshi who was placed at serial No.l, was appointed against the regular vacancy and the petitioner No. 1 came at serial No. 1 in the waiting list. He was not given a permanent appointment. it was observed in paragraph 4 of the judgment as follows : - "(4) The question that at once arises is, as to whether the petitioner got a legal right to a permanent post after the resignation of Sri Vijay Joshi. It is no doubt true that the mere entry of her name in the waiting list or even her selection in the first interview, did not confer upon her any right to the post. However, the position altered when a regular vacancy occurred by tHe resignation of Shri Vijay Joshi which took effect from July 24, 1972. It was at that stage that the case of the petitioner could not be discriminated as against Sri Vijay Joshi or any other. If Sri Vijay Joshi was appointed from the waiting list why could not the petitioner be appointed. What was the purposes of preparation of waiting list if not this, that future vacancies were to be filled from that list. Although it was not laid down anywhere for how long the waiting list was to hold good, yet according to respondent No. 5 himself the waiting list was to hold good for at least one year. The vacancy of Sri Vijay Joshi occurred in 1972 well within one year and the petitioner deserved to be appointed against that vacancy. Although it was not laid down anywhere for how long the waiting list was to hold good, yet according to respondent No. 5 himself the waiting list was to hold good for at least one year. The vacancy of Sri Vijay Joshi occurred in 1972 well within one year and the petitioner deserved to be appointed against that vacancy. Instead, the decision of the Court was taken that she should apply again for the permanent post and get her age relaxed only then she could be appointed. In my opinion, that decision was clearly hit by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution." 16. A decision in point is the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Y.V. Rangaiah v. T. Sreenivasa Rao and State of Andhra Pradesh v. T. Sreenivasa Rao, AIR 1983 SC 852 . There is a Department of Registration and Stamps, in Andhra Pradesh and the relevant rules applicable to it were Andhra Pradesh Registration and Subordinate Services Rules. The rules are that all first appointment to the service and all promotions in service otherwise than in accordance with the sub-rule have to be made by the appointing authorities or the authorities specified in sub-rule (3), as the case may be, from the list of approved candidates. The rules further provided that such a list shall be prepared in the manner prescribed by the appointing authority or by any other authority empowered in the special rules in that behalf. The rules also provide that a list of approved candidate for appointment by transfer where the Public Service Commission is not consulted on the suitability of a candidate shall be prepared in the month of September every year so as to be in force until the list of approved candidates for the succeeding year is prepared. The rules further enjoins that the list of approved candidates shall contain such number of candidates as is approximately equal to the number of vacancies expected to arise during the currency of that list. The Supreme Court found that the list as required by the Rules should have been prepared by 1st September, 1976 but in fact it had not been prepared. The rules were amended in the year 1977. Under the amended rules, the original rules, providing for consideration of Lower Division Clerks for appointment as Sub-Registrars, was done away with. The Supreme Court found that the list as required by the Rules should have been prepared by 1st September, 1976 but in fact it had not been prepared. The rules were amended in the year 1977. Under the amended rules, the original rules, providing for consideration of Lower Division Clerks for appointment as Sub-Registrars, was done away with. The complaint of the Lower Division Clerks was that by delaying the preparation of list of approved candidates till after the rules were amended, their chance for consideration for appointment to the higher post was adversely affected. The High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the Lower Division Clerks. There was an appeal to the Supreme Court which was dismissed. In paragraph 9 of the judgment, their Lordships observed as follows : "9. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we find no force in either of the two contentions. Under the old rules a panel had to be prepared every year in September, accordingly, a panel should have been prepared in the year 1976 and transfer or promotion to the post of Sub-Registrar Grade II should have been made out of that panel. In that event the petitioners in the two representation petitions who ranked higher than the respondents Nos. 3 to 15 would not have been deprived of their right of being considered for promotion. The vacancies which occurred prior to the amended rules would be governed by the old rules and not by the amended rules. It is admitted by counsel for both the parties that henceforth promotion to the post of Sub-Registrar Grade II will be according to the new rules on the zonal basis and not on the State-wide basis and, therefore, there was no question of challenging the new rules. But the question is of filling the vacancies that occurred prior to the amended rules. We have not the slightest doubt that the posts which fell vacant prior to the amended rules would be governed by the old rules and not by the new rules." 17. This case is an authority for the proposition that when a panel is drawn up in accordance with the rules in force for recruitment to a service or promotion in a service, the panel has to be adhered to. It further is an authority for the proposition that no appointments can be made outside the panel. This case is an authority for the proposition that when a panel is drawn up in accordance with the rules in force for recruitment to a service or promotion in a service, the panel has to be adhered to. It further is an authority for the proposition that no appointments can be made outside the panel. This case is also an authority for the proposition that the rules applicable to recruitment to vacancies which occurred, would be the rules which were in force at the time of occurrence of the vacancies and not the rules in force at the time of appointment, where the recruitment is delayed. 18. The argument of Sri Lalji Sinha appearing on behalf of the Union of India is that the life of the panel has come to an end. In the case before the Supreme Court the life of the panel had come to an end but nevertheless the Lower Division Clerks writ stood allowed. In the circumstances, Sri Lalji Sinha's argument that since the life of the panel had come to an end, the petitioner has no subsisting right, cannot be accepted. 19. Another case on the point is a Division Bench's decision of the Court in the case of Air Commodore U.C. Sen v. Union of India connected with Brig M.A. George v. Union of India, 1985 UPSC (N) 80. There is an Army Medical Corps which is constituted by integrating the services of Medical Officers of the Army, Navy and Air Force. There were specialist in Administrative Cadre in the services. The promotion was governed by A.I. O. No. 107 issued in 1977 under which separate select lists were prepared for the two cadres. The finally graded officers were required to be approved by the Government of India. This resulted in the preparation of select list limited to the number of vacancies anticipated to arise in the next year and for any unforeseen eventuality. Both the petitioners were placed in the select list, i.e. they would have become eligible to the post of Air Vice Marshal and Major General in due turn. Before their turn came in 1984, the Government of India decided to integrate the two cadres into an Executive Cadre and prepared a fresh select list. Both the petitioners were placed in the select list, i.e. they would have become eligible to the post of Air Vice Marshal and Major General in due turn. Before their turn came in 1984, the Government of India decided to integrate the two cadres into an Executive Cadre and prepared a fresh select list. The result of the preparation of fresh select list was that two officers lost their position in the new select list and chances of promotion were affected. This Court held that integration could not be done so as to prejudice and effect the petitioner and a direction was issued by this Court cancelling the order dated 23-1-1984 whereby the existing select list prepared for the specialist and administrative cadre was set aside and a direction was given to the State to implement the select list of Executive Cadre only after exhausting the previously prepared select list namely the list of Specialist and Administrative cadres. 20. The argument of the Standing Counsel that placing of a name under a select list did not give any enforceable right was rejected. The Court observed that it was directing implementation of the list and not a right to promotion as such. 21. Article 16 (1) of the Constitution enshrines the right of employment for a citizen in the matter relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Article 14 enshrines the principles that the State shall not deny any person equality before the law or equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. Let us measure the action of the respondents in denying the appointment to the petitioner on these tests. 22. The respondents Nos. 4, 6 and 7 who were selected at the same examination as the petitioner, have been offered appointments. The petitioner has been denied the appointment. The State says that there was pressure from organised labour who wanted all appointments to be made by promotion. The rules provided otherwise. The petitioner was entitled to appointment under the rules. Expediency demanded of the administration that organised labour be placated. So appointment on the basis of examination already conducted, was stopped on 15-7-1977. Those who were lucky and fortunate and who had been called before that date for medical examination and had joined were allowed, to continue. Those who had the misfortune to be called on or after 15-7-1977, were denied appointment. So appointment on the basis of examination already conducted, was stopped on 15-7-1977. Those who were lucky and fortunate and who had been called before that date for medical examination and had joined were allowed, to continue. Those who had the misfortune to be called on or after 15-7-1977, were denied appointment. Is there any rational classification ? We find none. The petitioner is entitled to ask this Court to give him relief. This Court will not deny relief to the petitioner on the ground that it was inexpedient for the administration to offer appointment to the petitioner. 23. Coming to the question of delay in institution of the present proceedings, the position is that the respondents never communicated their decision not to recruit any more successful candidates from the panel to the petitioner. The petitioner was hopeful that he would get employment and made representations. It is only when he realised that his efforts were in vain and that another examination was to be conducted, he filed the present writ petition. The respondents are not prejudiced in any manner by the delay on the part of the petitioner in filing the writ petition. ' The respondents have not altered the position so as to affect them adversely. If the petitioner who was seeking a Class III service, was making representations, it was, in the circumstances, nothing unusual. It is true that no representation lay but sometimes a representation to higher authority brings redress at least the petitioner so hoped. In the totality of the circumstance.', particularly when there is a violation of a fundamental right, it would be unfair to deny a relief to the petitioner at the stage of final hearing When the petitioner has made out a case for grant of a relief. 24. In the result, the writ petition succeeds in part. A writ of mandamus is issued to the respondents commanding them to call the petitioner for a medical test for the post of Train Lighting/Head Light Fitter and to send the petitioner for training if he is found medically fit and thereafter offer him appointment if he successfully completes his training. The petitioner should be called for the medical test within two months of the date of the communication of this order to the Divisional Railway Manager, Allahabad. The petitioner is entitled to his costs.