R. A. MEHTA,, J. ( 1 ) THESE petitions by the convicts of Court Martial seek a direction for giving them the benefit of setting off the period undergone by them in military custody during the pendency of their trial before the Court Martial and reliance is placed on sec. 428 Cri. P. C. which reads as under:"428 Where an accused person has on conviction been sentenced to imprisonment for a term not being imprisonment in default of payment of fine the period of detention if any undergone by him during the investigation inquiry or trial of the same case and before the date of such conviction shall be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on such conviction and the liability of such person to undergo imprisonment en such conviction shall be restricted to the remainder if any of the term of imprisonment imposed on him". ( 2 ) ON behalf of the respondents it is contended that the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code are not applicable to the military offences and convicts of Court Martial. They are exclusively governed by the Army Act which is a self-contained code providing for investigation inquiry trial and matters relating to military offences trial of military personnel and sentence and remission. Reliance is placed on secs. 4 and 5 of Cri. P. C. which read as under:"4 (1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be investigated inquired into tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained. (2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated inquired into tried and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating inquiring into trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. 5 Nothing contained in this Code shall in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary affect any special or local law for the time being in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred or any special form of procedure prescribed by any other law for the time being in force". ( 3 ) THE Army Act 1950 is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the government of regular Army. ( 3 ) THE Army Act 1950 is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the government of regular Army. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons it is stated as under: "the main objects of the revision of the Army Act are: (a) to make it self-sufficient by incorporating the relevant provisions from certain other related enactments: (b) to adopt the existing provisions to suit the new constitutional set up and present day requirements; and (c) on the one hand to bridge the gap between the Army and Civil laws as far as possible in the matter of punishments for offences and on the other to eliminate the disparity between the corresponding provisions of the law governing the Army and the Air force. ( 4 ) THE Army Act provides in the Chapters VI to XIV (sec. 34 to 190 to the following effect. Chapter VI Offences. VII Punishments. VIII Penal Deductions. IX - Arrest and proceedings before trial. X - Court-martial. XI - Procedure of courts-martial. XII - Confirmation and Revision. XIII - Execution of Sentences. XIV - Pardons Remissions and Suspensions. These sections from sec. 34 to 190 is a sort of a Criminal Procedure Code for the Army personnel. Ch. XIII deals with execution of sentence (sec. 166 provides for form of sentence of death sec. 167 provides for commencement of sentence of transportation or imprisonment secs. 168 and 169 provide for execution of sentence of transportation and imprisonment sec. 174 provides for execution of sentence of fine. There are restrictions on corporal punishment. Ch. XIV (secs. 179 to 190) deal with Pardons Remissions and Suspensions. ( 5 ) AS compared to that there are corresponding and comparable provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 regarding investigation inquiry trial and other general provisions and Chapter 32 deals with execution. suspension remissions and commencement of sentences the same subjects which are dealt by Chapters 13 and 14 of the Army Act. Chapter 32 of Cri. P. C. provides for: a. Death Sentence. B. Imprisonment. C. Levy of fine. D. General provisions regarding execution (including sec. 428 regarding set off ). E. Suspension Remissions and Computations of sentence. ( 6 ) IN the light of these corresponding provisions in both statutes it would be necessary to see what is the effect of secs. 4 and 5 of the Criminal Procedure Code. B. Imprisonment. C. Levy of fine. D. General provisions regarding execution (including sec. 428 regarding set off ). E. Suspension Remissions and Computations of sentence. ( 6 ) IN the light of these corresponding provisions in both statutes it would be necessary to see what is the effect of secs. 4 and 5 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Sec. 4 (2) quoted above shows that all offences under any other law (in the present case the offences are under secs. 37 and 40 of the Army Act and they are military offences) shall be investigated inquired into tried and otherwise dealt with subject to the special enactment regulating the manner or place of investigation inquiring into trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. Therefore the question whether the subject of execution of santence and set off for the period already undergone during trial is a subject which has been dealt with by this special law namely the Army Act. ( 7 ) THE argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is no provision in the Army Act regarding set off and the subject of set off is not at all dealt with by the Army Act and therefore sec. 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code which deals with set off would be applicable. It would not be correct to say that set off is an independent subject. Even in the Criminal Procedure Code it has been dealt with under Chapter 32 as execution of sentence. Same subject of execution of sentence is also dealt with by the Army Act under Chapter XIII. If the Army Act and the provisions dealing with execution of sentence do not include the provisions of set off it cannot be incorporated by reference to the Criminal Procedure Code. Having regard to the comprehensiveness and self contained nature of the Army Act and its preamble that it was an Act to consolidate and amend the law and the Statement of Objects and Reasons that the Army Act was intended to make it self-sufficient by incorporating the relevant provisions from certain other related enactments it is not possible to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioners that the general provisions of the Cri. P. C. in sec. P. C. in sec. 428 regarding set off would be attracted in the present case more particularly in view of the subject of execution of sentence having been specifically dealt with under the Army Act. If the provision of set off is not included in the Army Act it cannot be introduced by reference to sec. 4 of the Cri. P. C. because subsec. (2) of sec. 4 clearly excludes extension of Cri. P. C. to the subjects covered by Special enactments. Sec. 5 of the Cri. P. C. also provides that nothing contained in the Cri. P. C. shall in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary affect any special or local law for the time being in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred or any special form of procedure prescribed by any other law for the time being in force. Further having regard to the fact that Armed forces have a special status in our constitutional and judicial system where even the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court and Supreme Court is excluded by virtue of the provisions of Articles 33 and 227 of the Constitution and having regard to the self-contained nature of the Army Act it is not possible to hold that the provisions of sec. 428 regarding set off would be applicable in the case of convicts of court martial for military offences. ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents have relied upon the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of F. R. Jesuratnam v. Chief of Air Staff 1976 Cri. L. J. 65. It was a case under the Air Force Act 1950 and there also a claim was made for set off under sec. 428 for the period of pre-trial detention. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court held that the Air Force Act 1950 is a special law to which Cri. P. C. (1974) does not apply by virtue of sec. 5 of the Code and where a person is convicted under the Air Force Act and sentenced to imprisonment the period of pre-detention cannot he set off against the term of imprisonment. I was further held that non-extension of the benefit of sec. 42 of the Code to sentences under the Air Force Act is not discriminatory and is not violative of Arts. 14 21 and 33 of the Constitution. I was further held that non-extension of the benefit of sec. 42 of the Code to sentences under the Air Force Act is not discriminatory and is not violative of Arts. 14 21 and 33 of the Constitution. Section 164 of the Air Force Act provided that the sentence shall whether it has been revised or not be reckoned to commence on the day on which the original proceedings were signed by the presiding officer. The corresponding section of Army Act is sec. 167 which reads as follows:"167 Whenever any person is sentenced by a court-martial under this Act to transportation or imprisonment the term of his sentence shall whether it has been revised or not be reckoned to commence on the day on which the original proceedings were signed by the presiding officer or; in the case of a summary court-martial by the court". The Division Bench of Delhi High Court also observed that the legislature having introduced no such exception the court cannot read it into the section by a process of judicial construction that no set off of such pre-conviction detention would be permitted the same having been already taken into account by the court while imposing the term of imprisonment on conviction. ( 9 ) SIMILAR view is also taken by the Madras High Court in the case of P. P. Chandrasekaran v. Govt. of India 1977 Cri. L. J. 677. In that case before the Division Bench of the Madras High Court the Act in question was the Navy Act and the convict at court martial under the Navy Act had claimed benefit of sec. 428 for getting set off of the period of pre-trial detention. Kailasam J. (as he then was speaking for the Division Bench) held that the Navy Act is a special law as contemplated by sec. 5 of Cri. P. C. and it prescribes an elaborate procedure for conducting a trial and for execution of sentences. Section 151 of the Navy Act (which corresponds to sec. 167 of the Army Act) is to the same effect that every term of imprisonment or detention awarded shall be reckoned as commencing on the day on which the sentence was awarded and the Criminal Procedure Code not being applicable the accused cannot claim the benefit of sec. Section 151 of the Navy Act (which corresponds to sec. 167 of the Army Act) is to the same effect that every term of imprisonment or detention awarded shall be reckoned as commencing on the day on which the sentence was awarded and the Criminal Procedure Code not being applicable the accused cannot claim the benefit of sec. 428 ( 10 ) WE respectfully agree with the aforesaid two decisions of the Division Benches of Delhi and Madras High Courts. ( 11 ) A contrary view has been taken by a learned single Judge of Kerala High Court in the case of Subramonian v. Officer Commanding Armoured Static Workshop 1979 Cri. L. J. 617. The judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of F. R. Jesuratnam (supra) was cited. However the learned single Judge of Kerala High Court disagreed with the same. It was observed that in respect of trial of offences under the Penal Code committed by persons governed by the Army and Air Force Acts both the Court Martial and the Criminal Court have concurrent jurisdiction and the object of the enactment of sec. 428 of the Code was to relieve the anguish of prolonged detention of under-trials and to avoid over crowding in jails and sentence is the pith and substance of the whole criminal process. It was further observed that when that and the conviction remain intact and untouched inspite of the grant of set off the grant of set-off cannot be considered as in any manner affecting the provisions of the Army Act. With respect to the learned Judge of Kerala High Court we are unable to agree with the same. Subject of execution of sentence having been specifically dealt with under the Army Act the provisions of Cri. P. C. relating to execution of sentence and set off cannot apply. It is not by the provision of sec 428 only that sentencing justice is done. This provision for statutory set off is only one of the modes and another mode is that while awarding sentence at the time of conviction the authority or Court would lake into account the sentence already undergone during the pendency of the trial. In fact when provision of sec. 428 was not there before 1973 the Courts ordinarily took that circumstance into account and did the justice by taking into account the pre-trial detention. In fact when provision of sec. 428 was not there before 1973 the Courts ordinarily took that circumstance into account and did the justice by taking into account the pre-trial detention. ( 12 ) IT is not possible to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that each and every provision is required to be seen separately. A provision for set off is contained in the Cri. P. C. and no such provision is to be found in the Army Act. That would not mean that Army Act has not dealt with the subject of sentence and execution of sentence. A subject to be dealt with has to be looked broadly and to be seen whether it has been dealt with or not. The Army Act has not dealt with many matters which were dealt with under the Cri. P. C as for example a anticipatory bail. It would be absurd to suggest that the provision of anticipatory bail would be applicable to courts martial merely because there is no corresponding provision in the Army Act. In the light of the above discussion we hold that Army Act is a self contained cede and in view of sec. 4 (2) and sec. 5 of the Cri. P. C. section 428 of Cri. P. C. regarding set of does not apply to the offences tried and sentences awarded under the Army Act. ( 13 ) NO other contention has been advanced at the time of hearing. Learned counsel Mr. K. J. Shethna was requested to assist the Court as amicus curiae and we acknowledge his valuable assistance rendered at the hearing of this matter. ( 14 ) IN the result both these petitions fail and are dismissed. Rule discharged. Petition dismissed. .