SANKAR BHATTACHARYYA, J. ( 1 ) THE instant reference made by the learned Sessions Judge, Birbhum under S. 395 (2), Criminal P. C. , 1973 raises a question of some importance. The question referred to this Court, when properly framed, reads as under: "whether the Court of Session and the Special Court constituted under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 ('act' for short), as amended by the Essential Commodities (Special Provisions) Act, 1981 have concurrent jurisdiction to grant anticipatory bail under S. 438, Criminal P. C. , to a person apprehending arrest on an accusation of having committed an offence under the Act. " ( 2 ) ). In view of the importance of the question involved we requested Mr. Balai Chandra Roy, a Senior Advocate of this Court, to act as Amicus Curiae. We place on record our sincere appreciation of the valuable assistance rendered by him in deciding the question which does not appear to be altogether free from difficulty. ( 3 ) THE controversy, as it appears, stems from S. 12aa of the Act. Sub-sec. (1) of the above section which is relevant for our present purpose is extracted below: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code - (a) all offences under this Act shall be triable only by the Special Court constituted for the area in which the offence has been committed or where there are more Special Courts than one for such area, by such one of them as may be specified in this behalf by the High Court; (b) where a person accused of or suspected of the commission of an offence under this Act is forwarded to a Magistrate under sub- sec. (2) or sub-sec. (2) or sub-sec. (2a) of S. 167 of the Code, such Magistrate may authorise the detention of such person in such custody as he thinks fit for a period not exceeding fifteen days in the whole where such Magistrate is a Judicial Magistrate and seven days in the whole where such Magistrate is an Executive Magistrate: provided that where such Magistrate considers - (i) when such person is forwarded to him as aforesaid; or (ii) upon or at any time before the expiry of the period of detention authorised by him; that the detention of such person is unnecessary, he may, if he is satisfied that the case falls under the proviso to S. 8, order the release of such person on bail and if he 'is not so satisfied, he shall order such person to be forwarded to the Special Court having jurisdiction; (c) the Special Court may, subject to the provisions of clause (d) of this sub-section, exercise, in relation to the person forwarded to it under clause (b), the same power which a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try a case may exercise under S. 167 of the Code in relation to an accused person in such case who has been forwarded to him under that section; (d) save as aforesaid no person accused of or suspected of the commission of an offence under this Act shall be released on bail by any court other than Special Court or the High Court : provided that a Special Court shall not release any such person on bail- (i) without giving the prosecution an opportunity to oppose the application for such release unless the Special Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, is of opinion that it is not practicable to give such opportunity; and (ii) where the prosecution opposes the application, if the Special Court, is satisfied that there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of the offence concerned: provided further that the Special Court may direct that any such person may be released on bail if he is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or is a sick or infirm person, or if the Special Court is satisfied that it is just and proper so to do for any other special reason to be recorded in writing; (e) a Special Court may, upon a perusal of Police report of the facts constituting an offence under this Act take cognizance of that offence without the accused being committed to it for trial; (f) all offences under this Act shall be tried in a summary way and the provisions of Ss. 262 to 265 (both inclusive) of the Code shall, as far as may be apply to such trial : provided that in the case of any conviction in a summary trial under this section, it shall be lawful for the Special Court to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. ( 4 ) A plain reading of the above provisions makes it manifestly clear that they comprehend the entire procedure for dealing with persons accused of offences under the Act. Cl. (d) quoted above, expressly provides that no person accused of or suspected of the commission of an offence under the Act shall be released on bail by any Court other than a Special Court or the High Court. Cl. (d), therefore, clearly and unmistakably ousts the jurisdiction of the Court of Session to grant 'bail' to a person accused of or suspected of the commission of an offence under the Act; and if 'anticipatory bail' can be regarded as a species of 'bail' then undoubtedly a Court of Session, in view of the express prohibition of Cl. (d), would be powerless to grant anticipatory bail to such a person just as it is powerless to grant bail to such a person under S. 439, Criminal P. C. 1973. ( 5 ) MR. Sarojesh Mukherjee, the learned Public Prosecutor representing the State, vehemently contends before us that 'bail' and 'anticipatory bail' are two entirely different concepts and 'anticipatory bail' can never be equated with 'bail'. That being the position, argues Mr. Mukherjee, the Court of Session possesses and the Special Court constituted under the Act does not possess the power to grant anticipatory bail to a person accused of or suspected of the commission of an offence under the Act. For reasons to be stated hereunder, we find it difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Mukherjee. ( 6 ) AS already pointed out by us, the answer to the question lies in the interpretation of the term 'bail'. In other words, the question is whether the term 'bail' includes 'anticipatory bail' introduced by S. 438, Criminal P. C. 1973. ( 7 ) CHAPTER XXXIII of the Criminal P. C. 1973 contains all the provisions as to bail and bonds, including anticipatory bail contemplated by S. 438. Sub-sec. In other words, the question is whether the term 'bail' includes 'anticipatory bail' introduced by S. 438, Criminal P. C. 1973. ( 7 ) CHAPTER XXXIII of the Criminal P. C. 1973 contains all the provisions as to bail and bonds, including anticipatory bail contemplated by S. 438. Sub-sec. (1) of S. 438 runs as follows: -"direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest - (i) When any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section; and that Court may, if it thinks fit, direct that in the event of such arrest, he shall be released on bail. (Emphasis supplied ). " ( 8 ) FROM the collocation and scheme of Chapter XXXIII and the language of S. 438 it becomes explicitly clear that the legislature intended to bring 'anticipatory bail' within the category of 'bail' and not to treat it as something different from 'bail'. ( 9 ) IN this context, we feel tempted to extract below a portion of the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court in the case of Gurbaksh Singh v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1980 SC 1632 . It runs thus: -"the facility which S. 438 affords is generally referred to as 'anticipatory bail', an expression which was used by the Law Commission in its 41st report. Neither the section nor its marginal note so describes it but, the expression 'anticipatory bail' is a convenient mode of conveying that it is possible to apply for bail in anticipation of arrest. Any order of bail can, of course, be effective only from the time of arrest because, to grant bail, as stated in Wharton's Law Lexicon, is to 'set at liberty a person arrested or imprisoned, on security being taken for his appearance'. Thus, bail is basically release from restraint, more particularly release from the custody of the police. The act of arrest directly affects freedom of movement of the person arrested by the police, and speaking generally, an order of bail gives back to the accused that freedom on condition that he will appear to take his trial. Thus, bail is basically release from restraint, more particularly release from the custody of the police. The act of arrest directly affects freedom of movement of the person arrested by the police, and speaking generally, an order of bail gives back to the accused that freedom on condition that he will appear to take his trial. Personal recognizance, suretyship bonds and such other modalities are the means by which an assurance is secured from the accused that though he has been released on bail, he will present himself at the trial of offence or offences of which he is charged and for which he was arrested. The distinction between an ordinary order of bail and an order of anticipatory bail is that whereas the former is granted after arrest and therefore means release from the custody of the police, the latter is granted in anticipation of arrest and is therefore, effective at the very moment of arrest. (Emphasis supplied)". ( 10 ) ). The above observation of the Supreme Court gives the clear indication that 'anticipatory bail' falls within the category of 'bail' or, to be more precise, the term 'bail' includes 'anticipatory bail'. If, therefore, in view of the express prohibition contained in Cl. (d) of S. 12aa of the Act, the Court of Session has no power to grant bail to a person accused of or suspected of the commission of an offence under the Act it follows, as a necessary corollary, that it has also no power to grant anticipatory bail in such a case. Conversely, as the Special Court has the power to grant bail it has also the power to grant anticipatory bail. ( 11 ) THE view taken by us stands fortified by S. 12ac of the Act which, for proper appreciation, is extracted below:-"12ac. Application of Code to proceedings before a Special Court. Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code (including the provisions as to bail and bonds) shall apply to the proceedings before a Special Court and for the purposes of the said provisions, the Special Court shall be deemed to be a Court of Session and the person conducting a prosecution before a Special Court, shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor". ( 12 ) IN view of the deeming provision contained in the above section, the Special Court constituted under the Act is to be regarded as a Court of Session in relation to proceedings before it and the provisions of Chapt. XXXIII, Criminal P. C. as to bail and bonds shall be applicable to such proceedings. That being the position, the Special Court is fully competent to grant anticipatory bail under S. 438, Criminal P. C. to a person accused of or suspected of the commission of an offence under the Act. ( 13 ) IN this context, reference may also be made to S. 5 of the Criminal P. C. which provides that nothing contained in the said Code shall, in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, affect any special or local law for the time being in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed by any other law for the time being in force. ( 14 ) THE Essential Commodities Act, 1955 is a special enactment to provide, in the interests of the general public, for the control of the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in certain commodities. As already observed, it is a self contained code conferring special jurisdiction and power to the Special Court constituted under the Act in regard to trial of offences under the said Act and granting of bail to persons accused of or suspected of the commission of such offences. It follows, therefore, that the power conferred upon the Court of Session to grant anticipatory bail under S. 438, Criminal P. C. does not extend to a case where a person apprehends arrest in an accusation of having Committed an offence under the Act. ( 15 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, we answer the question posed by the learned Sessions Judge thus:-"the Court of Session has no power to grant anticipatory bail under S. 438, Criminal P. C. 1973 to a person accused of or suspected of the commission of an offence under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Such power, however, may be exercised by the Special Court constituted under the Act in respect of such offence keeping in view the provisos to Cl. (d) S. 12aa of the Act. "the reference is thus disposed of. MONOJ KUMAR MUKHERJEE, J. : -I agree. Order accordingly.