JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) APPELLANT-DEFENDANT, aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by Shri S. S. Trivedi, First Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, gwalior, on 26th November 1984 in Civil Appeal No. 1-A of 1983, has preferred this second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 2. ) APPELLANT is the tenant and respondent is the landlord. Respondent-plaintiff filed a suit in the Court of Seventh Civil Judge Class II, Gwalior, against the appellant-defendant under section 12 (1) (e) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short, hereinafter referred to as the Act), on the ground that the suit accommodation is genuinely required for herself and members of her family. The appellant-defendant denied the version of the plaintiff and contested the suit. The suit was decreed by Trial court in favour of the respondent-plaintiff. The appellant, aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, challenged it before the first appellate Court. The first appellate Court concurring with the findings of fact arrived at by the trial Court, dismissed the appeal. It is this judgment and decree that is being challenged in this second appeal. ( 3. ) THIS Court admitted the second appeal on the following substantial questions of law :- (1) Whether the District Judge, Gwalior, has jurisdiction to transfer Civil appeal to the Court of Additional Judge to District Judge having equal rank and not subordinate to District Judge? (2) Whether the learned appellate Court is in error in not believing the sale deed, certified copy of which was produced by the appellant. Whether the learned first appellate Court is wrong in rejecting the amendment application submitted by the appellant before the first appellate Court on 19-10-1982 ? ( 4. ) SHRI R. C. Lahoti, learned counsel for the appellant, has rightly conceded that the District Judge has jurisdiction, with regard to the first substantial question of law, to transfer appeal to the Court of Additional District Judge of that Court in view of the division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Daulatram vs. Bhanwar Singh 1980 (II) M. P. W. N. 17. Section 5 of the M. P. Civil Courts (Amendment and Validation)Ordinance, 1979 (No. 7 of 1979) validates the appointment of every Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge. Section 5 of the M. P. Civil Courts (Amendment and Validation)Ordinance, 1979 (No. 7 of 1979) validates the appointment of every Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge. Previous to this Ordinance, there was defect in the M. P. Civil Court Act, which was removed by the aforesaid Ordinance. Thus, in view of the submission of Shri Lahoti, the first substantial question of law stands answered. ( 5. ) TO answer the second substantial question of law, it is essential to trace its history at the time when the appeal was pending in the Court of the First Additional ludge to the Court of District Judge, Gwalior. Shri Lahoti contended that when the appeal was pending, the husband of the landlord-respondent purchased a house by a registered sale deed on 3-8-1981. When this fact came to the knowledge of the appellant, he moved an application off 19-10-1982 under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC for amending his pleadings. The proposed amendment, which the appellant wanted to incorporate in his pleadings, was that Babulal Sharma, the husband of the landlord respondent, has purchased an accommodation of 7-8 rooms, with latrine, bath-room and kitchen, on 3-8-1981, for a consideration of Rs. 22,000/-, by a registered sale deed from Battulal, Anand Kumar and Mahesh Kumar, and he has started living with his family in that new accommodation. Thus, the genuine need of the respondent-plaintiff has come to anend and now she has no right to get the suit accommodation vacated due to this subsequent event. ( 6. ) THE appellant also described the proposed amendment as bona fide, based upon the subsequent event. Along with this application, the appellant, also filed a cortified copy of the said sale deed. In paras. 10 and 11 of the impugned judgment the first appellate Court rejected the prayer of the appellant on the following 3 grounds : firstly, the proposed amendment is inordinately belated; secondly, the alleged accommodation purchased on 3-8-1981 is occupied by others and proceedings for their ejectment are still pending and, hence, incorporation of the proposed amendment in the pleadings of the appellant-defendant is not going to solve the issue, and, thirdly, the proposed amendment is not bona fide. ( 7. ) SHRI R. C. Lahoti, without challenging the concurrent finding of fact, confined himself only to the second substantial question of law. ( 7. ) SHRI R. C. Lahoti, without challenging the concurrent finding of fact, confined himself only to the second substantial question of law. He contended that the finding of the first appellate Court in paras 10 and 11 of the judgment is erroneous in view of the fact that neither the application was belated nor it was mala fide because as soon as the fact of sale came to the knowledge of the appellant, he immediately filed the application for this amendment. He further contended that the amendment application was in consequence of the subsequent event and according to the principles of law, the amendment was bonafide and that should have been allowed to be incorporated, as amendment can be incorporated at any stage of the litigation. ( 8. ) SHRI K. S. Tomar, learned counsel for the respondent-landlord, repelled the contentions of Shri Lahoti on the ground that the sale deed itself discloses the fact that the accommodation purchased by the husband of the landlord-plaintiff, is occupied by trespassers and the sellers have filed a civil suit for their ejectment in the proper Court of law. Thus, according to him, the very evidence produced by the appellant discloses that the purchased accommodation is not vacant, and the appellant has wrongly and falsely stated that the purchased accommodation is vacant and the respondent has been living in it. He further replied that the proposed amendment applications were filed to over-reach the judgments and decrees passed against the appellant and, hence, they were mala fide. ( 9. ) THE law with regard to the amendment of pleadings is settled. I am aware that the provisions of O. 6 R. 17 CPC should be liberally construed and the prayer cannot be refused merely on the ground of being sought at a belated stage, if the administration of justice requires that. It can also not be refused because of some mistake or negligence on the part of a party seeking it, "provided the relief sought is just. There can be no dispute with the proposition that the Court is required to take notice of the subsequent events having a material bearing on the right to relief. It is also a trite law that the merits of the proposed amendment, while deciding an amendment application, need not be gone into. There can be no dispute with the proposition that the Court is required to take notice of the subsequent events having a material bearing on the right to relief. It is also a trite law that the merits of the proposed amendment, while deciding an amendment application, need not be gone into. Delay in filing the amendment application can also not be a ground to reject the application. But an amendment can be refused when a party was acting mala fide, or if allowed, it would result in irreparable injury and injustice to the other party, which cannot be compensated by costs. ( 10. ) IN order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, it would be convenient to reproduce below section 12 (l) (e) of the Act : - "12. Restriction on eviction of tenants.- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely : *** *** *** *** (e) that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or tor any member of his family, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned; *** *** *** ***" It is clear from this revision that if the finding of the Court is that the landlord has a reasonable suitable residential accommodation of his or her own in his or her occupation in the city or town concerned, then the Court will refuse to pass the order of eviction of the tenant from the suit premises. The concurrent finding of fact of both the Courts below is that the respondent-landlord has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of her own in her occupation in the city of Gwalior. The concurrent finding of fact of both the Courts below is that the respondent-landlord has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of her own in her occupation in the city of Gwalior. If the tenant raises a plea before the appellate Court by way of an amendment that she has got an accommodation in her occupation, then he will have to show, prima facie, the court and satisfy it that there is a reasonably suitable residential accommodation of her own in her occupation other than the suit premises. ( 11. ) ON examination of the record, it becomes apparent that, admittedly, the husband of the respondent-landlord purchased a house on 3-8-1981 in Gwalior city. The first appeal was filed by the appellant on 3-11-1977. On perusal of the certified copy of the sale deed dated 3-8-1981 it is apparent that it contains the fact that the possession was not given to the purchaser at the time of the sale because it was not vacant then and was in occupation of other 10 persons and the ejectment proceedings against them were pending in the civil Court, initiated by the sellers. The sellers of this house have given full particulars of the litigation in the sale deed. It is specifically j mentioned in the sale deed that the vacant possession could not be delivered to the purchaser - the husband of the respondent - because it was not vacant and was occupied by trespassers, and was not in the occupation of the sellers on the date of sale. In this sale deed the purchaser has been authorised to get himself transposed as a plaintiff in the aforesaid ejectment proceedings against the said trespassers. Thus, according to the evidence produced by the appellant before the first appellate Court, it becomes crystal clear that the facts contained in the proposed amendment application are not true and the landlord and her husband are not in occupation of any residential accommodation of their own in the city of Gwalior. The finding of the first appellate Court, therefore, about the bonafide requirement of the landlord is a finding of a fact and not a mixed question of law and fact. (Muttulal vs. Radhelal, A. I. R. 1974 s. C. 1596.) Thus, the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate Court do not warrant interference in second appeal. ( 12. (Muttulal vs. Radhelal, A. I. R. 1974 s. C. 1596.) Thus, the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate Court do not warrant interference in second appeal. ( 12. ) IT is settled that the concurrent findings of fact arrived by the Courts below cannot, in second appeal, be interfered on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, however gross the error might seem to be. But it is also true that if the High Court is satisfied that the decision is contrary to law or some usage having the force of law, or that the decision has failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the force of law, or if there is a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by the code, or by any other law for the time being in force which may have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits, it can interfere with the conclusions of the lower Court. The following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of V. Ramachandra Ayyar, A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 302 will be relevant to quote : "the error or defect in the procedure to which clause (c) of S. 100 (1)refers is, as the clause clearly and unambiguously indicates, an error or defect connected with or relating to the procedure; it is not an error or defect in the appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties on the merits. That is why, even if the appreciation of evidence made by the lower appellate Court is patently erroneous and the finding of fact recorded in consequence is grossly erroneous, that cannot be said to introduce a substantial error or defect in the procedure. On the other hand, if in dealing with a question of facts the lower appellate Court has placed the onus on a wrong party and its finding of fact is the result, substantially, of this wrong approach, that may be regarded as a defect in procedure, if in dealing with questions of fact, the lower appellate Court discards evidence on the ground that it is inadmissible and the High Court is satisfied that the evidence was admissible, that may introduce an error or defect in procedure. If the lower appellate Court fails to consider an issue which had been tried and found upon by the trial Court and proceeds to reverse the trial Courts decision without the consideration of such an issue, that may be regarded as an error or defect in procedure; if the lower appellate Court allows a new point of fact to be raised for the first time before it, or permits a party to adopt a new plea of fact, or makes out a new case for a party, that may, in some cases, be said to amount to a defect or error in procedure. But the High Court cannot interfere with the conclusions of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court however erroneous the said conclusions may appear to be to the High Court. " ( 13. ) EVEN if the proposed amendment, as prayed for by the appellant, was allowed by the first appellate Court it would have unnecessarily prolonged this long drawn litigation. Ejectment proceedings are always delayed in the Courts of law and the history of this phenomenon in this country is legendary. When the landlord was given a decree in her favour by a concurrent finding of fact, then to allow incorporation of the proposed amendment would have amounted to a situation that the landlord will not be able to get the vacant possession of the suit house for several years to come, and will also have to wait for several years to get the trespassers ejected from the house which her husband had purchased subsequently. ( 14. ) HOWEVER, no prima facie case or evidence was produced by the appellant before the first appellate Court, so that it would have acted upon it and helped the tenant-appellant. Had the husband of the respondent got vacant possession of the house purchased by him, the appellant had a strong case for getting the proposed amendment incorporated in his pleadings. ( 15. ) IN the impugned judgment, the first appellate Court has branded the proposed amendment application as not only belated but also mala fide. Had the husband of the respondent got vacant possession of the house purchased by him, the appellant had a strong case for getting the proposed amendment incorporated in his pleadings. ( 15. ) IN the impugned judgment, the first appellate Court has branded the proposed amendment application as not only belated but also mala fide. It is evident from the record that before filing this application on 19-10-1982 the appellant had also filed a similar application on 4-10-1980, in which he stated that the respondent had purchased a house from one Ramdayal on 25-9-1980 and, as she was residing in that house, there was no necessity of getting the suit house vacated. This application is marked in the record of the first appellate Court as LA. No. 3. That application was dismissed by the first appellate Court and aggrieved by that dismissal, the appellant preferred a second appeal (No. 56 of 1981) in the High Court. This Court by a lengthy order dated 30-9-1981 allowed the appeal of the appellant, remanded the case to the first appellate Court with a direction that the said Ramdayal, from whom the respondent is alleged to have purchased the house, be summoned and for his summoning coercive methods be used and he be examined in the Court. As directed by this Court, all the methods were used by the first appellate Court for calling ramdayal, but, unfortunately, neither he could be traced nor he could be produced by the appellant, and, hence, the said Ramdayal was not examined. It is then that the appellant chose to file the present application after a long lapse of 2 years for incorporating the proposed amendment in his pleadings. It is clear that in his previous application, he had given altogether different facts and, in the subsequent application for amendment, he gave altogether different facts and particulars. The facts given in the subsequent application do not contain in I. A. No. 3. It is, probably in this background of the matter that the proposed amendment application of the appellant was branded as mala fide and belated, by the first appellate Court, and I see no reason to differ from the view taken by it. ( 16. The facts given in the subsequent application do not contain in I. A. No. 3. It is, probably in this background of the matter that the proposed amendment application of the appellant was branded as mala fide and belated, by the first appellate Court, and I see no reason to differ from the view taken by it. ( 16. ) THE real controversy has been set at rest by the concurrent finding of fact that the landlord has a bona fide need to her own residential property vacated by the appellant-tenant for her residential purpose. If and when the appellant is ejected from the suit house and the landlord does not occupy it within the prescribed period, or the circumstances, provided in section 17 of the Act, the appellant can seek re-entry in his old premises as provided and prescribed in this provision of the Act. ( 17. ) I am fortified in my view, as stated hereinabove, that even if the landlord has purchased a house and has, thus, the house other than the suit house, but it is not in the occupation of the landlord, mere ownership is not relevant; it is the actual availability that has to be shown. Mere purchase of a house by the landlord is not enough, but its vacant possession must be proved at least prima facie by the tenant. (Madholal vs. Kanhayalal, 1980 M. P. R. C. J. Note 48 ). The same view was taken by Oza, J. (as he then was) in the case of Siraram vs. Ramkumar, 1978 (1) M. P. W. N. 490. ( 18. ) AFTER considering all the principles laid down in the case laws cited by Shri r. C. Lahoti, learned counsel for the appellant, I am still of the view that the proposed amendment by the appellant in his pleadings before the first appellate Court was with a view to stall his exit from the suit house for an indefinite period, the reason being that if the proposed amendment had been allowed, it would necessarily have re-opened the whole history with a new chapter. The litigation has to reach its end somewhere and sometime like a life, and it cannot prolong more than the span provided by law. ( 19. ) THEREFORE, this appeal fails and is dismissed. The judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court are maintained. The litigation has to reach its end somewhere and sometime like a life, and it cannot prolong more than the span provided by law. ( 19. ) THEREFORE, this appeal fails and is dismissed. The judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court are maintained. The respondent shall get the cost of this litigation throughout. Counsels fee Rs. 250/- if certified. Later : -Keeping in view the decree of eviction of the appellant-tenant, it is directed that he should vacate the premises after the expiry of two months. Shri R. C. Lahoti, learned counsel for the appellant, has given an undertaking at the bar that the appellant shall hand over the vacant possession to the landlord respondent after two months. Keeping in view this assurance, it is directed that as the months of August and september are rainy season, the appellant shall hand over the vacant possession on or before 7th October, 1985. Appeal dismissed.