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Allahabad High Court · body

1985 DIGILAW 34 (ALL)

PRATIMA TIWARI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

1985-01-08

N.N.SHARMA

body1985
N. N. SHARMA, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision is directed against order dated 3. 9. 1983 recorded by Sri P. C. Agarwal, learned Ilird Additional Sessions Judge, Bareilly in Criminal Revision Nos. 66 and 70 of 1983 by which he allowed both the revisions and set aside the order of learned City Magistrate, Bareilly in Criminal Case No. 54 of 1979, Km. Pratima Tiwari and Pramod Kumar and others allowing the application of petitioner under Section 142 of Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 2 ) THE petitioner-revisionist is the Principal of school of Suraj Bhan Vidya Bhavan, situated in Chameli Ki Bagia, Nai Basti, Bareilly within Police Station Prem Nagar. About five hundred students were receiving their education in this school which was in existence for the last ten years prior to the filing of petition. Towards the west and east of the said school, the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 were manufacturing molasses through furnace by burning rice-husk as fuel as a result of which the entire atmosphere got polluted and the public institution was covered with smoke and volumes of particles of paddy and rice-busk which fall on the premises of the school and such smoke laden atmosphere and the particles were a great nuisance to the health and smooth study of the school children and teachers. On account of this great nuisance, it became impossible t:> run the institution in a healthy and peaceful state of atmosphere. ( 3 ) LEARNED Magistrate invited the police reports from Prem Nagar Police Station. The police supported the allegation of petitioner in their reports dated 3-3-1979 and 15-5-1979 which disclosed a great nuisance created by the burning of rice-husk in the furnance of the non- applicants. Thereafter on 14-6-1979, a conditional order was drawn by learned City Magistrate directing the opposite parties 2 and 3 to remove such nuisance by 26-6-1979 or to appear in his court to show cause why the conditional order may not be made absolute. The case was repeatedly adjourned. An application under Section 142 of Code of Criminal Procedure dated 10-7-1979 for an interim injunction was rejected by the learned Magistrate, on 6-9-1979. Another application was moved by the petitioner on 24-9-1981. Learned Magistrate made a local inspection and being satisfied about the enormity of the nuisance, issued such injunction on 29-9-1981. However, the matter was carried up in revision. Another application was moved by the petitioner on 24-9-1981. Learned Magistrate made a local inspection and being satisfied about the enormity of the nuisance, issued such injunction on 29-9-1981. However, the matter was carried up in revision. Learned revisional court (Sessions Judge, Bareilly) quashed the aforesaid orders of learned Magistrate dated 29-9-1981 and 17-11981 and directed the Magistrate to rehear the matter. ( 4 ) IT was thereafter that the case was adjourned repeatedly and the statements of Sri K. L. Saxena (P. W. 1), Sri Guru Chauan Lal (P. W. 2), Dr. S. P. Saxena, Chief Medical Officer, Bareilly (P. W. 3) and Sri V. S. Saxena (P. W. 4) were recorded. These witnesses included the doctor as well as the accountant and teacher of the school who testified that the smoke emitted by the burning of the aforesaid husk was injurious to the health and physical comfort of the persons who had to remain in that school. Doctor also stated that this smoke imperilled the health of the children studying in that institution. Learned Magistrate on the aforesaid evidence and the letters. of the doctors, recorded the order dated 2-3-1983 in which he mentioned the hazard to the health of the children studying in that school caused by the burning of the rice-husk in the said furnace and so be ordered the operation of the furnace to be stopped under Section 142 (1) of Code of Criminal Procedure will the decision of the case under Section 133 of Code of Criminal Procedure. The two revisions preferred against this order were disposed of by the impugned order as given above. Learned Additional Sessions Judge set aside the order of learned City Magistrate. Aggrieved by this decision, the petitioner has filed this revision. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. ( 5 ) ON behalf of revisionist, it was argued that respondents Nos. 2 and 3 were indulging in dilatory tactics, there was no justification on the part of respondents to play with the health and safety of the school children and the teachers; in cases where the discharge of the smoke from such operations were deleterious to the health and lives an urgent and immediate injunction was essential to safe-guard the interest of the inhabitants of the locality. It was further pointed out that in Govind Singh v. Shanti Sarup1, the Supreme Court simply modified the order of Magistrate so as to bring it inconformity with the provisions of Section 133 of Code of Criminal Procedure but the injunction was issued to protect the health of the inhabitants of the locality. On behalf of respondents, it was argued that it was not open to the petitioner to put in successive applications under Section 142 of Code of Criminal Procedure. The earlier application of petitioner dated 10-7-1979 had already been rejected on 6-9-1979. It was not open to the learned Magistrate again to review that order of his predecessor specially when the order drawn by learned Magistrate did not discuss the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses but simply referred to the medical reports and letters of the doctors which were not admissible in evidence and so the aforesaid order was rightly set aside. I have considered over the matter. The order of learned City Magistrate, Bareilly dated 2-3-1983 is worded as below: It was pressed on behalf of Pritma Tiwaris counsel that the application dated 8. 7-1980 for granting the injunction was still pending decision. On behalf of Promod Kumar and others, it was argued that an application of similar nature dated 10-7-1979 was heard and decided upon by the Court, and that no further application on the matter which has already been decided in this court could be entertained. It was argued on behalf of Pritma Tiwari that after Superior Court, judgment and the position reverted back to a situation where her application dated 8-7-1980 needed re-hearing and judgment. ( 6 ) ON behalf of Pritma Tiwari, attention of the Court was drawn to a letter which is available on the file, from Chief Medical Officer dated 7-7-80 to the then City Magistrate and also to another letter from Dy. C. M. O. dated 18-9-1979. Both these letters opined that hazard to the health of children studying in Suraj Bhan Bhawan High School was apprehended as a result of operation of the Bhatti allegedly run by Pramod Kumar and others. On the basis of Medical report I am of the view that the operation of the said Bhatti is likely to cause hazard to the health of children studying in the said school, and, therefore, it is necessary to stop the operation of the said Bhatti. On the basis of Medical report I am of the view that the operation of the said Bhatti is likely to cause hazard to the health of children studying in the said school, and, therefore, it is necessary to stop the operation of the said Bhatti. Therefore under Section 142, sub-clause (1) Cr. P. C. , it is ordered that Sri Pro mod Kumar and others shall stop the operation of the Bhatti till the decision of case u/s 133 Cr. P. C. Sd. Illegible 2-3-83 City Magistrate. ( 7 ) A Magistrate can pass an interim order under Section 142 (1) Cr. P. C. at any stage of the enquiry whenever satisfied that there is imminent danger or injury of a serious kind to the public vide T. N. Sudhakaran and another v. Dr. E. M. George and another2 which was relied upon by this Court in Ramji and another v. The State of U. P. and others3. Section 142 of Code of Criminal Procedure authorises a Magistrate to issue an interim order provided (i) Such order of injunction can be issued in cases where a valid conditional order in terms of Section 133 has been made. (ii) It can be issued if the court feels satisfaction that unless it is issued, it would result imminent danger of a serious kind, of the nature specified in Section 133 (1 ). (iii) The injunction which is issued must not go beyond the scope of the particular nuisance complained of. Thus, it is obvious that the order of learned Magistrate did not go beyond the scope of Section 142 or 133 of Code of Criminal Procedure. A conditional order had already been made in this case; the Magistrate was not bound to discuss the evidence which constituted such material so as to weight to me in issuing such order. ( 8 ) ONLY the offending portion of the order should have been deleted by the learned Sessions Judge. There is the satisfaction of the learned Magistrate which is of primary importance and has to be given due weight by the revising court. The satisfaction of the Magistrate rest upon the discretion vested in him under the said sections. Obviously, that discretion is a judicial discretion. There is the satisfaction of the learned Magistrate which is of primary importance and has to be given due weight by the revising court. The satisfaction of the Magistrate rest upon the discretion vested in him under the said sections. Obviously, that discretion is a judicial discretion. There is no question of any res judicata in the matter as no finality can be attached to the said interim order and such material was not before the Magistrate while the order of rejection was recorded by his predecessor-in-office. It is not possible to lay down any inflexible rule as to sufficiency of the material on which a Magistrate should feel satisfaction. This must vary from the facts and circumstances of each case. There is the testimony of four witnesses on record. The aforesaid letters of the doctors were duly proved by the Chief Medical Officer. The Magistrate was not bound to discuss the evidence while recording the order. He found that the material placed before him was sufficient for the purpose of his satisfaction. ( 9 ) IN this view of the matter, I find that the learned City Magistrate was well within his jurisdiction to exercise his discretion in favour of the petitioner. However, having regard to the menace to the health of the persons in the school and under restrictions imposed by the aforesaid conditional order, the safer course would be to accept the view of the learned Magistrate who observed the hazard resulting from the working of the Bhatti to a limited extent only as said here-under In the result, this revision is partly allowed. The impugned order of learned Sessions Judge, Bareilly is set aside. The order dated 2-3-1983 of learned City Magistrate, Bareilly is modified to the extent that the respondents 2 and 3 are hereby restrained under Section 142 of Code of Criminal Procedure from burning rice-husk in their Bhatti for manufacturing molasses pending the result of the enquiry, during the school hours only. It shall be open to the respondents 2 and 3 to operate their Bhatti by burning firewood only during the school hours also. Learned City Magistrate shall dispose of the case under Section 133 of Code of Criminal Procedure with utmost expedition. Send the record forthwith to the Magistrate concerned. Revision Partly allowed Sessions order set aside