JUDGMENT - DESHPANDE M.S., J.: - This revision application by the original defendant-tenant is directed against a decree for ejectment and Rs. 375/-, passed by the Additional Judge, Small Cause Court, Nagpur. 2. The opponent-plaintiff sued for ejectment of the applicant-defendant, contending that he was a monthly tenant at Rs. 110/- plus electric and water charges and the month of tenancy began from the 1st of every month. As the house was constructed after 1-1-1951, the provisions of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (for short 'the Rent Control Order'), did not apply and he, therefore, sent a notice dated June 12, 1979 determining the tenancy with effect from July 31, 1979. The premises were not vacated in spite of this notice and the opponent, therefore, while seeking ejectment, claimed Rs. 330/- as rent for the months of May, June and July 1979, and Rs. 125/- as damages for use and occupation from August 1, 1979 to August 5, 1979 as also Rs. 25/- as notice charges. 3. The applicant resisted the claim by contending that the permission of the Rent Controller was necessary before giving the notice to quit, and the notice to quit was not legal and valid. He also denied that the rent was Rs. 110/- per month, his contention being that originally the rent was agreed at Rs. 60/- per month. 4. The learned trial Judge found against the applicant on all the issues and passed a decree for ejectment and arrears of rent, and damages for use and occupation, as sated above. 5. In this Court, it was contended by Shri Vyawahare, the learned Counsel for the applicant that in view of the decision of this Court in (Prabhakar v. State of Maharashtra)1, 1985 Mh.L.J. 548, irrespective of the fact whether the house was constructed before or after 1-1-1951, it would be obligatory on the tenant to obtain the permission of the Rent Controller before determining the lease and since this permission was not obtained, the claim for ejectment cannot stand. It is evident that the notification, on the basis of which the opponent claimed exemption from the operation of the provisions of the Rent Control Order, has itself been struck down by the Division Bench of this Court. It is evident that the notification, on the basis of which the opponent claimed exemption from the operation of the provisions of the Rent Control Order, has itself been struck down by the Division Bench of this Court. Consequently, the notice to quit could not have been given without the Rent Controller's permission and the claim for ejectment could not have been decreed. The decree, so far as it relates to ejectment will, therefore, have to be set aside. 6. It was then urged that the trial Court should have held that the rent was Rs. 60/- per month. I was taken through the evidence of P.W. 1 Rajendra and D.W.I Deshwar. After considering that evidence, I find that no exception can be taken to the finding of the learned trial Judge that the rent was Rs. 110/- per month and that finding is affirmed. 7. Shri Bhangde, the learned Counsel for the opponent, contended that at least a direction should be issued to the applicant to pay the rent which became due from the date of the institution of the suit, i.e. from 6th August, 1979, because the rent had not been paid. On the other hand, it was urged by Shri Vyawahare that the provisions of Order 20, Rule 12(c), Civil Procedure Code, cannot apply where the decree for ejectment is not passed. Under that provision, where a suit is for the recovery of possession of immovable property and for rent or mesne profits, the Court may pass a decree: (a) for the possession of the property; and (c) directing an inquiry as to the rent or mesne profits from the institution of the suit until the delivery of possession to the decree-holder, or the relinquishment of possession by the judgment-debtor with notice to the decree-holder through the Court. A plain reading of this provision would show that the only requirement is that the suit should be for recovery of possession of immovable property and for rent or mesne profits. The power to order an enquiry can be exercised, irrespective of whether the relief of possession of the property is granted or not, not only for payment of mesne profits but also for rent. 8. The power to order an enquiry can be exercised, irrespective of whether the relief of possession of the property is granted or not, not only for payment of mesne profits but also for rent. 8. Another submission of Shri Vyawahare was that a direction for payment of time-barred amount cannot be made and since the suit was instituted on 6th August, 1979, a large portion of the amount in respect of which the direction is being sought by the opponent, would be barred by time. It must be noted that there is no question of limitation so far as the applicability of Order 20, Rule 12 Civil Procedure Code, is concerned, because all that is contemplated is passing of a preliminary decree and then a final decree for the amount which may be found due. When it is obvious that there could be no bar of limitation in ordering the amount of mesne profits, if it is coupled with a decree for ejectment is not granted, the bar of limitation would become applicable and arrears of rent also cannot be recovered. Putting such a construction would not be justified by the language of the provision. 9. A Division Bench of this Court, while dealing with the provisions of Order 39, Rule 10, Civil Procedure Code, in (Chandrakant Shakarrao Deshmukh v. Haribhau Tukaramji Kathane)2, 1983 Mh.L.J. 88, pointed out that in a suit by landlord against a tenant, the subject-matter of the suit is where he sues for delivery of possession, possession and delivery of that property to him and the claim relating to the use and occupation of that property may be as a tenant in his contractual authority or on account of his being in fact in its possession and occupation. The subject-matter of the suit, therefore, in a suit for possession against a tenant or ex-tenant as the case may be would be money recoverable for use and occupation as also the very property itself. The subject-matter of the suit, therefore, in a suit for possession against a tenant or ex-tenant as the case may be would be money recoverable for use and occupation as also the very property itself. The Court took the view that the combined result of the provisions of section 151, principle underlying the provisions of the Order 12, Civil Procedure Code and the provision made for passing interlocutory orders under Order 39, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure in a case of this kind clearly and easily permits the Courts to pass orders for deposit of money pending decision of the suit, and it is entirely within the power of the Court to determine as to what should be ordered to be paid or deposited in a given case by defendant-tenant depending upon the various factors and circumstances present and appearing in the case. When such an order can be made during the pendency of the proceeding for payment of the arrears, mesne profits and damages for use and occupation, there is no plausible reason for holding that such an order cannot be made at the conclusion of the proceedings, and that at that stage the bar of limitation should be applied. 10. In (The Muslim Bank v. Hasan Shiraza)3, A.I.R. 1951 Hyd. 57, it was observed that there plaintiff's title to the property is not questioned and the Court is unable to grant the relief for ejectment by reason of the jurisdiction to grant the same having been vested in another authority by special law, his claim to rent pendente lite cannot be affected and he could e given a decree. 11. 57, it was observed that there plaintiff's title to the property is not questioned and the Court is unable to grant the relief for ejectment by reason of the jurisdiction to grant the same having been vested in another authority by special law, his claim to rent pendente lite cannot be affected and he could e given a decree. 11. In (Parukutty Amma v. Naha Haji)4, 1961 K.L.T. 573 where the suit was for recovery of property with rent, past and future, and the claim for rent extended upto the date when the property would be delivered to the plaintiff, the learned Judge held that in a suit for recovery of possession of property with future rent, if a decree for the rent from the date of suit to the date of decree can be given on decreeing recovery of the property, there is no reason why a like decree for rent for the same period should not be given on disallowing recovery of the property merely because of the conferment of fixity of tenure by legislation and not because of a finding that the plaintiff had no right to the property or its rent. A suitor is entitled to have a decree soon after the institution of the suit. The delay inherent in the proceedings in a Court should not be allowed to prejudice his rights or deprive his dues. 12. In the present case, the plaintiff-opponent would have been entitled to a decree for eviction, if the exemption granted in respect of the house constructed after 1-1-151 had continued. The protection was, however, made available to the applicant in respect of the eviction by the provisions of the Rent Control Order. The plaintiff's right to recover the rent was not at all in question and in the event of the plaintiff getting the decree in ejectment, he would have been entitled to an enquiry into the future rent or mesne profits. Shri Bhangde argued that the striking down of the notification which granted exemption, brought about a material change in the circumstances of which the Court should take notice. He supported this argument by the observations in (Shikharchand Jain v. Digamber Jain Praband Karini Sabha)5, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1178, where the Court observed as follows:- “Ordinarily, a suit is tried in all its stages on the cause of action as it existed on the date of its institution. He supported this argument by the observations in (Shikharchand Jain v. Digamber Jain Praband Karini Sabha)5, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1178, where the Court observed as follows:- “Ordinarily, a suit is tried in all its stages on the cause of action as it existed on the date of its institution. But it is open to a Court (including a Court of Appeal) to take notice or events which have happened after the institution of the suit and afford relief to the parties in the changed circumstances where it is shown that the relief claimed originally has (1) by reason of subsequent change of circumstances become inappropriate; or (2) where it is necessary to take notice of the changed circumstances in order to shorten the litigation; or (3) to do complete justice between the parties.” In the present case, obviously if the direction for payment of rent from the date of institution of the suit is not given, merely on account of the protraction of the trial, the claim which the plaintiff could have ordinarily made would become barred by time and this exactly is the injustice which it is the duty of the Court to prevent. It would be instructive to refer to the observations in (Girdharilal v. Hukum Singh)6, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 129, as they were made in a case where the claim for ejectment was rejected: “The High Court had, in our opinion, rightly overruled the objection that a decree for rent or mesne profits, during the pendency of the suit could not be granted under Order 20, Rule 12, Civil Procedure Code, in this case. The defendant had himself pleaded here that the suit was for ejectment on which the additional Court-fee had to be paid. The High Court pointed out that the plaintiff had paid the additional Court-fee for a suit for ejectment. Hence, it held that it was not open to the defendant to object to the award of mesne profits on the ground that there was no suit for ejectment before the Court. The High Court pointed out that the plaintiff had paid the additional Court-fee for a suit for ejectment. Hence, it held that it was not open to the defendant to object to the award of mesne profits on the ground that there was no suit for ejectment before the Court. This was, we think, quite a frivolous objection.” Again in (B.R. Ramabhadriah v. Secretary, Food and Agriculture Department, Andhra Pradesh)7, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1653, it was observed that where a party has prayed for a larger relief it is always open to the Court to grant him any smaller relief that he may be found to be entitled in law and thereby render substantial justice. The Court can undoubtedly take note of changed circumstances and suitably mould the relief to be granted to the party concerned in order to mete out justice in the case. As far as possible the anxiety and endeavour of the Court should be to remedy an injustice when it is brought to its notice rather than deny relief to an aggrieved party on purely technical and narrow procedural grounds. 13. Having regard to these principles, I find that the opponent would be entitled to a direction for rent under Order 20, Rule 12(c), Civil Procedure Code. 14. In the result, the revision application is partly allowed. The decree for ejectment passed by the trial Court is set aside but the opponent-plaintiff would be entitled to an enquiry into the amount of rent accrued due to him from 1-8-1979 until the date of this judgment, at the rate of Rs. 110/- per month. The enquiry into this shall be made by the trial Court and the final decree shall be passed upon the opponents paying the requisite Court-fee on the amount that may be found dues as rent. The decree to the extent of arrears of rent Rs. 313/- and notice charges Rs. 25/- passed by the trial Court is affirmed. In the circumstance of the case, there will be no order as to the costs of this revision application. Revision partly allowed. -----